Escrypt (Germany)

This paper is an introduction to security challenges for the design of automotive hardware/software architectures. State-of-the-art automotive architectures are highly heterogeneous and complex systems that rely on distributed functions based on electronics and software. As cars are getting more connected with their environment, the vulnerability to attacks is rapidly growing. Examples for such wireless communication are keyless entry systems, WiFi, or Bluetooth. Despite this increasing vulnerability, the design of automotive architectures is still mainly driven by safety and cost issues rather than security. In this paper, we present potential threats and vulnerabilities, and outline upcoming security challenges in automotive architectures. In particular, we discuss the challenges arising in electric vehicles, like the vulnerability to attacks involving tampering with the battery safety. Finally, we discuss future automotive architectures based on Ethernet/IP and how formal verification methods might be used to increase their security.

Abstract A new approach to identity-based encryption (IBE), called identity-based factors selection (IBFS), allows to build efficient and fully collusion-resistant IBE schemes without the need for pairings or the use of lattices. The security of these constructions (in the random oracle model) rests on the hardness of a new problem which combines the computational Diffie-Hellman problem with the fact that linear equation systems with more variables than given equations do not have unambiguous solutions. The computational efficiency of the resulting IBE schemes is (for values of the security parameter not smaller than 80) better than in previous IBE schemes. The construction of these schemes may be seen as an extension of the ElGamal public-key encryption scheme. The sender of a message computes the ElGamal-like public key of the message receiver by first selecting, uniquely determined by the identity of the receiver, from a set of group elements \(\{g^{e_1}, ..., g^{e_z} \}\) made available as public parameters a subset, and then multiplying the selected elements.KeywordsIdentity-based encryptionIBEIdentity-based key-encapsul- ation mechanismID-KEMIdentity-based factors selectionIBFS

Standard approaches to functional safety as described in the automotive functional safety standard ISO 26262 are focused on reducing the risk of hazards due to random hardware faults or systematic failures during design (e.g. software bugs). However, as vehicle systems become increasingly complex and ever more connected to the internet of things, a third source of hazard must be considered, that of intentional manipulation of the electrical/electronic control systems either via direct physical contact or via the systems' open interfaces. This article describes how the process prescribed by the ISO 26262 can be extended with methods from the domain of embedded security to protect the systems against this third source of hazard.

Smartphones are popular attack targets, but usually too weak in applying common protection concepts. SKIMS designs and implements a cooperative, cross-layer security system for mobile devices. Detection mechanisms as well as a proactive and reactive defense of attacks are core components of this project. In this demo, we show a comprehensive proof-of-concept of our approaches, which include entropy-based malware detection, a mobile honeypot, and spontaneous, socio-inspired trust establishment.

Before we learn about the basics of public-key cryptography, let us recall that the term public-key cryptography is used interchangeably with asymmetric cryptography; they both denote exactly the same thing and are used synonymously.

A block cipher is much more than just an encryption algorithm. It can be used as a versatile building block with which a diverse set of cryptographic mechanisms can be realized. For instance, we can use them for building different types of blockbased encryption schemes, and we can even use block ciphers for realizing stream ciphers. The different ways of encryption are called modes of operation and are discussed in this chapter. Block ciphers can also be used for constructing hash functions, message authentication codes which are also knowns as MACs, or key establishment protocols, all of which will be described in later chapters. There are also other uses for block ciphers, e.g., as pseudo-random generators. In addition tomodes of operation, this chapter also discusses two very useful techniques for increasing the security of block ciphers, namely key whitening and multiple encryption.

No abstract available.

The HyperElliptic Curve Cryptosystem (HECC) was quite extensively studied during the recent years. In the open literature one can find results on how to improve the group operations of HECC as well as teh implementations for various types of processors. There have also been some efforts to implement HECC on hardware devices, like for instance FPGAs. Only one of these works, however, deals with the inversion-free formulae to compute the group operations of HECC. We present inversion-free group operations for the HEC y2 + xy = x5 + f1x + f0 and we target characteristic-two fields. The reason is that of allowing a fair comparison with hardware architectures using the affine case presented in [BBWP04]. In the main part of the paper we use these results to investigate various hardware architectures for a HECC VLSI coprocessor. If area constraints are not considered, scalar multiplication can be performed in 19,769 clock cycles using three field multipliers (of type D = 32), one field adder and one field squarer, where D indicates the digit-size of the multiplier. However, the optimal solution in terms of latency and area uses two multipliers (of type D = 4), one addition and one squaring. The main finding of the present contribution is that coprocessors based on the inversion-free formulae should be preferred compared to those using group operations containing inversion. This holds despite the fact that one field inversion in the affine HECC group operation is traded by up to 24 field multiplications in the inversion-free case.