FPoliSolutions (United States)

Several advanced reactor designs are now under active development in the United States and elsewhere, promising sustainable solutions to the growing world energy needs. The designs currently being considered are quite diverse and different from the more established light water reactor technology that has dominated the operating commercial nuclear landscape. While advanced reactor concepts were first explored in the dawn of the nuclear age, they are now being reconsidered under the light of modern needs, and specifically, for their flexible operating conditions and inherent safety characteristics. In response, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff is moving forward with development of 10 CFR Part 53 rulemaking, which is a more risk-informed, technology-agnostic framework for licensing and regulating such new designs. The nuclear industry response to this regulatory initiative resulted in the technical report by the Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 18-04 Revision 1, which provides an implementation roadmap of the risk-informed approach when defining the safety case for a new plant design. The implementation of this safety case may be a nontrivial exercise for an actual reactor design. This paper provides a demonstration of performing such an analysis for a representative advanced reactor. Public information from the General Atomics high-temperature gas reactor design was considered in this demonstration. The analysis workflow was facilitated with the FPoliSolutions’ proprietary Risk-Informed System Engineering (RISE) digital platform, a product that was presented in previous publications. RISE is one application of FPoli’s enterprise digital platform, which was created to facilitate orchestration of complex workflows leveraging recent technologies developed at national laboratories, such as Idaho National Laboratory’s RAVEN and EMRALD frameworks. The analysis described in the paper includes the selection and classifications of events, the integration of probabilistic risk analysis artifacts, and event modeling simulations for consequence evaluations. The results are then used for system, structures, and components safety classification and a synthesis of the safety case for the design in line with the frequency-consequence targets presented in NEI 18-04. The purpose of the analysis, as framed in RISE, is to readily produce outputs and views that can aid users and regulators in making risk-informed decisions to demonstrate their plant safety case.

The Yield Enhancement focus area is dedicated to activity ensuring that semiconductor manufacturing set up is optimized towards identifying, reducing, and avoiding yield-relevant defects and contamination.

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.