Hanseatic University Rostock

The principle of equal political representation can be undermined by differences in economic resources among citizens. Poor citizens are likely to hold policy preferences that differ from those of richer citizens. At the same time, their lack of resources can have as a consequence that these preferences are not taken into consideration by their representatives. Focusing on the case of the Swiss Parliament and using survey data on the opinions of citizens and MPs in the 2007–11 legislature, this study investigates whether the income of citizens systematically affects the proximity of their policy preferences with the stances of their representatives. It demonstrates that on economic issues MPs hold preferences that are generally less in favour of the state's intervention in the economy than the median citizen and that relatively poor citizens are less well represented as compared with citizens with high incomes. This remains true when taking into account only the opinions of the most knowledgeable citizens among these groups as well as when the focus is only on those who turned out to vote.

Although strong traditional principles have stifled reform of multiple procedures beyond joinder and consolidation, injunction claims by associations and commercial organizations have for some decades been more active in Germany than many European states. Since 2000, innovative experiments have been under way with a special model case procedure for investor claims and assignment of claims in antitrust. Both these approaches are likely to prove inadequate, but debates on reform remain cautious.