Higher Institute of Islamic Studies

This article examines Allama Ayub Dehlavi’s perspective on Husn (goodness) and Qubh (evil) of action an essential discourse in Islamic theology (ʿIlm al-Kalām). Central to the discussion is the question of whether the moral value of human actions is determined by reason (ʿaql) or divine command (sharīʿah). Allama Ayub Dehlavi (1888–1969), a distinguished scholar of logic, theology, and philosophy, diverged from major theological schools such as the Māturīdīs, Ashʿarites, and Muʿtazilites. He argued that moral value is not intrinsic to actions themselves but is contingent upon their consequences. Dehlavi proposed a dual framework: actions are evaluated as good or evil based on their worldly consequences (ʿaql-based) and their implications for the hereafter (sharīʿah-based). The article explores Dehlavi’s critical engagement with classical theologians. He opposed the Muʿtazilite and Māturīdī view that reason alone can discern moral values, as well as the Ashʿarite notion that moral value is solely dependent on divine command. Dehlavi maintained that while reason plays a role, it is insufficient to grasp the full moral weight of actions without divine guidance. He further challenged the long-standing philosophical axiom that averting harm (dafʿ al-maḍarrah) is superior to securing benefit (jalb al-manfaʿah). Contrary to this view, Dehlavi asserted that the divine order prioritizes the pursuit of benefit, as creation itself is an act of bringing about good, not merely the prevention of harm. In conclusion, Allama Ayub Dehlavi’s thought presents a critical reappraisal of traditional theological positions, offering a balanced synthesis of reason and revelation while contributing a fresh moral framework within Islamic philosophical discourse.