Nautilus Institute

ABSTRACT In October–November 2020, RECNA-Nagasaki University and Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) with the support of Nautilus Institute convened the Nagasaki 75th Anniversary scenario workshop to address the pandemic-nuclear nexus. About fifty participants of diverse background explored the future of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament in light of the uncertainty created by the global coronavirus pandemic. Their specific task was to develop four scenarios to identify the opportunities driven by global pandemics for Northeast Asian governments, civil society and market actors to reduce nuclear risk and resume nuclear disarmament. Based on these scenarios, the workshop recommended sixteen urgent steps that could be implemented globally and in particular, in Northeast Asia. With three more policy measures added after the workshop, this article elaborates nineteen policy recommendations.

ABSTRACT Although offenses against international law have been proscribed at a certain level of generality, nobody hitherto has examined closely the scientific and ecological damages that would be imposed by nuclear strikes in relation to resulting possible law-of-war violations. To correct that information deficit and institutional shortfall, the first Part of this Article constructs a hortatory proposal for a tribunal for the use of nuclear weapons under international law. The second Part of the Article shows how such a tribunal statute would have a real-world effect on those charged with launching nuclear strikes and determining the legality of the strike orders. For the first time, through a series of interviews and electronic communications, we have gathered empirical and anecdotal information regarding the actual processes of launch instructions to lower level crewmembers and, in particular, those who refused the order – or “refuseniks”. What emerges from these accounts is the startling reality that low-level crewmembers had little or no guidance on the legality of the strike under the laws of war but were told simply to trust their leadership. A tribunal statute geared specifically to the use of nuclear weapons would provide needed guidance and constitute solid legal grounds upon which to stand should those lower down in the chain of command find the order to launch a nuclear strike manifestly illegal under international law.

This essay reviews the status of nuclear threat in Korea and analyzes the appropriate policy response to the emergence of the DPRK as a nuclear‐armed state. We suggest that as of 2009, the DPRK made the ROK the main target of its nuclear strategy rather than the USA, as was the case from 1991–2009. The sinking of the ROK corvette Cheonan in 2010 provides a mini‐case‐study of the collision of ROK and DPRK historical trajectories, and portends continuing clashes involving nuclear threat that need to be managed to avoid escalation to nuclear next‐use. The artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 may be the second in what proves to be a series of such risky provocations. We conclude the paper by outlining the advantages of a ROK–Japan‐only nuclear‐weapon‐free zone relative to alternative ROK responses to the threat posed by the DPRK nuclear breakout. In an Epilogue, we reflect on the methodological difficulties posed by the DPRK in interpreting its nuclear statements.

As more and more countries adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol, all kinds of nuclear secrets will come spilling out. Currently under the microscope: South Korea.

As more and more countries adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol, all kinds of nuclear secrets will come spilling out. Currently under the microscope: South Korea.