The Econometric Society

We analyze the constrained-efficient allocation in an equilibrium model of investment and capital reallocation with heterogeneous firms facing collateral constraints. The model features two types of pecuniary externalities: collateral externalities, because the resale price of capital affects firms’ ability to borrow, and distributive externalities, because buyers of old capital are more financially constrained than sellers, consistent with empirical evidence. We show analytically and quantitatively that the equilibrium price of old capital is inefficiently high in general, because the distributive pecuniary externality exceeds the collateral externality, by a factor of two in the calibrated model. New investment generates a positive aggregate externality by reducing the future price of old capital, fostering reallocation toward more constrained firms. The constrained-efficient allocation induces a consumption-equivalent welfare gain of 5% compared to the competitive equilibrium, and can be implemented with subsidies on new capital and taxes on old capital.

We introduce a test for whether agents' preferences over network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent i will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. Our model also incorporates agent-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity and homophily on observable agent attributes. This introduces 2N+K^2 nuisance parameters (N is number of agents in the network and K the number of possible agent attribute configurations). Under the null equilibrium is unique, but our hypothesis is nevertheless a composite one as the degree heterogeneity and homophily nuisance parameters may range freely across their parameter space. Under the alternative our model is incomplete; there may be multiple equilibrium network configurations and our test is agnostic about which one is selected. Motivated by size control, and exploiting the exponential family structure of our model under the null, we restrict ourselves to conditional tests. We characterize the exact null distribution of a family of conditional tests and introduce a novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating this distribution. We also characterize the locally best test. The form of this test depends upon the gradient of the likelihood with respect to the strategic interaction parameter in the neighborhood of the null. Remarkably, this gradient, and consequently the form of the locally best test statistic, does not depend on how an equilibrium is selected. Exploiting this lack of dependence, we outline a feasible version of the locally best test. We present two illustrative applications. First, we test for whether nations behave strategically when choosing locations for overseas diplomatic missions. Second, we test for whether firms prefer to sell to firms with richer customer bases (i.e., whether firms value “indirect customers”). Some Monte Carlo experiments explore the size and power properties of our test in practice.

Abstract We document that seasonal temperatures have significant and systematic effects on the U.S. economy, both at the aggregate level and across a wide cross section of economic sectors. This effect is particularly strong for the summer: a F increase in the average summer temperature is associated with a reduction in the annual growth rate of state‐level output of 0.15 to 0.25 percentage points. We combine our estimates with projected increases in seasonal temperatures and find that rising temperatures could reduce U.S. economic growth by up to one‐third over the next century.

Most economists differ not on the causes of the Great Recession, but on their relative importance. They agree, however, that the core problem is human, not market failure. Their widely held assessment helps explain why the Dodd-Frank banking “reform” says so much and does so little. This study re-tries the usual suspects and finds none guilty. Instead, it points to multiple equilibria in banking and the overall economy. Whether it is Cooke and Company in 1873 or Lehman Brothers in 2008, leverage and opacity are the wicked brew that stokes bank runs. And bank runs prompt employer runs – laying off your employees (other firms’ customers) for fear that others are laying off their employees (your customers). The answer is fundamental, not cosmetic banking reform that fixes banking and the economy for good. The answer is replacing leveraged, trust-me banking with fully transparent, 100 percent equity-financed mutual fund banking. This reform, called Limited Purpose Banking, handles all aspects of finance, including lending, risk allocation and the payment system. It would permanently end the leveraging of taxpayers by banks and bring a permanent end to financial crises.

ABSTRACTNew firms are an important source of job creation, but the underlying economic mechanisms for why this is so are not well understood. Using an identification strategy that links shocks to local income to job creation in the nontradable sector, we ask whether job creation arises more through new firm creation or through the expansion of existing firms. We find that new firms account for the bulk of net employment creation in response to local investment opportunities. We also find significant gross job creation and destruction by existing firms, suggesting that positive local shocks accelerate churn.

Abstract We find consistent evidence of negative autocorrelation in decision making that is unrelated to the merits of the cases considered in three separate high-stakes field settings: refugee asylum court decisions, loan application reviews, and Major League Baseball umpire pitch calls. The evidence is most consistent with the law of small numbers and the gambler’s fallacy—people underestimating the likelihood of sequential streaks occurring by chance—leading to negatively autocorrelated decisions that result in errors. The negative autocorrelation is stronger among more moderate and less experienced decision makers, following longer streaks of decisions in one direction, when the current and previous cases share similar characteristics or occur close in time, and when decision makers face weaker incentives for accuracy. Other explanations for negatively autocorrelated decisions such as quotas, learning, or preferences to treat all parties fairly are less consistent with the evidence, though we cannot completely rule out sequential contrast effects as an alternative explanation.