بنەما هزری و واقیعیەکانی سیاسەتی ئاسایشی نەتەوەیی ئێران لە دوای شۆڕشی ئیسلامییەوە

Rediscovering the past to build a secure future is better realized by understanding the role of history in policy making. Today, while Nepal’s national security policies remain silent about the geopolitical threats, it is timely to rediscover the guidelines on national security strategies introduced in Divya Upadesh, a Divine Counsel of the Great King Prithivi Narayan Shah. Currently, Nepal inability in escaping the geostrategic challenge of accommodating the interest of major powers is explicitly visible in the fiasco created by the Nepali political parties in the context of Nepal’s uncertainty over US-sponsored MCC project, which is today perceived in Nepal as hostile to China-led BRI. Historically, Nepal has successfully balanced its two Gulliverian neighbors. But, today, Nepal is not in a position to evade the repercussions triggered by Sino-Indian rivalry at the regional front and Sino-US strategic competition at the global level. On the backdrop of their conflicting interest—strategic, security, economic—Kathmandu faces the geostrategic challenges of accommodating the interest of major powers. Although Nepal’s integrated foreign policy of 2020 mentions of the changed geopolitical context, pragmatic policy recommendations, as indicated by foreign policy behavior, are missing. Constitutional guidelines on Nepal’s foreign policy and national security alone are not sufficient. Thus, drawing lessons from history could be of help to formulate the national security strategies in order to better cope with the external threats. The rationale behind considering Divya Upadesh is to make Nepali policy makers realize that the national security strategies and policies that Nepal adopted in a usual/normal context won’t be able to fulfill the requirements of the uncertain strategic milieu against the backdrop of a ‘new Cold War’ brewing between the United States and China. In the late 18th century when P.N Shah was introducing a comprehensive national security policy for the first time, the external environment wasn’t much favorable. After his death, however, instead of paying heed to his guidelines, expansionism ended up to territorial loss, adventurism led to Himalayan wars, appeasement led to increasing British influence in Nepal. After 1950, guidelines in Divya Upadesh have been more confined to history books and classrooms lectures. While Nepal lionizes its act of balancing India and China though the policy of non-alignment and equidistance, foreign and security policy makers never paid attention to reinvent the lesson for the same. Thus, this qualitative study recuperates the relevance of effective balancing as advocated by PN Shah in addressing the challenges surfaced while accommodating the interests of major powers. Most of the available literature on Divya Upadesh are either translated English versions, or limited to the analysis of the unification process. The relevance of an intersection of foreign policy and national security in Divya Upadesh is not unveiled by any of the available literature. Apprehending the same research gap, this study explores the contemporary significance of Divya Upadesh while devising the national security policies and strategies. Firstly, the contemporary challenges to Nepal’s national security prompted by Kathmandu’s struggle in accommodation of the interest of major powers is discussed; secondly, the policy of ‘balancing’ counseled by Prithivi Narayan Shah is emphasized as an apt and relevant in dealing with the contemporary challenges emanating from the neighborhood and beyond. Thirdly, “meticulous diplomacy,” is highlighted to offer economic shape to the act of balancing. Finally, it has been realized how studying history means studying causes, and as such, turning the pages of Divya Upadesh, policy makers discover the causes of Nepal’s failure in accommodating the interest of major powers.

In the introductory part of the paper, the author defines the terms of policy and strategy for national security. Furthermore, the author determines the national security policy of Montenegro in accordance with the National Security Strategy of Montenegro from 2006, 2008, and 2018, as well as the components of the national security policy, such as national security interests and goals with special reference to strategic interests, overview of the global and regional environment, and security risks and threats. At the end of the paper, the author outlines the external components of national security policy – cooperation with European countries in responding to modern challenges, risks and threats, Montenegro's possible response to security risks and threats, and developing a crisis management system and participation in missions. The content will be based on an analysis of foreign literature and the use of electronic content. The subject of research in this paper is the national security policy of Montenegro in modern global conditions. The purpose of this study is to focus on the importance of national security and global security in the scientific literature. Keywords: national security policy, national security strategy, security interests and goals.

The government of Pakistan launched its first National Security Policy on January 14, 2022, and there has been no security policy in Pakistan in written form since its inception. However, it is claimed to be the first-ever national security policy (2022-2026) of Pakistan. This policy is called a comprehensive policy because it has combined various policies like economic policy, internal policy, foreign policy defense policy, etc. The policy document has focused on putting together the defense capabilities with social and economic capacities while prioritizing economic security in the document. This study is based on a qualitative method for collecting data and informed through secondary sources. This study aims to check out the reasons that restricted the past governments of Pakistan from framing a national security policy and to examine the main aspects of the National Security Policy recently launched.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the informal factors which influenced the effectiveness of the policy implementation toward national security policy concerning maintaining peace and order in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand. Important factors are mass media, local intellectual, local politicians, and local civil society organizations (CSOs). The result from this study reveals that apart from the Internal Security Operations Command Region 4 (ISOC4) and the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) which are the main government agencies responsible for devising and implementing policy in the region, non-government units as mentioned above have effects on national security policy implementation effectiveness in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand as well. These units are the insiders who understand the local context and are able to generate the cooperation from diverse sectors as well as local networks. The contribution of this paper is to provide a clearer information of informal factors influenced effectiveness of national security policy implementation concerning maintaining peace and order in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand. The result can be used as a guideline for policy makers and policy implementers to become more aware of the possible pitfalls and constraints in implementing and managing national security policy and create possible opportunities to seek the solutions toward the unrest events in such area. Keyword: policy implementation, policy effectiveness, national security policy, three southernmost provinces

Social security policies within individual countries are determined independently by national governments, but the resulting outcome is inefficient compared with what would result from the international co-ordination of policies. This is because national social security policies produce international externalities via their effects on world interest rates. An illustrative example suggests that the gains from co-ordination are potentially significant. Virtually all countries operate social security (or redistributive) policies. Each chooses policies independently, and to my knowledge no-one, either in a policymaking context or in the large literature on international policy co-ordination, has suggested that such decisions would benefit from international coordination.1 However, a simple argument suggests that independent national social security policies are inefficient: more specifically, in the long run national governments make policy decisions which are too egalitarian. This holds provided that social security lowers national saving. In this case, each national government faces a trade-off between income redistribution and national saving, and can be assumed to locate at the nationally optimal point on this trade-off, taking as given the world interest rate. The latter is clearly not independent of the combined effect of all countries' policies, however: if all countries expand social security, the resulting fall in world saving will raise the world interest rate, with adverse consequences for each national economy. Each country rationally ignores its own (small) contribution to the global outcome. If this international externality were internalised by co-ordination, countries would relocate on the trade-off between income redistribution and national saving. Demonstrating the existence of an externality says nothing about its quantitative significance. I address this with an example which focuses on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) retirement pensions in an economy with a mixture of forward-looking and myopic individuals. The pensions prevent destitution among retired myopes and thus effectively redistribute life time welfare, but they also lower saving because of PAYG financing. For all parameter values considered, international co-ordination of pensions policy decisions generates welfare gains which are larger - for many parameter values substantially larger - than recent estimates of the welfare gains from either the entire elimination of all cyclical fluctuations, or the reduction of inflation and nominal interest rates from suboptimally high to optimal levels. Hence the issues addressed in the paper are quantitatively significant when judged against other frequently-advocated * I am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions; they are not responsible for the present version.

Security and stability are always been an integral aim of human life so is the case with states. A state’s security paradigm is a determined or undetermined path to make its survival possible depending on the environment it is interacting. Pakistan’s security path is also determined by the environment it was interacting. It made alliances with West at times to enhance its hard-core national security but after 9/11 a drastic change was observed. Pakistan reconsidered its national security policy by focusing on the soft core of its national security path. The aim of writing this article is to see what factors led Pakistan to transform its focus from hard core to soft core of national security and its path to formulate its first national security policy 2022-2026. This article also elaborates the past national security directives of the state along with the national security compulsions it is facing. Thus, this article gives a detailed overview or genesis of Pakistan’s first national security policy 2022-2026 along with its shortcomings.

: The narrative that follows traces the role and influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from their creation in 1942 through the end of the Cold War in 1991. It is, first and foremost, a history of events and their impact on national policy. It is also a history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves and their evolving organization, a reflection in many ways of the problems they faced and how they elected to address them. Over the years, the Joint History Office has produced and published numerous detailed monographs on JCS participation in national security policy. There has never been, however, a single-volume narrative summary of the JCS role. This book, written from a combination of primary and secondary sources, seeks to fill that void. An overview, it highlights the involvement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the policy process and in key events and decisions. My hope is that students of military history and national security affairs will find it a useful tool and, for those so inclined, a convenient reference point for further research and study.

: As America champions a resurgence in patriotism following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and rallies behind a determined President to defeat an ominous and determined adversary, a complementing grand strategy for prosecuting the global war on terrorism remains conspicuously absent amidst a landscape of newly appointed cabinet officials and fledging Homeland Security organizations. In his speech to the nation following the attacks, President Bush declared that America would bring every resource to bear in the fight to defeat terrorism. In the ensuing days, news that President Bush had authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to target and kill Osama bin Laden and specific individuals of Al Qaeda, further shaped the scope and campaign tactics behind America's emerging strategy to combat global terrorism. Public polls reflect overwhelming support for the collective engagement of all elements of national power in the fight against terrorism. But can America prosecute a strategy that specifically targets terrorist leaders and can it be an effective instrument of U.S. national security policy in combating the global threat? Simply put, despite what the strategists achieve in their final design and assessment of a national counterterrorism strategy, can such an approach be militarily feasible, suitable and acceptable, and ultimately, can it be morally and ethically prosecuted? The purpose of this paper is to provide a general answer to that exact question. Through the dual framework of Carl von Clausewitz's center of gravity concept and Dudley Knox's strategic assessment model, this study will provide a heuristic framework for analyzing and assessing the utility of targeting terrorist leaders as a credible strategy and instrument of U.S. national policy in combating global terrorism.

Benjamin Bradlee has written that Emmet John Hughes's second book on Eisenhower administration reminded John F. Kennedy of the danger inherent in having historians work for any administration. According to Bradlee, president exclaimed, Those bastards, they are always there with their pencils out.' As it happened, more than two dozen of those who participated in Kennedy administration had their pencils out-only one of whom was designated historian. Additional memoirs by friends and supporters, those Garry Wills calls honorary Kennedys, embellished record even further. It was, of course, tragedy of assassination, and frustration of an unfinished agenda, as well as personal loss, that stimulated such a stream of personal reflection. Among authors were men and women whose lives had been entirely consumed by years of loyal support and campaigning as well as brief 1,000 days of Kennedy presidency.2 Unlike most other modern presidents who must survive low popular esteem and scholarly bashing before their reputations stage a comeback, Kennedy's national security policies were praised and even lauded in first round of books that emerged from publishers. With exception of Bay of Pigs, a disaster acknowledged by all concerned, memoirs dominating this group provide picture of a president courageously confronting Russians to prevent missiles being placed in Cuba; committed both to a militarily strong America and a nuclear test ban as first step toward arms limitations; yet sensitive to needs of less fortunate countries and peoples around world, particularly in Latin America. The memory of stylish and articulate president as well as tragedy in Dallas provided authors with eager publishers and receptive audiences. Whatever subject, each of these books shared a common assumption: that Kennedy administration was a break with past, unique in its organization and its policies. Full of young, energetic, innovative policymakers, and led by first president born in twentieth century, this administra-

The article examines the nature of the uncertainty impact on the formation and implementation of national security policy. The multiplication of uncertainties and complication of the system of social relations prompt a transformation of conceptual approaches to the identification of the national security basic features and the organization of key processes in this area. It has been proven that the development of the concepts of uncertainty and resilience prompts a reconceptualization of the national security. This process is currently taking place. The implementation of new approaches to ensuring national security contributed to the initiation of a paradigm shift in national security policy. Management of uncertainty allows for reducing its influence on national security policy-making. The development of science and increasing the level of public trust in scientific information, which is taken as a basis for shaping political decisions, are of great importance for this.

The National Security threats that we face today and, in turn, the National Security . requirements, are more diverse and complex than they were during the Cold-War from 1945-1990. During that period, and bolstered by the experiences of World Wars I and II, US National Security policy was focused on the stabilization of post WW II country boundaries and containment of the Soviet block and China. The result was the bipolar world in which the nuclear and conventional forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies ensured a measure of political stability through a military stalemate of world wide proportions. The practical result was that large scale changes in national borders were unlikely, but internal conflict within countries, and local conflicts between neighboring countries could still occur, albeit with participation from one or both of the Superpower camps. US National Security Policy was designed primarily for stabilization of the bipolar world on the military front and for competition with the Soviet Union and China on economic and political fronts. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the global picture. The bipolar world and its military stalemate appear to be gone for the moment and the threat which was the foundation for US National Security policy has changed significantly. Some will argue that China has intentions of replacing the Soviet Union as a military superpower and thus recreate the bipolar world. Furthermore, Russia still has significant nuclear forces and has recently talked of lowering the nuclear threshold in an apparent attempt to make up for its weakened conventional forces. Clearly the threat of large scale nuclear war is much reduced, but not gone entirely. Having acknowledged the Chinese and Russian threats, what does the global picture look like today? The boundaries of most countries are secure but there are significant frictions, that have, or could lead, to armed conflict. Most of these are today's manifestations of long standing problems with no easy solution in sight. It can be argued that most local conflicts will be of no direct threat to US interests. However there are situations where local conflict can have significant international impact if left unchecked, For example localized conflict in the Middle East could affect oil supplies world wide, open conflict between China and Taiwan could draw in Japan and the United States, India and Pakistan have armed conflict over Kashmir threatening a nuclear exchange, and North Korea continues to be a concern with its long range missile and nuclear and CBW, development programs. There is also the problem of state sponsored or sanctioned terrorism against the US and its allies. As with Korea, a number of countries have been identified as having had, or still having active chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs along with strategic missile programs that would enable them to deliver warheads to the US mainland or similarly threaten US allies. Furthermore the problem of the clandestine delivery of a weapon of mass destruction designed to target US civilian population centers is very real. Such threats designed to deter US policy initiatives abroad, have been termed ''asymmetric'' warfare and appear to be an emerging capability in a number of countries.

The popular image of national security policy making as a rational process focusing upon threats to the integrity and objectives of the state captures some of the elements of the process, but it also oversimplifies what is not only a highly complex, but also a deeply political activity. There is no single entity within any Western nation state which could handily be described as “the national security policy”. The making of security policy involves a chain of interconnected and interactive elements, not all of which move with the same rhythm or obey the same logic. Public opinion provides the broad framework, elite opinion shapes the immediate policy, assessments of the Soviet threat guide strategic doctrines, national proclivities guide military force structures and deployment postures, and arms control postures embody political and military judgments as to what mixture of unilateral efforts and mutual understandings (that is, force deployment and threat reduction) confer the greatest degree of security vis-à-vis the adversary. The policy making process in at least some Western states is highly fractionalized, and the lack of coordination between the various components impedes the articulation of national strategies toward the Soviet Union.

INTRODUCTIONGiven that the primary and most immediate experience of insecurity in troubled societies worldwide is through unmet basic needs, political exclusion, denied rights, social and political disintegration, and the criminal and political violence that invariably accompany these conditions of insecurity, the primary means of achieving security must be through the creation of favourable social, political, and economic conditions-that is, through economic development, respect for basic rights, political participation, control over the instruments of violence, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Hence, spending in support of international peace and security should be expanded beyond the traditional three Ds-defence, development, and diplomacy-to a more comprehensive five Ds of security-development, democracy, disarmament, diplomacy, and defence-which better reflect the dimensions of human security. Canada is an extraordinarily prosperous and secure country and has a responsibility to increase its commitment to international peace and security. That means an overall expansion of the five Ds security envelope, as well as spending shifts within that envelope to give appropriate emphasis to addressing the social, political, and economic conditions that are essential to durable international peace and security.THE MEASURE OF SECURITYThe search for a security consensusCanadian security policy promises to be a significant and contentious subject for national debate for many years to come and for many reasons, including the threat of terrorism and the threatened further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both of which bring international peace and security concerns directly to shores. In addition, funding for international peace and security efforts will continue to be crowded out by other urgent national priorities, such as health care, the urban infrastructure, and so on. There is also a widespread view, one that is embraced across the full political spectrum in Canada, that current defence policy is not workable, either because it lacks resources or because it does not address real security needs, or both. And finally, a changed security environment, as well as changes in understanding of what security policy should encompass, mean that there is no broad consensus on what security priorities should be; that is, what the threats to security really are, and how those threats should be met.The lack of consensus concerning the nature and extent of the threats to national and international security and the appropriate means to counter them is deeply rooted. The threat of terrorism, for example, is certainly widely accepted as real but there is little agreement on how imminent or prominent it is, whether it is primarily a policing and intelligence problem, a military problem, or whether it is a social-economic-political problem that requires greater attention to root causes. The ballistic missile threat is also widely accepted as real, but again, there is little agreement on how imminent it is, which missile threat is the greater danger (e.g., Russia's or North Korea's), or whether the priority response should be defence, counterproliferation, or nonproliferation diplomacy.The April 2004 tabling of a national security policy by the government of Prime Minister Paul Martin is an effort to guide the development of a national consensus. It is, as the prime minister notes in the preface, Canada's first-ever comprehensive statement of our National security Policy, and makes the point that although threats to Canada will change, our security interests are enduring. Three core national security interests are identified:* protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad;* ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and* contributing to international security.The report emphasizes that Canadian security will be increasingly dependent on our ability to contribute to international security,1 citing as an example the danger that failed states far away from Canada can become havens for terrorists, thus increasing risk to Canada. …

Attention is drawn to the priority value of information among the objects of the national security policy of Ukraine. It is argued that information freedom requires careful state control and inclusion of information in the list of objects of national security policy. Information threats to state security are considered as a combination of conditions and factors that pose a danger to the vital interests of the state, society, and individuals through negative informational influence on the consciousness and behavior of citizens, as well as destructive impact on information resources and information- technical infrastructure. Two types of information attacks are distinguished based on the object of influence: 1) purely technical information attacks aimed at the functioning of the technical equipment of information systems; 2) influencing people’s consciousness through the transmission of targeted information. Three main goals of information warfare are outlined: control of the information space and ensuring the protection of one’s information from enemy actions; using control over the information space to conduct information attacks on the opponent; increasing the overall effectiveness of armed information functions. It is argued that in order to prevent the above-mentioned negative consequences, the following measures should be taken at the State level: 1) development of a system of continuous monitoring and analysis of information flows for timely detection of potential threats and response to them; 2) introduction of information literacy programmes among citizens to reduce vulnerability to manipulative information and fake news; 3) cooperation with international partners and exchange of experience in the field of information security to increase the effectiveness of measures and improve strategies to counter threats. These steps can ensure a high level of information security that will contribute to stability, security and protection of national interests.

From Portugal to Poland and beyond, the dissolution of the unique political and strategic milieu of the Cold War has compelled a reappraisal of national security policies. Once again, European countries are seeking security in a continent that has undergone a major structural transformation, although mercifully this most recent transformation occured without a devastating war. And once again, the foreign policies and security activities of the great powers are receiving the lion's share of attention from scholars, the media, and foreign service bureaucracies. This comes as no surprise, for the decisions of the great powers — Great Britian, France, and Germany, as well as the United States — will be pivotal in the shaping of the post-Cold War security environment in Europe. At issue is the extent to which national security policies can be harmonized, and what institutional framework will evolve as the preferred instrument of coordinated foreign and security policy activity.KeywordsEuropean UnionForeign PolicyGreat PowerSmall StateNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganisationThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.