Многовекторная стратегия Грузии в условиях геополитической нестабильности на Южном Кавказе (1992–2003 гг.)

The European Union is still emerging as a fully fledged foreign policy actor. The vagaries of this process are clearly visible, yet insufficiently explained in the EU policies towards the post-Soviet space. EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts examines EU intervention and non-intervention in conflict resolution, with a specific focus on the EU’s role in the post-soviet conflicts in the South Caucasus and Moldova: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. It explains how EU foreign policy affected these conflicts, but more importantly what EU intervention in these conflicts reveal about the EU itself. Based on extensive field research, the author argues that the reluctant EU intervention in post-Soviet conflicts results from a dichotomous relationship between EU institutions and some EU member states. Popescu argues this demonstrates that EU institutions use policies of ‘stealth intervention’ where they seek to play a greater role in the post-Soviet space, but they do so through relatively low-profile, uncontroversial and depoliticised actions in order to avoid visible Russian opposition. Exploring an array of questions related to the EU as a foreign policy actor, this book traces the politics of conflict intervention by EU institutions using original empirical data related to the EU decision making process and will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics, conflict resolution, foreign policy and Post-Soviet politics.

The Caucasus region represents a clear example of an area of unresolved ethnic and religious problems that thread throughout the region’s historical development. During the Soviet era, due to Kremlin’s strength and ability to control the processes, these issues were suppressed by the socialist ideal of a conflict-free society and remained swept under the rug. However, the Caucasian republics in particular represent an area of preserved ethnic and religious contradictions during the nearly seventy-year period of the Soviet Union. The paper aims at exploring the genesis and development of the ethnic and religious conflicts in the South Caucasus during the Soviet times, which after the disintegration of the USSR turned into permanent conflicts in this post-soviet space such as the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (between Armenia and Azerbaijan) and the ones in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in Georgia. The study also seeks to explore the interstate aspect of those regional conflicts and the Russian role in them. Stalin’s consistent policy of active territorial redistributions deteriorated the situation, especially in the Caucasus region. Proof of the impossibility of consolidation in the region are the conflict points, South Ossetia and Abkhazia within the borders of Georgia, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh, which instigated an armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been on Georgian territory for many years. Nagorno-Karabakh, despite being inhabited by over 90% Armenian population, was part of Azerbaijani territory during the Soviet era. The Soviet policy failed to create conditions for an effective integration of the separate ethnicities. Evidence of these problems in the Caucasus still echoes in the Nagorno-Karabakh military conflict in the autumn of 2020.

The article focuses on the transformation of the European Union’s policy in the South Caucasus after the NagornoKarabakh war of 2020. Before the war, the foreign and security policy in the region had depended on the OSCE Minsk Group, Georgia’s role in the Russian-Georgian confrontation, and the Eastern Partnership program for the South Caucasus. After Azerbaijan won the Nagorno-Karabakh war with Turkey’s support, the previous line of policy stopped being effective. It failed to unite the countries of the South Caucasus, to remove the Russian Federation from the region, and to make the European Union a real mediator in the conflict zone. The democratization of the local political regimes also failed, despite the proEuropean position of Georgia and the velvet revolution in Armenia. As a result of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war of 2020, Russian and Turkish troops entered the South Caucasus, and Russia, Turkey, and Iran started acting as peace mediators. The European Union failed to strengthen the role of the OSCE Minsk Group and the mechanisms of the Eastern Partnership in the region. Ever since 2020, it has been trying to develop a common policy for all ethnic and inter-confessional conflicts in the postSoviet space. The European Union keeps failing in its competition and partnership with Russia, while Turkey is getting more active and independent in the region. Thus, the European Union will have to develop a new model of influence in the South Caucasus and the whole post-Soviet space. In the current global confrontation, it is very important to find an international actor able and willing to interact with all parties. The European Union seems to be the one, and its actions in resolving regional conflicts require a detailed research.

The purpose of this article is to study various factors of Russia’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus during the 44-day Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) war of 2020 and in the post-war period. Russia’s mediation efforts to end the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and establish peace are considered. Particular attention is paid to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh and the military-political significance of this initiative and the consequences, as well as the main reasons for the failure of this peacekeeping mission. The article also analyzes the multi-vector foreign policy pursued by regional states in the South Caucasus, in particular Türkiye and Iran. In this context, the prospects for Russian-Turkish cooperation in the South Caucasus, in particular, in the process of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, are highlighted. This also makes a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the United States, European Union (EU) and France in the region significant. The article examines Russia’s ability to maintain its military and political influence and expand its economic presence in the South Caucasus. Issues that have hindered the establishment of peace and stability in the South Caucasus were also discussed.

This study examines historical events and decisions related to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict in the period from 1989 to 1992, which were reflected in the regional South Ossetian periodical, the official state media of South Ossetia, published in Ossetian and Russian by Soveton Iryston (Soviet Ossetia). The publications of the newspaper “Admonykhas”, published by the socio-political movement of the same name, which advocated the secession of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region from the GSSR, were used as auxiliary materials. Based on the materials of the South Ossetian press, the initial period of the conflict, its active phase and the events of the peaceful settlement stage are considered. The array of publications contains important and key decisions, resolutions, appeals and statements of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of South Ossetia, the leadership of the Republic of South Ossetia; summaries of military operations, numerous interviews with government officials, eyewitnesses of events, participants in the defense of South Ossetia represent a rich source of historical information about the military-political armed confrontation with Georgia. To a certain extent, the information policy of the state and private media of Georgia, which have chosen anti-Ossetian rhetoric for their editorial activities, is affected. Regional media are considered as a source of official documents testifying to decisions to end the armed conflict and humanitarian blockade, the results of negotiations between the parties, resolutions, facts of war crimes and mass violations of human rights by the Georgian side. The periodical press of the period of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict of 1989-1992 is a source of relevant information in the study of the causes, beginning and end of the ethnopolitical conflicts in the South Caucasus using the example of Georgia’s military actions against South Ossetia. Currently, in a period of acute geopolitical tension, the importance of an objective analysis of the socio-political processes taking place in the post-Soviet space, in particular in the South Caucasus, is becoming increasingly important, especially in the context of the defrosting of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020-2023 and the transformation of risks and threats, the information space in the region.

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and the gradual growth in significance of the South Caucasus region economically and geopolitically, Armenia and Georgia have found themselves struggling to safeguard their national sovereignty and develop their weak economies. They have been forced to adhere to waves of expansion by both Russia and the European Union and NATO. They have also been obliged to choose one sphere of influence over the other, with serious consequences for national sovereignty and foreign policy considerations. This thesis examines the reasons behind Armenia’s and Georgia’s regional alignment choices. Georgia’s national Western identity, and history of Russian occupation and aggression on its territorial sovereignty, has led it to align with the Western bloc, especially after the 2003 Rose Revolution and the 2008 Russian-Georgian war that led to the de-facto secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. On the other hand, Armenia’s economic and military dependence on Moscow, and the struggle over Nagorno-Karabagh and its ensuing security climate, has pushed it to align with Russia at the expense of its own economic relations and geopolitical position. The thesis tests the alignment choices of the two Transcaucasian states against neorealist predictions. Whereas neorealism offers a robust explanation with regards to Armenia’s alignment choice, it fails to offer a compelling explanation for Georgia’s integration into Western structures. The latter’s foreign policy orientation towards the West can be better understood through constructivist approaches that consider Georgia’s post-revolution policy-makers’ immaterial identity preferences and perceptions of state purpose, both of which have been staunchly pro-European.

Russia and non-regional States have recently shown fresh interest in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The rivalry between Russia and the United States for the post-Soviet territory, beginning after the collapse of the USSR, has broken new ground. Russia considers the post-Soviet space as an area of vital interests. Economic and political relations with its neighbors, the internal political situation in the former Soviet Republics have a direct impact on the development of Russia. These determinants can explain the renewed interest in Eurasian integration and an integration project — the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, the USA hardly welcomes such aspirations of Russia and the support for the integration project on the part of some post-Soviet countries. The American side has no interest in the newly emerging regional centers of influence in the post-Soviet space, regarding this as a threat to its interests. Countering the development of Eurasian integration and strengthening the EAEU influence is the focus of US policy in this regard. The EAEU member countries are consistently taking steps to develop integration despite obstacles from the West. The long-term objectives, defined in various documents by the countries, should put them on a new path of economic cooperation. Eurasian integration faces a number of difficulties along with the successes, achieved since the creation of the EAEU. The world economy problems, in addition to internal ones, exert a considerable influence. They intensified after the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, which negatively affected the development of the EAEU countries. The internal political problems faced by the EAEU countries adversely affect integration. The internal political crisis in Belarus, beginning in the later 2020, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, worsened internal political struggle in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are the factors that influenced the work of the EAEU last year and early 2021. Nevertheless, economic difficulties and political events in specific countries, the pursuit of non-regional states to influence the elites of the former Soviet states have not altered the foreign policy priorities of the EAEU member states.

Emerging powers are usually referred to as states whose increasing material capacities and status-seeking strategies may potentially have an impact on the international system and also affect the dominant position of the hegemonic powers therein. The rising of new powers is a recurrent phenomenon in international relations. When talking about emerging powers, scholars associate the words with the so-called BRICS states: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The emergence of BRICS, and especially of China, poses the question of whether the rising process is a peaceful one. Realism, institutionalism, and constructivism have all dealt with the possible systemic impacts of the BRICS states. BRICS nations seem to be reformist rather than disruptive, meaning that they are pushing for the better representation of their self-perceived new status in multilateral institutions rather than challenging the current system per se. In terms of foreign policy, BRICS states interact with well-established powers such as the United States and European ones—herein they display balancing or bandwagoning strategies, as they do also toward each other. Moreover, well-established powers either accommodate or contest the rising process and status claims of these emerging powers. However, BRICS states are also regional powers. Regional peers contest the rising processes of BRICS and particularly claims to global powerhood. While BRICS can be seen as striving for the reform of multilateral institutions, the traditional view of BRICS as a homogenous force, comprising countries with similar interests, is sometimes misleading. Even though BRICS states have their own institution with a new bank, they also pursue different interests within traditional institutions. Therefore, the existing literature on BRICS is tilted toward systemic and institutional concerns. Although works taking into consideration the interplay between the domestic and international levels in foreign policy analysis do exist, they are not necessarily related to emerging processes and rarely go beyond foreign economic policy issues. People, leaders, and governmental institutions are decision makers or are part of the decision-making process in foreign policy, and thus they form perceptions and act according to how the rising process of the state is unfolding. An integration of the systemic, state, and personal levels captures the essence of the foreign policies of BRICS states in the context of rising and can take into consideration the ups and downs and stalemates of rising-process trajectories in international politics.

The research question is how national governments and civil societies reflect Russian involvement in the decision-making process of South Caucasus countries in 2022–2024? The structure of the research includes two sections: 1) Strategic interests of the countries of the South Caucasus and Russia in 2022–2024; 2) Changing the role of Russia in the South Caucasus in 2022–2024. In result of the research it was revealed that opting for a policy of normalization Georgia cannot renounce its territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Azerbaijan has been the most consistent among the Caucasian countries in challenging Russian hegemony in the region. This trend intensified after the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine: Azerbaijan increased humanitarian aid to Ukraine; pro-Ukrainian sympathies in Azerbaijani society were expressed through a number of leading media outlets that openly supported Kyiv. Baku unilaterally reviewed the ceasefire agreement - 2020, mediated by Russia. Amid the international isolation of the Kremlin, Azerbaijan began to play a much larger role for Russia. Baku is important link in the chain of diplomatic and economic ties of Putin's regime. Russia tries to maintain productive relations with Baku, even at the expense of its long-time ally Armenia. Yerevan revises its foreign policy, favouring a pro-Western vector. In Yerevan, the pro-Russian opposition organized rallies against the current government. Moscow and Baku both gained mutual benefits: Russia destabilized the situation in Armenia, and Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity. However, these actions of Moscow struck at its influence in the region, marginalizing Russia and its "guarantees." The Caucasus provides a clear example of Russia's inability to continue playing the role of a major power: it simply lacks the strength and means.

The relevance of this study lies in the radical transformations of the geopolitical landscape of the post-Soviet space, triggered by the prolonged aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The war has served as a catalyst for the rethinking of foreign policy strategies by numerous former Soviet republics. Against the backdrop of Russia’s weakening status as a geopolitical actor, countries in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Eastern Partnership have increasingly pursued diversified foreign policy trajectories. The objective of this research is to identify and systematize key trends in the behavior of post-Soviet states in response to the shifting balance of power in the international system caused by Russia’s war against Ukraine. The study employs comparative historical analysis, case study methodology, elements of geopolitical analysis, and inductive reasoning to derive general patterns from empirical observations. Findings indicate a growing tendency among post-Soviet countries to engage in foreign policy maneuvering and reduce their dependence on Russia. Armenia has initiated a strategic rapprochement with the United States, Azerbaijan has expelled Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh, and Kazakhstan has pursued a policy of balancing between Russia, China, and the West. Similar tendencies can be observed in Georgia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. For its part, Russia has attempted to compensate for its declining influence through military presence, energy leverage, and control over domestic political elites in neighboring states — tools that are becoming increasingly ineffective. The decline in Russian influence creates favorable conditions for a new configuration of international relations in the region. The study demonstrates that the key factor driving changes in the geopolitical orientation of post-Soviet countries is not only pressure from the Euro-Atlantic community but also the enduring resilience and resistance of Ukraine. This motivates political elites across the region to seek alternative pathways in security, economics, and international cooperation. Future empirical research on individual countries is recommended to explore strategies for further reducing Russian influence and strengthening the sovereignty of post-Soviet states within the international system.

This article analyses Russia’s foreign policy towards Georgia during the post-Soviet era. It examines the nuances between post-Soviet policies, which are heavily loaded with historical and nation-building issues, and neo-colonial ones, understood as the refusal to let go of the former empire. Since 1991, Russia has held the key to Georgia’s territorial integrity, political stability and economic development. Moscow’s policies gradually became more aggressive in the aftermath of the colour revolutions (from 2003 onwards). Georgia’s new leadership portrayed Russia as the main obstacle to the country’s modernisation, and the hostility reached a climax with the 2008 war in South Ossetia. Having considered the evolution of bilateral relations and the international context, this article argues that although Russia’s pressure on Georgia has always been strong, the change in political actors and the balance of forces – with the growing influence of the EU and NATO in post-Soviet countries – have played a decisive role in triggering aggressive, and eventually revisionist policies. Keywords: Russia, Georgia, Post-Soviet, Saakashvili, Caucasus war ----- Bibliography: Spetschinsky, Laetitia/Bolgova, Irina V.: Post-Soviet or Post-Colonial? The relations between Russia and Georgia after 1991, ERIS, 3-2014, pp. 110-122. https://doi.org/10.3224/eris.v1i3.19127

The paper examines Japan’s foreign policy towards the South Caucasus through the case study of Japanese engagement in Georgia. The goal of the study is to explore the formulation of Japan’s official foreign policy towards Georgia and to highlight the ideational factors influencing the process. As for the timeframe, the thesis is focused on the period from 1992 to 2016. Following the constructivist theory of International Relations, claiming the reality to be shaped by the perceptions of the actors, the study engages in documentary analysis and tries to provide a comprehensive understanding of Japan’s policymaking regarding the South Caucasus. The study contradicts the dominant positivist claims and argues that Japan’s official foreign policy discourse regarding the South Caucasus is constructed according to Japanese perceptions of world affairs, its domestic environment, the situation in the South Caucasus itself, the imagined role for Japan (identity), and the norms and values that were believed to have universal importance. As for the development of Japanese foreign policy towards Georgia, the author differentiates three stages in the construction of Japan’s approach: (1) No strategy (1992–1996); (2) “Eurasian Diplomacy” (1997–2005); and (3) “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” (2006–2016), while the factors claimed to be influencing these dynamics are the ideas, beliefs, and values of Japan.

In the context of the new geopolitical realities that emerged in the post-Soviet space after 1991, the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in the direction of the South Caucasus became noticeably more active. During this period, the export ideology of the Islamic revolution became more restrained and cautious, which allowed Iran to take part in solving complex problems in the South Caucasus: in particular, at the very beginning of the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Tehran offered their services in its peaceful permission. Iran’s regional strategy strictly fit into the framework of the state ideology of the «Islamic» path of development, therefore, in the course of its implementation, various tactical methods and opportunities were involved. These issues continue to arouse increased interest among domestic researchers, and their study is relevant, bearing in mind the remaining threats to Russia’s national security interests in the South Caucasus direction. The novelty of the study is determined by the fact that it contains a comprehensive analysis of the main directions of Iran’s regional policy in the South Caucasus, reveals its features and characteristics, as well as forms and methods of implementation. Particular attention is paid to issues related to the influence of internal and external factors on the complex processes of formation and development of Iran’s relations with the young states of the South Caucasus. The study found that in the course of conducting an anti-Western and, to a certain extent, independent of Russia foreign policy in the South Caucasus, Iran could not achieve noticeable success, since the influence and positions of Russia and the United States in the region remained strong. In general, the paper concludes that the hopes of Iran joining the circle of leading powers influencing the international situation in the South Caucasus were not destined to come true: in order to achieve this goal, first of all, it was necessary to strictly adhere to a pragmatic policy free from ideological layers, which was confirmed in the course of further development of events in the South Caucasus.

Any foreign policy decision of a country is formed on the basis of certain principles and norms that constitute the identity and determine the role of this country. In case with Iran, although the norms that form the identity of the Islamic Republic are diverse and each of them can determine the role of the country outside its geographical borders, none of these norms totally dominates Iran’s foreign policy. Iran is a country located within (or neighboring to) several strategic regions, and in each of these regions it demonstrates different foreign policy strategy based on different norms. For example, Iran’s foreign policy in Transcaucasia is determined by principles and norms which, in some cases, are similar to the principles and norms of Iran’s foreign policy in Western Asia and, in other cases, are different from them. These divergent patterns of behavior can be accounted for by two concepts: identity and national interests. The article aims at clarifying the role of identity in determining Iran’s national interests in Transcaucasia and studies Iran’s foreign policy in the region within the mentioned framework. At the same time, the article seeks to examine the challenges associated with the principles and norms determining foreign policy, as well as identify the shortcomings of Iran’s foreign policy in the Transcaucasian region.

ABSTRACTThis article applies the concepts of linkage and leverage as developed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way and elaborated by Gwendolyn Sasse in the introduction to this special issue of East European Politics to Russia’s involvement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two quasi-independent states in the South Caucasus. Through this re-conceptualisation of the developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, combined with new empirical insights, the article aims to increase our understanding of the conflicts in the region, of the involvement of the Russian Federation in particular, and consequently of the prospects of international conflict resolution. Compared to other political entities in the former Soviet Union, Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent an extreme case of Russian linkage and leverage. This article focuses on the period after the Russian–Georgian war in 2008, when Russia recognised the regions’ independence and effectively turned them into Russian protectorates. The economic, intergovernmental, technocratic and social linkages between Russia and the two regions are extraordinarily deep, and they directly undermine the autonomy of the regions. The post-war delegation of Russian cadres and institutional and legislative diffusion creates additional linkages underpinning Russian leverage.