ДО ПРОБЛЕМИ РОЗУМІННЯ ОСНОВНОГО ЗАКОНУ ВІЙНИ У СУЧАСНІЙ ФІЛОСОФІЇ ВІЙНИ

: The United States will continue to be drawn into Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in the post Cold War era. Although the American public desires to assist societies in distress, there is great intolerance for casualties to military forces, particularly in the absence of clear American interests. It is therefore critical that commanders plan for the operational protection if American military forces are to participate in Military Operations Other Than War. An examination of the two major Somali operations, UNITAF and UNOSOM II, shows that there is a clear correlation between observing the Principles of MOOTW and enhancing operational protection, or ignoring them and putting the force at risk. The American-led UNITAF succeeded in providing relief supplies to Somalia and security to relief workers. The military objective was attainable and complemented broader political and economic initiatives. Overwhelming force was brought to bear to ensure Security was maintained. The force remained neutral with regard to the internal Somali conflict thus maintaining Legitimacy. This enabled the force to show Restraint and minimize the risk of inadvertent combat. Unity of Effort was maintained throughout the operation. All of these factors enhanced operational protection. Conversely, during UNOSOM II, the mission was not successful. Military objectives were out of synch with the greatly expanded political, economic and social goals of nation building. The military force was not large enough or sufficiently equipped for this mission. When the military entered into armed conflict with a powerful clan leader, the principles of Legitimacy and Restraint were lost. The multiple chains of command prevented the operation from achieving Unity of Effort. The result was greater risk to the force and a weakening of operational protection.

在中國大陸國務院發表的｢2010年中國的國防｣白皮書中，提及要讓「國防交通動員建設紮實有序」 ，強調「鐵道運輸」是保障軍事作戰的重要能量之一，並且將交通戰備建設融入到國家交通體系建設中，甚至置重點在於提高戰略通道保障能力、戰略投送及保障能力和交通搶運搶修能力。 早在西元1948年時，當時的中共中央軍委制定的《鐵路軍運暫行條例》中便指陳：「軍事運輸為鐵路的第一等任務，在軍運計劃上，鐵道部無條件地執行中國人民革命軍事委員會之命令，保證軍運之安全、迅速與便利」，因此從中共自建政以來，一直將鐵道建設視於國防建設的一環。 中國人民解放軍的軍事戰略強調「積極防禦」，其中陸軍部隊的軍種戰略，已由早年的「區域防衛」型戰略，向「全域機動」型的地面部隊轉變，除了積極研建可進行快速投送部隊之軍規制式載台之外，更以時速可高達200公里以上的高速鐵路做為解放軍兵力機動快速投送的選項；中國大陸境內的鐵路與高速鐵路平時可用於旅客交通運輸，促進國內經濟發展，達成國家戰略目標，戰時可轉為軍交運輸，用於軍事戰略之目的，因此透過高速鐵路的建設，不僅可奠定中國大陸境內的交通運輸基礎建設，在軍是運用上亦可彌補解放軍部隊遠程兵力投送輸具之不足，符合中共的「寓軍於民」、「平戰一體」之國防建設理念。 建政以來中共在舊有鐵路基礎上，不斷以「提速」來增加列車運轉的速度，最後更汲取日本及歐洲高速鐵路經驗，決定另外修建「客運專線」以發展高速鐵路，迄今已擁有全世界規模最大、里程數最長、營運時速最快的高速鐵路網，本文自解放軍「積極防禦」的軍事戰略理論中探討中共是否可能藉由高速鐵路網路的建成，以達成軍隊「全域機動」的軍事目的。

Reviewed by: The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the Union Army LeeAnn Whites (bio) The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the Union Army. By Lorien Foote. (New York: New York University Press, 2010. Pp. 256. Cloth, $39.00.) In her insightful and innovative new book, Lorien Foote explores the ways in which the Union army in the Civil War was, as she puts it, “northern society in miniature, reflecting its culture and values and imbued with its strengths and weaknesses” (1). As much as the Union army was at war with Confederate troops, according to Foote, it was also simultaneously internally at war along fault lines created by changing ideas of what it meant to be a man in a rapidly modernizing northern economy and social order. In order to write this study of northern manhood at war, Foote moves beyond soldier correspondence, memoirs, and regimental accounts, which have served as the basis for most previous discussions of Civil War soldiers, and takes on new sources, particularly the Union army court-martial records, and to good effect. One of the most arresting discussions in the book concerns the role of honor in northern soldiers’ conception of themselves as men. Historians have assumed that while honor framed white southern men’s way of understanding themselves, conscience framed the self-understanding of northern men. Foote makes the case that honor was alive and well in the Union army. In fact, honor served as a flashpoint in what Foote identifies as the deepest division among northern soldiers, the division created by class, between what she terms the “gentlemen” and the “roughs.” Although both gentlemen and roughs valued honor, in the modernizing world of the North, elite notions of honor were increasingly tempered by self-control, “morality,” and even temperance, whereas lower-class and frequently immigrant men, the “roughs,” were more likely to still privilege honor and consequently violence over self-control. [End Page 424] This book will undoubtedly, and properly, be read as the latest word on the role of manhood in the internal dynamics of the Union army. In some ways, however, the book seems to fall between two stools. Foote takes the army as a sort of microcosm through which to study northern manhood under pressure. We learn more then about the complexities and conflicts between northern men as men than we learn about how those conflicts mattered in the conduct and the outcome of the Civil War itself. On the other hand, this focus on the army, for all that it offers as a microcosm of the different forms of manhood present in the civilian world, also removes men from the larger gender order in an atypical fashion. Readers will probably think that what they are reading is a gender analysis simply because the subject matter is that of men qua men. The fact is, however, that Foote does not use the term “gender” and instead repeatedly explains the fundamental role of class in her analysis. She can hardly do otherwise given the way she has framed her study. Ironically, authors of earlier works on soldiers, such as Reid Mitchell and Stephen Berry, while failing to explicitly frame their studies in terms of male identity, arguably come closer to a systematic gender analysis because they recognize the fundamental role that the relationships of soldiers to their female kin played in their experience of war. LeeAnn Whites Leeann Whites, professor of history at the University of Missouri–Columbia, is coeditor with Alecia Long of Occupied Women: Gender, Military Occupation, and the American Civil War (Louisiana State University Press, 2009). Copyright © 2011 The University of North Carolina Press

The Soviet experience of World War II has too often been seen as beyond comparison. Official Soviet historiography tended to present the war on the eastern front as incomparably tragic and heroic, and as the only struggle which really counted. In the west, selective memory dwelt mainly on the war in western Europe and the Pacific, and sometimes neglected the eastern front altogether. The opportunity to address the Soviet experience from a truly comparative viewpoint is therefore welcome. Another comparison which the scholar may follow profitably is with the Russian experience in World War I. Mobilization to meet the German threat in 1914 and to fight the first campaigns quickly exhausted the Russian armies and military industries. Imperial Russia was able to remain at war after the first winter only because of Allied aid and because Germany, tied down by trench warfare in the west, was unable to launch a serious attack in the east. Despite this limitation, the German pressure eventually brought Russia to the point of economic and social disintegration and political collapse. In this chapter I ask why the outcome of World War II was so different for Russia’s successor state, the USSR, how the resources were mobilized for the Soviet war effort, what price was paid for victory at the time, and what the long-term consequences of this victory may have been.

The assertion that strategic bombing is ineffective in determining the military or political outcome of a war has been made repeatedly during the past forty years. For the most part, this assertion has been limited to the experiences of major powers in a total war (e.g. Germany, Britain and the United States in the second world war) or the American experience in a limited war (Korea and Vietnam).1 The effectiveness of strategic bombing as practised by a small state in a limited local war has not been examined until now. This paper proposes to focus on such a situation by analyzing Israel's decision to use strategic bombing during the 1969-70 War of Attrition the first conflict in the cycle of Arab-Israeli violence in which one party initiated strategic bombing, and in which military intervention by a superpower (the Soviet Union) subsequently occurred.2 The focus of this research is an analysis of the decision-making process that led to the strategic bombing; an evaluation of the effectiveness of strategic bombing both in terms of Israeli policy-makers' aims and the results and consequences of the action; an examination of the influence of superpower constraints on the effectiveness of a strategic bombing in limited local war; and suggestion of a new consideration concerning the use of strategic bombing as a bargaining means, rather than as a method to bring a war to a decisive end. The War of Attrition, initiated by Egypt in March 1969, was a limited land war aimed at compelling Israel to withdraw from the Sinai. Egypt's military strategy consisted of massive artillery bombing of Israel's position on the Suez Canal front and occasional

Purpose. To explain how political leadership shapes the selection and adaptation of fundamental military tactics by examining the cognitive, institutional, and political mechanisms through which political objectives are translated into concrete forms of organized violence. Method: Comparative analysis, and synthesis. Findings. The findings show that the selection of fundamental military tactics—annihilation, exhaustion, intimidation, and subversion—is primarily shaped by political objectives rather than by material, structural, or doctrinal factors alone. Political leadership emerges as the central mechanism through which political intent is translated into concrete forms of military force employment. The analysis demonstrates that leaders’ cognitive frameworks, institutional constraints, and regime characteristics influence how political goals are converted into organized violence. The proposed typology of strategic logics indicates that each form of force employment corresponds to a specific configuration of political objectives, opponent characteristics, time horizons, and resource availability. Comparative case analysis—from Napoleon’s campaigns and the Second Punic War to Operation Desert Storm (1991), the Second Karabakh War (2020), and contemporary subversion—confirms that strategic choices reflect not only military necessity but also leaders’ perceptions of authority, risk, and legitimacy. Strategic selection is further shaped by political aim type, opponent profile and centers of gravity, urgency, resource and force-generation capacity, domestic politics and civil–military relations, the external environment, and leadership traits. Overall, the findings confirm that military strategy is a form of political choice, whose effectiveness depends on alignment between political objectives, available capabilities, and the broader decision-making context. Theoretical implications. This study can be applied to predict and analyze how political leaders translate objectives into military tactics, guiding research and models in strategic studies, civil–military relations, and conflict decision-making. Practical implications. This study can assist military planners, policymakers, and analysts in anticipating leaders’ strategic choices and tailoring operational, diplomatic, or deterrence measures accordingly. Value. It bridges the gap between political objectives and military action, offering both a conceptual framework for understanding leadership-driven strategy and practical insights for anticipating and influencing real-world conflict decisions. Paper type. Theoretical.

: War termination strategies are not an issue of whether or not the nation should devote sufficient military means to achieve the chosen political objectives. Conflict termination involves more than simply ending hostilities. It is a matter of effective coordination in development of objectives and strategies while at the same time linking the political leadership and the military commander to achieve the ends with the appropriate means. The American approach to military strategy has had a tendency to sever the links between military action and political objectives, and American military strategy has largely been awkward in its contribution towards achieving a better and lasting peace. This is in part due to having insufficient doctrinal guidance to achieve the ends as described by the policy maker. It is also because current doctrine and policy does not cause us to think through the implications of successfully achieving our objectives. The operational commander must be skilled in maintaining a balance of military force and diplomatic initiation to preserve and reinforce our political objectives while, at the same time working the concerns of a defeated enemy or enemies to prohibit part two of the same conflict.

ABSTRACT: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has sophisticated propaganda capabilities and expertise that can be turned against it. The United States should draw upon its expertise in political communication and psychological operations as well as adapt Russian precepts of operational shock and reflexive control to complement traditional military approaches. ********** The requirements for defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have many facets: a coherent policy, a confluent political strategy, traditional military and kinetic operations, and effective information warfare (TW) strategies. Despite their dominant role in ISIL's playbook, IW strategies are too often ignored. The group has used information warfare to expand its battlespace beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq to every television set on the planet--reaching anyone with Internet access. (1) American IW response must be as aggressive and strategic as kinetic military operations. Congress recognized the need to broaden military authority to counter ISIL messaging after US Special Operations Command commander General Joseph L. Votel argued the Department of Defense required more authority to counter recruitment and reduce the flow of foreign fighters. (2) This article, therefore, focuses on communication strategies and tactics the US military might employ in close coordination with kinetic operations as well as political and diplomatic efforts. We first examine the broader precepts governing information warfare, then apply them to define potential options for defeating ISIL. Fundamental Assumptions about Winning the War What steps will achieve battlefield dominance against ISIL in information warfare? One key lies in aligning a counter-ISIL narrative with our military objectives and the political goals of regional allies, which requires defining assumptions about US intentions. (3) First, battlefield victories--including victory in the information environment--are vital. Second, taking sides in the long-standing tensions between Sunnis and Shiites or making US policy the issue in the conflict should be voided. Third, the prominent public role Muslims should take in articulating a counter-narrative that discredits and delegitimizes the religious and political dogma of ISIL should be recognized. Public demonstrations denouncing ISIL require words and deeds to contribute significantly to success: Western countries should provide behind-the-scenes leadership and support, but Muslims must lead. The United States must clearly define the stakes, narratives, themes, and messengers, requiring careful target audience analysis (TAA) for language and content. (4) No single narrative or messenger fits every strategy. Components must be consistent, coordinated, and tailored to each target audience. Communication strategies must respect current political and military realities. Iraqi Sunnis comprehend ISIL brutality; however, they will not risk their lives to destroy ISIL to restore the status quo ante of Shiite repression. A winning IW strategy requires fresh approaches. Western commercial advertising methods do not work for politics or for changing behavior in military conflict zones. Consumers represent groups who have already decided to purchase. Brand advertising seeks to increase the hit rate of customers in a target group. A successful commercial ad campaign may change the minds of 10 percent of customers. But as Steve Tatham points out, a 10-percent change in the behavior of an insurgent group or hostile community is highly unlikely to be game changing in the context of the wider conflict. (5) The United States should not confuse political communication with commercial advertising. Branding and commercial advertising are the kiss of death for information warfare. Strategic Considerations for Information Warfare We define communication as words, deeds, images, or symbols that shape public opinion and attitudes to change behavior in order to achieve specific effects or end-states. …

Relevance. The experience of wars and armed conflicts of XX-XXI centuries. showed that during the conduct of hostilities before the command of the most acute issue is not only planning and carrying out operations, but also maintaining the moral and psychological state of the military staff, explaining to soldiers the objectives of combat operations, maintaining discipline and law and order. In this regard, the retrospective analysis of the activities carried out by the political management bodies of the Red Army in the period from May to October 1939 allows us to draw new lessons and conclusions necessary for the organisation of military-political work in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at their current stage of development.The purpose is to identify the peculiarities of changes in the party-political work in the units of the 1st Army Group during the armed conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol River.Objectives: to analyze the main directions of work of the apparatus of the chief of the RKKA GUPP in 1939, the peculiarities of agitation and propaganda work, rallying of military collectives, control over the moods of servicemen, suppression of crimes against military service.Methodology. The research is based on the principles of objectivity and historicism. The scientific toolkit of the work consists of the following methods of historical research: problem-chronological, historical-comparative, historical-genetic and historical-systemic.Results. Despite the fact that in 1939 the military-political organs of the Red Army were in a difficult situation due to the expansion of their powers and the lack of trained personnel, during the period of combat operations on the Khalkhin-Gol River the party-political work in the troops was able to quickly restructure itself in accordance with the conditions of combat operations, goals and tasks facing the Soviet armed forces. An important feature of it was the refusal to apply disciplinary and criminal liability for offences against military service.Conclusions. The activity of the KA GUPPP during the period of military operations on the river Khalkhin-Gol underwent a number of serious changes. If at the beginning of the conflict the political bodies acted in a rather formulaic way, then already by July 1939, a number of serious changes emergedthere was a need for reorientation of work among servicemen.

Those who plan or decide upon an attack in an armed conflict, including an attack involving a military space operation, shall do everything feasible to verify that the target is a military objective and is not subject to special protection. This Rule is based on Article 57(2)(a)(i) of Additional Protocol I and is generally accepted as customary international law applicable in international and most likely to non-international armed conflicts. The obligation is continuous and ongoing such that those who plan or decide upon an attack have a legal obligation based upon information reasonably available to them to do everything feasible in order to verify, at all times before the actual execution of the attack, that the military target/objective is indeed a military objective and is not subject to special protections.

Introduction. Tax audits are a crucial part of any country’s financial system, ensuring taxpayers comply with the law and pay their taxes on time. However, conducting tax audits during wartime can be complicated due to various factors. Ukraine, currently experiencing an extremely difficult period in its development due to the constant threat of war and geopolitical conflicts, serves as the context for this study. The purpose of the paper is to explore the unique challenges of conducting tax audits during wartime. It seeks to understand the changes in tax legislation and audit procedures during war, the increase in tax violations and abuses, and the challenges faced by fiscal authorities in ensuring tax compliance and maintaining budget stability. Results. The study reveals several key features of conducting tax audits during wartime, including changes in legislation, increased tax violations, challenges for fiscal authorities, and preparation for audits. Based on these findings, practical recommendations have been developed for businesses and taxpayers on preparing for tax audits during military operations. Conclusion. The paper concludes with the need for legislative adaptation, the use of technology to simplify the audit process, promoting transparency and mutual trust between tax authorities and taxpayers, and strengthening control over compliance with tax legislation. Despite the challenges that may arise during a state of war, compliance with tax legislation remains the obligation of every taxpayer.

In the paper I examine the tradeoffs typical of counterinsurgency warfare. I argue that counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real practice a counterinsurgent needs to choose two out of three. The impossible
\ntrilemma in counterinsurgency is that, in this type of conflict, it is impossible to
\nsimultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and noncombatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents

: Today, the United States has approximately 148,000 service members deployed or forward stationed in nearly 150 countries to support our nation s strategic political / military objectives. U.S. response to emerging megatrends of the 21st Century along with budgetary constraints suggests significant changes to this status quo. Consequently, U.S. force structure and training strategies must be nested with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) partners to achieve unity of effort throughout all phases of military operations to include efforts to shape and prevent likely irregular conflicts ahead. We must eliminate training gaps and exploit efficiencies gained through the last decade of war through utilization of lessons learned, Joint Doctrine, professional leadership development, and training efforts designed to achieve U.S. national goals and objectives. U.S. military forces must retain the capability to prevent, shape, and win our country s wars, but also must be prepared to execute stability operations through all phases of operations and be capable of transition into a supporting role to other USG agencies or multinational organizations.

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) declared cyberspace as an operational domain in 2011. The DoD subsequently formed US Cyber Command and the Cyber Mission Force to conduct operations to achieve national and military objectives in and through cyberspace. Since that time, the DoD has implemented and evolved through multiple command and control (C2) structures for cyberspace operations, derived from traditional military C2 doctrine, to achieve unity of effort across both the global cyberspace domain and with military operations in the physical domains (land, sea, air, and space). The DoD continues to struggle to adapt its C2 methods from the physical domains to the cyber domain. Applying traditional military C2 constructs to the cyberspace domain leads to several problems due to the uniqueness of cyberspace from the other domains. Cyberspace presents a very different operational environment than the physical domains, where time and space are compressed. In this paper, we describe the factors that make cyberspace different from the other operational domains and the challenges those differences impose on existing C2 constructs. We propose a campaign of experimentation, consisting of a series cyberspace C2 experiments, to address these challenges by conducting research into the taxonomy of C2 nodes, decisions, information, and relationships, which can be used to simulate and refine DoD cyberspace operations C2 constructs.

: This paper will address the type of strategic nuclear forces the United States will find most effective to best achieve nuclear deterrence over the next twenty years. I will use the approved National War College Framework for Military Strategy as a tool for examining the political objectives of our nuclear deterrent policy, the military objectives that will support those political objectives in the outyears, and the capabilities and vulnerabilities of both superpower arsenals. Finally, I will define the force structure required by the strategic plan to accomplish our objectives and discuss the potential results. Before looking at the political objectives of our deterrent policy, I feel it appropriate to point out the curious aspects of discussing a military strategy that depends for its success on never being proven out. In many cases, the successful application of a military strategy requires hostilities to exist -- the military strategy of the Allied Powers to defeat the Axis Powers in World War If being a case in point -- and involves the use of force to cause the enemy to do something he would not otherwise want to do. Judging our nuclear deterrent strategy of the past four decades as successful implies that the Soviets would have initiated a nuclear war had our strategic forces not existed. This is an implication that absolutely cannot be proven to be true, yet it is the very basis of our stated need for a triad of forces capable of devastating the Soviet Union. Whatever future strategy the United States pursues to deter a major nuclear war with the Soviets, it will only be successful if such a war does not occur. Therefore the strategy must be one of war prevention. This does not mean, however, that we should concentrate on cost issues and ignore the warfighting capabilities of these forces. Rather, we must field affordable forces that guarantee a great amount of credible retaliatory capability regardless of the mode of attack the Soviets choose.