구조상, 이용상 독립성이 없는 구분건물의 인도청구에 대한 최근 대법원판결의 분석

BackgroundThe purpose of the present study was to obtain information on the use of PD-1/PD-L1 inhibitors by oncologists in China through a national questionnaire survey.MethodsBetween the 7th and 25th of July in 2019, a questionnaire designed by the Chinese Society of Clinical Oncology Immuno-Oncology (CSCO IO) Committee on the current status of the use of PD-1/PD-L1 inhibitors was distributed online and offline to cancer-related medical departments in thirty different provinces and autonomous regions of China. The national questionnaire consisted of three sections as follows: general information, current status of the application of PD-1/PD-L1 inhibitors in the clinic, and oncologists’ concerns regarding utilization.ResultsThe valid response rate of the current status survey was 76.3%. The proportion of senior doctors (physician-in-charge or a more superior position for more than 3 years) among the respondents was relatively high (67.0% in 588). Of the respondents, 59.2% had prescribed PD-1/PD-L1 inhibitors during clinical treatment, and the most frequent reason for not prescribing these inhibitors was the choice “do not understand the mechanism and the efficacy of PD-1/PD-L1 inhibitors”. In addition, 77.9% of the prescribers used the medications in an off-label situation, and the most important motivation for this use was the fact that “there were indications abroad but not domestically”. In addition, 77.9% of the prescribers believed that “immunotherapy-related adverse effects could be controlled or intervened through follow-up management”. The prescribers were mostly concerned about “how to identify pseudoprogression and hyperprogression” and “immunity-related adverse effects management”.ConclusionThe present study highlights the current status of PD-1/PD-L1 inhibitors in China. Increasing numbers of medical oncologists are interested in PD-1/PD-L1 inhibitors, and they are in need of immunotherapy education.

Roe v Wade, Dobbs, and the Future of Graduate Medical Education.

Clinical Practice Guidelines and Recommendations: Room for Dissent?

There are five major Supreme Court precedents related to inheritance and gift taxes for 2022. In this article, the above five precedents were divided into facts, issues, the position of the Supreme Court, and the significance and evaluation of the judgment in chronological order.
 First of all, the Supreme Court's ruling on March 11, 2022, on whether to invalidate the enforcement ordinance related to Article 41 (1) of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act, reaffirmed the position of the Supreme Court's ruling of 2015Du45700 on April 20, 2017 and the Supreme Court's decision of 2019Du35695 on September 9, 2021. The above judgment is valid in that the scope of gifts through corporations is limited through interpretation. However, it is necessary to review whether it is right to follow the materiality and clarity test of the illegality of administrative disposition.
 Second, the Supreme Court's ruling on the taxation and additional tax on the deeming property registered in name of another person to have been donated related to the acquisition of new stocks on September 15, 2022 is about the legal interpretation of the old tax and gift tax law in which the gift tax payer was in principle a trustee at the time of title trust. The target judgment judged that the case in which the title truster acquired new shares as collateral and transferred them under the same person's name, but before the transfer was made, the case in which the loan was repaid with the sale price of the existing title trust shares was not different. From the perspective of sanctions on the total amount of property that is difficult to grasp by title trust, it must be judged as the subject judgment. In addition, it was confirmed for the first time that the subject judgment should be based on the name trustee to determine whether the additional tax is imposed based on the taxpayer. If the above logic is applied to the current tax increase law, it should be judged based on the title truster who is liable for tax payment.
 Third, the Supreme Court's 2022Du33712 ruling on the scope of cancellation of disposition on May 26, 2022 reaffirms the previous precedent (Supreme Court March 28, 1997) that only the portion exceeding the legitimate tax amount should be canceled if the lawsuit for cancellation of the tax disposition exists. It is reasonable in that there is no need to appeal again for parts that exceed the legitimate tax amount.
 Fourth, the Supreme Court's ruling on November 10, 2022, 2020Du52214 is a precedent on whether to recognize self-gifts related to Article 45-3 of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act (before amended by Act No. 13557 on December 15, 2015). The above ruling is the first case in which the donor and the recipient cannot be said to be the same, even though the controlling shareholders of the beneficiary corporation are shareholders of a related corporation at the same time. Given that agenda regulations that are disadvantageous to taxpayers need to be interpreted in a limited way, it is necessary to review whether the above judgment is correct.
 Finally, the Supreme Court's decision on December 29, 2022 on the method of calculating gift profits according to the comprehensive exchange of stocks followed the previous precedent (the Supreme Court's decision on March 29, 2018) that gift taxes should be levied by applying Article 42 (1) 3 of the former Inheritance Tax Act. In addition, the target judgment clarified the application of Article 31-9(2)5(b) of the Enforcement Decree of the former Inheritance Tax Act (before amended by Presidential Decree No. 20621 on February 22, 2008), which is the basis for calculating the gift property value of a company that becomes a full subsidiary due to stock exchange.

Background. In accordance with the norms of national legislation, the conclusions of the Supreme Court regarding the application of certain norms of law must be taken into account by courts of general jurisdiction when applying such norms of law. Thus, the article addresses the theoretical and legal analysis of the institution of legal opinion of the Supreme Court as a unique act of law enforcement in the national judicial system. Methods. The empirical scientific method (observation) was used in the part of the study of the practice of taking into account conclusions from the Supreme Court decisions by the courts; theoretical and scientific methods (proposing hypotheses and theories, analysis, synthesis, abstraction) in the part of identifying categories of improper (defective) consideration of conclusions from the Supreme Court decisions. The method of scientific modeling is used in the part of determining ways to solve the problematic issues raised in the article. Results. Emphasis is placed on the problem of the insufficiency of the definitions in relation to legal regulation of the legal opinion of the Supreme Court. The article highlights problematic issues related to taking into account the conclusions from the decisions of the Supreme Court: 1) the problem of dividing such conclusions into those that directly affect the outcome of the proceedings, and those that do not have such an impact on the outcome; 2) the problem of taking into account the conclusions expressed without due consideration of the actual circumstances and/or legislation; 3) the problem of the defectiveness of conclusions relating to legal prescriptions that have lost their validity or have been changed, and conclusions from which the Supreme Court deviated; 4) the problem of taking into account conclusions from Supreme Court decisions retrospectively (backward in time). The analysis of the indicated problems was carried out on the basis of theoretical provisions, court practice and partially foreign experience of law enforcement. Conclusions. Based on the practice of courts of general jurisdiction, the practice of the Supreme Court on the above-mentioned problems, attention is focused on cases of formal consideration of conclusions from Supreme Court decisions, own conclusions are put forward and models for solving problematic issues are proposed.

The Supreme Court's decisions dealing with civil liberties in the ten years under review fall into four groups: (1) cases involving the rights protected by the First Amendment—freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly; (2) those concerned with racial discrimination; (3) cases enlarging the power of the federal government to protect civil rights against invasion by private persons; (4) war-time cases arising out of conflicts between civil liberty and military power. Decisions dealing with procedural due process and other rights of those accused of crime are discussed in another part of this symposium.I. FIRST AMENDMENT—FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH, PRESS, AND ASSEMBLYDuring the decade we are examining, the Supreme Court not only has decided a substantial number of cases involving freedom of speech, press, and religion, but it has developed a new and important judicial philosophy or doctrine with respect to them. In this judicial doctrine, three principles are fused. The first is that the four liberties protected by the First Amendment are so indispensable to the democratic process and to the preservation of the freedom of our people that they occupy a preferred place in our scheme of constitutional values.

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article ArticleNo AccessAlcoholism—The Supreme Court DecisionDANA L. FARNSWORTHDANA L. FARNSWORTHSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:1 Apr 2006https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.125.6.826AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail "Alcoholism—The Supreme Court Decision." American Journal of Psychiatry, 125(6), pp. 826–827 Access content To read the fulltext, please use one of the options below to sign in or purchase access. Personal login Institutional Login Sign in via OpenAthens Purchase Save for later Item saved, go to cart PPV Articles - American Journal of Psychiatry $35.00 Add to cart PPV Articles - American Journal of Psychiatry Checkout Please login/register if you wish to pair your device and check access availability. Not a subscriber? Subscribe Now / Learn More PsychiatryOnline subscription options offer access to the DSM-5 library, books, journals, CME, and patient resources. This all-in-one virtual library provides psychiatrists and mental health professionals with key resources for diagnosis, treatment, research, and professional development. Need more help? PsychiatryOnline Customer Service may be reached by emailing [email protected] or by calling 800-368-5777 (in the U.S.) or 703-907-7322 (outside the U.S.). FiguresReferencesCited byDetailsCited ByThe American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, Vol. 7, No. 1 Volume 125Issue 6 December 1968Pages 826-827 Metrics PDF download History Published online 1 April 2006 Published in print 1 December 1968

The Supreme Court Decision No. 23P/HUM/2024 on the minimum age limit for regional head candidates has come under scrutiny due to its impact on legal principles, politics, and public trust. This research discusses the application of power theory in the decision, highlighting the role of the Supreme Court as a guardian of the rule of law and the principle of checks and balances. Using a qualitative method, this research analyses the legal process, impact, and public response to the ruling, which stipulates that a candidate's age is calculated from the time of inauguration, not determination. This decision has raised pros and cons: on the one hand, it is considered inclusive of the younger generation, but on the other hand, it has triggered accusations of political manipulation. The survey showed that the majority of the public understood the importance of the Supreme Court's involvement in maintaining justice, despite concerns about the transparency of the process. The conclusion underscores the importance of caution in the formation of regulations to reflect legal integrity and maintain public trust.

There is legal chaos in the national Superfund. The Supreme Court reversed decisions of eleven federal circuit courts in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. There is no instance in modern Supreme Court history where the Court reversed every federal circuit court in the country, as it did in Atlantic Research. The Supreme Court’s reversal was through a unanimous decision. This was extraordinary: It not only reversed the entire legal interpretation of one of America’s most critical statutes, but also re-allocated billions of dollars among private parties. The Supreme Court, when it rendered its decision, seemed to be rectifying a bottleneck in Superfund remediation of hazardous waste. However, in the decade since this Supreme Court decision, several federal trial and circuit courts have circumvented the Supreme Court command. This article illustrates how the lower federal courts have done this without violating Article III of the Constitution, by re-defining a one-word term. The practical impact has been chaos in hazardous substance remediation across the U.S., affecting an estimated 600,000 contaminated waste sites. There are huge dollar impacts: addressing the 350,000 remaining contaminated sites in the U.S. would cost up to one-quarter trillion dollars, or an expenditure of $6-8 billion annually. This Article analyzes how the lower federal courts have circumvented the Supreme Court decisions, with particular focus on decisions and legal prestidigitation in the most recent four years. This lower court inversion of the law is without much basis in law, and resurrects exactly what the Supreme Court thought it had overruled unanimously. What transpired in enforcement in the lower courts is not what the Supreme Court’s opinion contemplated. This Article examines the method by which the lower federal courts have created an ongoing legal mechanism to circumvent the most important Supreme Court holding in a critical area of the economy.

SHE RECOGNITION that we need to look beyond the Supreme Court in order to obtain a realistic understanding of the American judicial system is not new. In the 1950s Jack Peltason' and Walter Murphy2 conceptualized this system in terms of a bureaucratic structure in which the Supreme Court, much like any high level decision-maker, faces a problem of achieving acceptance of and compliance with its decisions by lower level officials under its jurisdiction. While this approach has been utilized in research on the lower federal courts,3 it has not been generally applied to state courts. Rather the work on state courts has been limited to individual courts or comparisons of a small number of state courts without regard for their relationship to the Supreme Court.4 Paralleling this development, there has been a growing concern with the analysis of the impact of Supreme Court decisions, a concern with the effect of these decisions on the institutions and the problems to which they are directed. Despite the large number of impact studies that have been produced to date, however, state supreme courts have been largely ignored.5 This omission is particularly unfortunate in the field of criminal procedure, an area in which the Supreme Court has been attempting to institute fundamental changes at the trial court level. State supreme courts are of vital significance in this area for they interpret Supreme Court decisions and apply them within their own states. In this capacity the state supreme courts serve as a mediating force between the Supreme Court and its decisions at the national level and the trial courts, which are subject to local pressures that often run counter to the decisions of the Supreme Court. If changes in criminal procedure are to be meaningful at

대법원 2010. 12. 16.ﾠ선고ﾠ2010도5986ﾠ전원합의체 판결; 2013. 4. 18.ﾠ자 2011초기689ﾠ전원합의체 결정; 2013. 5. 16.ﾠ선고ﾠ2011도2631ﾠ전원합의체 판결 은 유신헌법 시행 당시의 대통령 긴급조치가 위헌이라고 하였다. 그런데 대법원 2014. 10. 27. 선고 2013다217962 판결은, 긴급조치 제9호에 의하여 수사를 진행하고 공소를 제기한 수사기관의 직무행위나 유죄판결을 선고한 법관의 재판상 직무행위는 공무원의 고의 또는 과실에 의한 불법행위에 해당하지 않는다고 하였고, 대법원ﾠ2015. 3. 26.ﾠ선고ﾠ2012다48824ﾠ판결은, 대통령의 긴급조치 발령이 국민 개개인에 대한 관계에서 민사상 불법행위를 구성한다고는 볼 수 없다고 하였다. 그러나 대상판결인 대법원 2022. 8. 30. 선고 2018다212610 전원합의체 판결은 위 두 개의 판례를 변경하여, 긴급조치로 인한 국가배상책임을 인정하였다. 이 글에서는 위 2018다212610 전원합의체 판결을 분석한다. 그 분석의 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 위 판결은 대통령의 위헌인 긴급조치 발령을 국회의 위헌법률 제정과 다르게 보았다. 그러나 국가배상책임의 성립에 관하여는 양자를 같이 취급하여야 한다. 둘째, 위 판결은 대통령의 긴급조치 발령 자체가 독립적인 불법행위가 되는지에 대하여는 명확한 태도를 밝히지 않았다. 그러나 당시 박정희 대통령은 긴급조치가 위헌임을 알면서도 긴급조치를 발령하였으므로 고의가 있었고, 따라서 대법원으로서는 박정희 대통령의 긴급조치 선포가 불법행위임을 명확히 하였어야 할 것이다. 셋째, 위 판결의 다수의견은 긴급조치에 근거하여 유죄판결을 내린 법관들의 불법행위책임에 대하여는 언급하고 있지 않다. 당시 유신헌법 제53조 제4항은 긴급조치에 대한 사법심사를 배제하고 있었으므로, 법관들의 불법행위책임은 인정되기 어렵다. 넷째, 위 판결은 광범위한 다수 공무원이 관여한 일련의 국가작용에 의한 기본권 침해에 대해서 국가배상책임의 성립이 문제되는 경우에는 전체적으로 보아 객관적 주의의무 위반이 인정되면 충분하다는 이유로 국가배상책임을 인정하였다. 그러나 유신헌법 제53조 제4항을 고려하면 대통령 아닌 개별 공무원들의 불법행위를 인정할 수 없고, 단지 다수 공무원이 관여하였다고 하여 국가배상책임을 인정한다는 것은 논리적으로 맞지 않는다. 결국 대상판결의 결론은 수긍할 수 있으나, 그 이유 설명은 설득력이 부족하다.On December 16, 2010, the Korean Supreme Court, by its en banc decision, declared that Presidential Emergency Decree No. 1, enacted on January 8, 1974 was unconstitutional. In 2013, another series of en banc decisions by the Court held that Presidential Emergency Decree No. 9, enacted on April 3, 1974 and Presidential Emergency Decree No. 4, enacted on May 13, 1975 were unconstitutional. However, the Korean Supreme Court decided on October 27, 2014 decided that the officers act of investigating and prosecuting according to the Presidential Emergency Decree No. 9 did not constitute torts. And The Supreme Court decision on March 26, 2015 opined that the enactment of Presidential Emergency Decree No. 9 by the then president did not constitute a tort. Recently, however, Korean Supreme Court en banc decision on August 30, 2022 overruled theses 2 decisions and recognized the Korean Government’s state liability because of the Presidential Emergency Decree. This article analyzes this en banc decision. Firstly, this decision treated the unconstitutional Presidential Emergency Decree differently from the unconstitutional law by the legislature. However, in relation to the state liability, these two must be treated equally. Secondly, this decision did not expressly stated whether the proclamation of the Presidential Emergency Decrees by the President Park Chung-hee was an independent tort or not. However, President Park Chung-hee proclaimed the Presidential Emergency Decrees, knowing the unconstitutionality of the Decrees. So the Supreme Court should make it clear that the proclamation of the Presidential Emergency Decrees was an independent tort by itself. Thirdly, the majority opinion denied the responsibility of judges who convicted defendants according to the Presidential Emergency Decrees. This result can be accepted, as the Article 53 Paragrph 4 of the Constitution at that time (the so called Yushin Constitution) excluded the judicial review of the Presidential Emergency Decrees. Fourthly, this decision opined that in cases where the violation of fundamental rights resulted from the state’s continuing acts by multiple public offcials occurred, the state liability could be recognized if the overall breach of objective duty of care existed. However, it is not logical to recognize the state liability on the ground that multiple public officials were related, even though torts of the individual public officials could not be ascertained. So the result of the decision is acceptable. However, the reasoning is not persuasive.

Issuance of a State Administrative Decree by the Regional Secretariat of Central Java Province to people with disabilities on behalf of M. Baihaqi who was considered discriminatory during the 2019 Central Java National Civil Service Candidate selection who was declared not to have passed due to the requirements for the type of disability and educational qualifications being inappropriate. Administrative efforts have been taken to regain his rights but have been unsuccessful. Until finally resorting to litigation by filing a lawsuit with PTUN Semarang and an appeal to PT TUN Surabaya but it was declared not accepted. Then in the cassation the Supreme Court granted all the claims and asked the defendant to revoke the issued State Administrative Decree and process M. Baihaqi's in the Central Java National Civil Service Candidate selection 2019. The research method used is normative juridical with statutory, conceptual and case approaches. The research results show that the fulfillment of the constitutional rights of persons with disabilities in the 2019 Central Java Civil Servant Candidate Selection is considered not optimal because the solution provided by the defendant as an implementation of the Supreme Court's decision is not in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision.

This paper was originally delivered in July of 1975, within a few weeks of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody. The law, of course, does not stand still. Less than a year after the Albemarle decision, the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis appeared to turn sharply away from the proposition that the EEOC guidelines are to be applied mechanically as the only legal touchstone of the job relatedness of a test. The Washington decision contains many obscurities and ambiguities, and at the time of writing (October 1976) it appears that at least one more Supreme Court case will be necessary in order to clarify this question. Though the present paper is outdated in some respects because of the Washington decision, it is hoped that it will continue to be of interest for the light it may shed on the interrelationship between the practice of industrial psychology and the judicial process in operation.

The California Recall Punch Card Litigation: Why Bush v. Gore Does Not Suck

There are over 570 federally-recognized Tribal Nations in the United States and more than 330 tribal courts serving as the judicial branch of those nations. Yet, there is little mention of the existence of tribal courts in most mainstream civil procedure courses taught in the over 200 law schools in the United States. To gain any knowledge as to the existence of these courts, law students must take a course on federal Indian law, which is not available in the majority of law schools. In fact, less than twenty law schools offer a series of courses forming an Indian law program. Thus, the invisibility of tribal courts is perpetuated through curriculum omission in mainstream civil procedure courses and rarely remedied through offering a stand-alone course on federal Indian law. Tribal Nations have existed from time immemorial with their own laws, dispute resolution systems, and governing structures. This lack of attention and suppression of information serves only to reinforce colonizing ideas of subsuming tribal governance into the forums set up by the United States. This article will discuss the history of formal tribal courts as first established to control American Indian populations in the late 1800s. As tools of oppression, the first judicial forums established on American Indian reservations were the Code of Indian Offenses Courts, also known as the C.F.R. Courts (Code of Federal Regulations Courts). The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 signaled a shift in policy which provided for the adoption of tribal constitutions. Under the Department of Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel developed boilerplate constitutions for adoption by Tribal Nations. These constitutions often included provisions for the establishment of tribal courts. Through U.S. Supreme Court decisions and federal laws, the criminal and civil jurisdiction of tribal courts has been limited. The U.S. Supreme Court has also opined that the U.S. Congress holds plenary authority over American Indian Tribes. Utilizing this authority, the U.S. Congress has legislated federal criminal jurisdiction as concurrent on all tribal lands with tribal court jurisdiction and has provided a mechanism to delegate federal criminal jurisdiction to state legal systems. In the civil jurisdiction sphere, the U.S. Supreme Court has established processes for federal courts to review tribal civil jurisdiction determinations and for the refiling of cases from tribal courts to federal courts based on the status of civil defendants as non-Indians or non-members. Following a discussion on the history and function of tribal courts, this article will examine the limitations on tribal court civil jurisdiction set forth in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Through a critical examination of the U.S. authority and legal basis for review of tribal court determinations or decisions, this article will provide commentary on the ungrounded nature of the assertion of U.S. federal court review over tribal court decision-making. Finally, the article will recommend a government-to-government treaty agreement to set the framework for civil jurisdictional issues arising between Tribal Nations and the United States.