Оценка роли философии и методологии естественных наук в развитии биологии

Notes on Contributors

Psychologists are familiar with ‘cheap and dirty’ or ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics, typically efficient but imperfectly reliable ways of solving problem. Much human cognition relies on them, and many seem to be humanly universal. Nevertheless, we are often unaware of using them. This chapter argues that general cognitive heuristics are responsible for philosophical paradoxes just as heuristics built into our visual system are responsible for visual illusions. Examples include paradoxes about vagueness and sorites series; identity over time; conditionals; ascriptions of belief and other intentional attitudes; disquotational principles about truth and falsity; weighing reasons and intersectionality. Heuristics can also deceive us into accepting erroneous counterexamples to philosophical principles. The proper response to such challenges is not scepticism (any more than visual illusions warrant scepticism about visual perception) but a more sophisticated treatment of our evidence in philosophy, just as naïve falsificationism is not the methodology of natural science.

The article is oriented forward to folk notes of Petro Ivanov. It must be stressed that authentic folklore notes are of considerable interest to representative of various scientific fields. They are trying to explore the results of understanding folk life, environment etc. The article stresses that Ivanov's scientific heritage represents folklore of the territory of Kupyanshchyna of the 19th – 20th centuries. Over a long period he recorded folk materials of the one small territory. His records demonstrate the domination of traditions of Ukrainian culture. He showed the household and spiritual life of the population of the investigated territory. However, fixed materials turned out to be greater even in comparison with the collections at that time. Folklorist used the methodology of natural sciences. He fixed all the existing texts and not only ideal from the editor's point of view. The emphasis has been placed on significant part of his notes represented by folk signs of this territory. These are the largest volumes of Peter Ivanov's published materials. Fixed folklore materials show the dominance of dualistic worldview of that time peasantry. Folklore records emphasize the peculiarity of the perception of the environment, life, social life, mythology. Separately, it is worth emphasizing the originality of certain works that are not inherent in the folklore of other territories. The material investigated demonstrates that the records of Petrо Ivanov about the fate are authentic and do not have similarly published folk collections. Folklorist discovered a certain identity of the images of the fate, the house and the soul of man in folk views. In general this analysis shows that Ivanov's notes of folk signs give opportunity to modern researchers to obtain important information about cognition, demonstrate the popularity of this genre in the 19th century. To summarize it is worth emphasizing on originality of certain texts that are not inherent in the folklore of other territories.

Does Germany Need a (New) Research Ethics for the Social Sciences?

Work has been ongoing, at least since Newton's Principia, to develop a science of life and social phenomena equivalent to the natural sciences such as physics and chemistry. Currently, such a science does not exist. This paper provides the foundation for a science of life and society. The hypothesis of this paper is that the methodologies used to develop the extant natural sciences can be used as a model for developing a natural (hard) life and social science. The natural sciences are typified by identification of fundamental phenomena, measurement of and measurement units for these phenomena and formal equations for the relations among these phenomena. Information is identified as a fundamental phenomenon of life. The natural science methodology is used to develop units of measure for information, and formal equations are developed among behaviours, structural characteristics, available energy and information. This paper shows that information is a measurable universal phenomenon that causes the behaviours of living systems. These developments validate the hypothesis and provide the foundation for natural living systems science. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The history of psychoanalytic education is fraught with controversy. Its difficulties have been described for so many years that one might wonder how our field has survived. Remarkably for a profession that advocates a multi-deterministic understanding of causality, the usual sole explanation for the multitude of problems besetting psychoanalytic education is to blame the training analyst (TA) system. But blaming the TA system focuses on a symptom, not the underlying causes of our regular and ongoing battles about how to educate fledgling psychoanalysts. One must assume that there are multiple and complex underlying reasons for this situation given the psychoanalytic principle of multiple function. This chapter describes two contributors to dissension: (1) ambiguity about whether we are a guild or a scholarly discipline, and (2) disagreement about whether our discipline is a natural science or a hermeneutic one. It is suggested that most of the models comprising psychoanalysis (of the mind, of development, of pathogenesis) can be studied using natural science methodology. And scientific study of outcome research can also clarify our model of therapeutic action. But understanding actual therapeutic process may require a hermeneutic approach. Clarifying these disagreements may reduce the amount of dissension about our educational attempts.

Philosophy of science has a crucial role in building a framework of thinking that underlies the development of scientific research methods. This article aims to examine this role by highlighting three main aspects of the philosophy of science, namely ontology, epistemology and axiology, as a basis for the research process. This research uses a qualitative approach with a literature study method, analyzing relevant literature and philosophical theories of science. The study stages include explaining the relationship between philosophy of science and scientific methods, critical evaluation of the contribution of philosophy of science in validating and developing research methods, as well as examining the strengthening of philosophy in contemporary research practice. The results of the discussion show that the philosophy of science helps researchers clarify basic research concepts, determine appropriate paradigms, and ensure coherence between research objectives and the methods used. In addition, the philosophy of science encourages critical reflection on the basic assumptions of research so as to produce methods that are more relevant and adaptive to changes in the scientific context. The main conclusion of this article is that philosophy of science serves not only as a theoretical framework, but also as a practical tool in making methodological decisions, ultimately improving the quality and integrity of scientific research. This article is relevant for academics, researchers and practitioners who wish to deepen their understanding of the relationship between philosophy of science and research methods. ABSTRAKFilsafat ilmu memiliki peran krusial dalam membangun kerangka berpikir yang mendasari pengembangan metode penelitian ilmiah. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji peran tersebut dengan menyoroti tiga aspek utama filsafat ilmu, yaitu ontologi, epistemologi, dan aksiologi, sebagai landasan dalam proses penelitian. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan metode studi pustaka, menganalisis literatur dan teori-teori filsafat ilmu yang relevan. Tahapan kajian meliputi identifikasi hubungan antara filsafat ilmu dan metode ilmiah, evaluasi kritis terhadap kontribusi filsafat ilmu dalam validasi dan pengembangan metode penelitian, serta penelaahan terhadap implikasi filosofis pada praktik penelitian kontemporer. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa filsafat ilmu membantu peneliti dalam memperjelas konsep dasar penelitian, menentukan paradigma yang sesuai, dan memastikan koherensi antara tujuan penelitian dengan metode yang digunakan. Selain itu, filsafat ilmu mendorong refleksi kritis terhadap asumsi-asumsi dasar penelitian sehingga menghasilkan metode yang lebih relevan dan adaptif terhadap perubahan konteks ilmiah. Simpulan utama dari artikel ini adalah bahwa filsafat ilmu tidak hanya berperan sebagai kerangka teoritis, tetapi juga sebagai alat praktis dalam pengambilan keputusan metodologis, yang pada akhirnya meningkatkan kualitas dan integritas penelitian ilmiah. Artikel ini relevan bagi akademisi, peneliti, dan praktisi yang ingin memperdalam pemahaman tentang hubungan antara filsafat ilmu dan metode penelitian.

This article discusses the philosophy of science and the development of the scientific method, between the philosophy of science and the scientific method has a close relationship. Philosophy of science cannot be separated from scientific rules relating to the scientific method used, and the scientific method is the key word in science. Some of the problems that can become material for the study of scientific activity thinking are all activities related to the universe and its contents while it can be observed (observable) indirectly or directly by utilizing methods and means of assistance, as well as measurable. In order for a science to have an object and scientific method, it must meet several requirements which include the following dimensions/aspects. namely: (1) the ontological aspect (2) the epistemological aspect (3) the axiological aspect. The mindset in the scientific approach consists of an inductive mindset and a deductive mindset. The steps in the scientific method include: Formulating problems, conducting literature studies, formulating hypotheses, testing hypotheses, collecting data, analyzing and interpreting data, and drawing conclusions. There are two types of scientific research methods, namely qualitative methods and quantitative methods. Types of qualitative research are generally divided into narrative research, phenomenology, ethnography, case studies, grounded theory, participatory action, discourse analysis, document / text / heurmenetic studies, natural observations, centralized interviews, reasoned theory, historical studies, while quantitative research in general include: Descriptive Research, Relationship Research, Correlation Research, Experimental Research, Laboratory, Case Studies, Surrvey, Action Research field, Class Action research, Research development, evaluatif.analytic descriptive.

В статье основное внимание уделяется анализу проблем о роли философии в естествознании, в частности диалектического характера изучаемых современным естествознанием объектов и диалектических способов воспроизведения их в научных понятиях и представлениях. Причем некоторые вопросы о значении философии для естествознания в статье подтверждаются высказываниями выдающихся естественников XX века. The article focuses on the analysis of problems about the role of philosophy in natural science, in particular the dialectical nature of the objects studied by modern natural science and dialectical ways of reproducing them in scientific concepts and representations. Moreover, some questions about the importance of philosophy for natural science in the article are confirmed by the statements of outstanding natural scientists of the XX century.

This publication is a Russian translation of F. Gironi’s paper devoted to a panoramic survey of attempts to relativize Kantian ideas about a priori knowledge. Gironi reconstructs various approaches and interpretations, focusing on the ideas of C. I. Lewis, H. Reichenbach, W. Sellars, and M. Friedman within the context of scientific realism, and relates such forms of dynamic Kantianism to recent speculative projects based on a critique or rejection of Kant’s legacy. In doing so, the author argues that Kant’s ideas on a priori conceptual structures form the core of debates about the role of philosophy vis-a-vis science, as opposed to variants of metaphysics and philosophy of science, which replace the so-called correlationist paradigm of transcendental critique with unconstrained speculation that falls out of step with the realities of modern science. The naturalized Kantianism of W. Sellars appears to be the most promising starting point for subsequent speculative – and transcendental – endeavours in the field of conceptualizing meta-conceptual frameworks that would meet the need to regulate and systematize the reality of scientific discourse. This is precisely what speculative realism, consistent with what we owe to Kant’s philosophy, is supposed to be.

In this paper I defend an etiological theory of biological functions (according to which the proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection) against three objections which have been influential. I argue, contrary to Millikan, that it is wrong to base our defense of the theory on a rejection of conceptual analysis, for conceptual analysis does have an important role in philosophy of science. I also argue that biology requires a normative notion of a “proper function”, and that a normative notion is not ahistorical.

I shall attempt to demonstrate here that the general categories of hermeneutics can be applied just as well to the natural sciences as to the humanities, and I shall explore the implications of this demonstration for both types of disciplines. In doing so, it will be necessary for me to raise some unfashionable issues about the objectivity and rationality of critical interpretations, and, as a result, I may appear to be cast in the role of advocatus diaboli. The value of lowering the critical barriers that have been set up between the human and natural sciences, however, will outweigh any incidental paradoxes that may crop up en route.

ConclusionWe personally have found the card exchange activity to be an effective method of drawing our students into the philosophy of science, a subject they heretofore resisted. It capitalizes on the innate gregariousness of students and the diversity of opinion among students. A set induction is, however, only the beginning of a lesson. The effectiveness of what happens afterwards depends on how well one can hold the attention captured during the set induction. Obviously there is a need for many creative instructional strategies if the philosophical preparation of preservice science teachers is to be effective.

The modern philosophy of science is genetically related to the formed in the modern era classical philosophy of science. The latter, in turn, was formed under the influence of developments in the New European (“new”) science in the late 16th – 18th centuries. The new European science has acquired the status of classical one, because it is the initial stage of the modern type of science. The distinctive feature of this modern type is that experiment has become its basis and method. The article reveals the specifics of experiment as an activity associated with the search for facts that can confirm or refute an assumption/theory/law. An overview of the emergence of the experimental method in natural science and humanities is carried out. The concepts of Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and Immanuel Kant are considered as varieties of classical philosophy of science. It is concluded that in the case of Francis Bacon, the philosophy of science represents a methodology of science, extremely approximated to and aimed at the objective world studied by science, revealing the laws of experimental activity and the rules of the method of induction, which make exploration of nature possible. This type of philosophy of science runs from Francis Bacon to Auguste Comte and the whole positivist tradition. The second type of classical philosophy of science constitutes the axiomatic-deductive methodology of science. It has its origin in the philosophy of René Descartes and brings science and philosophy quite closely together, since in this methodology it is philosophy that sets the fundamentals/axioms of the deductive method. This branch leads to Hegel and the phenomenological tradition. Immanuel Kant builds a critical methodology that claims to overcome the limitations of both empirical-inductive and axiomatic-deductive methodologies. In this methodology, experiment is comprehended through such a concept as “the limits of possible experience”. A peculiar continuation of the Kantian variety of the philosophy of science is the critical rationalism by Karl Popper.

In the second half of the 20th century, the crisis of positivism led to the rise of new directions in the philosophy of science. In the same period many economists expressed an increasing dissatisfaction with the so far dominant economic paradigms. The aim of this paper is to point out the relation between the main trends in the philosophy of science and the debate on the nature and the method of economics. The paper will review the main thesis of logical empiricism, proposed by Hutchison as research guidelines in the field of economics, and the transition from verificationism to Popper's falsicationism. It will then examine how the empirical-deductive method of positivism was interpreted by Friedman and Samuelson, who many consider the main exponents of neo-classic economics. With Kuhn and Lakatos, the emphasis of the «new» philosophy of sciences shifts from what scientists «should do» to what they actually «do» in the research practice. Another important evolution occurs with the works of Feyerabend and Rorty and the emergence of «post-modernist» trends, which deny any a kind of epistemology and maintain that a theory is acceptable only inasmuch it is endorsed by the scientific community. The relation between these radical changes in the philosophy of sciences and the debate on the methods and status of economics is complex. Heterodoxes economic theories, wishing to address the crisis of mainstream economics and the «economists' uneasiness», do not imply a refusal of positivism, and «post-modernist» approach had a limited appeal among economists. The paper presents the contributions of McCloskey and Rosenberg, two economists who particularly developed the arguments against positivist epistemology applied to economics, but it observes that, if interesting, such ideas do not provide a solid enough basis to overcome neoclassical orthodoxy. The conclusions briefly examine a still evolving and promising research approach, the «critical realism» recently promoted by the «Cambridge Group», which links criticism to the empiricaldeductive method with the proposal of alternative economic theories.