Золотое правило и принцип справедливости в этике Генри Сиджвика

It is a striking fact that the two leading egalitarian liberals of recent times, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, deploy hypothetical reasoning in their somewhat different conceptions of justice. As is well known, Rawls uses the device of the original position in which representatives must choose between candidate principles of social justice – in the first instance, between the principles Rawls favors, the two principles of justice, and utilitarianism. Principles of justice, he argues, are those that would be chosen by representatives charged with the duty of securing their clients’ enjoyment of primary social goods while lacking particular information about their clients’ characteristics, including their socioeconomic class, natural talent, sex, race, and conception of what it means to live well. True, Rawls nests what I shall call the original position argument within a more general moral methodology of “reflective equilibrium” in which we reason about political morality by seeking consistency between our abstract and concrete considered judgments about justice in the light of the leading alternative moral theories available to us. However, the original position argument plays a central role in Rawls's distinctive conception of justice, justice as fairness. He recommends the original position as a thought experiment to be used when theorizing the demands of justice. Just terms of cooperation should be viewed as if they stemmed from an agreement between citizens, but the agreement must be one not reached out of fear or because of one's poor bargaining position. The agreement we are after is a hypothetical agreement: an agreement that would be made by representatives in the original position who were deprived of certain kinds of information the use of which would tend to render the agreement unfair.

One approach to legal theory is to provide some sort of rational reconstruction of all or of a large body of the common law. For philosophers of law this has usually meant trying to rationalize a body of law under one or another principle of justice. This paper explores the efforts of the leading tort theorists to provide a moral basis - in the sense of rational reconstruction based on alleged moral principles - for the law of torts. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I consider and reject the view that tort law is best understood as falling either within the ambit of the principle of retributive justice, a comprehensive theory of moral responsibility, or an ideal of fairness inherent in the idea that one should impose on others only those risks others impose on one. The second part of the paper distinguishes among various conceptions of corrective or compensatory justice and considers arguments — including previous ones by the author himself — to the effect that tort law is best understood as rooted in principles of corrective justice. This paper argues that although the principles of justice may render defensible many (but by no means all) of the claims to repair and to liability recognized in torts, it cannot explain why we have adopted a tort system as the approach to vindicating those claims. Some other principle — probably not one of justice — is needed to explain why it is that the victim's claim to repair is satisfied by having his losses shifted to his injurer — rather than through some other means of doing so. The paper concludes that the law of torts cannot be understood — in the sense of being given a rational reconstruction — under any one principle of morality.

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics’, John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61).l A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 29). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position’, would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.KeywordsTheory ChoiceMoral TheoryMoral BeliefMoral RealismMoral FactThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.

Both the Eastern and Western societies have an extensive and celebrated history of ethics education. Although normative ethics have been rigorously studied epistemologically and vigorously debated, abstract ethics theories are very difficult to interpret or apply. On the other hand, applied ethical standards can usually provide more direct guidance on specific personal or business conduct in determining whether it is ethical. In this paper, we will focus on the Ethical Egoism principle. Five examples of real-world personal and/or business conducts will be provided to demonstrate how to apply this ethical standard. We will also apply Confucius’s Golden Rule to the same examples in determining whether the similar ethical evaluations can be observed.

The best way I can illustrate what philosophy is and how it can help is by taking some problems in professional ethics and talking about them in a philosophical way. Most of my examples will come from business ethics, because that is what I have thought most about. But the lessons I shall draw from them will be applicable to other fields of professional ethics too. I said just now that I shall be applying a particular ethical theory which I think is well supported. being a combination of true insights from the utilitarian and Kant. It is also consistent with the Golden Rule, the foundation of Christian morality and other moralities too: that we should do to others as we wish they should to do to us if we were in their situations. In effect this wil1 lead us, as Kant said. to treat their ends as our ends. or, as the utilitarian say. to do the best we can for them, treating them all impartially (see Chapter 14).

It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle thestabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form ‘each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power’. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls’ original position.

Liberal political philosophy presupposes a moral theory according to which the ability to assess and choose conceptions of the good from a universal and impartial moral standpoint is central to the individual's moral identity. This viewpoint is standardly understood by liberals as that of a rational human (not transcendental) agent. Such an agent is able to reflect on her ends and pursuits, including those she strongly identifies with, and to understand and take into account the basic interests of others. From the perspective of liberalism as a political morality, the most important of these interests is the interest in maximum, equal liberty for each individual, and thus the most important moral principles are the principles of justice that protect individuals' rights to life and liberty.According to the communitarian critics of liberalism, however, the liberal picture of moral agency is unrealistically abstract. Communitarians object that moral agents in the real world neither choose their conceptions of the good nor occupy a universalistically impartial moral standpoint. Rather, their conceptions of the good are determined chiefly by the communities in which they find themselves, and these conceptions are largely “constitutive” of their particular moral identities. Moral agency is thus “situated” and “particularistic,” and an impartial reflection on the conception of the good that constitutes it is undesirable, if not impossible. Further, communitarians contend, the good is “prior” to the right in the sense that moral norms are derived from, and justified in terms of, the good. An adequate moral and political theory must reflect these facts about moral agency and moral norms.

Many of our distinctively human social traits are interwoven with simulational propensities. A stroll through simulation-related topics includes the psychological underpinnings of social bonds, our fascination with fiction, and the relevance of simulation and empathy to moral theory. The “chameleon effect”, which involves unconscious mimicry of facial expressions, postures, and mannerisms, promotes cohesion and liking within a group. Enactment imagination and empathy lie at the core of our experience of fiction. Emotional empathy, i.e., affective contagion, is a crucial determinant of the quality of life, and high-level empathy, or perspective taking, plays a critical role in moral motivation and moral principles, especially universalization principles like the golden rule.

The idea of the research revolves around some of the rules related to civil peace in the purified Sunnah of the Prophet, including the rule that peace is the origin in relations and war is an exception, an authentic and deep rule applied in all areas of the biography of the Prophet, peace be upon him, so that all components of society can live in peace, security and stability. Continuous constructive dialogue and stable peace are the cornerstones in the upbringing of a people and a calm society that is governed by kindness and peace. So quarrels, hatred and fighting are absent from it. By presenting the side of the spirit of peace over the side of the flames of war and devastation, and our Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him, emphasized it with his words, deeds and daily practices. And that the principle of justice and equality is one of the basic principles that our Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, brought to achieve and to achieve peace and security between individuals, families and society. That pushes society to anarchy and terrorism, and one of the biggest reasons for raising security and safety among people is injustice in all its forms and types. Including that the rule of good neighborliness is one of the basic rules for the establishment of a peaceful society, and for the establishment of wonderful and refined civilized values. The Prophet applied this principle in Medina and elsewhere, and the rule of moderation and moderation paves the way for peaceful civil coexistence in society through tolerance and positive interaction among all human beings.

It seems likely that there is no threshold for the induction of cancer by ionising radiation. Hence even small radiation doses may result in a finite number of premature deaths if a large number of people are exposed. Various arguments are used to demonstrate that such deaths, if they occur, are acceptable; these arguments are shown to be flawed. Many of the arguments, and the ICRP's principle of justification, appear rooted in a utilitarian system of moral philosophy. Such a system is superficially attractive as it appears objective and rational; however, the objectivity may be an illusion masking the underlying aims of the interested parties.

This research paper delves into the intricate realm of punishment theories within the frameworks of ethics and philosophy, transcending conventional notions of retribution. It embarks on a journey to unravel the multifaceted dimensions of punishment, shedding light on its philosophical underpinnings, ethical implications, and societal ramifications. Departing from traditional retributive paradigms that prioritize vengeance and deterrence, this study navigates through alternative perspectives that advocate for rehabilitation, restoration, and moral transformation. Drawing upon a diverse array of philosophical insights and ethical considerations, this paper critically evaluates various theories of punishment, including consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. It examines how these theories conceptualize the purpose and justification of punishment, contemplating their compatibility with principles of justice, fairness, and human dignity. Moreover, it scrutinizes the practical applications of these theories within contemporary legal systems, assessing their effectiveness in promoting social harmony, individual accountability, and communal well-being. By exploring the complexities of punishment beyond retribution, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of the moral and philosophical frameworks that shape our attitudes towards justice and punishment. It advocates for a nuanced approach that acknowledges the inherent complexities of human behaviour, the potential for redemption, and the imperative of fostering a more compassionate and rehabilitative justice system. Ultimately, this paper endeavours to provoke critical reflection and stimulate discourse on the ethical foundations of punishment, paving the way for a more enlightened and humane approach to justice in society.

Hall, Gartner & Forlini 1 apply ethical philosophy to tobacco harm reduction. There are parallels between the ethical analysis of product bans and of misinformation (or disinformation) about the risks of products that are available in legal market-places 2-4. I agree that vaping products can be marketed in ways that will reduce the harms of smoking, minimize causal gateway effects and promote smoking cessation. Marketing's 4Ps (Product, Place, Promotion and Price) can alter product preferences 4, 5. Tobacco harm reduction principles should be included in public health approaches 5, 6 as one ‘pillar’ of public health 7, but objections to harm reduction remain widespread [8]. Challenges to progress arise in part because thorough moral assessments are uncommon by individuals or organizations. Research on moral psychology argues that rapidly processed ‘moral intuitions’ which are influenced by emotions are critical to moral judgments, and ‘moral reasoning’ is less often the creator of moral judgments than the defender of moral intuitions 9. The classic moral principles of autonomy, beneficence/non-maleficence and justice are involved in moral psychological issues of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, but moral psychology identifies additional important moral principles such as loyalty to group/community, respect for authority and appreciation for sanctity/purity 10. On the continuum from ‘conservative’ to ‘liberal’ positions, none of the moral values disappear, but the relative importance of these values change 10. When community standards (loyalty and authority) are violated (by disagreeing with the opinions of a distinguished medical society), contempt can be felt. When there is a ‘contamination of the pure’ (by recommending e-cigarettes which are not perfectly safe), disgust can be felt. When individual rights are violated (harm, unfairness), anger arises. The interplay of the moral emotions of disgust, contempt and anger contribute to individual positions on harm reduction issues 11, 12. An example of the emotions arising in harm reduction disputes are depicted in this dramatic dialogue, which provides links to an audio performance on the journal website 13. Individuals working in institutions or organizations are also constrained by the biases and role responsibilities of their employers or organizations. Public and professional roles can affect the moral principles that are stressed and the positions that need to be defended, especially in adversarial contexts 14. Those who work for certain ‘Disease Control and Prevention’ organizations (public or private) would probably be most vigilant for any indications of negative consequences of e-cigarettes. They would be primed (and most rewarded) to find (a) any indication that e-cigarettes might act as a causal gateway to cigarettes and (b) any evidence that e-cigarettes are ‘not safe’. It would not be surprising if their workers would be reluctant to emphasize evidence that e-cigarettes could be preventing smoking or that they are much safer than cigarettes. In contrast, those aligned with advocating e-cigarettes for harm reduction would be similarly disinclined to promote any findings consistent with the possibility of a causal gateway to cigarettes or nicotine addiction. Organizations have, in effect, party-lines and preferred positions, and these influences act to truncate the extent to which complete, ethical analyses are conducted or published on any issue. Organizations in keeping with role responsibilities are likely to have their preferred principles and their own moral intuitions that limit what they think, do and are prepared to recommend. Although thorough assessments of philosophical ethics and policy implications may change some opinions, abiding biases in individuals and organizations promote truncation of evaluations, reduce objectivity and impair progress. Players (individuals and organizations) should (a) try to consider an application of moral reasoning that is as complete as possible and (b) try not to jump to conclusions when they have encountered their ‘hot-button’ preferred issues. In conflicts where participants believe they are ‘doing good’ that urgently needs to be done, one can also expect instances of ‘white hat bias’ 15. White hat bias refers to the ‘distortion of information in the service of what may be perceived to be righteous ends’ 15. Righteous zeal may be another kind of moral psychological influence (charged with anger, contempt or disgust) that further clouds the turbulent waters of applied science on controversial issues. None.

Can unanimous (or nearly so) agreement be reached by members of a diverse community on a system of justice in distribution used to guide the re-distribution of endowments within this community? Arrow’s impossibility result suggests that this question will receive a negative answer if certain conditions are imposed on the procedures that a community employs in the attempt to make important community decisions. These conditions are reconsidered by allowing for various types of under-insured risk and uncertainty that face members of communities—especially communities in developing countries. Next, two types of uncertainty are allowed for in the designs of various game-theoretic experiments to determine if groups of individuals can come to agree unanimously on a single system of justice in distribution. (These experiments are based on those devised by Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey, and Frohlich and Oppenheimer.) The participants in these experiments are asked to choose one out of four reasonable alternative systems of justice. As for the participants, they are drawn from various sections of Filipino society. The experimental results obtained indicate that groups of individuals, who possess certain characteristics (but nevertheless who hold diverse views on matters of social importance) do agree unanimously to choose a single system of justice in distribution under relevant conditions of uncertainty. The system of justice agreed upon is a version of Rawls’s first principle of justice and the priority rule—a principle that is related to Popper’s principle of minimising avoidable suffering. The participants also explain their decisions in language that reflects that they have an understanding of the uncertain economic and social realities that members of their community face. In the light of these experimental results it is indicated what alternative conditions should be used, in place of some of the Arrovian conditions, in order to generate possibility results. It is also emphasised that this possibility result need not be satisfied in all communities. This is so since the moral intuition of members of a community probably will be influence by the cultural and other relevant circumstances to be found in this community, yet these cultural and other relevant circumstances vary across communities.

The paper deals with the collision of two approaches to discovering and expressing the normative content of justice. The first one takes as a starting point the character of a just person or rather a person who has the virtue of justice. It is classically represented by Aristotle’s conception of particular justice. For Aristotle, a just person is a person who successfully overcomes the desire to have more (pleonexia). The second approach considers the virtue of justice a secondary phenomenon which is dependent on the principles of justice. The latter are formed due to a projection of the equal moral respect to every person onto relationships between cooperating and concurring individuals. To evaluate the relevance of the approaches, the author draws on the experience of the polemics on the meaning and theoretical value of the Aristotelian conception of particular justice. Its critics claim that: particular justice appears to be a highly contradictory virtue and doesn’t fit into the frameworks of the individual quest for the perfect and flourishing life; Aristotle distorts the structure of the value of justice because he prioritizes personal qualities of a distributor over methods and results of distribution. The advocates of the Aristotelian conception suppose that these criticisms don’t take into account the relation of the virtue of justice and communities with shared conceptions of the flourishing and perfect life (conceptions of good). The virtue of justice is a capacity to support a community and to identify the right order of the components in the shared conception of good. The author believes that the priority of virtue over principles in the sphere of justice marginalize the universal fairness and ignores the common usage of the moral vocabulary. So he concludes that the reverse order of priorities is more justified.