Финансовые кризисы и финансовое заражение в странах Латинской Америки

Human resources for health in the Americas

미·중 경쟁이 중남미 경제에 미치는 영향과 시사점(An Effect of US-China Rivalry on Latin America and Its Implication)

Book Review

This article is devoted to the analysis of trade and economic relations between the United States and China with Latin American countries. This region is a sphere of competitive confrontation between the two countries not only for foreign policy ties, but also for trade and economic ones. The authors in this article show the peculiarities of the bilateral relations between China and the United States with Latin America and describe the process of changing US policy towards Latin America after 2017, when it radically changed after the Trump administration came to power, and Beijing, taking advantage of this opportunity, began to compete with Washington in this region. Also, in this article, the authors provide a comparative analysis of the indicators of trade and economic relations between China and the United States with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. The scientific novelty of this work lies in the fact that, using the example of the transition of leading positions towards China, the authors, within the framework of the theory of "power transit" (Power transition theory), describe the competitive struggle of states in this region in trade and economic terms, which is inextricably linked with political relations. The main conclusions are that the United States is still an external force that cannot be ignored in Latin American international relations, while China has every chance of gradually displacing the United States from the foreign market in Latin America thanks to its economic projects with the introduction of leading Latin American countries in the economic sphere. The United States of America, in turn, is trying to maintain its position in this region by easing its economic and financial constraints and, thereby, inclining the political leadership of Latin American countries to its side.

Transmission of Shocks through Stock Markets Channel: The Case of the CEECs

In low-income and middle-income countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, the COVID-19 pandemic has had substantial implications for women's wellbeing. Policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have highlighted the gendered aspect of pandemics; however, addressing the gendered implications of the COVID-19 pandemic comprehensively and effectively requires a planetary health perspective that embraces systems thinking to inequalities. This Viewpoint is based on collective reflections from research done by the authors on COVID-19 responses by international and regional organisations, and national governments, in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa between June, 2020, and June, 2021. A range of international and regional actors have made important policy recommendations to address the gendered implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on women's health and wellbeing since the start of the pandemic. However, national-level policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have been partial and inconsistent with regards to gender in both sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, largely failing to recognise the multiple drivers of gendered health inequalities. This Viewpoint proposes that addressing the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on women in low-income and middle-income countries should adopt a systems thinking approach and be informed by the question of who is affected as opposed to who is infected. In adopting the systems thinking approach, responses will be more able to recognise and address the direct gendered effects of the pandemic and those that emerge indirectly through a combination of long-standing structural inequalities and gendered responses to the pandemic.

A promising potential partner for the Latin American region is Canada, which is also interested in diversifying its economy and strengthening investment and trade ties. But the closest economic ties have developed between Canada, the United States and Mexico, which is due not only to geographical proximity, but also to participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA, and later USMCA. The subject of the study in the article is Canada's trade cooperation with Latin and North American countries. The aim is to study the economic and trade relations of Canada and Latin American countries in the context of North American integration from the point of view of a holistic view of their evolution. Methods: in studying the model of economic integration, the historical method and comparative analysis were used; statistical analysis was used to analyze the trends in the development of trade cooperation between Canada and Latin American countries. The following results were obtained: based on the analysis, it is noted that the development of economic and trade relations between Canada and Latin American countries almost completely corresponds to the interests of Canada, which wants to get a quick return on its investments in the region. Latin America appreciates working with Ottawa in key areas, actively using Canadian investments in the industrial and social spheres. But the closest economic ties have developed between Canada, the USA and Mexico, which is due not only to geographical proximity, but also to their economic integration, which was regulated by various documents - NAFTA and USMCA. Conclusions: Canada considers the Latin American region as a rather promising direction of development due to the richness of economic relations, the volume of trade turnover is quite stable, and today there are hardly any factors that can influence this trend. At the same time, the closest economic ties are developing between Canada, the USA and Mexico within the framework of the USMCA integration agreement and their intensification is given special attention, taking into account new requirements.

The Nagoya Protocol is a legal framework focused on the Access and Benefit Sharing of genetic resources, including Biological Control Agents. In order to comply with the Nagoya Protocol, countries in Latin America are establishing legal frameworks for access to genetic resources. Scientists face the challenges of the bureaucratic and administrative burden to obtain the access permits to study the biodiversity present in Latin American countries, which include the evaluation of biological control agents that can be used in sustainable production programs. In order to avoid the demotivation of scientists and students to work on biological control by blocking the opportunities to get new bioproducts, it is important to increase the communication between the regulatory authorities and the scientific community, to ensure the establishment of an effective structure and mechanisms to facilitate the process and reduce the time needed to obtain the access permits. On the other hand, the establishment of regional platforms for the exchange of information and harmonization of procedures can contribute to reinforce the collaboration among Latin American countries and facilitate regional studies and biocontrol activities. In this article, the legal framework in place in different countries in Latin America will be discussed and some possible solutions and ways forward to the major challenges observed will be presented.

Stability periods between financial crises: The role of macroeconomic fundamentals and crises management policies

Latin American and Caribbean countries will face significant increases in future health expenditures. A variety of factors are responsible - population growth and aging, the epidemiological transition to noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), and economic growth and technology, among others. Increasing health expenditures are particularly concerning to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) given growing levels of debt, insufficient fiscal revenues, and high out-of-pocket payments. The projected average annual per capita CHE growth rate from 2018-2050 is slightly higher in Latin American countries (3.2%) than in the Caribbean (2.4%). The share of health expenditure in GDP is projected to increase to 2030 in all LAC countries except for Guyana. The effect of demographics and epidemiology on health spending growth are more modest. Among strategies to control NCD risk factors, a focus on hypertension control generally had the strongest effect on restraining CHE growth except in countries where smoking is particularly prevalent. The main driver of health expenditure growth is economic growth and technology, demonstrating the importance of adopting policies such as explicit prioritization systems and benefit plans that establish common rules for payers and providers that encourage cost-effective decisions. The underlying model for making projections and analyzing alternative scenarios is publicly available.

Representations of Asians in Latin America and the Caribbean have been caught in the fissures of history, in part because their presence ambivalently affirms, depends upon, and simultaneously denies dominant narratives of race. While these populations are often stereotyped and mislabed as chino, Latin American countries have also made them into symbols of kinship and citizenship by providing a connection to Asia as a source of economic and political power. Yet, their presence highlights a rupture in nationalistic ideas of race that emphasize the European, African, and indigenous. Historically, Asian Latin American and Caribbean literary and cultural representations began during the Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade (1565–1815) with depictions of Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino slaves and galleon laborers. Soon after, Indian and Chinese laborers were in demand as coolie trafficking became prevalent throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Toward the end of the 19th century, Latin American and Caribbean countries began to establish political ties with Asia, ushering in Asian immigrants as a replacement labor force for African slaves. By the beginning of World War II, first- and second-generation immigrants recorded their experiences in poetry, short stories, and memoirs, often in their native languages. World War II disrupted Asian diplomacy with Latin America, and Caribbean and Latin American countries enacted laws that ostracized and deported Japanese immigrants. World War II also marked a change for Asian immigrants to Latin America and the Caribbean: they shifted from temporary to permanent immigrants. Here, authors depicted myriad aspects of their identities—language and citizenship, race, and sexuality—in their birth languages. In other words, late 20th century and early 21st century literature highlights the communities as Latin American and Caribbean. Finally, the presence of Asians in Latin America and the Caribbean has influenced Latin American and Caribbean literature and cultural production, highlighting them as characters and their cultures as themes. Most importantly, however, Latin American modernism emerged from a Latin American orientalism that differs from a European orientalism.

Similar and mimics: Latin America biosimilar regulations.

The relevance of the study is related to the trend of the states of the "global" South towards a polycentric world, accompanied by an independent foreign economic course. The EAEU is interested in expanding cooperation with Latin American countries. The purpose is to conduct a comparative analysis of the macroeconomic indicators of the EAEU and LAC countries and FDI destinations based on statistical data. Objectives: to analyze the current state of macroeconomic indicators of the integration associations of the EAEU and LAC in order to identify identical development indicators; to characterize the country and sectoral directions of FDI of the EAEU countries in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in comparison with similar investments of the countries of the "collective" West and the United States. Methodology. Investment cooperation is analyzed within the framework of the theory of structural functionalism (Parsons) using macroeconomic indicators of foreign trade cooperation based on UNCTAD statistics on world investments, data from the central banks of Bolivia, Brazil, statistical agencies CEPAL and the Bank of Russia. Results. It has been proved that investment flows between the EAEU and LAC have developed unevenly, and the volume of investments has fluctuated significantly. This trend reflects the general stagnation of the EAEU's investment activity in Latin America outside the commodity sectors. The leading sector attracting investment is the software and IT services sector in LAC. Conclusions. There is a trend towards an increase in the volume of trade turnover between the regions of the EAEU and the LAC, but investment cooperation between the countries is slowed down due to the logistical inaccessibility of the region, the insufficient development of the port infrastructure of the LAC, the lack of interbank relations, and insufficient state support in the LAC.

LATIN AMERICAN DEBT: WHAT KIND OF CRISIS? Barbara Stailings J.hird World debt is widely regarded as one of the principal problems facing the world economy today. The total volume of the debt is now around $600 billion, up from only $100 billion a decade ago.1 About two thirds ofit is owed to the private banks, which typically make loans on the basis of a floating interest rate. The combination of rapidly growing debt and floating rates means that borrowing countries have been paying increasingly large percentages of their export revenues for debt service. For a substantial number, the burden has proved too heavy, and reschedulings have been sought. Although the "scare scenario" that predicts defaults leading to the imminent collapse of the international financial system is clearly exaggerated, serious problems do exist. Some concern the safety of the banking system. Others center on the adverse consequences for world growth if the import capacity of Third World countries is sharply curtailed. Finally, political and economic crises threaten to engulf the Third World itself if external finance is restricted too much, leading to economic depression in those countries. Looking beyond superficial generalities, it is clear that the so-called Third World debt problem is essentially a Latin American problem. About half of all Third World debt is owed by Latin American countries; 1 . There is substantial variation on estimates for total Third World debt, ranging at least between $500 and $700 billion. These figures come from OECD, External Debt ofDeveloping Countries (Paris: OECD, 1982). Barbara Stallings is associate professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin—Madison. She has published various articles on international finance and on the International Monetary Fund and is currently completing a book entitled Latin America and the U.S. Capital Markets, 1900-1980. 27 28 SAIS REVIEW the percentage ofprivate bank debt is an even higher—60 percent.2 Also, nearly all the Third World countries with payments problems are found in Latin America. Every major Latin American borrower except Colombia has recently renegotiated its debt or is in the process of doing so. A glance at the figures on debt service shows why: Eight Latin American countries have service payments that exceed their total export revenues.3 It is possible to be even more specific, however, since a small number of Latin American countries can be identified as the real focus of the problem. These countries include Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Together they account for 36 percent of total Third World debt and 45 percent of bank debt.4 An illustration of their importance is the recent estimate of William R. Cline that, if they failed to pay interest on their debts for a single year, the capital of the nine largest U.S. banks would be cut by one third, thus raising the cost of credit and exacerbating unemployment in the United States itself.5 It is therefore on these four countries that this article will focus. It will examine the composition of their debt in comparison with other Latin American and Third World countries and the ways in which they got into their current predicament. It will also look at the solutions being proposed and their likely effects. Finally, some policy recommendations will be suggested. A key theme will be that, contrary to the view many bankers seem to hold, the Latin American region is not homogenous. The four countries to be discussed include sharply different patterns of debt and economic policy. These differences must be taken into account in devising responses to the debt problems. One of the major difficulties in analyzing Third World debt is the lack of detailed data on an up-to-date basis. World Bank data are very useful for public sector medium- and long-term debt, but they have a one- to two-year lag. Furthermore, data on private sector debt and shortterm debt are generally not included. It is short-term debt that has provided the most volatile element in many of the renegotiations over the past year. The reason can be seen by comparing the World Bank figures on debt service ratios (interest plus amortization as a percentage of 2.Pedro-Pablo...

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Linda Robinson, “Terror Close to Home” U.S. News, September 28, 2003, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031006/6venezuela.htm; Dan Burton, “Opening Statement: Hearing on Venezuela,” testimony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 17, 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/43520.pdf; Fred Burton, “Venezuela: Documenting the Threat,” STRATFOR, December 13, 2006; Nima Gerami and Sharon Squassoni, “Venezuela: A Nuclear Profile,” Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Web site, December 18, 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22568&prog=zgp&proj=znpp&zoom_highlight=Venezuela+A+Nuclear+Profile; Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, “Hezbollah Presence in Venezuela Feared,” Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/27/world/fg-venezterror27. 2. Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 255–270. 3. Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 7–45; T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 46–71; Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism, and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?” International Affairs 82, no. 1 (January 2006): 1–19. 4. Stephen Walt, “Can the United States be Balanced? If So, How?” (remarks, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 2–5, 2004) (hereinafter Walt remarks). 5. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 72–108; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 509–524; Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back,” International Security 30, no. 1(Summer 2005): 109–139; Robert Kagan, “The September 12 Paradigm,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5 (September/October 2008): 25–39. 6. Mark Eric Williams, “The New Balancing Act: International Relations Theory and Venezuela's ‘Soft Balancing’ Foreign Policy,” in The Revolution in Venezuela, eds. Jonathan Eastwood and Thomas Ponniah (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming 2009); Gregory Wilpert, Changing Venezuela: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government (London: Verso, 2007). 7. Wilpert, Changing Venezuela . 8. “Country Fact Sheet: Venezuela,” UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2007, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir07_fs_ve_en.pdf (hereinafter UNCTAD World Investment Report 2007). 9. This includes petrostates for which there is data: Algeria, Angola, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Gabon, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Kuwait was excluded from this list because with 47 percent of outward foreign direct investment it is a prominent outlier. See UNCTAD World Investment Report 2007. 10. See UNCTAD World Investment Report 2007; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2007 ( Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 2008), http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/1/32931/lcg2360i.pdf. 11. Maruja Tarre Briceño, “Abandonados en grandes ligas: Chávez Quiere ahora codearse con los grandes de la política mundial,” El Universal, August 24, 2008. 12. Gustavo Coronel, “Pedigüeños de todo el mundo: absteneosi¡” Las Armas de Coronel Blog, August 4, 2007, http://lasarmasdecoronel.blogspot.com/2007/08/pedigueos-de-todo-el-mundo-absteneos-ya.html 13. See “US Accuses Venezuelan Diplomat of Working for Hizbullah,” Jerusalem Post, June 19, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1213794272800. 14. Natalie Obiko Pearson and Ian James, “Venezuela Offers Billions to Countries in Latin America,” VenezuelaAnalysis.com, August 28, 2007, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2571. 15. Andrés Oppenheimer, “Alan García, Chávez y las Casas del ALBA,” El Nuevo Herald, March 16, 2008. 16. Sean W. Burges, “Building a Global Southern Coalition: The Competing Approaches of Brazil's Lula and Venezuela's Chávez,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (October 2007): 1343–1358. 17. Richard Feinberg, “Chávez Conditionality,” Latin Business Chronicle, June 4, 2007, http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=1296. 18. “Food Aid Arrives in Haiti Amid Protests, Political Unrest,” FoxNews.com, April 19, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,351830,00.html. 19. Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe For Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 20. Ernesto “Che” Guevara, “Vietnam and the World Struggle for Freedom (Message to the Tricontentinental, published in 1967),” in Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution: Writings and Speeches of Ernesto Che Guevara, ed. David Deutschmann (Sydney: Pathfinder Press, 1987). 21. International Monetary Fund, “Honduras: Request for Stand—By Arrangement-Staff Report,” IMF Country Report, no. 08/241 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, July 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08241.pdf. 22. “Petrocaribe heredó deudas y compromisos; Zelaya cerró las puertas a los organismos de financiamiento internacional para Abrazar los proyectos chavistas y embarcar al país en una dependencia financiera de largo plazo,” El Heraldo, August 3, 2009. 23. Julia Buxton, “European Views of the Bolivarian Progressive Social Image: Have the Revelations of Deeper Relations with the FARC Changed Anything? Does it Matter?” (paper, Miami, Florida, 2008) (presented at the Florida International University Summit of the Americas Center conference “Ten Years of Venezuelan Foreign Policy: Impacts in the Hemisphere and the World”). 24. Jack Levy and L.Vakili. “Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case,” in The Internationalization of Communal Strife, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 118–146; Graeme A.M. Davies, “Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts: A Directed Dyad Analysis, 1950–1982,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5 (October 2002): 672–692. 25. See Demetrio Boersner, “Dimensión internacional de la crisis venezolana,” in Venezuela en retrospectiva: Los pasos Hacia el régimen chavista, ed. Günther Maihold (Madrid and Frankfurt: Iberoamericana and Vervuert, 2007) (in Spanish). 26. Janet Kelly and Carlos A. Romero, The United States and Venezuela (New York: Routledge, 2002). 27. Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, “Venezuela: Crowding Out the Opposition,” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 2 (April 2007): 99–113; Francisco Monaldi, Rosa Amelia González, Richard Obuchi, and Michael Penfold, “Political Institutions and Policymaking in Venezuela: The Rise and Collapse of Political Cooperation,” in Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, eds. Ernesto Stein, Mariano Tommasi, Pablo T. Spiller, and Carlos Scartascini (Washington, D.C. and Cambridge, MA: Inter-American Development Bank and Harvard University David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2008), pp. 371–417; David J. Myers, “Venezuela: Delegative Democracy or Electoral Autocracy?” in Constructing Democratic Governance, 3rd edition, eds. Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 285–320. 28. Vitaly Kozyrev, “China's Continental Energy Strategy: Russia and Central Asia,” in China's Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing's Maritime Policies, eds. Gabriel B. Collins, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Andrew S. Erickson (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 2007), pp. 202–251. 29. Because supertankers are not capable of passing through the Panama Canal, oil shipments from Venezuela to China would need to go first south to the Strait of Magellan and then northwest across the Pacific or else entirely east through Cape Horn and then the Strait of Malacca. Either route would be one of the lengthiest in the world. 30. Farideh Farhi, “Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance” (paper, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2008) ( presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars conference “ Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance”), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Farhi.pdf. 31. Henri J. Barkey, “Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and Energy Security” (paper, Washington, D.C., May 28–June 3, 2007) (presented at the Aspen Institute's sixth conference on political Islam “Political Islam: Challenges for U.S. Policy”). 32. Elodie Brun, La Place de l'Iran dans la politique étrangère du Venezuela (paper, Washington, D.C., July 10, 2008) (presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars conference “Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance”), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Brun1.pdf. 33. Michael Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: Metropolitan Press, 2008). 34. Burton, “Venezuela: Documenting the Threat.” 35. Veneconomía Opina, “¡Ni espejo de China es!,” Veneconomía, October 18, 2008. 36. Most Latin Americans doubt the leadership of Chávez. See “Global Unease With Major World Powers; Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey,” Pew Global Attitudes Project (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, June 27, 2007), http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256 (hereinafter Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007). 37. Michael Shifter, “A New Path for Latin America,” Current History 107, no. 706 (February 2008): 90–92. 38. Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007. 39. Peter Hakim, “The Next President's Agenda for the Americas” (paper, Washington, D.C., November 27–December 2, 2007) (presented at the Aspen Institute conference “U.S. Policy in Latin America”), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/congressional%20program/Hakim_Paper.pdf; Abraham F. Lowenthal, “The Obama Administration and the Americas: A Promising Start,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 3 (July 2009): 119–136, http://twq.com/09july/docs/09jul_Lowenthal.pdf. 40. María Teresa Romero, “Expansión sin plata,” El Universal, January 7, 2009. 41. John Kiriakou, “Iran's Latin America Push,” Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-kiriakou8-2008nov08,0,878526.story. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJavier CorralesJavier Corrales is an associate professor of political science at Amherst College