Подкатегория «права человека» в отчетности в области устойчивого развития

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted on December 10, 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nations is the major reference document for international human rights. The UDHR and the subsequent International Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 (on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights) represent the International Bill of Human Rights. In these documents, two generations or dimensions of human rights have been distinguished. The first dimension consists of civil and political human rights, for example the prohibition of discrimination, the right to life, the prohibition of torture or inhuman treatment, the right to freedom of thought, of opinion and expression, the right to seek asylum. The second dimension is made up of economic, social, and cultural human rights, for example the right to work, protection against unemployment, the right to equal pay for equal work, the right to remuneration ensuring an existence worthy of human dignity, the right to a standard of living adequate for one's health and well‐being, including food, housing, and medical care, and the right to education. In addition, a third generation of human rights has been discussed in the United Nations but not yet adopted. It includes mainly the right of peoples to peace, the right to development, and the right to a healthy environment.

In human history, the death penalty is not a brand-new form of punishment. In early civilizations, it was known and widely used throughout the world. It was legalized in Codex Hammurabi. Contrary to its long history, the view changed radically after World War II. The abolition of it began to be propagated during the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) formulation in 1948 due to respect for the right to life. Islam adheres to the fundamental principle that everyone has the right to life, but that does not mean there is no death penalty in Islam. In this research, the problem to be solved is whether the death penalty regulation, according to the International Bill of Human Rights and Islam, has accommodated the right to life. The purpose of it is to find out and analyze which death penalty regulatory regime is more accommodating to the right to life. This type of research is normative juridical research using secondary data consisting of primary and secondary legal materials. The approaches used are statute and comparative approaches. This research shows that the right to life is thoroughly accommodated in the Islamic death penalty regulation, while the abolition of it under the mandate of the International Bill of Human Rights, especially the Second Protocol to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, only accommodates the perpetrator right to life of the perpetrator by ignoring many people right who could potentially be taken away if they are not sentenced to death.Keywords: right to life, death penalty, Islam.

This chapter discusses the struggle for human rights in Afro-Latin America and moves beyond the traditional International Bill of Human Rights (and other human rights instruments) to underscore that the traditional human rights framework, while useful, is not sufficient. The premise is that a human rights lens – specific to Afro-Diasporic peoples – offers a more nuanced way to analyze the issues and problems faced by Black communities in the Americas. The argument is that after centuries of slavery, and in the neo slavery period, new forms of exploitation arose. In other words, the abolition of slave laws and slavery did not eliminate nor address the new forms of exploitation in the post-slavery period. Consequently, Afro-Communities in the post-slavery period were subjected to new forms of marginalization, while at the same time, they were granted limited, partial, or contingent citizenship. The struggle for racial, gender, and economic equality, full democratic participation, social inclusion, land rights, identity recognition, and citizenship is therefore framed as a struggle for human rights that has unfolded over centuries. Moreover, these rights are interdependent, wholistic, and mutually dependent. In order to discuss human rights specific to Afro-Latin peoples a racialization and gender framework is used to inform this understanding. Some questions to be explored are: How is racial and gender inequality linked to human rights violations? Is the liberal or soft human rights rhetoric of states and some civil society groups sufficient to address the severity of human rights violations committed against Afro-Latin populations? Does the nature of the neo-liberal state by definition contradict and call into question its ability to enforce and protect the human rights of Afro peoples in the Americas? The chapter does not aim to list or recount the genocidal practices, atrocities, and massive violations that have unfolded over the centuries. The idea is to discuss, and as far as possible, develop a lens to understand how particular forms of inequality lead to human rights violations.

The chapter provides a discussion of the temporal and substantive development of the international law of human rights, starting with the creation of the United Nations, where the history of human rights was left in Chapter 1. It explores the process of adoption of the so-called ‘International Bill of Human Rights’—comprising the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two 1966 Covenants—and of the mechanisms for the implementation of the protected rights. The chapter places special emphasis on the ‘traditional’ debate concerning the distinction between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and economic, social, and cultural rights, on the other, to conclude that such a dated differentiation of rights should be considered a relic of the past. The chapter then engages in further reflections on the development of the international law of human rights, focusing both on the convergence of different regimes for the international protection of individuals, as well as on the meaning of time in the protection of rights.

One of the issues constantly discussed in the context of human rights is their assessment as universal or relative. International human rights norms are universal, which corresponds to the nature of human rights. The process of universalization of human rights began after the second world war with the creation of the United Nations, whose Charter declared its determination to reaffirm faith in the fundamental rights of the individual, in the equality of men and women and in the equality of nations large and small. These intentions of the organization were confirmed by the adoption of universal documents: the International Bill of Human Rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the International Covenants on Human Rights, opened for signature on December 16, 1966, and other acts. However, the problem lies in the fact that human rights recognized at the international level as universal and enshrined in international instruments, which must be respected by all and everywhere, lose the signs and qualities of universality under the influence of various socio-cultural, national traditions and customs, religious and other factors, and acquire the meaning or status of relative ones.

This chapter provides an overview of the intertwined histories of Aboriginal rights advocacy and human rights advocacy in Australia during two distinct periods: the post-war era of the 1950s–early 1960s, and the closing decades of the 20th century, spanning the 1970s–early 2000s. It shows that while the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights served Aboriginal rights advocates well for a while, the limitations of a human rights framework for the protection of specific indigenous rights and interests eventually led to a movement in the closing decades of the 20th century to develop an international legal regime specifically tailored to the needs, demands, and rights of indigenous peoples – as distinct from other minority groups. In charting the course of this history, the chapter seeks to emphasize the strategic and persistent nature of indigenous peoples’ engagements with the international legal instruments provided by human rights law and the United Nations. In emphasizing the complex and varied nature of indigenous peoples’ historical and continuing engagement with these international legal tools and discourses, the chapter attempts, ultimately, to prompt further lines of inquiry: how useful is the human rights framework for indigenous peoples, and how useful is the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples?

This chapter addresses the emergence of International Human Rights Law. International Human Rights Law consists of international norms set out in instruments adopted over the years. These consist of binding instruments, which carry obligations (such as ‘covenant’, ‘convention’ and ‘protocol’) and non-binding instruments (such as ‘declaration’, ‘guiding principles’, ‘basic principles’ and ‘standard minimum rules’, also described as ‘soft’ law). They are all related, directly or indirectly, to the rights in the International Bill of Human Rights, which may be considered as the substantive canopy of International Human Rights Law. As the International Bill of Human Rights was reaching completion in the mid-1960s, a process developed that complemented the International Bill with conventions on specific rights, protecting (vulnerable) groups, such as the child, women, persons with disabilities and migrant workers, and conventions protecting against the violation of specific rights, such as freedom from racial discrimination, freedom from torture and from involuntary disappearance. The conventions which envisage a system by which an expert body (treaty body) monitors the implementation by States Parties of their treaty obligations came to be referred to as ‘core’ conventions. The chapter also looks at non-core conventions, as well as declarations and other norms.

During the 1990s, the human rights-based approach (HRBA) emerged as the newest development framework to address increasing global poverty and inequality. Under this approach, development objectives are determined by human rights standards and goals as set out in international treaties, conven- tions, declarations, and authoritative interpretations of rights. Beneficiaries of development programmes also gain legal rights against corresponding duty bearers, which supersedes moral claims for the fulfilment of development goals. Furthermore, human rights principles such as equality and non-discrimination, accountability, participation, empowerment and the indivisibility of rights form the cornerstone of a HRBA. However, the human rights framework, as the foundation for this approach, has come under severe criticism over the past few years. Significant disparities exist between that which is promised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and real-world respect for, and protection of human rights. This article aims to explore and analyse the most popular of these criticisms. These include critiques raised against the claimed universality of rights, inherent discriminatory practices, the inability of the framework to take account of practicalities and limitations, and the lack of effective protection and monitoring by United Nation’s bodies. It also explores emerging threats such as, for example, globalisation to the human rights framework. However, the framework has proven to be adaptable to these challenges. Practitioners and scholars are continuously working towards overcoming practicalities that impede the achievement of the protection and realisation of the human rights of all. In addition, the article examines critiques against the normative value of human rights as a product of natural law. However, the international human rights framework has gained widespread acceptance as the highest moral authority, as it is based on respect for human dignity and guaranteeing the freedom of all. The article demonstrates that the use of human rights language in lieu of other terms such as ‘goals’, ‘duties’, ‘interests’, ‘needs’, and ‘claims’ carries several advantages, the most important of which is the creation of rights holders with corresponding duty bearers. It also determines that, despite the numerous critiques examined, the human rights framework offers a solid, and the most accepted, foundation for development programming with a number of benefits.

This article critically examines the efficacy of ratifying International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) within the complex relationship between a State’s sovereignty and its pre-existing, non-derogable obligations under international law. Many States may use reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) to ratify treaties like ICERD while managing substantive obligations. This article analyze ICERD’s the challenges of domestic enforcement, scrutinizing how ratification by States, could be diluted by extensive RUDs, thereby analysing whether formal ratification translates to meaningful compliance. This analysis further interprets enforcement lacunae, including the jurisdictional barriers facing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in adjudicating human rights violations. By contrast, this article uses Malaysia as a critical case study to examine the legal implications of the persistent non-ratification of ICERD, a dimension of the international human rights scholarship that remains insufficiently examined. This article critically examine and analyse the domestic legal context to demonstrate that the State remains legally bound by the international principle of equality and non-discrimination through multiple legal nexus, the UN Charter membership, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as Customary International Law, and the ASEAN Human Rights Framework, which cumulatively reinforce the jus cogens character of racial equality. This analysis advances a novel legal argument by applying the framework of jus cogens norms and constitutional equality principles under Malaysian law, suggesting that non-ratification of ICERD may have implications beyond a neutral exercise of sovereignty. The non-ratification of ICERD constrains the efficacy of the international human rights machinery, avoiding the full scope of external monitoring and legal accountability, and raising questions regarding the alignment of its domestic constitutional integrity. It is submitted that the States that ratify ICERD even with RUDs, demonstrate a foundational commitment to human rights norms despite enforcement complexities. Non-ratification perpetuates structural inequality and directly challenges international mechanisms designed to uphold universal human rights.

This chapter examines the scope and application of indigenous peoples’ rights and minority rights in international human rights law. It discusses the recognition of the need for minority protection in the drafting of the International Bill of Human Rights; analyses the provisions of Art 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and describes tests employed to determine minority status. The chapter also considers developments in the protection of minority rights in Europe. The rights of indigenous peoples are also examined.

In 1976 two treaties came into force in international law that embody the highest ideals that have ever been expressed in law, let alone in international law. They are the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. This chapter sketches aspects of the classical liberal worldview that are inherently hostile to the implementation of important rights now held through the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights and other international human rights conventions. The conflict is rooted in the classical liberal theory of value and associated moral principles. It presents an alternative to classical liberalism in the form of a systemic theory of value that is more compatible with human rights law. The chapter considers returns to the subject of the International Bill of Human Rights as the blueprint for the common good in the twenty-first century.

The urgency of the study is stipulated by the necessity to cover the process of project preparation and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which will allow a comprehensive study of the nature of human rights, to understand their universal nature. The choice of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an object of the study is determined by the special nature of this international soft law act. It is emphasized that the process of adopting this international act remains somewhat unclear among lawyers. The preparation and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is hardly covered in the legal literature, which does not contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the Western human rights concept and relativism in the interpretation of human rights as a phenomenon within various legal cultures. Some aspects of project preparation and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are described. The activities of the Human Rights Commission, which consisted of 18 members representing various political, cultural and religious groups, are noted. It is emphesized that starting with Art.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from the words “All people are born free and equal…”, the developers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reproduced the idea of the universality of human rights, their global nature, that is not limited to a state or even a region. It is summed up that representatives of various groups of the population were involved in the work on the text of the document, creating an international act that was to consolidate human rights, to embody the ideas of equality of human rights, and their universal character. However, while adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not all states voted in its favor. Eight states have refrained from supporting it which is stipulated by a number of religious and political factors. At the same time, different interpretations of human rights by various states do not deny their universal nature. Covering the issue of human rights, it is advisable to disclose the process of preparation and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which will allow systematically and clearly understand the nature of human rights, differences in the activities of various states concerning human rights ensuring.

Translating the UDHR into a binding treaty ‘with teeth’ was an acid test for the international community. This chapter places the genesis of the ICESCR and the ICCPR in its political context. It highlights the interlocking challenges of the Cold War and of decolonization and also underscores disagreement among allied nations as well as attempts to ‘export’ the domestic conception of human rights. Three issues central to completing the International Bill of Human Rights are analysed: (1) identification of the rights to be included; (2) States’ obligations to give effect to human rights on the domestic level; and (3) international supervision mechanisms. These issues are closely related to the decision to divide human rights into two Covenants. In tracing the major controversies and decisions reached, light is also cast on the relationship and characteristics of civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights, as understood at the time.

The article analyzes the provisions of international legal acts at the universal and regional levels (Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers of 1990, Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec (2004) 4 to member states on the European Convention on Human Rights in university education and professional training etc.) regarding education in the field of human rights for representatives of legal professions. It is noted that representatives of legal professions who are at the center of human rights protection should be able to obtain high-quality education in the field of human rights in order to effectively perform their human rights function and prevent human rights violations. Human rights education programs were described (the UN World Programme for Human Rights Education, Council of Europe Programme for Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals). It is indicated that the UN World Programme for Human Rights Education consists of a number of stages aimed at specific issues: the first stage (2005-2009) was aimed at including human rights in the educational program of primary and secondary schools; the second stage (2010-2014) was dedicated to education in the field of human rights in the higher education system and professional training programs for teachers, lecturers, civil servants, law enforcement officers and military personnel; the third stage (2015-2019) was aimed at employees of mass media, and the fourth stage (2020-2024) identified youth as the target group. It is noted that the Council of Europe Programme for Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals (HELP) consists in strengthening the potential of judges, lawyers and prosecutors, etc. on the application of European standards in the field of human rights through online courses that cover a range of topics in this field.

In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declared a wide range of human rights including economic, social and cultural rights as a ‘common standard of achievement’ for all peoples and all nations. At an international level, these rights were reinforced by a legally binding international treaty, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966, and more recently by the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR as adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 2008, and opened for signature on 24 September 2009. Despite these positive developments, six decades after the UDHR, there are still questions regarding the status of economic, social and cultural rights as human rights in international law. In particular, four key questions regarding these rights, are addressed in this article: (1) what are the real human rights obligations of states parties to the ICESCR? (2) Are such obligations territorially limited or is there scope for extra-territorial obligations? (3) Are states permitted to derogate from (some) economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights during emergencies despite the fact that the ICESCR does not contain a derogation clause either permitting or prohibiting derogations? (4) Was it really necessary to adopt in 2008 an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR to provide for the competence of the committee monitoring the obligations of states parties under the ICESCR, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to receive and consider communications alleging violations of any of the rights protected by the ICESCR? And should states parties to the ICESCR sign and ratify this Optional Protocol without delay?