Греция и Северная Македония: прорыв в двусторонних отношениях

Alexandre Kostov, ed. <i>Contemporary Balkans. The Challenges of the 21st Century</i>

: The purpose of this thesis is to find similarities and analyze the changes in military spending (patterns and its structure) of the countries that joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the past 15 years. The thesis will address the following issues: 1. Whether NATO membership, or a promise to join NATO, impact a country's budgetary behavior and its defense resource allocation the same for all countries, or whether it differs by country, by examining changes in the spending structure five years before joining NATO and after joining NATO. 2. Determine if there are any common spending patterns among the countries. The author will analyze the military expenditure data for Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), cross comparing country data using quantitative analysis (correlation, R-square and t-test for means). The goal is to draw conclusions for whether the spending patterns and trends for the countries mentioned above are moving in the same directions. Does the percentage of GDP allocated for defense needs change in the same pattern for these countries? Are the spending patterns among groups of countries who joined NATO similar, or is there no evidence of change in budgetary behavior due to joining (or promising to join) NATO?

The Balkans have been a significant region in political history. Despite being a small, mountainous country without a coastline, Macedonia’s territory has been a significant region throughout history, attracting the attention of major powers due to its strategic location. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, Macedonia declared its independence. During this period, Greece reacted strongly against the independence. In this context, North Macedonia has been experiencing a name and other crisis. According to Greece, Macedonia doesn’t have the territory to use this name, flag, and the national anthem. In addition, they blame to Macedonia with appropriate to Greek cultural values as, Vergina Sun, Alexander the Great. Also, the statue of Alexander the Great built in the center of Skopje, renaming of Skopje airport to “Alexander the Great Airport,” and the description of the Thessaloniki Tower on the Macedonian currency have all been perceived as provocative actions by Greece. Greece identifies Macedonia’s historical and cultural heritage with its own identity, while the presence of minorities also raises concerns. Additionally, the fact that the preamble of the “Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia” states that the principles of the 1944 ASNOM Declaration are inherited and emphasizes that Macedonians living in the territories of Greece and Bulgaria will be united under the Macedonian Socialist Republic, constitutes one of the main reasons for Greece’s concerns. Greece has clearly opposed the use of the name “Macedonia” by rejecting both the existence of the Macedonian minority living within its borders and the recognition of the Macedonian nation. Greece has created international pressure for the resolution of the name issue by blocking Macedonia’s NATO and European Union membership process. After the discussions, the Prespa Agreement was signed in 2018 (Gounaris &amp; Kofos, 2019).

The ratification of the Prespa Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia marked the end of one of the longest diplomatic disputes in Europe. EU officials were quick to praise the agreement not only as a positive example for resolving bilateral disputes in the Western Balkans, but also as an illustration of the power of attraction of the EU. Nevertheless, while it is undeniable that the agreement aligns with EU strategic interests and its normative agenda of transformation of its near abroad, we argue that a closer look into the history of the dispute and the ratification process in each country reveals tensions that cut across the internal governance of the EU and the conduct of its external relations. Our analysis of the Prespa Agreement as an instance of this internal-external nexus of EU governance showcases lingering stresses that today’s mode of European integration generates between state elites, EU institutions and democratic communities across the EU’s internal and external periphery.

The Macedonian name dispute, a political debate between Greece and the current Republic of North Macedonia, arose after the break-up of the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia. The issue was overpoliticized for the societies of both countries. The international community followed the dispute, yet it did not exercise any pressure on Greece to cede in a debate seen by many as the stronger bullying the weaker. A breakthrough became achievable when political forces interested in the resolution came into power in both countries in the mid-2010s. The Prespa Agreement, signed in 2018, offered a mutually acceptable resolution and opened the way for North Macedonia to enter the NATO and to the opening of accession talks with the EU in March 2020.

Reviewed by: The Macedonians of Greece: Denying Ethnic Identity Phaedon John Kozyris The Macedonians of Greece: Denying Ethnic Identity. Helsinki: Human Rights Watch. 1994. Pp. 85. Keeping watch on governments and calling them to account for human rights is a top priority in the international arena, and the mission of Helsinki Watch, past and future, in ferreting out violations should be commended and supported. Focusing on the treatment of “Macedonians” in Greece is an appropriate subject for investigation, but it does require special care, a historical perspective, and sensitivity to the national security concerns that, regrettably, are largely missing from this report. To be sure, Greece over time, concerned about the loyalty of some of its citizens who spoke a Slavic dialect or language that resembled Bulgarian, discouraged activities that may have been connected to the various movements and ideologies that aimed to detach Greek Macedonia from Greece and to annex it either to Bulgaria or to a Greater Slavic Macedonia. Elementary familiarity with the history of the region, and with the bloody wars that were fought there until very recently, would suggest that these fears of Greece about “activity contrary to . . . its territorial integrity and political independence” (Article 8 of the Declaration) were anything but imaginary. The job of Helsinki Watch was to check the facts, identify any related Greek measures in reliable ways, place them in context, and evaluate their compatibility with any legitimate security concerns. This job was done poorly regarding the facts and almost not at all regarding context and compatibility. To begin with, the report most often uses FYROM’s terminology—“Aegean Macedonia”—for Greek Macedonia. It also refers to the repression of “the Macedonians in Greece” without qualification, which not only generates confusion but also gives the impression that members of this small minority constitute the only or true Macedonians in the region. With all due concern for the excesses of Greek nationalism, to attribute the name and the identity of Macedonia to a certain group within a certain minority in this geographical area is not only naïve but shows gross partiality. In a vacuum, any one or any group may adopt any name they want. When, however, at least two groups claim the same name in the same location, and there has been a lot of history and bad blood regarding that location, Human Rights Watch should be careful about how it uses the name. Besides, there are also the (different?) Macedonians of FYROM. For example, I myself was born a Greek and a Macedonian and my “ethnic identity has not been denied.” Furthermore, many of the Macedonians who speak or are familiar with that Slavic language also speak Greek as their primary or secondary language and do not associate with the separatist elements. They are the “dopii,” a Greek word meaning “locals,” distinguishing them from the refugees from Asia Minor, whom the report confuses with its own Macedonians. Indeed, these Macedonian Slavs—called “Grecomans” because they refused to join the Bulgarian Exarchate and remained faithful to Constantinople—associate with Greece, and many fought on the Greek side during the Macedonian wars. Even more seriously, the report should be faulted for creating questionable [End Page 358] impressions about the twentieth-century demographics in the region. Let me cite a few examples. The report suggests that “most of the inhabitants” (italics added) of the geographic region may be “a distinct Macedonian ethnic group.” This cannot be true. Next, and in the same vein, it states, using a recycled FYROM source, that in 1912 in “Aegean” Macedonia there were 326,426 Macedonians and 240,019 Greeks. This also cannot be accurate, and not only because at that time the statistics did not recognize a “Macedonian” nationality and there was no distinct Aegean Macedonia. As reported by Loring Danforth, if at that time the “Slavic-speaking Christians in [greater] Macedonia were pressed to state their national identity, some of them would have said that they were Serbs, many of them would have said that they were Greeks, but the majority of them would undoubtedly have said they were Bulgarians” (“Competing Claims to Macedonian Identity: The Macedonian Question and the Breakup of Yugoslavia,” Anthropology Today 9...

NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center’s consequence management field exercise (FX) “Bosnia I Hercegovina 2017” was organized by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina and had participation from 34 countries and 6 International Organizations. The consequence Management Field Exercise “SRBIJA 2018” was organized by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the Sector for Emergency Management of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia and 29 nations committed resources, equipment, exercise participants, directing staff and/or observers. The exercise “NICS-Montenegro 2019” was organized by Montenegro Directorate for Emergency Situations, MIT LL and with support from DHS & NCIA. This was the first field exercise organized exclusively by the Advanced Regional Civil Emergency Coordination Pilot (ARCECP) team members and partners and independently from other NATO exercises (e.g. EADRCC). Finally, EADRCC and the Crisis Management Center of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of North Macedonia jointly organized the Consequence Management Field and Command Post Exercise “NORTH MACEDONIA 2021”. The planning process for each exercise included formal planning conferences, in-progress reviews, training, command post exercises (CPX) and a capabilities demonstration day for invited dignitaries. This chapter describes how NICS was used in simulated disaster conditions.KeywordsNICSARCECPExerciseTestEvaluationTechnologyChallenges

In the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) the European Union (EU) has completed two operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). It is currently engaged in four more in south east Europe — two in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one in the FYROM and one on the margins of the region, the border between Moldova and Ukraine. These operations range from fairly modest exercises in police training and security-sector reform, on the one hand, to the major commitment represented by the 7000 troops of EUFOR [European Union Force], the successor to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, on the other.KeywordsEuropean UnionUnited NationsOrganize CrimeNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationSecurity Council ResolutionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The senseless name dispute and the renaming of the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia, which was perceived by the Western countries as a «technical obstacle» to the country's NATO and EU accession, was in fact a part of the Macedonian southern neighbor’s long-term plan to erase the Macedonian identity by violating the Macedonian people's right to national self-determination. Since, any change in the name of a country automatically entailed consequences for the national and cultural identity of the Macedonians - the titular people of the country. Russian diplomacy closely followed the events in the country and thoroughly knew the essence of the political crisis that began in 2015 which eventually ended with the renaming of the country against the will of the Macedonian people. The Russian decision to retreat from the intention to challenge the Prespa agreement in the UN Security Council as contradictory to the international law and violating Macedonian 1991 Constitution questioned the role of the Russian diplomacy in upholding the principles and norms of the rule of international law in the world. The subsequent recognition of Macedonia’s new name by Russia forced many in the Republic of Macedonia to include Russia, an indisputable fighter for justice in a multipolar world, in the list of countries involved in the national “depersonalization” of Macedonia, which appeared on the political map of Europe as a result of the anti-fascist liberation movement of the Macedonian people.

Singapore is a multicultural and multilingual country. The four official languages of Singapore are English, Malay, Mandarin Chinese, and Tamil. An "English-knowing" bilingual policy was established in 1953. In recent years, there has been a clear trend towards language shift in Singapore families from mother tongue to English. Besides the official languages, Singlish and Singnese have emerged in Singaporeans' daily lives. Linguistic studies in Singapore have mostly followed the language separation norm, which cannot fully represent highly diverse real-life language use in Singapore. Hence, this study analysed language use from the perspective of polylanguaging. Speakers who employ whatever linguistic features they need to achieve their communicative aims are practising polylanguaging. The linguistic features can be described along three parameters: linguistic features associated with different languages, linguistic features associated with different registers, and speakers' positioning. Two research questions were set. First, what is the nature of polylanguaging in the talk of speakers from families of diverse backgrounds? Second, is the choice of linguistic features context-bound? Two Singaporean families (the Hau and the Ngor family), two Malaysian families (the Lim and the Toh family) and two Chinese families (the Chiu and the Zhao family) participated in this study. Each family filled in a language ecology questionnaire and collected spontaneous language data in four different contexts: mealtime, free play or daily routines, Chinese-related context, and English-related context. A total of 12 hours, 11 minutes, 17 seconds of valid video recordings and 12 hours, 25 minutes, 38 seconds of valid audio recordings were transcribed and analysed. All utterances were coded as EO (English Only), MCO (Mandarin Chinese Only), or NEONMCO (Neither English Only Nor Mandarin Chinese Only). Among the Singaporean families, the Haus and the Ngors displayed a greater usage of linguistic features associated with English. The primary register they used was mainly SCE (Singapore Colloquial English). The two Malaysian families, the Lims and the Tohs showed a higher occurrence of linguistic features associated with Mandarin Chinese, particularly in the case of the Tohs. They tended to combine linguistic features from different languages. The registers they used varied between SCM (Singapore Colloquial Mandarin) and SCE. As for the two Chinese families, the Chius and the Zhaos, they predominantly exhibited linguistic features associated with Mandarin Chinese. The main register they used was BSM (Beijing Standard Mandarin), particularly in the case of the Zhaos. All six families engaged in polylanguaging regardless of their linguistic ideology. The major contributions of this study are providing data for theorising polylanguaging, providing a new lens in viewing "a language," and stimulating the rethinking of language learning and language use. Future studies should recruit more varied families within each cultural background and develop a more comprehensive coding system.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENCE SYSTEM

For decades English has been considered a global language used as not only a native language, but as an official language, a second language in many countries and taught as a foreign language worldwide. Herein, English includes numerous varieties, regional and local dialects, professional speech, slangs, jargons etc. The variety of English is an important feature for learners of EFL, especially for future teachers of English. The constant exposure to different types of English through television, movies, online content etc. might hinder the fluency of EFL learners. Therefore, EFL teachers need to help their students and prevent any ambiguities due to the differences between American and British English. In this research, we have analysed the preference of students between British English and American English vocabulary. The analysis includes 60 first year students of English language and literature from the University “Goce Delcev” in North Macedonia and the South-West University in the Republic of Bulgaria. The results provide an insight on both the knowledge and linguistic preference of students between the two standardized English varieties and enable teachers, university professors and English coursebooks authors to determine their approach in class and help students master fluency.

The article investigates and compares the contributions of NATO member states to the collective security of the organization, particularly concerning military expenditures over different periods of time. The study examines the ratio of military spending between the United States and other NATO member countries by analyzing NATO's official documentation on the military expenditures of member states across various periods of the Alliance's existence and comparing the obtained results. Open datasets related to the GDP of NATO countries, the ratio of GDP indicators of Alliance countries, and the proportionality of contributions to security through military spending were analyzed. The study compares the GDP ratios of individual NATO member states relative to the total GDP of all NATO countries, demonstrating the disproportionate contribution of the United States to the collective security of the entire Alliance. Publications from think tanks and media outlets, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Atlantic Council, CNN, and Politico, were analyzed. The study proves the critical security dependence of European NATO members on the military presence and economic power of the United States. Analytical tools were used to construct graphs that clearly illustrate the ratio of military expenditures of NATO states in absolute terms relative to GDP. The research results suggest that European countries are neglecting their obligations to ensure and maintain NATO's collective security, particularly in the matter of financing their own military capabilities. Examples of European countries that have not ignored their NATO obligations regarding military spending—specifically, the Baltic states and Poland—are provided. The article concludes with the fallacy of such policies and the necessity for European NATO members to increase their level of military spending in the face of the threat of military aggression against the Euro-Atlantic region from the russian federation.

В статье приводится анализ внешней политики Германии по отношению к Косово в начале XXI века. Авторы обосновывают стратегическую заинтересованность федеративной республики в регионе Западные Балканы, где Косово является одной из проблемных точек. В начале 1990-х годов Германия стремилась закрепить свой новый, более высокий международный статус за счет вовлечения в процесс урегулирования Югославского кризиса. На протяжении развития трагических событий на Балканах Берлин планомерно наращивал военную компоненту своей политики, в итоге став одним из государств-членов НАТО, бомбивших Югославию в 1999 году. В начале 2000-х годов во внешнеполитической стратегии Германии на постъюгославском пространстве на смену жестким силовым методам пришла концепция «умной силы». Данная тенденция была характерна для политики Евросоюза в целом, ядро которой составляла деятельность ФРГ. Будучи «локомотивом» евроинтеграции ФРГ выступала главным инициатором распространения влияния Европейского союза на Юго-Восточную Европу, что также отвечало задаче укрепления лидерства самой Германии. Политика федеративной республики по отношению к Косово выстраивалась, прежде всего, путем предоставления помощи, сотрудничества в целях развития, участия в работе KFOR, UNMIK, EULEX. В рассматриваемый период Берлин стал одним из ключевых доноров Приштины. Однако, несмотря на заинтересованность Брюсселя и Берлина в сближении Западных Балкан с Евросоюзом, проблема Косово после одностороннего провозглашения независимости стала одной из ключевых преград на пути стабилизации региона. The article analyzes German foreign policy towards Kosovo in the beginning of the XXI century. The authors substantiate the strategic interest of the federal republic in the Western Balkans region, where Kosovo is one of the problematic points. In the early 1990s, Germany sought to consolidate its new, higher international status by engaging in the process of resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Throughout the development of the tragic events in the Balkans, Berlin systematically increased the military component of its policy, eventually becoming one of the NATO member states that bombed Yugoslavia in 1999. In the early 2000s, Germany's foreign policy strategy in the post-Yugoslav space was replaced by the concept of “smart power”. This trend was characteristic of the EU policy as a whole, the core of which was the activity of the FRG. Being the “locomotive” of European integration, the Federal Republic of Germany was the main initiator of spreading the influence of the European Union to South-Eastern Europe, which also corresponded to the task of strengthening the leadership of Germany itself. The federal republic's policy towards Kosovo was built, first of all, by providing assistance, development cooperation, participation in the work of KFOR, UN-MIK, EULEX. During the period under review, Berlin became one of Pristina's key donors. However, despite the interest of Brussels and Berlin in the rapprochement of the Western Balkans with the European Union, the problem of Kosovo after the unilateral declaration of independence became one of the key obstacles to the stabilization of the region.

Defense ministers meet regularly in the Nuclear Planning Group to discuss specific policy issues relating to nuclear forces, such as safety, deployment issues, nuclear arms control and proliferation. The Secretary-General proposes items for NATO consultation and is generally responsible for promoting consultation and co-operation in accordance with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. In April 2007 NATO ministers responsible for foreign affairs held immediate discussions following an announcement by Russia's President that it intended to suspend unilaterally its implementation of CFE obligations. In November 1991 NATO heads of government, convened in Rome, Italy, recommended a radical restructuring of the organization in view of the fundamental changes then taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. In March 2003 protocols of accession, amending the North Atlantic Treaty, were adopted by the then 19 NATO member states with a view to admitting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to the organization.