- Research Article
- 10.21146/2413-9084-2025-30-2-5-18
Perceptual intentionality within the frameworkof cognitive phenomenology
- Dec 12, 2025
- Philosophy of Science and Technology
- Natalia Smirnova
The paper presents definite review of mutual communication between analytical philosophy and phenomenology in the study of conscious experience’s phenomenal character. It is clearly demonstrated, that analytical philosophy tends to share the so-called “narrow” interpretation of conscious experience phenomenal character both in its strong and moderate versions. Strong version denies that cognitive states may have phenomenal properties and insists that the latter adhere only to sensorial domain. Those who share moderate position, admits, that perceptual experience preserves its phenomenal character although laden with definite conceptual content. According to this position, conscious thoughts may possess their specific phenomenal character, but only due to perceptual states, with which they are obviously tied. In their turn, those, who adhere to phenomenological tradition, support the so-called wide interpretation of conscious experience phenomenal character. Their point is, that our thoughts also have their specific phenomenal character, which differs from the former and cannot be reduced to sensory phenomenology. Those who accept this position acknowledge (logical and metaphysical) possibility of specific cognitive mental states; differ from any sensorial mental states. Vivid debates on cognitive phenomenology, dated back to the last years 80th of XX century and embrace wide range of international philosophical community, still continue. They throw a fresh light on the most fundamental problems of contemporary epistemology: perceptual intentionality and its influence on the high-level cognitive processes, qualia of mental experience (if any), the relevance of introspection in the study of abstract thinking, phenomenological description cognitive status. This analysis outlines directions of their further elaboration and not only paves the way to the new decision of the so-called “hard problem” of mind, but also raises to the new level of complexity the problems of artificial intelligence.
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