지역활성화를 위한 커뮤니티 비즈니스 도입방안 -일본의 사례를 중심으로-

Fiscal system incentivises local government officials to depend on central government’s transfers to fund their budgets. This paper examines whether district and municipal status local government officials exhibit the same spending behaviour when presented with central government’s transfers. The paper uses the panel data model to estimate the flypaper effect on district and municipal status local governments in the Central Region of Ghana from 2008 to 2015. The result shows differences in spending behaviour between district and municipal status local governments, where the flypaper effect is more pronounced on municipal status local governments (52.6%) than district status local governments (44.8%). Though municipal local governments are financially better in raising own-source revenues compared to the district local governments, the design of the fiscal system tends to make municipal local governments more reliant on central transfers than on expenditure of own-source revenues. This reduces interest in raising own-source revenue and its expenditure, a situation which has an adverse long-term impact on decentralisation in terms of citizen empowerment and participation. The study recommends an optimal level of central transfers which will serve the purpose of correcting vertical and horizontal imbalances, as in theory, and at the same time promote the ideals of decentralisation (citizen empowerment and participation).

Many countries in the world attach great attention to the relationship between central and local governments, which is also of great importance for China, a great country with over one billion population. The relationship between the central government and local governments is critical for the stability and prosperity of the country and attracts wide concerns from the political and academic fields. Overemphasis on the centralization of authority is not good for the fully play of enthusiasm of the local governments, whereas over-devolution of powers is not favorable for the stability and prosperity of the nation. Therefore, dealing with the relationship between the central government and local governments requires the balance – maintaining the authority of the central government and considering enthusiasm of the local governments at the same time. In this paper three aspects will be discussed about the relationship.

Urban and social policy are formulated and implemented within the structure of the relations between central and local governments. The achievement of central government goals often requires action by local governments. The agendas of local governments are often set by the problems and opportunities created by central government action. The relationship between central and local governments is often seen as a trend toward increasing local autonomy or increasing central control. Finance is often assumed to be the key, whoever controls the purse strings. In Great Britain, as in many other countries, the increasing financial dependence of local government on central government has fueled a debate over the effect of central government finance on the relations between central and local government. One side of the debate is characterized in the conclusion of the Layfield Committee on Local Government Finance: We too believe that in the end he who pays the piper calls the tune.' In support of the Layfield Committee's position, G. W. Jones, has argued that central finance serves to extend central control because, first, central finance gives central government bureaucrats an excuse to become involved in regulating local policy and, second, that dependence on central government funding orients local government politicians towards Whitehall and away from their constituents.2 Opposing the view that central government finance inevitably leads to central control of local government are Ashford3 and Dearlove.4 Ashford finds, in a study of the relation between central government aid to local authorities and local authority budgets, that the level of central government aid is not a good predictor of local activity. He goes on to suggest that the complexity of the relationship between central and local government may be a serious hindrance to central control. For both Ashford and Dearlove, the increasing financial role of central government does not inevitably translate into central control; they do not argue that central government is without influence over local government but that finance does not directly lead to control. This paper will argue that control is not one-dimensional, that there are areas of local autonomy that can develop (or that are maintained) despite central government control of finance. The argument will be made by explicating one set of conditions under which local governments maintain their autonomy and by examining a case in British policy in which the predicted results obtain. Understanding the conditions under which local autonomy develops helps us to predict what the central state can actually accomplish. Such an analysis can also

The purpose of this paper is to know the various obstacles in the issuance of municipal bonds by local governments as well as the relationship of problem solving on the publication. The research methodology of the study was conducted in a way to verify data obtained from local and central government then tried to problem solving with a similar pattern of comparison in the State of Malaysia. Primary and secondary data are then analyzed and evaluated normative juridical. Finding of the research conducted by the Capital Market Supervisory Board there is a trend of positive law concerning the issuance of municipal bonds has been made yet implemented by the Central Government Local Government appear inconsistencies. Excessive licensing process by the Central Government is not in line with rational quality, readiness and potential of the region. Quantity areas analyzed at the time a row is Jembrana Local Government, Local Government Bandar Lampung, Medan Local Government andLocal Government Tabanan. Problem of availability of funds for regional development is one of the main things that faced by all regions of the world, especially developing countries, including Indonesia. Utilization of funds from the public contributes to the success of regional development, especially through alternative municipal bond issuance. All elements of both investors Local Government and the Center have important role aspects. The role of the central government initiated since the manufacture of various statutory provisions and licensing provision relating to the issuance process. Local Government as the publisher and owner of the project, while investors concerned about the return on investment funds according the agreement between them. Knowledge of good financial management area and also the position of the object transparent collateral is one of the important things as a form of responsibility for Local Government in the event of default.

Realizing good governance, the Indonesian government, both central and regional, needs to immediately carry out bureaucratic reforms that are not only at the level of commitment but also at the level of real life. It is hoped that this will reduce bureaucratic pathologies such as mal-administration that leads to corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Max Weber's legal rational bureaucracy concept is actualized in Indonesia with various advantages and disadvantages as seen from the behavior of the bureaucracy. Bureaucratic behavior arises when there is an interaction between individual characteristics and bureaucratic characteristics; especially with the various issues that are developing and current law enforcement related to bureaucratic pathology. Gradually, in Indonesia, bureaucratic reform is carried out in the dimensions of institutions, apparatus resources, management, and culture/mind set. Both the central government and local governments should carry out bureaucratic reform through consistent and sustainable learning organizations, taking into account critical success factors.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implementation of initiative e-procurement in decentralized system on Indonesia’s local government system. Design/methodology/approach – The authors combine quantitative and qualitative methods. The central finding of this research is that human resources are the pivotal factors that determine the performance of local e-procurement in three cities. This research focusses on three local governments in Indonesia – Yogyakarta City, Tangerang City, and Kutaikartanegara Regency. Findings – The central finding of this research is that human resources are the pivotal factors that determine the performance of local e-procurement in three cities. However, Tangerang City is going institutionalization phase in e-procurement initiative to ensure its sound local regulation. Research limitations/implications – There are several limitations to this study including the recent nature of decentralized procurement in Indonesia, limited standardized and disaggregated data on local government procurement expenditures and performance. Practical implications – The study recommends that human resources management in procurement needs to be addressed by both local and central government. Originality/value – e-Procurement is an important instrument for preventing corruption in goods and services procurement. Indonesia has been implementing an e-procurement policy since 2008 based on a Presidential Decree. The president has issued annual orders (presidential instructions), and all central ministries and local governments have been required to comply with them to obtain their budget through the e-procurement system. However, as of 2012 fiscal year, only around 10.26 percent of the central government institution procurement budget and 10 percent of the local government procurement budget in Indonesia went through the e-procurement system, with wide variations among cities.

Residents’ Perceptions of Impending Forced Relocation in Urban China

<p><em>Waduk Darma merupakan salah satu sumber daya air yang diharapkan optimal hasilnya untuk memenuhi kebutuhan air bersih masyarakat Kabupaten Kuningan.</em><em> </em><em>Pemanfaatan Waduk Darma untuk kegiatan perikanan Keramba Jamba Apung (KJA) dinilai tidak sesuai dengan PP Nomor 37 Tahun 2010. Kegiatan perikanan KJA yang semakin masif berdampak pada menurunnya kualitas lingkungan di sekitar Waduk Darma. Kelembagaan pemanfaatan Waduk Darma ditengarai menjadi akar permasalahan yang perlu dikaji. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis permasalahan kelembagaan pemanfaatan Waduk Darma untuk kegiatan perikanan Keramba Jamba Apung (KJA) di Kabupaten Kuningan, Jawa Barat. Pendekatan kualitatif digunakan dalam penelitian ini yang didukung oleh data hasil wawancara kepada pemerintah pusat dan daerah dan petani KJA. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kelembagaan pemanfaatan Waduk Darma tidak berjalan baik dilihat dari aspek kebijakan, peran dan kewenangan, dan koordinasi stakeholers. Dari aspek kebijakan, ada tumpang tindih peraturan antara pemerintah pusat dan pemerintah daerah, tidak ada prosedur perizinan yang diberlakukan untuk kegiatan KJA, dan kurangnya sosialisasi mengenai kebijakan dan aturan pemanfaatan keramba kepada masyarakat maupun lembaga terkait. Dari aspek peran dan kewenangan, ada perubahan wewenang dari pemerintah daerah kepada pemerintah pusat, sumber daya manusia untuk mengelola Waduk Darma kualitasnya masih rendah, dan aktivitas perikanan KJA yang tidak terkoordinir dengan baik. Kemudian dari aspek koordinasi, belum ada koordinasi langsung antar instansi yang terlibat dalam pemanfaatan waduk, Tim Koordinasi Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Air (TKPSDA) sebagai wadah koordinasi belum berjalan dengan baik, dan adanya missing link antara pemerintah pusat melalui BBWS dan pemerintah daerah. </em><em>Pemerintah sebagai otorita</em><em>s</em><em> dapat membuat suatu konsep kelembagaan dengan model hubungan </em>integrated administrative system<em> agar tercipta hubungan yang harmonis antara pemerintah pusat dan pemerintah daerah.</em></p>

This paper puts forward a hypothesis suggesting a hierarchical discrepancy between Chinese central government and the local governments, which argues that, in the progress of policy making and implementation, the central government is an encompassing group, whose policy making stems from the historical responsibilities it carries, while the local governments, though politically obedient to the central government, and competing in economy with each other, usually take local economic growth into account during policy execution. By developing a double-task principal-agent model between central government and local governments, this paper comes to a conclusion that the incentive incompatibility, in the discipline contract between central government and local governments, is likely the root cause of the weakness in policy execution.

Competence vs. Independence: Auditors' connections with members of their clients’ business community

PurposeRecent research has drawn attention to the tension between the Central and local governments in China regarding their roles in environmental protection. This paper aims to explore this tension and examine the extent to which local/provincial government’s environmental oversight has influenced the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in China.Design/methodology/approachA sample of 198 listed companies in heavily polluting industries were selected to examine the relationship between their environmental disclosure quality and the respective local government’s environmental oversight level.FindingsThe results provide evidence that local/provincial government’s environmental oversight significantly influences environmental disclosure in China. Despite the coercive pressure from the powerful Central government on corporate environmental disclosure, local/provincial governments are able to buffer the pressure and adjust the intensity of their environmental oversight on companies during the implementation of central policies to retain local economic and political interests. This may partially explain the persistent issue of low environmental disclosure quality in China.Research limitations/implicationsThis study enriches our understanding of the significant role of local governments in China in enhancing or sometimes discounting the regulatory enforcement of the Central government on corporate environmental disclosure, pointing to the need for concerted efforts by both local and Central governments to advance environmental disclosure development.Originality/valueResearch on environmental disclosure in developed countries has been well established in the literature. However, such research in developing nations is still limited, especially in China, the world largest developing country. The existing literature on environmental disclosure in China links it with either market demands, or regulatory enforcement from the Central government. The importance of local/provincial governments and their environmental oversight has long been ignored, which motivates this research.

The purpose of this research was to determine how geographic distance affects corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities within China. Our argument focuses on whether the impact of the distance between countries on CSR activities also applies to the impact of the distance within a country between Chinese enterprises and local governments and the central government on CSR. Most previous studies of the impact of geographic distance on CSR focused on the distance between countries, reporting opposing claims. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) need to overcome the liability of foreignness (LOF) in host countries: the greater the distance, the worse the disadvantage. MNEs will choose CSR to shorten the distance from the host country. Hence, CSR activities should have a positive relationship with the distance from the host country. Conversely, due to the various differences caused by distance, it is difficult for the national sovereignty of the home country and the host country to resonate, so the distance between CSR activities and the host country should be negatively related. In this study, 5147 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database from 2009 to 2018 were selected as the research objects to analyze the impact of the geographical distance between companies and the Central Government and local governments on CSR activities within China. Our results show that the effect of the distance between countries on CSR also applies within countries, and our results support the argument that distance and CSR are negatively correlated. This research enriches the understanding of CSR practices of Chinese domestic companies and provides new inspiration for multinational companies that plan to enter China in overcoming LOF.

The authors propose the use of an interactive model to explain the way the central government and the local governments carry out the formulation and implementation of China’s foreign economic policies. Case studies on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the China-Europe Railway Express (CERE) show a policy feedback loop between the central government and the local governments. While the local governments make adjustments to comply with the central government’s directive, their policies and measures also have a significant impact on the central government’s foreign policies. The findings suggest that neither the autonomy of local governments nor the authority of the central government in foreign economic affairs are eroded under Xi’s leadership despite notable recentralisation in the past decade. Instead, both the central government and local governments engage in a continuous, interactive partnership to formulate and execute China’s foreign economic policy.

This study carries out an in-depth analysis of urban water policy implementation in China through a policy cycle analysis and case study of Sponge city program. The policy cycle analysis articulates discrete steps within the policy formulation and implementation process, while the case studies reflect the specific problems in water project implementation. Because of the principal–agent relation between central and local government, a ‘‘double wheel’’ policy cycle model is adopted to reflect the policy cycles at central level and at local level. Changde city and Zhuanghe city, two demo cities in the Sponge city program, are chosen for the analysis. The policy cycle analysis shows that the central government orders local government to implement policy without clear direction on how to attract private sector participation. The evaluation of central government did not include private sector involvement, nor the sustainability of the investments. This promotes the local government’s pursuit of project construction completion objectives, without seriously considering private sector involvement and operation and maintenance (O&M) cost. The local governments do not have political motivation and experiences to attract private investments into project implementation. The case study in the two demo cities shows that local government subsidies are the main source of O&M funding currently, which is not sustainable. The water projects are not financially feasible because no sufficient revenue is generated to cover the high initial investments and O&M cost. The lack of private sector involvement makes it difficult to maintain adequate funding in O&M, leading to the unsustainability of the water projects. It is not easy to achieve private sector involvement, but it could be the key to realizing urban water resilience in a more sustainable way.

State intervention in housing has developed over many years and, as it has developed, the respective roles of central and local government have changed. For most of the history of active housing policy local authorities have been the favoured agencies for housing provision alongside the private sector. Latterly local authority housing provision has been in decline with sales to sitting tenants and large-scale transfers to registered social landlords occurring alongside low rates of new local authority housebuilding. The role of local authorities has shifted towards an enabling role with key roles for housing associations and their regulators alongside private provision. The powers and duties of local authorities and central government have expanded but the constraints, and in particular financial constraints imposed by central government, have increased considerably. Any attempt to describe or understand the operation of housing policy has to take account of the ways in which both public and private sector agencies involved in the housing market act in relation to housing. This chapter focuses on the framework for public sector administration relating to housing and on central and local government and housing associations. As was emphasised in Chapter 1, these institutions operate within a wider context in which there are a range of private sector agencies involved in the production of housing. In addition to builders and developers, others such as estate agents, solicitors, building societies and other financial institutions are involved in the production or consumption of housing.