Нравственная оценка войны в русской марксистской мысли 1910–1930-х гг.

Coercion in mental healthcare has led to ethical debate on its nature and use. However, few studies have explicitly explored patients' moral evaluations of coercion. The purpose of this study is to increase understanding of patients' moral views and considerations regarding coercion. Semi-structured focus-group and individual interviews were conducted and data were analysed through a thematic content analysis. Participants and research context: A total of 24 adult participants with various mental health problems and experiences with coercion were interviewed in 2012-2013 in three regions of Norway. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval and permissions were obtained according to required procedures. Informed consent and confidentiality were also secured. Ethical considerations regarding coercion included seven main themes: the need for alternative perspectives and solutions, the existence of a danger or harm to oneself or others, the problem of paternalism, the problem of discrimination and stigma, the need for proportionality, the importance of the content and consequences of coercion and concerns about way that coercion is carried out in practice. The participants' views and considerations are in line with previous research and reflect the range of normative arguments commonly encountered in ethical and legal debates. The study accentuates the significance of institutional factors and alternative voluntary treatment opportunities, as well as the legal and ethical principles of proportionality and purposefulness, in moral evaluations of coercion. Broader perspectives on coercion are required to comprehend its ethical challenges and derive possible solutions to these from a patient perspective.

THAT THE MORAL AND THEOLOGICAL ISSUES discussed in what follows are not academic matters, we are reminded by an exchange that moved theater-goers four centuries ago. KING HENRY Methinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the king's company,--his cause being and his quarrel honourable. WILLIAM That's more than we know. BATES Ay, or more than we should seek after, for we know enough if we know we are the king's subjects: if his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us. WILLIAM But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in a battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all, We died at such a place; some swearing; some crying for a surgeon; some upon their wives left poor behind them; some upon the debts they owe; some upon their children rawly left. I am afeared there are few die well that die in a battle, for how can they charitably dispose of anything when blood is their argument? Shakespeare, King Henry V, iv. i. Origins of Just War Theory It has become a commonplace to assert that just war arose from a Christian tradition formulated by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. This half-truth conceals both the indebtedness of each to earlier thinkers as well as the profound differences between them that have important consequences. It is also often claimed that war theory has been developed in order to justify wars favored by authors of the theory. This claim is confuted by the historical circumstances in which Christian thinking on this subject reached its fullest development. In what follows, I hope to stimulate constructive doubt about these opinions. I wish to indicate that as war doctrine matured it also progressively departed from Augustine's point of view. Augustine makes a significant contribution to moral wisdom about war, but he does not contribute to a theory of war's justice. I shall also suggest that war doctrine was both a distinctively Catholic achievement and one that could, for that very reason, be appropriated by all conscientious persons. Fatuous as it may be to assign provenance to great movements in human thought, international law has been repeatedly assigned either of two originators. more widely known is the seventeenth-century Dutch Calvinist scholar, jurist, and diplomat, Hugo Grotius. (1) other candidate is the sixteenth-century Spanish Dominican philosopher and theologian, Francisco de Vitoria. (2) By a winsome irony there exists at Hague a plaque dedicated to The Founder of International Law. plaque was erected by the Grotius Society. person it honors is Vitoria. My present interest in this amicable question of origins is the symbolic focus it provides. For between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a progressive though erratic Catholic doctrinal development reached its maturity. It subsequently shed its ecclesiastical particularities and entered upon a new tradition, secular and juridical. (3) Finally, after two world wars, the theory has gained firmer footing in practice through the League of Nations and the United Nations. I hope to indicate two things in this condensed account: first, how war theory originated as a moral doctrine; and second, how it was modified by the principles of authoritative thinkers and refined in controversy generated by unforeseen events. I shall stop at the period commonly labeled Renaissance and Reformation because it was then that war theory, in essence nearly complete, ceased to be part of specifically Christian intellectual history and became part of the new jurisprudence of international law. After that time, Catholic war theory participated in a general stagnation of post-Reformation Catholic moral and political thought that continued to the nineteenth century. During the same period, mainstream Protestant religious thinkers paid it little attention beyond insisting, against Protestant pacifists, that wars certainly could be and--at least when conducted by Protestant rulers--were best presumed to be so. …

: The continued development of precision guided munitions and remote targeting technologies, and the US military's incorporation of effects-based operations, will present ethical challenges to the joint force commander (JFC) as the 21st century progresses. These technologies are intended to provide the JFC with an unprecedented ability to prosecute targets while at the same time purporting to minimize collateral damage, but have the unintended consequence of blurring the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. This paper does not propose that the US military is explicitly negligent in following the Law of Armed Conflict much less the Just War Tradition (JWT); rather, the paper argues that there is the real potential for divergence between the ethics of JWT and the joint force's capabilities. It is vital that the US military not lose its ethical bearings when conducting war since the lives of innocent noncombatants are at stake, as well as our country's international legitimacy, our own countrymen's support, our professional military values, and our young warfighters moral health. It is at the JFC's level of command, where strategy is translated to tactical killing that the consideration of ethics in the conduct of war can reemerge. By explicitly providing his ethical decision-making standards, the JFC can ensure 21st century capabilities do not supersede morally right human activity.

Nuclear weapons create a fundamental problem for our moral understanding. The condition of mutual vulnerability calls into question some basic features of our moral view. The fantastic destructive power of nuclear weapons seems to place them beyond our moral world, whereas their presence in our hands makes them inescapably part of that world. One aspect of the moral problem is the conflict nuclear weapons create between institutional morality and prudence and the resulting political marginalization of morality. But the moral problem goes deeper. Nuclear weapons appear to create a sharp conflict not only between morality and prudence, but within morality itself. Beyond forcing a choice between morality and prudence, they seem to confound moral choice itself. The sharp conflict between morality and prudence implied by the institutional norms might be shown not to hold if appeal is made to a moral perspective broader than that of the just-war tradition. The way in which we reason about moral matters in everyday life, outside the context of particular social institutions and their special moral norms, provides a broader perspective. I will refer to this perspective as everyday moral reasoning . Everyday moral reasoning is pluralistic, in the sense that it recognizes different, often conflicting, approaches to assessing the moral status of actions or policies. The just-war tradition is not pluralistic in the same way.

It is argued that there are moral costs of our accepting ‘strict materialism’, the view that there is no such phenomenon as an irreducible first‐person point of view. If we accept strict materialism, then we have to give up some considered moral views, such as the principle of an agent‐relative morality and the hedonistic principle. The necessity involved is not logical, however, but pragmatic. Strict materialism does not imply that these moral views are false; it is our belief in them that is undermined by pur belief in strict materialism. If there is no irreducible first‐person point of view these moral views simply do not seem to make any moral sense. Since these moral views are prima facie very plausible, the moral costs of our accepting strict materialism are considerable

This article presents a case study in how sellers of weaponizable technology can develop safeguards to mitigate risks of misuse by end users. In 2020, the authors were approached by a defense technology start-up whose core product offering was weaponizable drones. The start-up sought guidance in designing terms of sale and service that would ensure responsible usage of this technology. Combining elements from just war theory, international humanitarian law, and the theory of responsibility, we developed a novel, systematic framework for reducing risks of misuse on the basis of precise principles and objective metrics. Although designed for a specific use case, we believe aspects of this framework are portable to a wide range of scenarios. We share it to demonstrate proof of concept and stimulate further work on integrating ethical considerations into the business of weapons and dual-use technology.

Legitimate authority is a widely touted yet rarely analyzed concept in discourse about war. In this essay, I articulate and analyze the schema of just war theory that has dominated philosophical discourse regarding war since the early medieval period. Although the requirements for a “just war” appear to exceed the simple proclamation by a legitimate authority, in fact, all of the other requirements are subject to the interpretation of the legitimate authority. In other words, just war theory reduces, in actual practice, to the requirement of legitimate authority. A consideration of the nature of contemporary warfare further suggests that just war theory is the vestigial idiom of a world that no longer exists. What remains today of just war theory is a dangerous rhetorical weapon, deployed by the leaders of both sides in every belligerent conflict.

PurposeThe concept of grit has been receiving increased attention in recent years. Grit is a trait that enables individuals to persevere while facing challenges and obstacles in life, sometimes “winning at any cost”. The purpose of the study is to understand how ethical views may vary among different groups of people segmented on grittiness. Our key argument is that grittier segment is more inclined towards Machiavellian factors (amorality, desire for control, desire for status, distrust of others) and materialism.Design/methodology/approachData derived from self-administered questionnaires completed by convenience samples of Indonesians living in Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY), a region commonly considered as the miniature of Indonesia. Turning to market segmentation tools (n = 467), we first segment people based on their level of grittiness and, subsequently, investigate each segment's perception towards various Machiavellian factors (amorality, desire for control, distrust of others) and materialistic attitudes.FindingsThe study identified three segments of grittiness: The Least Gritty (the Good), The More Gritty (the Bad) and The Most Gritty (the Ugly). The results of this study showed the dark side of grit. Individuals with higher grit traits are more likely to behave unethically which could be referred to as “bad” and “ugly”. To help them succeed, cheating and lying are more likely considered acceptable by gritty individuals compared to less gritty “good” individuals.Practical implicationsMerely focussing on grit–be it grit promotion or training–may produce individuals who achieve success at all costs and disregard ethical values. An implication from the study is not to discourage developing grit in individuals but instead to add and emphasise ethical components. This implication is especially critical for educators and managers developing grit as a part of their activities.Originality/valueThe results of this study will have important theoretical implications and managerial implications educators balancing the consequences of teaching grit, but also for managers interested in understanding employees' level of grit within their workplaces along with ethical considerations.

The concept 'encounter' occurs in caring literature as a synonym for dialogue and relation describing deeper levels of interaction between patient and nurse. In nursing and caring research, the concept 'caring encounter' is often used without further reflection on the meaning of the concept. Encounters are, however, continuously taking place in the world of caring, which calls for a clarification of the concept. This study is an analysis of the concept of caring encounter in nursing from the patients' and nurses' point of view. Rodgers' evolutionary view guided the concept analysis within the theoretical perspective of caritative caring. Peer-reviewed articles in English published between 1990 and 2014 were retrieved from the databases: CINAHL, PubMed, Web of Science, ScienceDirect (Elsevier), Springer Link, Primo Central (Ex Libris) and Academic Search Premier (EBSCO) using different combinations of encounter, caring and nursing as keywords. In all, 28 articles related to caring encounters were included in the analysis after applying inclusion and exclusion criteria. This study was conducted according to good scientific practice. Four antecedents to the caring encounter are found in the nurse's way of being: a reflective way of being; openness, sensitivity, empathy and ability to communicate; confidence, courage and professionalism; and showing respect and supporting dignity. The attributes are as follows: being there, uniqueness and mutuality. As a consequence, the caring encounter influences both patient and nurse. The caring encounter is an encounter between two equal persons where one is nurse and the other is patient. They encounter in mutuality, in true presence, and both have allowed themselves to be the person they are. The results clarify the conceptual differences between relationship and caring communion as the mutuality in the caring encounter differs from the dependence on the other pronounced in the relationship.

Live donor liver transplant (LDLT) was first reported in the 1990s and quickly raised ethical considerations, mainly related to the risk brought to the donor. The question of donor safety was even more accurate with the occurrence of laparoscopy, a technique which could allegedly increase the risk of severe intraoperative complications. Besides the questions of justice and autonomy, donor safety remains the main ethical debate of LDLT. Considering the lack of comparative assessment of postoperative outcomes, the Jury of the last Consensus meeting held in Japan in 2014 called for the creation of international registries to help to determine the benefit/risk ratio of laparoscopic donor hepatectomy. Since randomized studies are very unlikely to occur, benchmarking comparisons, between liver and kidney donors for instance, may also help to define standard practice. At last, donors' points of view should also be taken into account in the evaluation of those innovative procedures.

The subject of the present paper concerns the issue of a very significant, current and inspiring deep social interest value, especially in the field of scientific creativity. The notion of autoplagiarism appeared there in the 90’s of the last century and at once it became amazingly popular, achieved enormous “power of effectiveness”, evoking at the same time strong emotions – anxiety, disquiet or even fear. The term of autoplagiarism is a compound verb and this is the second of its component – expression “plagiarism” – that has contributed to this fast career and extraordinary effectiveness, becoming a carrier of a strong pejorative, stigmatizing and disqualifying evaluation. 2. The notion of plagiarism has its origin in the language of ancient Rome – Latin, where gradually as a “plagiatus” it was explicitly associated with a theft. The term “plagiarism” is used by Polish copyright juristic doctrine and judicial decisions in reference to the offence consisting in appropriation of the authorship of the whole or a part of a third person’s work – presenting himself as the author of such a work. On the one hand, the act of plagiarism as an offence brings to civil liability based on the ground of art. 78 Polish Copyright Act of 1994, on the other hand, as a crime brings to criminal liability based on the ground of art. 115 P.C.A. The crime of plagiarism derives from the offence of appropriation of a third person’s property, generally called a theft. This is the reason why plagiarism is commonly identified as a theft and as such is evaluated from the ethical and moral point of view. However, it is necessary to notice and stress a question of a fundamental importance and decisive for final conclusion that plagiarism consists in appropriation of the authorship of a third person’s work – you can neither steal your own property nor your own work. 3. The notion of autoplagiarism is not a normative expression. In the field of academic creativity it has been connected with evaluating of scientific achievements of the representatives of these circles in the context of academic career. That means achieving academic degree of doctor, doctor habilitatus and academic title of professor as well as posts and profits connected with them – prestige, awards, grants, incomes. The task of defining the notion of autoplagiarismis is not easy. It may be accepted that the phenomenon of autoplagiarism is understood as a special form of the author’s repeated distribution of his former publications, however, without providing any proper information about it. The aim of the autoplagiarist’s acting is to enlarge a quantity of his publications and thereby mislead as to the volume of his scientific achievements. 4. The analysis of proper provisions justifies the statement that from the point of view of the normative requirements to grant an academic degree or title, a matter of indifference – featureful however, for plagiarism – is a candidates’ intention to mislead as to the quantity or quality of his scientific achievements. 5. Answering the question asked in the title of the present article – whether autoplagiarism is a plagiarism in the field of scientific creativity – it should be stated that obviously autoplagiarism is not a plagiarism. It is also necessary to notice that the word “autoplagiarism” is an oxymoron from the linguistic point of view and thereby there are a lot of problems to define this notion. The introduction of an expression of autoplagiarism to the sphere of legal language should be in my opinion recognized as useless and even harmful. An acting named by this term may find its place only in the sphere of ethics considerations as an infringement of good academic customs. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the resignation of using the notion of autoplagiarism as hitherto in the mentioned context might be the best solution. However, if it appeared impossible there should be made an effort to redefine this notion, but in my opinion this undertaking has a little chance to be successful.

Klein & Barron's analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not seek to demonstrate that insects can experience pleasure and pain in particular. This would be something of which insects have not traditionally been thought capable. If further research were to demonstrate that one or more insect species turn out to be conscious, yet incapable of experiencing pleasure and pain, it would give rise to a philosophical question that ethicists have yet to answer: Would a creature that is conscious, but lacks the capacity to feel pain, have moral standing?

Ecological field research has generated a wealth of valuable information, much of which informs conservation efforts. Such research raises ethical issues when we propose to modify or endanger the individual organism, population, species, or ecosystem we study. Yet the scientific literature contains little explicit consideration of the impact of ecological study itself on organisms or ecosystems. We propose that the lack of public ethical discourse among field scientists is due to (1) trepidation about initiating a controversy that could endanger future research efforts; (2) an assumption that the relative benefits of our research outweigh potential short‐term costs to the study object (that is, increased knowledge of the study object may inform its conservation); (3) difficulties in perceiving the potential negative impact of our work; (4) tacit assumptions about certain experiments that are simply “wrong” to do. Ethical considerations have already arisen with the collection of organisms, the effects of scientific observation on survivorship and behavior, and experimental manipulations of whole ecosystems. The literature on environmental ethics and animal experimentation, two sources that bear tangentially on the issues of ecological ethics, may afford diverse and occasionally conflicting value systems on which to build an ethic of ecological experimentation. Although methods specifically devised to minimize the impact on study subjects have been published, we find few existing formal mechanisms of external regulation or self‐regulation of research activities in the field. We suggest that ethical considerations, conservation and restoration measures that are compatible with sound scientific protocols, may be profitably incorporated into the design of field experiments. We encourage a dialogue between scientists and philosophers on this issue.

Common sense suggests we are autonomous beings with a free will and a body. This is an anthropological premise of much contemporary bioethics, especially in the Western world. Obviously, this premise should be specified and nuanced. What is more, it may be critically questioned to what extent the premise, even in a more sophisticated appearance, is relevant to the analysis of specific ethical issues. This is exactly what the first five papers in the present issue of Medicine Health Care and Philosophy endeavour. The issue starts with Ignaas Devisch’s exploration of the concepts of autonomy and heteronomy. According to Devisch maximization of autonomy, understood as self-realization, has not turned out to provide solutions to all ethical problems in health care, as some once believed it would, which has triggered a renewed focus on heteronomy. However, the latter does not suffice as a central value in health care either. Devisch attempts to escape the dilemma by breaking down the absolute opposition between autonomy and heteronomy, and introducing the concept of ‘‘oughtonomy’’, which he expects might advance current health care ethics debates. Next, Gerben Meynen reflects on free will and psychiatric assessment of criminal responsibility. Meynen focuses on criminal cases, in which forensic psychiatrists are to assess the state of mind of the defendant. As free will is regarded as a necessary requirement for legal responsibility, it is crucial to determine the extent to which possible mental disorders may have compromised free will at the time of the legally relevant act. Against this backdrop forensic researchers tend to be drawn into metaphysical debate on free will. In contrast, researchers on informed consent do not seem to ponder on similar philosophical issues so much, although free will and free choice are considered to be pivotal to informed consent as well. Nevertheless, significant conceptual and operational clarification has been achieved in debates on informed consent. Meynen argues that in this respect, research on informed consent could provide a helpful model for research on forensic assessment. Thus researchers on forensic assessment may not have to engage into philosophical discussions on free will. Julie Aultman presents a conception of mental disease in relation to the embodied person. The concept of an embodied person encompasses both the biological body and the cognitive mind as interactive, unified and whole. Mental disease affects the person as a whole, not merely the body or mind. Aultman argues that a better framework is required in order to improve our understanding of mental disease. This framework should connect metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical considerations. Once introduced, it would also benefit researchers, clinicians, patients as well as their families. Kristin Zeiler chooses a phenomenological starting point in exploring bodily self-awareness. She focuses on how subjects experience their body and departs from Drew Leder’s distinction between bodily ‘‘dis-appearance’’ and ‘‘dys-appearance’’. When we do not think about our body in daily situations, our body dis-appears from our attention. In contrast, dys-appearance happens when the body appears to us as ‘‘ill’’ or ‘‘bad’’, for example, when B. Gordijn (&) Institute of Ethics, Henry Grattan Building, Dublin City University, Dublin 9, Ireland e-mail: bert.gordijn@dcu.ie

Readership Awareness Series – Paper 4: Chatbots and ChatGPT - Ethical Considerations in Scientific Publications