사고 데이터베이스를 활용한 안전 관리 시스템의 정량적 Audit 시스템 개발

Process safety practices and process safety management (PSM) systems have been applied since the various incidents and accidents in the refining and petrochemical industries over many years. In the US, the Center for Chemical Process Safety created risk-based process safety as the framework for the next generation of PSM. In petroleum refining and petrochemical industries, companies are required by law to have occupational safety programs, with a focus on personal safety, as the focus of these programs is to prevent harm to personnel from workplace accidents such as fall, cuts, strains, and so on. Petroleum refineries are one of the major energy-consuming industries that contribute to a major proportion of the production cost. Energy in a typical refinery is 60% of variable costs and 1% improvement in energy equals to ~$650,000 year saving for a 100,000 bpsd refinery.

Introduction: For years, chemical process industries have reported the unexpected release of highly hazardous liquids and gases. A disaster could not be avoided when these materials were not adequately controlled. The issue of Process Safety Management (PSM) is still being discussed in developing and developed countries. PSM was established to manage the risks of a company’s personnel, properties, products, environment, and credit risks. This study aimed to review the challenges and achievements of PSM implementation and provide recommendations for improvement. Material and Methods: A collection of scholarly articles published from 2000 to 2023, such as Science Direct, WOS, PubMed, and Scopus, was chosen through a systematic, meticulous review. After thoroughly examining these abstracts, titles, and complete contexts, 49 articles were finally selected for inclusion in the study and classified based on different criteria, such as publication year, authors, achievements, and challenges. Results: PSM in the United States has been chiefly studied due to the high number of chemical process industries and its presence in the form of OSHA legislation in this country. The areas of operations, audits, and resources have the most challenges in implementing PSM. On the other hand, reducing the severity of incidents in chemical processes and increasing productivity are considered the most significant achievements of PSM implementation. Conclusion: PSM as an interdisciplinary field has improved and become more effective over the years.. However, incidents still exist, and the number can increase, considering the growth of industries’ chemical processes. Therefore, a deep look at the issues of risk-based regulations, competency, operational excellence, and learning from incidents is necessary to achieve excellence in PSM.

Many major accidents have taken place in the chemical and petrochemical industry over the past 40 years (e.g. Bhopal (India, 1984), Texas City (USA, 2005)), which have been key driving forces for issuing new regulations (governments), publishing standards (industry groups), developing policies (companies), and ultimately for improving Loss Prevention strategies and Process Safety Management (PSM). On this context, a key standard is the OSHA PSM (29 CFR 1910.119), a process-based program aiming at preventing or minimizing the consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals. The present paper focuses on the results from several PSM audits performed between 2010 and 2016, at several different Chemical Process Industry (CPI) facilities. On the one hand, we have evaluated how well these facilities complied with the requirements of the OSHA PSM Standard. On the other hand, the data from the audit findings has been compiled and statistically processed in order to compare the main common findings with the results of those analyzed by OSHA's Refinery and Chemical National Emphasis Programs (NEP) in 2012. Key audit findings from the CPI are a valued source of information for understanding current safety weaknesses. The lessons learned from this study help us to identify operational discipline and process safety leadership and culture benefits towards minimizing or avoiding audit findings, and therefore, to contributing to an optimized and sustainable Process Safety management system.

Numerous manufacturing and service organizations have integrated or are considering integration of their respective occupational health and safety management and audit systems into the International Organization for Standardization-based (ISO) audit-driven Quality Management Systems (ISO 9000) or Environmental Management Systems (ISO 14000) models. Companies considering one of these options will likely need to identify and evaluate several key factors before embarking on such efforts. The purpose of this article is to identify and address the key factors through a case study approach. Qualitative and quantitative comparisons of the key features of the American Industrial Hygiene Association ISO-9001 harmonized Occupational Health and Safety Management System with The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. management and audit system were conducted. The comparisons showed that the two management systems and their respective audit protocols, although structured differently, were not substantially statistically dissimilar in content. The authors recommend that future studies continue to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of various audit protocols. Ideally, these studies would identify those audit outcome measures that can be reliably correlated with health and safety performance.

Palm oil industry (POI) is one of the major industries in Malaysia that contribute more than half of the Malaysia’s export value. Hence, the development of the industry also includes the well-being of the workers in the industry. As a consequence, the POI must adhere to several laws that provide protection for the workers’ safety and health such as OSHA 1994 and availability of guidelines to safety and health management such as OHSAS 18001. However, in terms of process safety, the POI is way lacking behind despite several incidents that show that POI as well is susceptible to process failures that lead to disastrous accidents. Process safety management has been successfully implemented in the chemical process industry (CPI) which is driven by the fact that the process is high risk with the utilization of hazardous materials and likelihood of fire and explosion. Hence, by comparison, it is found that these two industries has some similarity in terms of hazards, however the risk is found to be lower in the POI as compared to the CPI mainly because of the more hazardous materials that are involved in the CPI.

Formal Safety Management Systems (SMS) have been required in the USA and elsewhere for the onshore refining and petrochemical industries since the mid 1980's (EU) or early 1990's (USA). While several different versions of SMS exist they are mostly similar in content. Risk based SMS are more modern in thinking than hazard based systems. The O&G and petrochemical industries have reduced occupational accidents by close to a factor of ten over the past 15–20 years. However, major accident performance has hardly improved globally. An exception is the North Sea where major accidents appear to have declined by close to a factor of ten as well as occupational safety. This paper reviews some key additional requirements in the North Sea and why these appear to address major accidents better - by focusing on risks and barrier management and verification focusing on these. The SEMS approach as mandated by BSEE is essential and will be improved by safety culture requirements BSEE is proposing. However, since SEMS is very similar to OSHA 1910, and much less than North Sea requirements, it is likely that achievements will mirror that of 1910 and unlikely that the desired order of magnitude improvement in major accidents will occur. Additional focus on risk and barrier management is still required and this is not part of SEMS. A strong culture for process safety requires a focus on risk assessment and barriers. Background to Safety Management Systems The requirement for formal safety management systems (SMS) in the process industry has been common since the 1980's with earlier development of formal SMS by leading companies. Examples of these include the DuPont SMS, Exxon OIMS - Operations Integrity Management System, BP Getting HSE Right, and the DNV International Safety Rating System. A common feature is that most of these systems were developed in response to some major accident. The insight was that accident causes are not simply technical, but have underpinning management system influences (root causes) and major accidents would recur unless improved management systems were implemented. The major accidents in the 1970's in Europe (i.e. Flixborough UK and Seveso Italy) spurred development of safety case regulations in the Seveso Directive (originally passed in 1984 and coming into force in 1986). This included a requirement for a formal SMS. Major accidents in the 1980's in the USA or affecting USA companies (i.e. Bhopal MIC release, Phillips Pasadena VCE, Marathon HF release Texas City) led OSHA to seek input for new regulations. API issued RP 750 for onshore and RP 75 (1991) for offshore and CCPS issued its Guidelines for Technical Management of Process Safety (1989). These guides were extensively used in the public process leading to development of OSHA 1910.119 - the Process Safety Management regulations (1992). About this time the UK HSE issued HSG 65 - Successful Health and Safety Management (1991). All of these systems used an element based approach to the SMS with 12–20 elements typically. Most had the same content and the differences were primarily textual. These initial processes were followed by other initiatives that continue to current times. The UK HSE Offshore Safety Case regulations (1992) were an extension of the requirements in the EU Seveso Directive and included more advanced risk thinking from the Cullen Inquiry. The EU Seveso Directive was updated on multiple occasions to address new threats as they occurred (e.g. environmental damage: pollution of the Rhine following a fire at Sandoz, and a major cyanide spill from a mining dam in Eastern Europe). A major revision increased the focus on major accidents and changed the degree of justification in the safety case (e.g. as implemented in the UK) from " describe?? the safety systems to " demonstrate?? the adequacy of safety systems. The US EPA (1996) issued the RMP regulations (Risk Management Plan). These were very similar to OSHA 1910, but required Offsite Consequence Analysis for standardized 10 minute worst case events and optional some alternative release scenarios. An RMP document had to be created describing the SMS and safety systems this had some similarity to the EU safety case document. OSHA 1910 required the SMS elements to be in place but not collected into a single document.

With the popularization and application of chemical process safety management (PSM) systems in the chemical industry, the use of such systems in China has become the focus of a large volume of research. In this article, 12 elements included in the current Chinese PSM system are divided into four stages from a structural point of view. This division will be helpful in the follow‐up analysis. After a careful analysis of the evaluation results for one PSM pilot study in Nanjing, some correlations have been found between the results of the elemental evaluation. Small‐ and medium‐sized chemical plants make up a large proportion of Chinese chemical plants and many chemical accidents take place in these plants, so a simplified PSM system in practical operation need to be found. Based on a previous PSM structural analysis, the secondary elements of the PSM system can be removed. This allows researchers to avoid the traditional method of analyzing PSM elements individually. In the concrete analysis process, a theoretical analysis of the correlation degree between elements can be combined with the results of accident investigations. The simplified Chinese PSM system consists of four core elements: Process safety information, process hazard analysis, training, and emergency management. Based on the current applications of these four core elements in China, a consideration of correlations between these elements is used to make several suggestions for improving China's PSM systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 378–381, 2017

Herein, we present the steps a small pharmaceutical research and development company is taking to prepare for process safety management (PSM). Although not regulated by PSM at the present time, the corporate growth plan is such that PSM will be a requirement within the next 2–5 years. When looking at the safety management systems in use by many major companies, safety personnel at small companies can become overwhelmed by the daunting task before them. Preparation is key for a small company that must use available resources efficiently in order to accomplish day to day activities. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012

As various disasters and safety accidents frequently occur, people's expectations regarding safety management are gradually increasing. The importance of disaster and safety management is especially magnified due to successive accidents. These include fires in complex buildings and hospitals, inversion of cranes, paralysis of a communication network by a fire in the KT underground cable tunnel, rupture of pipelines in district heating systems, derailment of a KTX train, etc. To strengthen the generalization and mediation functions for disaster management and improve the disaster management system, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety introduced the safety audit and inspection system. This study suggests plans for the establishment and improvement of the system in the early part of its implementation. This includes a theoretical discussion on the safety audit and inspection, an investigation of the current organization in Wide-Area Units of the Local Government, and drawing plans for the establishment and improvement of the system. As a result, efficient planning for the safety audit and inspection, expansion of manpower, enhancement of the organization's status, and establishment of a system for the safety audit and inspection were suggested.

A comparative analysis of process safety management (PSM) systems in the process industry

Guidance to improve the effectiveness of process safety management systems in operating facilities

Beach Energy Limited (referred as Beach Energy or Beach) is an ASX-listed exploration and production company headquartered in Adelaide, South Australia. Founded in 1961, Beach produces oil and gas from five onshore and offshore basins across Australia and New Zealand. During its most recent growth phase, Beach added a number of assets to its portfolio that were originally developed and operated by companies with different management systems, standards and reporting requirements. Over the past 5 years Beach has been – and continues to be – on a journey of learning, developing and refining its systems and standards for reporting process safety performance and integrating these within a ‘one Beach’ philosophy. This paper describes the current stage of this evolution in measuring, reporting and managing process safety performance at Beach, presents some of the key learnings to date, in addition to outlining the next steps Beach is taking on this journey. The paper covers the following: (1) experience with IOGP RP 456 Tier KPI model and current main KPIs in use; (2) application to projects, drilling campaigns and operating assets; (3) challenges in gathering data and event classification; (4) importance of getting safety critical equipment selection right; (5) communicating large and complex KPIs to a varied audience; (6) learning and improving process safety performance and systems based on KPIs; (7) new approaches to reporting health of process safety barriers aligned to IOGP RP544 categories using simplified bowtie Major Accident Event dashboards; and (8) integration of process safety management within the Beach Operations Excellence Management System. The key conclusions are that measuring process safety performance requires dedicated effort and consensus across all stakeholders on the most appropriate way to measure performance. Reporting needs a positive and collaborative culture to have the right impact. Managing performance must be based on objective evidence and careful analysis of the data. Achieving effective and efficient process safety measurement, reporting and management is a multi-year journey of continual improvement.

Enhancing regional process safety management

Development of Safety Regulation and Management System in Energy Industry of China: Comparative and Case Study Perspectives

Application of Bayesian network and artificial intelligence to reduce accident/incident rates in oil & gas companies