ІНСТИТУЦІЙНИЙ ФРЕЙМВОРК ПУБЛІЧНОГО ПІДПРИЄМНИЦТВА В УКРАЇНІ

Common Property Resources (CPRs) have become a topic of scholarly research and attention, only after publication of an article entitled “The Tragedy of the Commons” by Garrett Hardin (1968). It is well established fact that CPRs and its allied products play vital role in promoting sustainable rural development and thus there is a need to understand the perception of local people in management of CPRs (Olo Mola, 1993). In this context, the Theory of Collective Action, also known as Theory of Public Goods, can provide the basis for understanding the conditions under which the users of CPRs will act and react on the utilization CPRs and the major problems confronted in using the CPRs. Traditional economic theories recognize and focus only two types of property viz public and individual. But there is third dimension of property as CPRs, which have been traditionally recognized by the rural society. They CPRs are playing a crucial role in people’s survival and particularly in community development of “Rural India” - real India according to our future of Nation Mahatma Gandhiji. In rural environment of India, both ecological and socio economic sustainability is largely determined by the status of CPRs and rights. In this context (Jodha 1995) and (Singh 1994) are rightly pointed out that CPRs are owned in common by identifiable group of people, regulated by social convention and legally enforceable rules. Further, CPRs are resources accessible to the whole community of a village to which no individual has exclusive property rights. In short CPRs is subject to individual use, but not to individual position. Cross root evidences show that CPRs have made significant contribution to rural mass and they are: providing physical products, generating income, promoting social culture gains, bringing environmental/ecological benefits. With this background, the researchers have made an attempt to study “People’s perception on CPRs management in Thamaraikulam Village of Dindigul District”, by carving out the following objectives such as (i) to study the socio economic conditions of the sample users of CPRs in the study area; (ii) to examine the extend in which the CPRs are used and managed by the sample households; (iii) to identify the major problems in using and many the CPRs; and (iv) to suggest ways and means for effective utilization of CPRs for betterment of village community. The researchable issues and questing raised are: What are the CPRs available to the village community? How these resources are being utilized and managed for the well being of the community as a whole and individual in particular? What are the constraints found by the community for sustainability of CPRs usage? This micro level research provides feasible, viable possible and sustainable solution to these issues and questions.

How do we allocate natural resources in an equitable way? For many, Garret Hardin's 'The tragedy of the commons' published in Science in 1968 became a parable of its time, giving succour to both environmentalist and capitalist alike. The intervening years have seen developments in environmental economics, participatory planning, environmental regulation, governance and resource efficiency, all strands that Hardin would recognise. New multi-disciplinary fields have emerged in topics such as socio-ecological systems theory, environmental cognition and resilience, all things that Hardin alludes to. The new science of ecosystem services is providing a robust framework for natural resource evaluation as it starts to underpin exactly what nature provides to us all in common. As we face the challenges of a changing climate and other ‘wicked‘ problems, is Hardin's analysis of a ‘class of problem with no technical solution‘ still a useful one? Followers of the debate over sustainable communities and the ’big society‘ may think so. This paper aims to introduce the reader to Hardin‘s now classic tragic scenario of natural resource use, place it within an evolving corpus of environmental literature, explore a little of the author's own life and attempt to asses its impact and relevance today.

The tragedy of the commons has been an influential metaphor in the environmental movement, not only referring to the misappropriation of common property resources by private producers, but also incorporating a variety of other issues into the metaphorical commons. Criticisms of the thesis have concentrated on the facts of how humans manage classical common property resources in the real world. Yet the most provocative aspects of the metaphor are associated with its more general usage for resources not usually thought of as manageable common property resources. A full analysis of the tragedy of the commons reveals important political insights into the environmental consequences of capitalism, especially the tendency for externalization of many production costs, suggesting that a more appropriate title for the thesis might be the tragedy of the privately owned sheep.

The aim of behavior analysis has always been to apply technologies rooted in basic behavioral principles to problems of societal importance (e.g., Skinner, 1948; 1953; 1987). One such problem is the Tragedy of the Commons - a phenomenon arising from systemic failures among a community, leading to the total collapse of a critical resource (Hardin, 1968). Elinor Ostrom's Eight Design Principles were developed to provide a framework for the self-management of common pool resources (CPRs; Ostrom, 1990/2015). When applied as an independently manipulated variable, Ostrom's design principles have shown strong effects in the management of CPRs within the context of a tabletop board game Catan® (Smith & Becker, 2023). This preparation included both rewards (i.e., positive reinforcement) and sanctions (i.e., positive punishment) as a feature of the independent variable. However, it has been well documented that punishing and coercive contingencies can lead to problematic outcomes for individuals and societies (e.g., Sidman, 2001; Skinner, 1976). This study evaluated the effects of utilizing only rewarding consequences in lieu of sanctions in an effort to produce the previously observed control over self-management of a CPR, utilizing the previously adapted rules of the Catan® board game.

Susan Dalton. Engendering the Republic of Letters: Reconnecting Public and Private Spheres in Eighteenth-Century Europe (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003). Pp. 206 + ix. $70.00 cloth. Alessa Johns. Women's Utopias of the Eighteenth Century (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003). Pp. 212 + xi. $34.95 cloth. Patricia Meyer Spacks. Privacy: Concealing the Eighteenth-Century Self (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003). Pp. 242 + vii. $36.00 cloth. A critical rethinking of the ubiquitous terms "public" and "private" in the eighteenth-century context informs the three books under review here. Susan Dalton, Alessa Johns, and Patricia Meyer Spacks explicitly address the influence of Habermas' 1962 Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (translated, in 1989, as The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society) on the entire field of eighteenth-century studies. In their nuanced readings of eighteenth-century literary and cultural production, Dalton, Johns, and Spacks question the prevalent interpretation of Habermas as establishing a strict binary opposition between the public and the private and, perhaps even more importantly, an equation of the private with the domestic and the public with the political. While Habermas has coined these terms and injected them into the critical discourse about the eighteenth century, the strict demarcation of supposedly separate spheres is more a product of Strukturwandel's subsequent reception than of Habermas' theory itself, prompted by critics' desire to establish some kind of coherent categorization for the complex nature of eighteenth-century life and letters. Habermas himself discusses the intersections of the public and private spheres and explores the arising ambivalences. He argues that the opposition between the "intimate sphere of the conjugal family" (51) and the "public sphere" was, above all, a discursive construct because the intimate/domestic sphere formed part of the private sphere of the gradually developing market economy. Even though the domestic was imagined as unaffected by the workings of the private realm of the market economy due to the accelerating division of labor and family life in the eighteenth century, both were connected not only to each other, but also to what Habermas calls the "public sphere in the world of letters" and "the public sphere in the political realm" (51). While the ideological construction of these separate spheres affected reality to some extent and women became increasingly equated with the domestic in the discourse of the time, an analysis of this reality also shows how porous and connected these areas were. Habermas' discussion of these intersections serves as the starting point for the studies of eighteenth-century literature and culture by Dalton, Johns, and Spacks. They explore the space which Habermas himself highlights but which has often been overlooked: the third space where public and private aspects meet in complex and ambivalent ways. The authors' well-reasoned and compelling analyses of these intersections [End Page 394] in British, French, German, and Italian writings underline the complexity of eighteenth-century textual production by men and women. In Engendering the Republic of Letters: Reconnecting Public and Private Spheres in Eighteenth-Century Europe, Susan Dalton looks with a historian's eye at the correspondence of four French and Italian salon women, Julie de Lespinasse, Marie-Jeanne Roland, Giustina Renier Michiel, and Elisabetta Mosconi Contarini. Dalton explores the communities formed by social networking and polite sociability in the eighteenth-century republic of letters and investigates salon women's engagement with the political and philosophical debates of their time. Her argument perceptively unravels the ambivalence that characterizes these elite women's theoretical writings and their practical applications. Yet, rather than classifying these ambivalent moments as contradictions, Dalton disentangles these women's strategic negotiation of gender discourses. This mediation allowed them to express their political views at the same time that it enabled them to echo discourses of propriety and...

This paper addresses a series of fundamental issues relating to the governance of common-pool resources at multiple scales. Perhaps the most important question is whether the tragedy of the commons, as first articulated in Hardin's 1968 Science article, is inevitable. For many policy analysts the answer to that question is usually no. Avoiding the tragedy, however, is contingent on their policy prescription being adopted. The range of preferred approaches includes government ownership or private property. Some scholars will recommend community property. In the main, simple solutions are posed for complex problems. best is proposed by many analysts to a wide variety of problems. Ecological diversity is something that many of us feel strongly should be protected. There is considerable interest in preserving biodiversity as one form of global commons. On the other hand, a frequent way of maintaining ecological diversity has been to reduce or eliminate institutional diversity at a variety of scales including indigenous local institutions as well as institutions at other scales. I would argue that we need as serious attention to the problem of understanding institutional diversity as we do understanding ecological diversity. We need to build on that understanding rather than presume that there is a single, best way. At the current time, a large gap exists between policy recommendations about the commons and findings from empirical research. Underlying contemporary policy recommendations are three basic assumptions. One of the basic assumptions has to do with individuals using resources, e.g., fishermen, grazers, irrigators, farmers, users of the radio spectrum, and those of us who send smoke into the air, etc. All of these users are appropriating from a resource. We will use the term appropriator as the general, technical term for users or harvesters. A common assumption is that appropriators are trapped in tragic overuse of most resources. Thus, whatever the solutions to overuse are, they must come from the outside. This perception is based on a series of assumptions. This first one emerges from training in economics--which offers a narrow model of the individual that is useful for many purposes. When it is applied as a general theory, however, it leads to a presumption that all appropriators are norm-free, short-term maximizers of selfish gains. In the same policy analyses, government officials are assumed to be people who maximize the public interest. Do public officials have different genes? How come individuals are narrow and selfish and government officials seek out the public interest? We need to reflect on how we arrived at these two disparate assumptions. Secondly, there is a shared belief that it is feasible to design optimal rules by modelling and analysis. Models are useful, but it is unlikely, if not impossible, that one can get to optimality for a complex system through modelling. The third assumption that is frequently made is that to be organized you have to have a central direction. Unless the policy analysis finds a single central authority, an assumption that organization is lacking is made. These three basic assumptions underlie a good deal of our current policy thinking. I will argue that all three are incorrect. All three are a poor foundation for public policy. The management and governance of the commons at multiple scales is a cogent example of how these assumptions are in error. What are Common-Pool Resources? Common-pool resources generate limited amounts of resource units that can be fish, mushrooms, timber, water. A variety of resources exist that have a finite stock at any particular time. One person's use subtracts from the corpus or stock. Thus subtractibility is a core concept in defining a common-pool resource. Secondly, it is difficult to exclude individuals who might benefit from using common-pool resources. …

ABSTRACTNatural resource tenure and economic feasibility of resource‐based activities are two of the most important issues in the current debate around environmental degradation and rural poverty. While many analyses have blamed the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and government mismanagement for environmental destruction, this paper provides a case study of resin tapping in Honduras which formulates the hypotheses that common property regimes can be successful and that economic liberalization policies may be detrimental to community‐level resource schemes. Over half of the 6000 farmer‐resin tappers in Honduras are organized into forty‐six co‐operatives that market the tree sap, wood and other forest products. These activities combine the twin goals of community‐based forest preservation and income generation. Established legally in 1974, the tapping groups have expanded to include a variety of organizational and technical arrangements. The two co‐operatives of Villa Santa and San Juan de Ojojona demonstrate contrasting histories, ecological endowments and economic outcomes. Currently the Honduran resin tappers are facing problems over their access to forest resources, the fluctuating profitability of extractive activities and the stability of the co‐operative organization. These three issues are relevant to a variety of community‐based environmental activities, and the lessons of the Honduran experience can be applied to analyse the processes of environmental degradation and community response elsewhere in the Third World.

‘The tragedy of the commons’ arises when it is difficult and costly to exclude potential users from common-pool resources that yield finite flows of benefits, as a result of which those resources will be exhausted by rational, utility-maximizing individuals rather than conserved for the benefit of all. Pessimism about the possibility of users voluntarily cooperating to prevent overuse has led to widespread central control of common-pool resources. But such control has itself frequently resulted in resource overuse. In practice, especially where they can communicate, users often develop rules that limit resource use and conserve resources.

First principles of thermodynamics imply that metabolic pathways are faced with a trade-off between the rate and yield of ATP production. Simple evolutionary models argue that this trade-off generates a fundamental social conflict in microbial populations: average fitness in a population is highest if all individuals exploit common resources efficiently, but individual reproductive rate is maximized by consuming common resources at the highest possible rate, a scenario known as the tragedy of the commons. In this paper, I review studies that have addressed two key questions: What is the evidence that the rate-yield trade-off is an evolutionary constraint on metabolic pathways? And, if so, what determines evolutionary outcome of the conflicts generated by this trade-off? Comparative studies and microbial experiments provide evidence that the rate-yield trade-off is an evolutionary constraint that is driven by thermodynamic constraints that are common to all metabolic pathways and pathway-specific constraints that reflect the evolutionary history of populations. Microbial selection experiments show that the evolutionary consequences of this trade-off depend on both kin selection and biochemical constraints. In well-mixed populations with low relatedness, genotypes with rapid and efficient metabolism can coexist as a result of negative frequency-dependent selection generated by density-dependent biochemical costs of rapid metabolism. Kin selection can promote the maintenance of efficient metabolism in structured populations with high relatedness by ensuring that genotypes with efficient metabolic pathways gain an indirect fitness benefit from their competitive restraint. I conclude by suggesting avenues for future research and by discussing the broader implications of this work for microbial social evolution.

Garrett Hardin's idea of the "tragedy of the commons" is widely invoked in the discussions of conservation and natural resource management. Many teachers of environmental studies use classroom simulations to introduce students to the "tragedy of the commons" and its implications. This chapter describes an activity in which students are asked to take the role of herders who are all given the same initial amount of cattle and cash. Each year they have an opportunity to buy cows and receive income from the sale of milk and excess calves. Everyone's purchases are summed up and a formula is used in the chapter to calculate a figure for the income per cow during the year from milk and calves. In this formula, the income declines once the combined herd on the common pasture exceeds some threshold, and the pasture becomes overgrazed.

A field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons

Simple movement rules result in ideal free distribution of mobile pastoralists

The theory of the anticommons opens up a new approach for legal research into Public International Law. This article demonstrates that anticommons structures can be readily located in the legal rules and legal institutions of public international law and its many affiliated substantive areas of law, such as in International Environmental Law. It provides an introduction and survey of the existing research into anticommons and sets out a list of the known potential solutions to anticommons structures. As such, it is demonstrated that legal researchers would benefit from a greater familiarity with current research in the field of anticommons theory. This article provides legal researchers with the frameworks necessary to begin research on anticommons in Public International Law.The model knowns as the ‘Tragedy of the Anticommons’ is a symmetrical reflection to the ‘Tragedy of the Commons,’ in that both models work on the extremes of having or not having exclusionary rights over a common resource or completion of a joint endeavor. Both models result in reduced benefits, or welfare, from the underlying resource albeit on different mechanisms.When this common resource or joint endeavor is a legal service, legal right, or legal procedure, one can have a legal anticommons; when the issue is based in complementary or competitive regulatory processes, one can obtain a regulatory anticommons. Evidence is presented that both legal and regulatory anticommons can be found in Public International Law.Given that there are anticommons in the rule sets and legal institutions of Public International Law, policy makers should be able to locate and characterize those anticommons to better identify which problems are thus created and which frustrations in public international law can be avoided or ameliorated.

The classical theoretical prediction for the “commons dilemma” is as tragedy. The situation popularized as “the tragedy of the commons” became intriguing because beneath this unfortunate and surely undesired result of collective action laid the model of “rational actor”. Yet, the messiness of alternative theories of human behavior has been motive of hesitation to adopt more realistic assumptions than those of the rational choice to address collective action. Still, a deeper understanding of the interplay among cognition, values systems, and institutions should be the starting point for any discussion of societal change. In this paper, we present a new approach to advance the theory of collective action by combining the framework of institutional analysis with Clare Graves’s theory of adult biopsychosocial development. Moreover, we sketch an empirical strategy for investigating the behavioral hypotheses resulting from the Graves’ model using experimental CPR (common-pool resource) games. The results from the suggested approach promise to be a valuable improvement toward a more integral approach to collective action problems and sustainability.

In human society selfish use of common resources can lead to disaster, a situation known as the 'tragedy of the commons' (TOC). Although a TOC is usually prevented by coercion, theory predicts that close kinship ties can also favour reduced exploitation. We test this prediction using data on a TOC occurring in Melipona bee societies.