Феноменология и терминология в Идеях I. Что естественного в «естественной установке»?

In their article “Person, Human Being and Subjectivity in Phenomenology”, Māra Grīnfelde and Uldis Vēgners look at three types of human attitudes of consciousness through the prism of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. First, the authors describe the concept of attitude itself. Attitudes express a person’s relationship to objects in the broadest sense, whether they be things, living beings, events, abstract ideas, or ultimately the person himself and their feelings, emotions and attitudes. Even when people say they are indifferent (they have no attitude), they do have an attitude, i.e., neutral attitude. In Husserl’s philosophy, however, attitude is not a particular approach to a particular object, but a comprehensive point of view of consciousness, perspective or stance towards objects in general. Husserl defines attitude in general terms as a habitually determined style of life of the will, with its predetermined will-directions and interests, with destinations, cultural achievements, the overall style of which is thus determined. The authors describe the three characteristic types of attitude in greater detail, according to Husserl’s phenomenology: personalistic, naturalistic and phenomenological. The personalistic attitude is the “the self as a person”, which Husserl also calls the naturalistic attitude. The word “natural” is not meant here as the one characterising or belonging to physical nature, but as opposed to that artificially created and maintained. Man does not have to do anything to adopt a personalistic attitude, because he finds himself in it from the beginning and in the very essence. The naturalistic attitude is “Me as a representative of the species” – man can experience themselves not only as an embodied person but also as a specific living nature, a specific specie that experiences itself and other living organisms as natural objects, so that man can be studied by the methods of natural science. Unlike the personalistic attitude, which is characterised by motivational relations, the naturalistic attitude operates in causal, i.e., causal, relations. Phenomenological attitude “the self as a transcendental subjectivity” – as is the case with the naturalistic attitude, the phenomenological or transcendental attitude is artificial; one does not tend to live it as a person in everyday life, but as the result of a special intellectual effort which, in order to persist in it, requires practising and habit-forming. The authors conclude that transcendental subjectivity is meaningful because it makes everything experienced mean something to us. Whereas the self in the personalistic and naturalistic attitudes can die and is therefore mortal, the transcendental self does not die because it is not a living being but rather a condition of experience of living beings. The transcendental self can only begin and end. / Māra Grīnfelde un Uldis Vēgners rakstā “Persona, cilvēks un subjektivitāte fenomenoloģiskā skatījumā” skata cilvēku caur Edmunda Huserla fenomenoloģijas prizmu. Saskaņā ar Huserla fenomenoloģiju autori detalizētāk apraksta trīs raksturīgākos attieksmes veidus: personālistisko, naturālistisko un fenomenoloģisko. M. Grīnfelde un U. Vēgners secina, ka transcendentālā subjektivitāte ir jēgpilna. Pateicoties tai, viss, ko mēs pieredzam, mums kaut ko nozīmē. Ja es personālistiskajā un naturālistiskajā attieksmē varu nomirt un tādēļ esmu mirstīgs, tad transcendentālais es nemirst, jo nav dzīva būtne, bet gan drīzāk dzīvo būtņu pieredzes nosacījums. Transcendentālais es var tikai sākties un beigties. Atslēgvārdi: Subjektivitāte; fenomenoloģiskais skatījums; Es kā persona; Es kā cilvēka sugas pārstāvis; Es kā transcendentālā subjektivitāte.

This essay is a journey into the phenomenology of place and Goethe's science of nature by an Australian lecturer on the philosophies and practices of place-based education. It takes the form of a series of encounters with leading figures in the field— David Seamon, Henri Bortoft and Isis Brook, as well as an application of Goethean science to some granite outcroppings on the Cornish coast of England. The profundity of the phenomenological concepts of 'natural attitude' and 'lifeworld' is discussed together with ideas behind Goethe's participative and intuitive practices. Goethean science and phenomenology have enormous potential to deepen the experience, understanding and expression of place relationships, but they put challenging demands upon students and lecturers within the structure of a university subject.

Does man live forever or for a limited period of time? Can man become immortal, staying young forever and living for eternity? The natural attitude towards life and health offers an affirmative answer and reveals the secret ingredients to longevity, ideal physical maintenance and becoming immortal. Subscribers to this belief think that Heaven and Earth are merely the place and space for man’s existence, neither of which could give birth to or manipulate man’s life. On the one hand, Heaven and Earth outshine everything in size and age. On the other, life, wealth, fortune and grace are all predestined, long before reincarnation and qi accumulation. Man is born to follow the course of destiny according to the Natural Attitude Towards Life. Just as medicine can influence man’s health, longevity and physiology, man’s body can be tended and nurtured after birth to ensure immortality and the ascension to Heaven, hence the Natural Attitude Towards Health. The most representative proponent of the Natural Attitude Towards Life and Health is Ge Hong of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317 A.D.–420 A.D.).

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to run its course, the discourse about the virus has splintered into diverse narratives characterized by different views of, for example, its origins, vaccine hesitancy, and the efficacy of masking. This chapter provides a theoretical understanding of the grounds of the polarization of this information environment. In doing so, it addresses a core assumption of social informatics, the relationship of mutual shaping among people, technologies, and their contexts of use, by providing an initial sketch of a conceptual framework that grounds this assumption in concepts from phenomenology, postphenomenology, and critical data studies. Using the example of the emergence of competing and deeply held and starkly different narratives depicting the COVID-19 pandemic, concepts of the lifeworld, the natural attitude, algorithmic assemblages, algorithmic imaginary, and technological frames are used to account for the generation, spread, and persistence of these narratives. The argument proceeds in three sections. First, algorithms and algorithmic assemblages are introduced. Second, the concepts of the lifeworld and the natural attitude are described. Third, these concepts are used to explain how algorithmic assemblages are shaping the lifeworld and the natural attitude, using examples of the algorithmically mediated and polarized responses to fundamental issues of the pandemic.

In what follows, I want to address the reciprocity between two questions: What might a particular philosophical tradition bring to the study of film? and What might film studies bring to the practice of philosophy? Here, explored from a pedagogical perspective, my exemplar is existential phenomenological philosophy as it illuminates — and is illuminated by — Derek Jarman’s seemingly ‘monochromatic’ film, Blue (UK, 1993). Made when the filmmaker was almost completely blind and dying of AIDS and theatrically released in 1993, Blue is an instance of cinematic perception and expression at their extremity. Seemingly without figures, the screen rectangle is filled with a field of cobalt blue (except for a flash of white light at the end) as a soundtrack of voices, sound effects, and music weaves a poetic and fragmented first-person narrative of Jarman’s observations, memories, and emotions in relation to his failing eyesight, horrific medical experiences, and approaching death, all in the context of a larger community of lovers, friends, and strangers living with and dying from AIDS. Blue not only elicits extremely positive or negative responses from most of those who experience it but also challenges our ‘natural attitude’ (better termed ‘naturalized attitude’) about the phenomenon we call a ‘film.’KeywordsNaturalize AttitudeSound EffectNecker CubePhenomenological MethodVisual DeprivationThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Throughout his career, Husserl identifies naturalism as the greatest threat to both the sciences and philosophy. In this paper, I explicate Husserl’s overall diagnosis and critique of naturalism and then examine the specific transcendental aspect of his critique. Husserl agreed with the Neo-Kantians in rejecting naturalism. He has three major critiques of naturalism: First, it (like psychologism and for the same reasons) is ‘countersensical’ in that it denies the very ideal laws that it needs for its own justification. Second, naturalism essentially misconstrues consciousness by treating it as a part of the world. Third, naturalism is the inevitable consequence of a certain rigidification of the ‘natural attitude’ into what Husserl calls the ‘naturalistic attitude’. This naturalistic attitude ‘reifies’ and it ‘absolutizes’ the world such that it is treated as taken-for-granted and ‘obvious’. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological analysis, however, discloses that the natural attitude is, despite its omnipresence in everyday life, not primary, but in fact is relative to the ‘absolute’ transcendental attitude. The mature Husserl’s critique of naturalism is therefore based on his acceptance of the absolute priority of the transcendental attitude. The paradox remains that we must start from and, in a sense, return to the natural attitude, while, at the same time, restricting this attitude through the on-going transcendental vigilance of the universal epoche.

Medical futility has a long history going back to Plato but continues to be a controversial topic. Patients, families, and health professionals are faced with decisions about which treatments and interventions may be futile, but such questions as who decides; how do competing values get resolved; what value is placed on human life; how are decisions balanced according to reason and, in some circumstances, faith; and who decides effect, benefit, and burdens of treatments are often difficult to answer. The naïve reality of medical futility is explored in the natural attitude to expose presumptions and facts related to both physiologic (fact-based) and evaluative (value-based) futility components. Highlights from the bioethical and clinical literature, a review of 3 landmark cases, and implications for nursing practice are presented. This natural attitude description could serve as what ought to be bracketed for a future phenomenology.

In the debate between the natural science and the phenomenological or herme neutical approaches in the human sciences, a third alternative described by Husserl has been widely ignored. Contrary to frequent assumptions, Husserl believed that a purely phenomenological method is not generally the appropri ate approach for the empirical human sciences. Rather, he held that although they can and should make important use of phenomenological analysis, such sciences should take their basic stance in the "natural attitude," the ordinary commonsense lifeworld mode of understanding which cuts across the divergent abstractive specializations of natural science and phenomenology Human sci ence in the natural attitude, shorn of its naivete by phenomenological insight, would be the field of descriptive concrete sociocultural sciences capable of taking a truly explanatory approach to their subject matter, persons and personal formations. In practice, both Weber and Freud exemplify the method recom mended by Husserl.

The following paper argues that Husserl’s description of the natural attitude can be used as an alternative to Beck’s cognitive therapy’s understanding of the change process and the perpetuation of an emotional disorder. Conversely this also provides further insight into the natural attitude. Specifically the works of Sebastian Luft and Alfred Schutz are referred to as a means of developing what is termed by the paper as the universalising attitude. The paper extrapolates the incidental, yet significant, phenomenological structures within CBT’s process of guided discovery to support its hypothesis that the change process can be understood as the patient undertaking at various times in therapy, a series of differing epoché. It is argued that CBT ultimately ‘works’ by the patient learning to achieve a rudimentary phenomenological attitude. The patient acquires insight by ‘standing back’ from their factual understanding of self, others and the world.

The purpose of this paper is to show how teachers’ experiences of one dimension of enjoyment of work, namely joy as a subtle atmosphere, can be described and understood from a lifeworld perspective. The lifeworld phenomenological approach contributes to the whole research design and provides the concepts that form the theoretical basis for the analysis. The specific lifeworld concepts used are ‘intertwinement’, ‘natural attitude’, ‘pre-predicativity’, ‘intentionality’ and ‘intersubjectivity’. Using these concepts, the results illuminate and describe the meanings of enjoyment of work, based on what the teachers expressed in interviews. The empirical study consisted of interviews with five teachers working with pupils aged seven to nine years. The results illuminate some vital and fundamental characteristics of teachers’ experiences of enjoyment of work and its significance. These characteristics include its basic function and its inherent possibility for opening up the whole classroom situation to the teachers. In this sense, enjoyment of work is similar to standing in a doorway and involves an expectant foreshadowing. The study also found that teachers’ experiences of joy are intertwined with their experiences of flow and control. The results found that enjoyment of work was significant in the sense of the confirmation of good work, like a receipt. Finally, the results revealed new concepts and metaphors for a richer understanding of this phenomenon. The research implications of the study illustrate how the lifeworld approach enables a deeper understanding of emotional dimensions in teachers work. The approach provides useful concepts that broaden the understanding of the content, function and meaning of teachers’ experiences of enjoyment of work. The paper also points to the need for more research in this area. The results illuminate new and different aspects of teachers’ work that may be a valuable resource in this profession.

This chapter argues that contrary to its own self-image, the so-called “common sense” of the natural attitude is actually highly prejudicial. Far from being an unmediated direct intuition of “the facts” of, say, a hate incident, the natural attitude generates interpretations that are driven by a number of underlying presuppositions. These in effect “mediate” even the most apparently “immediate” intuition of seemingly “objective facts” and “factual patterns” of hate crime. As a result, the natural attitude’s objectivism encourages distinctly positivist quantitative forms of hate crime research. At this stage, we leave open the question of whether its mediation by far from objective presuppositions tends to contradict and undermine such positivism; and if so, do the difficulties created in this way tend to point the way forward to a diametrically opposite radically qualitative approach of Husserl?

S/Z aims to demonstrate how language produces the realist text as natural. It examines not the structure of the text but its structuration. The text is seen as a productivity of meaning which is carried on within a certain regime of sense: realism. The productivity of language which is dramatically revealed in the unconscious and in avant-garde texts is given a fixity, a positionality, so that it functions to 'denote' a 'reality'. Thus realism is more than a 'natural attitude', it is a practice of signification which relies upon the limits that society gives itself: certain realist texts, like the novella analysed in S/Z are consequently capable of dramatising these limits at certain moments. …

Attitudes to nature in the East and West

<p class="Abstract">This paper sets out an argument in favour of emergentism as an alternative theoretical paradigm to nativism, arguing that it offers a coherent, evidence-based account of language structure, language acquisition, language evolution, and language change. A number of key tenets of the nativist approach are summarised first, including the nature of the presumed complexity of language, the poverty of the input argument against the learnability of language, the assumption of parsimony, the view of language as innate, biological faculty, and the view of the primary function of language as cognitive representation rather than communication. This is followed by a presentation of the emergentist alternative, which is centred on the notion of the grammatical construction as central unit in the emergentist approach. The properties of constructions, and how they can come into being with recourse to only domain-general cognitive processes, are presented, before the implications of this view for language structure, language acquisition, language evolution and language change are discussed. Additional points of difference with the nativist position are highlighted, including the assumptions of non-parsimonious storage and the centrality of communicative interaction in the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of language. Throughout the presentation, arguments are illustrated with reference to aspects of complementation in the Germanic languages. The article concludes with a detailed case study of the wh-extraction construction, drawing on an analysis of corpus data from Afrikaans, to demonstrate how the construction-based, emergentist approach leads to an insightful analysis of a well-known construction, without having to make extensive assumptions about the underlying linguistic complexity and the need for innate mechanisms to enable the acquisition of such a complex construction.

Evidence abounds that a segment of our field views the current status of communication research with alarm. Whether the specific issues involve the logic of theory construction, the methodologies employed in collecting and analyzing data, or the criteria used in assessing scientific evidence, the refrain is constant: prevailing research practices are fruitless and wrong-headed and our wrong-headedness will be remedied by an alternative approach that will lead to a tree scientific understanding of human communication. In other words, the lost souls responsible for promulgating heathen research practices of old are urged to repent and to accept the word of the philosophical and scientific messiahs who have come to save them. A new gospel is compelling when sinners are convinced that they have really sinned or when they are persuaded that it is indeed new and better than the prevailing theology. Unfortunately, we find the scriptures of alarmists jumbled. Rather than presenting a ringing reaffirmation of our own faith, we will content ourselves with pointing out several of the confusions and ambiguities encountered in the critics' writings. There are two kinds of confusions and ambiguities: those associated with practices which are characterized as the reigning paradigm and those associated with certain alternative paradigms that have been advocated. Although our comments are relevant to the problem of assessing scientific evidence, they also relate to broader issues concerning the epistemological moorings of communication research. INDICTMENTS OF THE REIGNING PARADIGM: OR, ARE YOU POSITIVE THAT'S A POSITIVIST? Disciples of the new research order frequently warn that stubborn adherence to prevailing practices forces the researcher to worship at the pagan shrine of an outmoded, discredited logical positivism. Despite the religious fervor of their remarks, it is often difficult to discern just how or in what ways these critics equate current communication research practices with positivism. Indeed, some skeptics have dismissed the effort to make such an equation as a red herring which relies on a naive or distorted view of logical positivism. For instance, Robert Bostrom stated in a recent paper that close attention to most of these polemics reveals a standard tactic: the construction of a far-fetched and altogether unrepresentative set of assertions which are blandly identified as the essence of the positivistic position.(1) As we attempt to untangle some of the ways that prevailing research practices have been linked with positivism, it will become apparent that we are at least partially sympathetic with Bostrom's indictment of this practice. In some cases, allegiance to logical positivism is equated with paying homage to the covering law model of explanation. Typically, the argument proceeds as follows: (1) logical positivism champions the covering law model of explanation; (2) the covering law model demands universal, invariant generalizations; (3) no such generalizations have been discovered in communication; therefore, (4) the covering law model is deficient; and (5) logical positivism is deficient. This argument is patently specious, both on intellectual and practical grounds. Nowhere in the literature of logical positivism does one encounter the claim that covering laws constitute the sole acceptable means of scientific explanation. In his classic analysis, Carl G. Hempel distinguishes three types of scientific explanation, two of which rely upon statistical or probabilistic premises.(2) An astute critic of the law-governed approach to theory construction, Donald Cushman, has characterized the logical positivist position regarding explanation thus: According to this view [positivism], laws enunciate the uniform concomitance of phenomena, the prototype instance of which is either a universal implication (all A are B) or a problematic correlation [italics ours].(3) Simply stated, total allegiance to the covering law model of explanation is not an inherent feature of a positivistic perspective, nor does knowledge of one's position regarding the efficacy of covering law explanations permit his or her classification as positivist or non-positivist. …