БЕЗПЕКОВА СТРАТЕГІЯ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА ДОНАЛЬДА ТРАМПА

The article analyzes the features of Japan’s security policy. It is noted that tradi- tionally, after World War II, the country relied on US defense resources, adhering to the Yoshida Doctrine. This made it possible to focus on socio-economic issues and reduce military spending. However, Japan’s security situation has changed since the end of the Cold War, when the country sought to increase its contribu- tion to regional and global security. At the beginning of the 21st century, growing military threats from China and North Korea forced Japan to step up its defense efforts. The government of Sh. Abe initiated a number of reforms: the National Security Council was established, the «National Security Strategy» was adopted, and defense capabilities were modernized. Japan has also focused on building new security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. Changes in security policy have covered a variety of issues, including the gradual militarization of the re- mote southwestern islands and cyber security. The final break with the pacifist traditions of foreign policy was performed due to the government of F. Kishida, and the key event that provoked these drastic changes was the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine in February 2022. Key changes proposed by Japan’s new national security strategy include: doubling the defense budget over the next five years; development of counterattack capabilities; expanding into new areas such as space; creation of the Permanent Joint Staff to coordinate the command of the armed forces; strategic emphasis on the southwestern islands, which are under the greatest threat in the context of the situation around Taiwan; increasing the country’s defense capability and readiness to conduct military operations. The «National Defense Strategy of Japan», adopted in 2022, takes into account the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war and aims to respond to «new ways of waging war». In accordance with this, the government’s efforts to make gradual changes in the Self-Defense Forces are focused on seven main areas: strengthe- ning defense capabilities; complex air defense; development of unmanned tech- nologies; means of electronic security; possibilities of mobile deployment and protection of the civilian population; operational headquarters and intelligence centers; increasing the fighting capacity of the personnel of the Self-Defense Forces. Strategic communications with NATO and other defense alliances also play an important role in Japan’s security policy.

Rediscovering the past to build a secure future is better realized by understanding the role of history in policy making. Today, while Nepal’s national security policies remain silent about the geopolitical threats, it is timely to rediscover the guidelines on national security strategies introduced in Divya Upadesh, a Divine Counsel of the Great King Prithivi Narayan Shah. Currently, Nepal inability in escaping the geostrategic challenge of accommodating the interest of major powers is explicitly visible in the fiasco created by the Nepali political parties in the context of Nepal’s uncertainty over US-sponsored MCC project, which is today perceived in Nepal as hostile to China-led BRI. Historically, Nepal has successfully balanced its two Gulliverian neighbors. But, today, Nepal is not in a position to evade the repercussions triggered by Sino-Indian rivalry at the regional front and Sino-US strategic competition at the global level. On the backdrop of their conflicting interest—strategic, security, economic—Kathmandu faces the geostrategic challenges of accommodating the interest of major powers. Although Nepal’s integrated foreign policy of 2020 mentions of the changed geopolitical context, pragmatic policy recommendations, as indicated by foreign policy behavior, are missing. Constitutional guidelines on Nepal’s foreign policy and national security alone are not sufficient. Thus, drawing lessons from history could be of help to formulate the national security strategies in order to better cope with the external threats. The rationale behind considering Divya Upadesh is to make Nepali policy makers realize that the national security strategies and policies that Nepal adopted in a usual/normal context won’t be able to fulfill the requirements of the uncertain strategic milieu against the backdrop of a ‘new Cold War’ brewing between the United States and China. In the late 18th century when P.N Shah was introducing a comprehensive national security policy for the first time, the external environment wasn’t much favorable. After his death, however, instead of paying heed to his guidelines, expansionism ended up to territorial loss, adventurism led to Himalayan wars, appeasement led to increasing British influence in Nepal. After 1950, guidelines in Divya Upadesh have been more confined to history books and classrooms lectures. While Nepal lionizes its act of balancing India and China though the policy of non-alignment and equidistance, foreign and security policy makers never paid attention to reinvent the lesson for the same. Thus, this qualitative study recuperates the relevance of effective balancing as advocated by PN Shah in addressing the challenges surfaced while accommodating the interests of major powers. Most of the available literature on Divya Upadesh are either translated English versions, or limited to the analysis of the unification process. The relevance of an intersection of foreign policy and national security in Divya Upadesh is not unveiled by any of the available literature. Apprehending the same research gap, this study explores the contemporary significance of Divya Upadesh while devising the national security policies and strategies. Firstly, the contemporary challenges to Nepal’s national security prompted by Kathmandu’s struggle in accommodation of the interest of major powers is discussed; secondly, the policy of ‘balancing’ counseled by Prithivi Narayan Shah is emphasized as an apt and relevant in dealing with the contemporary challenges emanating from the neighborhood and beyond. Thirdly, “meticulous diplomacy,” is highlighted to offer economic shape to the act of balancing. Finally, it has been realized how studying history means studying causes, and as such, turning the pages of Divya Upadesh, policy makers discover the causes of Nepal’s failure in accommodating the interest of major powers.

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.

Offline: From 1918 to 2018—the lessons of influenza

State of the Union Addresses (SOUA) by two recent US Presidents, President Obama (2016) and President Trump (2018), and a series of recent of tweets by President Trump, are analysed by means of the data mining technique, sentiment analysis. The intention is to explore the contents and sentiments of the messages contained, the degree to which they differ, and their potential implications for the national mood and state of the economy. President Trump's 2018 SOUA and his sample tweets are identified as being more positive in sentiment than President Obama's 2016 SOUA. This is confirmed by bootstrapped t tests and non-parametric sign tests on components of the respective sentiment scores. The issue of whether overly positive pronouncements amount to self-promotion, rather than intrinsic merit or sentiment, is a topic for future research.

: In a future geo-political environment where North and South Korea are unified under a single government with single economic and military systems how will this shift in the strategic environment impact U.S. diplomacy the U.S. National Security Strategy and the balance of power in the region? Will U.S. vital interests in the region remain unchanged and if not how will they change? In the past U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) prominently stated that a strong and stable Asia Pacific community was one of six top strategic priorities. The current NSS states, . . North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. During his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush labeled North Korea as part of the axis of evil. Undoubtedly, the Korean peninsula is one of the likely major regional conflicts or theaters of war. Major military reviews of U.S. military requirements and force structure this decade have factored in North Korea as a major conventional and unconventional threat to U.S. vital interests in the region. A change to this major regional threat will alter the strategic environment of Asia Pacific region and have significant implications for the U.S. Armed Forces.

Research Highlights and Abstract This article Contributes to the debate on British Foreign and Security Policy; Contributes to the literature on the British National Security Strategy; Links international relations literature with domestic policy formation literature; Introduces the concept of ‘legitimacy’ to foreign and security policy analysis. The publication of the Britain's first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2008 marked a formal shift away from the secret state of the Cold War to the highly public protective state of today. This article is interested in the question of why the NSS and related framework have taken this particular public and explicit form. Both mainstream and critically minded academics have argued that contemporary security discourses and policies are techniques of power and governance and that the public nature of the policies is vital to this function. In this article, I argue that there has been a transformation in the nature of the British state from a representative state in which the state's authority was legitimated through a number of political mechanisms of representation, to one in which state elites and institutions need to forge new kinds of relationships with the governed. This is a key development that has been noticed in political, sociological and legal theoretical literature but as yet hardly addressed in international relations and security studies. This transformation of the state, I will argue, is intimately linked to the form and content of contemporary security policies. The contemporary state is undergoing a process of an erosion of legitimacy, which has a direct impact upon the capacity of the state to govern. In this context, policies take on the role of trying to bridge the legitimacy gap. I will argue that this shift in the state leads to a different understanding of contemporary security policies as representative of a decreasing ability to govern security, a state that is losing legitimacy and authority; that is in effect, losing its sovereignty. This article argues that British national security strategies and policies are representative of this.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) are specific documents prepared periodically by the United States’ executive, describing the main concerns of Americans’ national security and developing strategies to face the challenges. At the same time, by exposing the US government’s strategic vision, it contributes to informing the US government’s approach and intent on various topics related to security and foreign policy. This paper seeks to analyze the NSS of the last four American presidents, in a time frame that runs from the immediate post-Cold War to Trump’s administration, as well as its influences with regard to Latin America. Using a quantitative method, through the frequency content analysis, and a qualitative methodology, based on the empirical-deductive method, the central objective is to rationalize that, although there was a relative power vacuum at the beginning of the 21 st century, there is a return of the region as an important geopolitical and geoeconomic space in contemporary times.

In this chapter, we consider the Donald J. Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as part of the larger issue of presidential responsibility and prerogative on nuclear issues. The Nuclear Posture Review outlines Trump administration priorities with respect to nuclear force structure, modernization, policy planning and other issues. Compared to the Barack Obama administration, Trump calls for a wider range of limited nuclear options for deterrence across the spectrum of possible conflicts, prompted by alleged Russian interest in a theory of victory supported by nuclear first use as a means of de-escalation. However, Russia is also modernizing its conventional forces, including those for long-range, precision strike, in order to implement a more credible pre-nuclear deterrence. The Trump administration NPR anticipates commitments to nuclear modernization beyond the ambitious program already approved during the Obama administration. Along with this, Trump also expects to augment US defense capabilities in space and cyberspace: the President has called for the creation of a space force that is organized as a separate arm of service, but initially it will be a subordinate command within the US Air Force.

This article examines the domestic political dynamics behind US president Donald Trump’s “America First” approach to trade and foreign policy, to understand better how long this strain of American economic nationalism might last and what it means for Japan’s national security strategy. The political base for Trump’s trade protectionism and apparent indifference to allies has roots stretching back into American history, but this movement has strengthened in recent years due to a combination of growing economic inequality in the United States, demographic changes, and the impact of fast-paced technology development and economic globalization. These political trends are likely to persist beyond Trump’s presidency, although some potential negative effects on Japan and the US-Japan alliance in the medium-to-longer term can be mitigated by Japan’s proactive foreign policy and other steps. The alliance still offers a great deal of value to both countries—now and into the future—but Japan should consider a slightly larger global leadership role in concert with others, even as the allies work to enhance their continued cooperation on shared interests.

Members of the Japanese government and the Japanese security elite welcomed the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, praising its emphasis on the twin goals of pursuing disarmament and protecting international peace and stability. Unlike many non-nuclear weapon states, Japan does not condition its support for nonproliferation upon nuclear weapon states’ progress on denuclearization. Despite general enthusiasm for the review in Japan, concerns remain. The NPR emphasizes the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of non-state actors; from Japan's vantage point, state actors—North Korea, China, and Russia—are just as worrisome. While disarmament advocates in Japan had hoped the NPR would endorse a no-first-use doctrine or “sole purpose” declaration, defense officials and strategists were relieved it did not go that far, fearing that to do so would undermine US extended deterrence and leave Japan vulnerable to attack by North Korean biological or chemical weapons. US policy toward China shadows many Japanese concerns about security policy in general and nuclear policy in particular. In the absence of more clarity on the Sino-US relationship, Japanese concerns can be expected to increase. Nonetheless, the Japanese government has responded positively to the release of the NPR, in large part due to unprecedented levels of coordination and consultation between Tokyo and Washington during the drafting process. Tokyo now seeks continued close consultation on nuclear strategy and policy to develop a better understanding of the concept of extended deterrence and what Tokyo can do to support this shared goal.

ABSTRACTThe current US nuclear modernization program departs in several major ways from longstanding US nuclear policy: It elevates the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy, includes plans for developing several new nuclear weapon capabilities, and resurrects former nuclear capabilities that past US presidents had wisely eliminated. Of all the Trump administration’s nuclear modernization plans, however, the most destabilizing are probably the new, low-yield nuclear options and dual-capable systems that may be ambiguously nuclear or conventional. But the United States can still return to a smarter path – one that eliminates these specific nuclear weapons plans, and adopts a more measured nuclear rhetoric to match.

With its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump administration expanded the scope of US nuclear deterrence, re-emphasizing the importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons, perceptively lowering the threshold for nuclear use and casting doubt on the future of arms control. The authors argue that these changes are consistent with the administration's wider ‘peace through strength’ approach that draws on traditional Republican thinking on security policy. While designed to demonstrate credibility and resolve to both allies and adversaries, however, this assertive approach to security policy and specifically nuclear policy as a necessary precursor to renewed engagement in strategic negotiations may have unintended consequences. This article focuses on European reactions to the strategy and argues that the Trump administration's nuclear posture challenges common European understandings in three principal areas. First, changes to US declaratory policy contest European assumptions on the role of nuclear weapons in defending NATO. Second, US modernization plans and their implications for intra-alliance relations risk accentuating controversial debates about the US commitment to Europe. Third, the apparent US rejection of arms control widens the scope for discord with European leaders. If European leaders assert a clear and credible alternative vision advocating nuclear restraint, risk reduction and arms control they could rebuild trust and confidence between the United States, NATO and Russia, demonstrating real strength and ultimately leading to more genuine opportunities for peace and sustainable European security.

Chapter 6 applies the framework of strategic delinquency to the revealing behaviour of North Korea during the US administration of Donald Trump, placing particular focus on the period from 2017 to 2019. In so doing, it examines how North Korea’s accelerating nuclear ambitions and pursuit of international status were heavily influenced by the unprecedented foreign policy of the Trump administration, the declining stability of the nuclear order, and a waning US commitment to the nuclear order during this time. This chapter emphasizes how, during this time, North Korea’s initially provocative behaviour, marked by the launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2017, was followed by feigned compliance with nuclear norms and the United States’ demands. It highlights how North Korea sought to leverage the unusual disposition of President Trump in order to compel the United States to abandon its ‘hostile policy’, ease unilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed upon the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), and gain international recognition as a nuclear state. Despite three presidential-level summits between Kim Jong Un and Trump and the same number of meetings between Kim Jong Un and his South Korean counterpart, Moon Jae-in, North Korea failed to reap its desired outcomes, in no small part owing to its reluctance to concede on its increasingly sophisticated nuclear programme. As a result, by 2020, the DPRK had lost interest both in the global nuclear order and in dialogue with the United States. Relations between Washington and Pyongyang had reached a nadir.

In the nine years after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, the consensus regarding the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States was that it couldn't be better. Yet with the inauguration of new administrations in both capitals, despite the reaffirmation of each side's commitment to the alliance, there are some concerns and anxieties over North Korea policy, the implications of China's rise for the regional security architecture, and alliance management. In general, the United States is concerned about the possibility that Moon Jae-in will revive Roh Moo-hyun's Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea as well as adopt a pro-Chinese orientation and encourage anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, the ROK has concerns about the Trump administration's protectionism, hostile policy toward North Korea that eschews dialogue, unilateralism in the military sphere, and demand for greater burden-sharing.To maintain, strengthen, and upgrade the U.S.-ROK alliance, both Seoul and Washington should work very closely to increase trust and mutual respect and to iron out possible differences over the aforementioned issues. The following discussion will examine the two allies' areas of convergence and divergence on North Korea policy, China's rise, and alliance management. It will then conclude by assessing the prospects for the U.S.-ROK alliance in the aftermath of political transitions in both countries.Consultation and Coordination on North Korea PolicyFor both Washington and Seoul, North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains the most urgent and important challenge. The overall situation in and around the Korean Peninsula is very unstable and intense, as North Korea seeks acceptance as a nuclear state and relevant parties try to force the Kim Jong-un regime to give up its nuclear weapons.At the moment, Washington and Seoul appear to be on the same page in their commitment to a strategy of pressure and engagement. However, each side seems to have some suspicion about the other. The United States is concerned about the possibility that the new ROK government will revive Roh's Sunshine Policy, which strongly emphasized engagement and positive incentives. On the other hand, the Moon administration might have anxieties that the Trump administration's policies will be too militant and aggressive, potentially inducing a series of crises and confrontations without the possibility of dialogue and negotiation.1 Nonetheless, given North Korea's ongoing missile tests and threats to stage another nuclear test, both the United States and ROK are in a common stance of mounting more pressure on North Korea until it shows meaningful signs of denuclearization.At the moment, despite its desire to have some degree of autonomy in dealing with North Korea, South Korea does not have much room to maneuver. It would be difficult for the Moon government to go against the Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure and engagement and pursue a completely new policy. From the South Korean perspective, the threat posed by North Korea goes beyond nuclear weapons and missiles. Human rights violations, as well as economic and social instability, are among the conventional security issues that must be resolved. Therefore, the United States must not restrict its North Korea policy to the nuclear and missile threats but should adjust its policy to address all of these issues. To gain the support and cooperation of the United States, and to reduce suspicion between the two allies, South Korea should also clarify its vision, strategy, and action plans to handle and solve the North Korea problem.At the same time, the United States and South Korea should discuss and come to an agreement on the level and scope of pressure to be applied and on the conditions, procedures, and agenda for dialogue. The United States is concerned that the Moon administration will rush into a dialogue with Pyongyang and has reservations about reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours regardless of the progress toward denuclearization. …