【イスラエル政治】「ユダヤ人国家」の二律背反（ディレンマ）：相克する民族主義と民主主義1

Judges in a Borderless State: Politics versus the Law in the State of IsraelProfessor Gideon Doron teaches in the Political Science Department, Tel Aviv University.

Since Israel’s founding, being a “Jewish state” has been central to its self-representation. However, Israel has struggled to identify what that means. This article examines the strength of Jewish nationalism in Jewish Israeli public opinion. It draws on a recent survey of 200 Jewish Israelis for a qualitative and quantitative investigation of public responses to religious nationalist statements. These findings offer a utilizable survey short scale for measuring Jewish nationalism and to understand how Jewish Israelis are interpreting these statements. This study is a necessary step to empirically evaluating religious nationalism in the “Jewish state”.

Abstract: The paper offers a first comparison and critical review of the social and political theories of German-Jewish political thinker Hannah Arendt and Russian-born Zionist thinker Aaron David (A. D.) Gordon. Bringing these two thinkers into conversation sheds light on their distinctive human ontologies and competing theories of labor that led them, in turn, to critically assess modern politics. Subsequently, the analysis identifies the two thinkers’ opposing conceptual trajectories as underpinning their competing perspectives on the Jewish state. Whereas Arendt’s commitment to upholding neutral political spaces led her to call for safeguarding the state from the Jewish nation, Gordon’s view of nations as corporeal-organic entities led him to advocate securing the Jewish nation from statist institutions. In broader terms, the analysis seeks to add to the burgeoning literature in recent years that revisits the theoretical and ideological parameters conventionally understood as underlying the historical debate about the Jewish state. The analysis shows that whereas Gordon, as a Zionist thinker, set forth an antistatist doctrine, the non-Zionist Arendt assigned a key role to the state in securing Jewish national self-determination.

For Israel maintaining strong relations with Diaspora remains one of the key goals as the Jewish State. American Jewry, American Zionist organizations and Pro-Israel lobbyists have been playing an important role in organizing support and providing assistance for Israel in the US. However, in the XXI century there is a deepening crisis between the Jewish state and American Jewish community, mainly, because of dissatisfaction of Israel’s domestic and foreign policy. Managing the risks of lowering support from the US, that are the most important strategic partners for Jerusalem, Israel has intensified its rapprochement with the US Christian Zionists, who are the most consistent supporters the Jewish state as “the Zionist project”. The Christian Zionist’s interest in Israel is based on the Bible's theological interpretation of the significance of the gathering and preservation of the Jews in Palestine (and then in Israel) for the ultimate salvation of mankind. Despite the controversy of this concept to the core principles of Judaism and Zionism, the significance of their support, primarily political, for Israel is currently increasing.

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In order to delineate more precisely the probable or possible consequences of a binational Israel for the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Jewish state, it is important to assess the legacy of the Carter-Reagan era. Future American political leaders will have to consider the extent to which the two rationales for a close working relationship with Israel are valid, namely, that the Jewish state is the only functioning democracy in the Middle East and is also a strategic asset. They must also evaluate changes within the United States, within Israel, and within the Arab world that make options other than a comprehensive regional solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict seem more attractive or realistic. One assumption is that while the United States has been and will remain the most important external player in the region, its capacity to affect the overall political situation in the Middle East is subject to new challenges at home and abroad.

The get (Jewish divorce) can only be granted by the husband. Refusal by some Jewish husbands to grant the get has created the widespread problem of the agunah (chained wife) who, without a religious divorce, cannot remarry according to Jewish law nor have legitimate children in the eyes of her religious community. This article studies the measures put in place in Canada and Israel to address this social problem. It presents the results of two years of fieldwork among Canadian and Israeli Jewish women who went through divorce at the intersection of secular and religious legalities. In both polities, State responses are to varying degrees rendered less effective by social, religious and economic realities which lie beyond State law but have all sorts of crucial impacts on it. In the context of Jewish divorce, the Canadian civil State remedies are influenced by a web of alternative community responses and recourses available to women. Moreover, Israel’s family law regime, while attractive to some Jewish women of the Diaspora, is also hopelessly ensnared in informal practices of rabbinical court judges, police, and rabbinical advocates, most of the time rendering Israeli policy responses unproductive. It seems clear that socio-legal research can no longer ignore the non-State legal ecosystem in which State law is grounded. This article thus seeks to further a new legal pluralist approach to research and legal practice, one which takes into account the relevance of everyday normativity and its potential usefulness to alleviate the plight of the agunah.

Israel is often described as a Jewish state and as the locus of Jewish self-determination. How should these phrases be understood? How can they be squared with a commitment to equal citizenship for non-Jewish Israelis? This Article distinguishes between descriptive and normative answers to these questions. The descriptive answer interprets the phrases as referring to the fact that a majority of Israelis are Jewish. The normative answer reads into the phrases a special obligation to promote the common good of the Jewish people. The Article argues that the phrases are unobjectionable when taken in the descriptive sense, but problematic when understood in the normative sense. A state that is guided by the normative answer would offer inadequate protection to key interests of minorities. The critique of the normative answer also points to the more positive conclusion that Israel should foster an Israeli civic identity amongst all its citizens.

Since the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of WWI and the Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923, much of the debate on Palestine was framed between the two polarities of a ‘One-State Solution’ versus a ‘Two-State Solution’. This paper suggest that, given the hybrid international legal considerations pertaining to the question of Palestine, taking the values of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, standards of international law, and all UN resolutions relevant to the question of Palestine as a point of departure frames the debate in an applied international legal context that usefully reconciles the said two polarities into a synthetic whole of one federated or confederated state incorporating three bi-national components: an ‘Arab state’, a ‘Jewish state’, and the City of Jerusalem as corpus separatum, thereby reconciling both the rights of the Palestinian Arab people for national self-determination and their rights as the indigenous people of the country.

In 1947, the United Kingdom and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) concluded that Palestine’s Arabs and Jews, who had been subject to a British-administered League of Nations mandate since 1922, were sufficiently advanced to govern themselves. A “Plan of Partition with Economic Union” was subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 181 (II) “for the future Government of Palestine” (Resolution 181 (II)) that made provision for the establishment of two states in the territory along with a special international regime for the City of Jerusalem. The plan was never implemented in the way it was foreseen, due to the outbreak of war, although the UN Secretariat, the Soviet Union, and the Jewish Agency, considered it a binding act of international law. This was also a view that was reiterated by other states when Israel applied for membership of the UN, and during the debate in the UN General Assembly to establish a special international regime for Jerusalem in 1949. Additionally, there is jurisprudence in the International Court of Justice concerning the South West Africa/Namibia cases, and judgments in Israeli and Italian courts that can be cited in support of this view. Statements made by UK officials in 1947 referred to Resolution 181 (II) as a decision of a court of international opinion. The views of the US Government and France were equivocal, although both issued statements that could be interpreted to mean that they viewed Resolution 181 (II) as normative, given the subsidiary powers conferred on the General Assembly by Article 22 of the UN Charter. The Arab states, on the other hand, opposed the resolution during the debates in 1947 on the basis that it was contrary to the Palestinian Arab people’s right of self-determination to establish a single unitary state over the whole territory. However, Israel and the Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) accepted Resolution 181 (II) as a basis for negotiation in the Lausanne Protocol of 12 May 1949, indicating that it was acceptable, in principle, as a basis for negotiating the territorial issue, before negotiations began in the UN Trusteeship Council and the UN General Assembly on establishing a special international regime for Jerusalem. Although Resolution 181 (II) was never implemented in the way it was foreseen, a UN Mediator was established with wide powers to continue the work of the Palestine Commission. These powers were subsequently transferred to the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), before a plurality of states in the UN General Assembly recognized the Palestinian people as a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace (GA Res 3236, 22 November 1974, para 4), who could participate in its work, in furtherance of their right to self-determination, through the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—initially as an observer (GA Res 3237, 22 November 1974), then as an observer state (GA Res 67/19, 29 November 2012). Accordingly, it could be argued that the Palestinian people retained title to the territories allotted to the Arab state in Resolution 181 (II). This is a view that has since been endorsed by the international community multiple times in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions in support of a “two-state solution.” The opposition the Arab states expressed toward Resolution 181 (II) in 1947 was opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state. These states were not opposed to the creation of an Arab state. The dispute, therefore, was not over statehood per se, or title, but over the shape that the state would take and the location of its boundary with the Jewish State. Given the specificity of the topic, most analyses of Resolution 181 (II) have taken the form of articles in international law journals or chapters in books. In addition, there are historical accounts that consider partition from a broader historical vantage point. By far, most of the material comes in the form of primary sources in UN speeches, government reports, and legal memorandums.

particularism is central to Jewish and Zionist history, and basic point of contention over the character of Israel. Was the Jewish state to be a state like other states by which advocates usually meant something on the progressive European model? Or was it to be something uniquely Jewish, an expression of the Jewish people's own history, traditions, and way of life? Or some synthesis of the two? Though rejecting assimilation, Zionism was reaction to the particularism of Jewish life. The movement for Jewish state was very much part of the currents then sweeping Europe. In copying the nationalism of other peoples, proponents of Jewish state were revolting against the powerlessness, passivity, and pious quietism they associated with the ghettoized Jewish life of recent centuries. Zionism was an act of assertion against ageold patterns of Jewish existence, and an attempt to establish normal social, political, cultural, and occupational patterns that would make Jews more like other nations. The fact that many early Zionists sought to divorce themselves from Jewish history does not, however, mean that they always succeeded in disentangling themselves from its grip. In fact, the illusion that Zionism could escape the legacies negative and positive of the Jewish past, through an exercise of sheer ideological will, may have been the greatest conceit among the necessary self-deceptions of the founding generation. One of the great contributions of twentieth-century Jewish historians has been to challenge the notion that Jews have no political history, and that Jewish history is lamentable chronicle of persecution, suffering, and powerlessness. Salo Baron attacked the lachrymose depiction of the Jewish past already in I1928; David Biale recently argued that Jews were not powerless, but exhibited a wide spectrum of persistent and on-going political activism.' To survive two millennia of hostility, emerging with an undiminished sense of self-identity, required not only spiritual strength, but also capacity for organization and for the assertion of collective interests: in

After October 2000: Israeli Arab Members of the 15th Knesset - Between Israeli Citizenship and their Palestinian National Identity Alexander Bligh. Between Nationalism and Liberalism - The Political Thought of Azmi Bisharah Abigail Fraswer and Avi Shabat. Social Issues: Fertility Transition in the Middle East - The Case of the Israeli Arabs Onn Winckler. Social and Educational Welfare Policy in the Arab Sector in Israel Khawla Abu Baker. A Binational Society - The Jewish-Arab Cleavage and Tolerance Education in the State of Israel Dan Soen. History and Nationalism: The Arabs in Haifa - From Majority to Minority, Processes of Change (1870-1948) Mahmoud Yazbak. Jewish Settlement of Former Arab Towns and their Incorporation into the Israeli Urban System (1948-1950) Arnon Golan. Ethnicity or Nationalism? Comparing the Nakba Narrative among Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Hillel Frisch. The Media and the Israeli Arab Citizens: The Israeli Newspapers' Coverage of the Israeli Arabs during the Intifada Ilan Asya. The Arab Citizens of the State of Israel - The Arab Media in Perspective Haim Koren. Political Standing in a Jewish State - Present and Future: Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel - Is There a Basis for a Unified Civic Identity? Ilana Kaufman. The Collective Identity of the Arabs in Israel in an Era of Peace Muhammad Amara. The Status of the Palestinians in Israel in an Era of Peace - Part of the Problem but not Part of the Solution As'ad Ghanem and Sarah Ozacky-Lazar. The Final Settlement of the Palestinian Issue and the Position of the Israeli Arab Leadership Alexander Bligh

Periphery: Israel's search for Middle East allies. By Yossi Alpher. London: Rowman and Littlefield. 2015. 159pp. Index. £21.95. ISBN 978 1 44223 101 6. Available as e-book. In this work, Yossi Alpher examines Israel's ‘policy of the periphery’, namely the country's relations with Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia, the Jewish state's search for alliances with ethnic minorities in Arab and Muslim countries and with those Arab states on the periphery of the Middle East with which it has shared concerns. The chapters deal not only with this intriguing aspect of Israeli foreign policy, but also detail the ramifications it had, and continues to have, in the Middle East and beyond. The chapters combine seamlessly, but may also be read as stand-alone vignettes. Alpher's book, far from being a pedestrian overview of Israeli statecraft, benefits from his unique experience and expertise as a former officer in Israeli military intelligence, and, later, as a Mossad operative. Readers are therefore treated to a personalized narrative of diplomatic events—for example the author's reticence in playing table tennis with Somali president Mohamed Siad Barre. Moreover, the author's account of Israeli involvement in southern Sudan in the early 1970s reveals just how the Jewish state's Africa policy, described by Golda Meir as ‘a continuation of our own most valued traditions and an expression of our own deepest historic ties’, bore such significant fruit for a state of diminutive stature—at least geographically.

The vast multidisciplinary literature on marital dissolution tends to conceptualize divorce as a personal, individualist act that naturally resides in the domestic sphere. The article challenges this prevailing scholarly perspective by dissecting a substantially underexplored dimension of divorce as a citizenship-certifying act located squarely in the public sphere. Drawing on a pioneering qualitative study among Palestinian Christians in Israel as a case study, we argue that Israel’s divorce law, which locks Catholics into indissoluble marriages, should be recognized as a key state instrument for delineating the contours of citizenship—a boundary-demarcating apparatus between insiders and outsiders who are excluded from full and equal membership. The article provides novel insights into the complex interrelations between divorce, gender, and citizenship, showing how Palestinian-Christian women pay the price of a purportedly sex-neutral, no-exit regime. The article also illuminates a seldom-studied phenomenon we call “divorce conversion”: the act of changing one’s denomination for the sake of marital freedom, which is a hallmark of Palestinian-Christians’ third-rate status in the Jewish state. We conclude that divorce should be reconceptualized as a right to egalitarian female citizenship, serving as a basic precursor to women’s full participation in all spheres of life.

The article examines the issues related to the change in the Saudi Arabia’s policy towards Israel in the context of Riyadh’s approaches to solving the Palestinian problem. The author emphasizes that the positive dynamics taking place in the evolution of Saudi-Israeli interaction in recent years is determined by the intra-Saudi socio-economic and political transformation, including changes in public opinion regarding Israel, as well as significant shifts in the development of the Middle East regional situation, inter alia those proclaimed by the United Arab Emirates (as well as Bahrain) heading towards a settlement with Israel. At the same time, the emergence of a tendency to support the course towards normalizing relations with Israel in the context of the current Saudi internal political situation also marked a public demarcation in relation to initiatives to support the Crown Prince. If his supporters act, among other things, as supporters of normalization, then opponents see contacts with the Jewish state as “a betrayal of Arab national interests”. Noting that the current Saudi-Israeli rapprochement is largely determined by a joint interest in confronting Iran, the author, nevertheless, sees the most important reason for the continuing Saudi unwillingness to normalize relations with the Jewish state in the unresolved Palestinian problem on the basis of the “two states” principle. At the same time, the author believes that this principle itself is an instrument of Saudi foreign policy, thanks to which Riyadh seeks to exclude the possibility of Israeli hegemony in the future post-confrontational Middle East. This means, in particular, that the achievement of mutual understanding will become a reality only if the Israeli regional policy is adjusted so as not to pose a threat to Saudi interests.