杜魯門政府嘗試聯中(共)制蘇之決策過程(1949年1月至1950年6月)

This dissertation examines the motivations, logic, and functions of media control in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Rather than telling the history of media control in modern China, or giving a comprehensive account of the techniques employed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to control the media, it investigates the origins of the CCP’s theoretical approach to the media, as well as the consequences of the resulting concepts for practical media work in the PRC. The first half of the thesis tracks the genesis of the Party’s media concept and reconstructs the conditions that contributed to its rise in the first half of the twentieth century; the chapters in the latter half follow this concept in its implementation through a number of case studies from the early 1950s through the late 1990s. Since the day of its founding, the CCP has placed great emphasis on questions of media and propaganda; after 1949 the party-state has claimed full control of the Chinese print, broadcast, and electronic media. Asking for the reasons behind this claim, I argue that it must be traced back to the Party’s desire to bring about the transformation of human consciousness and to create an environment conducive to this process, a utopian project informed as much by the Leninist version of Marxism as by Neo-Confucian ideas of education and state-society relations prevalent in the late imperial era. This project and its underlying fundamental assumptions have survived – in greatly transmuted form – to the present day and continue to inform the strict control of the Chinese media, even when such controls clash with other political and socio-economic interests of the Party-state. I propose to take the media as a variable to measure changes in the CCP’s approach to governance. The Party’s handling of the media serves as a mirror of state-society relations; consequently, the investigation into the media provides us with information on the CCP’s conceptions of governance under changing circumstances. I argue that over the past twenty years, the CCP has successfully altered and reinterpreted its vision of the state and its position therein; it has adopted a more flexible set of methods to achieve its fundamental political objectives. At the same time, however, the ultimate goals of the Party – originally formulated in Yan’an – have changed remarkably little.

The island of Taiwan (Formosa) was ceded to Japan by China by the Treaty of Shimonoseki on 8 May 1895. After the Second World War the island was surrendered to Gen. Chiang Kai-shek in Sept. 1945 and was placed under Chinese administration on 25 Oct. 1945. USA broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan on 1 Jan. 1979 on establishing diplomatic relations with the Peking Government. Relations between the USA and Taiwan are maintained through the American Institute on Taiwan and the Co-ordination Council for North American Affairs in the USA, set up in 1979 and accorded diplomatic status in Oct. 1980.

In the midst of last century, during the war between KMT (Kuomintang) and CCP (Chinese Communist Party), a large number of KMT Chinese soldiers and their families retreated all the way from Yunnan, China to Myanmar and Northern Thailand (Thaibei). With their “anti-Communism” belief, the Chinese in Thaibei maintained close relationship with the Republic of China (Taiwan) for past decades, by receiving plenty of benevolent resources from the Taiwanese government and the general public. In Northern Thailand, Chinese school exists in each village. Local Students can learn Mandarin with Taiwanese textbooks in the traditional Chinese format. Parents are desirous of sending their children to study in Taiwan. However, during the past years, the abundant resources provided from CCP have changed the condition in the traditional anti-Communism area. China struck on Thaibei Chinese villages with the ground of “taking care of Thaibei compatriots.” The report has found that the resources from China are similar to those from Taiwan, including school admission offerings, overseas passports, scholarships, simplified Chinese textbooks, permanently stationed teachers, exchanges and training activities of teachers. Chinese people in Thaibei have different attitudes and perceptions towards China in different areas, positions and backgrounds. Receiving the resources from China has caused a huge controversy in the traditional pro-Taiwan Thaibei Chinese community. The sensitive problem between “pro-China” and “pro-Taiwan” groups is still difficult to be solved. By tracking the studying path of Thaibei students studying in China, this TV in-depth report discusses their motives of choosing China over Taiwan. It also analyzes Thaibei Chinese's tangle with China by investigating the controversy caused by China resources provided to Thaibei.

China has proposed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), initiating a key turning point in the international finance system. Unfortunately, its design at present is quite problematic, for several reasons: it limits participation by Western countries, effectively locking in China as the undisputed leader; the lack of a Board of Directors in residence; the potential for a conflict of interest if the AIIB will fund projects within China; the potential of China to use AIIB for political purposes; the relationship the AIIB will have with already-existing international financial institutions; and the potential for a weakening of “best practices” in order to compete against the other international finance institutions. For these reasons, it was the right decision for Japan not to join as a charter member in order to negotiate the MOU; nevertheless, Japan should maintain the option of joining the AIIB in order to have leverage over the architecture of the AIIB.

Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II

Jean Kang and Victor Kaufman shed light on one of the more intrigu ing questions of Sino-American-Soviet relations during the Cold War: Why in the early 1960s, after achieving the rupture in the Sino-Soviet alliance sought by U.S. policy since 1950, did the United States tilt toward the Soviet Union rather than toward the People's Republic of China (PRC)? The U.S. tilt toward alignment with the USSR against the PRC in the early 1960s is paradoxical because, as U.S. leaders rec ognized in 1950, the USSR represented a far greater threat to the United States than did the PRC. The USSR constituted one of only several global centers of industrial and technological power. It had achieved a fairly high level of industrialization and technological prowess by the 1950s and had proved its ability to translate those economic capa bilities into effective military power, both conventional and nuclear. The USSR controlled the eastern half of Europe and deployed power ful military forces on the frontiers of Western Europe—itself an indus trial and technological center second only to North America. The Soviet state had spawned and for several decades directed a global Commu nist movement founded on inveterate hostility to the bourgeois val ues and institutions of the West. The USSR had already for a generation used the resources mobilized by its powerful state to wage protracted political war against the capitalist world. The PRC by contrast was preindustrial and technologically primi tive. Its armies abutted areas whose resources might weigh signifi cantly in the global balance, but they were nonindustrialized areas. In Asia, only Japan ranked in the same league with Europe as a center of industrial-technological wealth and power, and there was no pros pect that Chinese armies or political agents might bring about Japan's defection from the U.S.-led alliance system. Moreover, the PRC was successor to previous Chinese states that had several times cooper ated with the United States in important ways while sometimes view ing Russia with deep suspicion. These geopolitical factors were recognized by leaders of the Truman administration in late 1948 and early 1949 when they decided to let

Reviews 181 Martin L. Lasater. The Changing ofthe Guard: President Clinton and the Security ofTaiwan. Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1995. ix, 270 pp. Hardcover $44.95, isbn 0-8133-8806-6. The strategic and commercial value ofTaiwan in modern times has attracted the interest offoreign powers ever since the beginning ofthe Opium War in the late 1830S. The island's geographic location in the South China Sea and the enticement ofcoal, camphor, and agricultural products, as well as confrontations between shipwrecked mariners and hostile tribal groups, captured the attention primarily ofthe United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan in the nineteenth century. After a half-century ofJapanese colonization (1895-1945), followed by anotiier half-century ofNationalist Chinese governance, Taiwan continues to maintain a prominent position in Big Power strategies. Although Taiwan has long been the focus ofinternational controversy and symbolizes a divided China, the end ofthe Cold War and the island's achievement of considerable wealth accompanied by a free-market economy and democratic government have altered the island's political oudook and potential disposition . By the 1990s the political and diplomatic conditions surrounding Taiwan had changed dramatically since 1949, when the U.S. Departments of State and Defense feuded over whether Taiwan was sufficiendy important to be a primary security interest and, if so, die extent to which the United States would use force to defend fhe beleaguered island. Unfortunately, at that time die differences became marred by an acrimonious dispute between Secretary ofState Dean G. Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, which was exacerbated by emotional public debates in the political arena.1 Nevertheless, the legacy ofthose debates is the fundamental issue ofthe unification of die Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan widi the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland, signifying a thread of continuity from the nation's division in 1949 to the present. There is also continuity in U.S. policy with regard to Taiwan, more clearly established by the Mutual Defense Treaty (1954), as evidenced by American advocacy ofthe island's security, peaceful unification, and stability through economic growth. The diesis advanced by Martin L. Lasater in his insightful account of Taiwan's contemporary position in the international affairs of East Asia is that maintaining the security ofTaiwan, threatened in 1995 by the increased power of the PRC and a growing interest in independence on Taiwan, is more essential© 1996 by University now than ever before. Consequentiy, he urges the administration of President Bill ofHawai'i PressClinton to give paramount attention to expanding the commitment ofthe United States to die security ofTaiwan. Lasater, a specialist on U.S. policy in East Asia, has been consistent in his emphasis on the importance ofTaiwan's security in 182 China Review International: Vol. 3, No. i, Spring 1996 maintaining a balance of power in the western Pacific, having authored and edited seven earlier books on Taiwan.2 In this current account, Lasater examines Clinton's China policy in general and his administration's Taiwan policy in particular , giving close attention to U.S. relations with the PRC and Taiwan, as well as the PRCs relations with Taiwan. Throughout his analysis, Lasater makes a strong case for what he believes to be the essential need for enhancing Taiwan's security, namely to maintain peace and stability in the area through an adequate defense, democracy, free trade, and economic prosperity. While Lasater makes every reasonable effort to present a balanced evaluation based on a fair enunciation ofthe views of each component of the Taiwan issue (i.e., the United States, PRC, and ROC), he clearly favors a U.S. contribution to the security ofTaiwan but expresses his concern for the worsening of U.S.-PRC relations. The tension in this relationship has been due in part to the PRCs poor human rights record, the sale of arms to the Middle East, Chinese goods made by prison labor, and goods labeled as made in odier countries shipped to die United States. While China remains critical ofwhat it considers to be American interference in the internal affairs ofa sovereign nation, Lasater identifies areas in which the two countries continue to maintain mutual agreement. China...

Journal of Democracy 14.1 (2003) 18-26 [Access article in PDF] The Limits of Authoritarian Resilience Bruce Gilley The success of the recent leadership transition in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) might be interpreted as evidence that China's authoritarian regime is historically unique. More than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist orders of Eastern Europe, the CCP not only remains in power but has installed a younger, better-educated, even more confident set of successors at its head. And the CCP's Sixteenth Party Congress in November 2002 marked the first smooth leadership transition in a communist regime not to have involved the death or purging of the outgoing leader. Authoritarian regimes have been traditionally understood by political theorists as being terminally weak at their core, due to the absence of any of the checks on power that the rule of law, the separation of powers, or popular contestability would afford. The view is that the inherent weakness of these regimes will inevitably become more pronounced as the relative balance of resources shifts over time away from the state and toward autonomous social forces, often as a result of such forms of development as economic growth or international opening. At these stages of development, it is generally believed, authoritarian regimes find themselves suffering from what might be called "the logic of concentrated power"—that is, the tendency for power to concentrate in the hands of a few individuals or personalistic factions and to be fatally misused by them, with results that typically include misgovernment, a deterioration of legitimacy, corruption, and weak norms of conduct among governing elites. 1 But China—whose people represent roughly half of that part of the [End Page 18] world's population which is not allowed to choose its leaders though democratic elections—has so far defied the traditional model. Some have attempted to account for this in terms of a fundamental reconsolidation of the CCP's house following the nadir of the Party's legitimacy after the 1989 Tiananmen protests. The CCP, these observers argue, appears to have effectively solved the democracy deficit without democracy by putting in place mechanisms that have mitigated, or possibly eliminated, the traditional weaknesses of authoritarian regimes. Andrew Nathan nicely sums up the evidence for such mechanisms under the rubric of "regime institutionalization." I think that this characterization is mistaken, a point I will argue below in reference to three features of authoritarian regimes that have historically been among the most difficult to institutionalize: 1) the process of elite promotions; 2) the maintenance of elite functional responsibility; and 3) popular participation. Certainly by comparison to the bedlam of the Mao Zedong era, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is today a fairly institutionalized state. But relative to the actual needs of contemporary Chinese society, the PRC falls conspicuously short: Any given feature of a political system can be said to be "institutionalized" only when it is both consistent with a state's normative ideals and effectively implemented. By these standards, the evidence of PRC institutionalization remains faint. Nor does it seem likely that such institutionalization will eventually strengthen. Indeed, since 1949, there have been discernable cycles of consolidation and breakdown in China: The limits of regime institutionalization have been reached before and, in response, the "logic of concentrated power" has reasserted itself. Something similar is likely to happen again and, in due course, weaken the institutionalization apparent at the CCP's recent Sixteenth Party Congress. Present Institutionalization Samuel P. Huntington characterizes political institutionalization as the process by which a given feature of a political system acquires the traits of "adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence." The feature in question may be a process, an institution, or a rule. When institutionalization is achieved throughout a political system, Huntington says, it produces government which is "effective, authoritative, [and] legitimate." 2 Although this definition suffices to explain a government's effectiveness or authoritativeness, Huntington has almost certainly misconceived the particular nature of the problem of legitimacy in an authoritarian context: He fails to grasp that for any of the above mentioned features of...

The complex relationship between the Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland is rooted in the Chinese civil war of 1946–1949, which ended when the defeated ROC government fled to Taiwan, where it remains. Initially the conflict concerned which side was the legitimate government of China. However, by the end of the 20th century Taiwan’s insistence on maintaining its sovereign status conflicted with the mainland’s insistence that the island was an inseparable part of China. Despite the steady growth of economic and cultural relations in the early 21st century, this central political dispute remains. Given the growing military power of the mainland as well as its refusal to abjure force to achieve its objectives, the dispute constitutes a potential flashpoint for armed conflict. However, there are other actors in this long-running drama. Since the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the United States has supported the ROC. Official relations and a mutual defense treaty with the ROC were terminated after Washington established relations with the PRC in 1979. However, the Taiwan Relations Act passed in the same year provides the basis for a robust relationship with the island, arms sales, and the possibility of American intervention to resist coercive actions by the PRC. Finally, the people of Taiwan have played an important role. For most of the first half of the 20th century the ethnic Chinese population on Taiwan was not a part of the historic changes occurring on the mainland. They were a colonial people ruled by the Japanese, who sought—half-heartedly, to be sure—to assimilate them. The Chinese population was forced to take Japanese names and served in the Japanese army. They initially greeted the mainland forces that occupied the island after the Japanese surrender; but soon the distrust of what seemed to be a collaborationist population by the newly arrived Chinese mainlanders and the disgust of the local population with the corrupt, dictatorial control of the ruling Kuomintang (Nationalist Party or KMT) erupted in violence that was followed by institutionalized authoritarian rule by the Party and “White Terror” aimed at the native population. In the decades that followed, a movement and later a party (the Democratic Progressive Party or DPP) made up largely of native Taiwanese pressed for democratization as well as for the affirmation of an identity apart from the mainland and, eventually, independence. As democratization proceeded, their demands increasingly became an important consideration shaping the management of cross-strait relations.

The United States and China have different disciplinary structure and R&D investment and post-doctoral funding systems. Postdocs play an important role in scientific research output. In order to understand the development status of post-doctoral development in China and the United States, especially the problems in post-doctoral training, this study compares the number of postdocs, R&D expenditure, quality and quality of research papers, and post-doctoral disciplinary structure between China and the United States to analyzes. The study found that the American R&D investment in the past 20 years and its ratio to GDP has stabilized, and the number of papers published in high-quality journals represented by Nature and Science has also stabilized, while both of them in China is still in a period of rapid growth. American medical postdocs who mainly study in clinical medicine account for 10.9%(1 980/18 244) of the total number of postdocs, while the proportion of Chinese medical postdocs is about 29.3%(18 975/64 712), mainly in clinical medicine. In this article, the insufficient of funding and quality of innovation training were discussed during the post-doctoral training process in China. In order to promote the development of medical postdocs, it was suggeste to improve medical postdoctoral funding and research environment and to optimize the layout of postdoctoral disciplines for promoting the development of China human resources in research emerging. Key words: Medical postdoc; China; United States; Training; Thinking

In light of the intertwining logics of military competition and economic interdependence at play in US-China relations, this book examines how the United States has balanced its potentially conflicting national security and economic interests in its relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). To do so, it investigates a strategically sensitive yet under-explored facet of US-China relations, the making of American export control policy on defense-related technology to China since 1979. On the basis of 199 interviews, declassified documents, and diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks, two major findings emerge from this book. First, the hopelessness, in the post-Cold War era, of a US strategy of military/technology containment of China in the same way it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War because of the erosion of its capacity to restrict the transfer of defense-related technology to the PRC. Secondly, a growing number of actors in Washington has reassessed the nexus between national security and economic interests at stake in the US-China relationship – by moving beyond the Cold War trade-off between the two – in order to maintain American military preeminence vis-à-vis its strategic rivals. By focusing on how states manage the heterogeneous and potentially competing security and economic interests at stake in a bilateral relationship, this book seeks to shed light on the evolving character of interstate rivalry in a globalized economy, where rivals in the military realm are also economically interdependent.

This paper analyzes lyrics of the three hundred and fifteen collected so-called ”patriotic songs” during the Two Chiangs, namely Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, dictatorial rule for the purpose of better understanding the essence of the Two Chiangs' ruling politics. The result of this analysis shows ”patriotic songs” during the era of dictatorial rule contain characteristics as follows: 1) announcing ”anti-communists and resisting Russia,” ”annihilating communist bandits”; 2) rousing the will to fight; 3) personal cult of Chiang Kai-shek; 4) national identity of a great China, publicizing Chinese nationalism; 5) attachments to landscapes of the old mainland China; 6) instrumentation of the singing praise of Taiwan; 7) glorifying The Three Principles of the People; 8) eulogizing Sun Yat-sen; 9) eulogizing the flag of blue sky, white sun and red all over the ground, the flag of the Kuomintang; 10) glorifying ”revolution;” 11) inserting propaganda in love songs; 12) advocating Chinese history and culture, singing praise of historical figures and traditional Chinese poetry; 13) boosting morale after diplomatic setbacks; 14) promoting ”keeping secrets and guarding against spies”; 15) pure didactic encouragement of a positive, aggressive, open-minded and optimistic determination. It is thus detected, through these afore-mentioned characteristics, the nature of the Chiang regime conformed completely to the sufficient term of Fascism.

The Saudi Arabia’s “Fundamentalists” the position runs counter in the basic religious doctrine with, and People's Republic of China ’s “Communist” and “Socialism” the idea, also can affect the Saudi Arabian imperial family’s benefit and the stability. However the Saudi Arabia actually purchases the missile to the People’s Republic of China, and established diplomatic relations in 1990 . The Transformation in Diplomatic Relations between Saudi-Arabia and China was really worth studying and the discussion truly. Because in 1973 the petroleum crisis took Saudi Arabia the huge economic interest, enable Saudi Arabia’s government to have the abundant financial resource to foster the talent, but caused in this border to have the social structure change, because the group accepted the higher education or overseas abroad study return to homeland, dominated the political power to Saudi Arabian’s Government and the traditional royal court to be discontented, finally urged Saudi Arabian’s King to implement the reform as well as the cabinet carries on the reorganization, in addition, also enabled the sand country tradition political power abandonment passing the country to have to “the communism” first impressions ares most lasting the hostility, and after suffered US ‘s Parliament to go back a promise to sell the Saudi Arabian F-15 fighter plane, originated the policy using the disperser arms sale to purchase missiles form People’s Republic of China. In the international environment aspect, the Saudi Arabia after the excavating petroleum, is admires the US military force to protect its petroleum benefit, but because US's Israel's policy, causes the Saudi Arabia to the American confidence vacillation, however, this time People’s Republic of China actually unceasingly (the People’s Republic of China using the United Nations Security Council), the economy (purchases petrified industry and wheat), the military (sells the missiles), the psychology (using religious relations), at that time Saudi Arabia is in order to maintain the Saudi Arabian leader regime stably, strengthens own national defense military force, by the consolidated this country in under the Islam world leading positions consideration, urges Saudi Arabia choose People’s Republic of China to purchases missiles, and establishes both sides official foreign relations.

The balance between national security and economic interests at play in the United Kingdom’s ‘China policy’ has significantly evolved in the post-Cold War era. As the first recipient of Chinese foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Europe but also a close ally of the United States, the United Kingdom has faced difficult trade-offs in formulating its policy towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This chapter investigates how London has responded to China’s growing foothold in the United Kingdom through increased FDIs and the supply of advanced telecoms equipment for the digital infrastructure. It will be shown that Chinese inroads into these strategic sectors in the 2010s—and British policymakers’ perception thereof—have been a key driver of change in the United Kingdom’s ‘China policy’. In particular, heightened threat perceptions, coupled with increasingly competitive economic relations with the PRC, have caused the United Kingdom to recalibrate the national security and economic interests at stake in its ‘China policy’ and to harden its stance towards Beijing. To corroborate this argument, the first two sections examine two key drivers of the United Kingdom’s ‘China policy’, namely the shifting British economic interests with China—including the Chinese economic imprint in the national infrastructure and in the telecoms sector—and London’s threat assessment of the PRC. The subsequent two sections show how changing economic interests and threat perceptions have, in turn, caused the United Kingdom to recalibrate its policy goals and to strengthen the policy instruments leveraged to achieve such goals. The chapter also discusses the consequences of Brexit for the United Kingdom’s ‘China policy’ and for its cooperation with other European powers.

Common Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union so far is still dominated by nation-states, especially in the security and military affairs, the position of major Member States such Britain, France and Germany, have absolute impact on the EU decision-making process. Over the years, the relationship between the EU and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been continually wavering affected by the United States and international situations. For some key international issues, the EU Member States the might show different position due to their national interests resulting in the lack of a common China Policy for the EU. This paper will firstly review the relations between the EU and China from political and economic aspects on two theoretical bases, New Realism and Neo-liberalism. Then, to analyze the barriers and challenges encountered in the bi-lateral interaction over these years. Secondly, the paper will review the relations be-tween Germany and China in different periods of German government, and discuss how Germany interacts with China under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Last but not the least, the paper will assay the impact of the special partner-ship relations” between Germany and China during Merkel government on the EU’s China Policy.