中國土地徵收之過程：地方政府、農民與國家策略選擇分析

China's land expropriation disputes seem to be growing incrementally to the level of massive protest and violent conflicts. This dispute becomes the focus of peasants protests. Local governments, encouraged by the concept of managing the city, move to making profits by the land. This motivation creates large expropriated land and then to earn high profits in the form of ”expropriated land rent.” The standard procedure includes expropriation of land in low compensation and lends the land in high prices. This profit-making approach becomes the major political performance, fiscal income and improvement of civil servants welfare of the local government. This paper aims at examining the deficiencies of China's villages land system, the ambiguity of public interests, and the legal conflicts so as to explain the roots of expanded expropriation practice in rural China. This paper first concludes that the plural and uncertain property rights of the land contribute to the conflicts between peasants and the local governments, which take over the land and become the final owners, supreme arbitrators and ultimate controllers in the name of national needs or public interests. There is no clear distinction between land of public interests and land of profit-making. So the government administrators seek financial interests by manipulating the ambiguity. Secondly, the ambiguity of public interests gives the local governments ample tools to interpret and operate its flexible jurisdiction in the name of public interests needs and public purposes so as to secure business interests. Thirdly, the process of land expropriation is extremely complicated. Current regulations involve multiple legal statutes and rules rather than constitutional provisions. Many local governments take flexible measures to decrease the level of compensation to the peasants by lowering the compensation standards, which is designed and implemented by local governments.

As a phenomenon of urban political economy,urban primelot is an inevitable consequence of the development of urban political economy in China recently.Firstly,this paper reviews the theory of urban political economy at home and abroad;then explains the phenomenon of primelot through theories of urban regime and growth machine by analyzing the mechanism of each interest group behind this setting.It reveals that urban primelot is an urban political economy aftermath of the interactions between different political economy groups in the area of land development.This study also indicates that there are four features in this urban setting.(1) Local government is the core in this growth coalition that dominates other parts or agents/agencies,for the local offices need not care too much about their parochial civilian as well as their superior in Chinese appointed bureaucracy system.(2) The central government not only has the absolute,but final macro controls over the growth coalition as well,however,these leaders are hesitating to disorganize the local growth machines or coalitions since it may jeopardize national economic locomotive which has been lasting for over three decades since Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up policy started in 1978.(3) Growth coalition and anti-growth coalition constitute a kind of cooperate-collide continuum.The more peripheral individuals or organizations who are distributed away from the center of core-benefit in the building of growth machines might be more inclined to throw themselves into the lap of anti-growth coalition.(4) The category of urban growth machines or urban regimes might differentiate within the development of national citizenship in historical scale and the economic capacity of local governments in geographical scale.In the areas open wider to the ourside world,such as Beijing and Shanghai,the municipalities would rather build somewhat concessionary regimes/federalist regime than conserving regime/elitist entrepreneurial regime in which the local governments are hungry for development capital and dream for achievements.Therefore,according to the structure of building,dynamic machine and self-organization of growth coalitions,the nationalization process of land market might be necessary to disconnect the coalition through pumping more investment capital into local authorities from the central government or deducing the social consumption responsibility of local governments by the central government.

Agricultural productivity improvements are essential for achieving overall economic growth. The Philippine performance on both counts has been disappointing. Agricultural extension which is one way of improving productivity has undergone substantial change in the last thirteen years through devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991. Whether devolution has improved agricultural extension delivery is a key question. Devolution generally has yielded some positive outcomes: cooperation between local government units (LGUs) and with the private sector and nongovernment organizations (NGOs); recognition of the realities of globalization; and use of modern management and communication. But problems of capacity building, partisan local politics and uncertain lines of financial and decisionmaking accountability between central and local government remain. These general lessons apply to agricultural extension. Moreover, even the best extension service, whether delivered by local or central government, is unlikely to be effective where farmer decisionmaking is unduly influenced by government controls and pricing policies and where security of tenure is weak. Philippines Journal of Public Administration Vol.XLVIII(3) 2004

Urban and social policy are formulated and implemented within the structure of the relations between central and local governments. The achievement of central government goals often requires action by local governments. The agendas of local governments are often set by the problems and opportunities created by central government action. The relationship between central and local governments is often seen as a trend toward increasing local autonomy or increasing central control. Finance is often assumed to be the key, whoever controls the purse strings. In Great Britain, as in many other countries, the increasing financial dependence of local government on central government has fueled a debate over the effect of central government finance on the relations between central and local government. One side of the debate is characterized in the conclusion of the Layfield Committee on Local Government Finance: We too believe that in the end he who pays the piper calls the tune.' In support of the Layfield Committee's position, G. W. Jones, has argued that central finance serves to extend central control because, first, central finance gives central government bureaucrats an excuse to become involved in regulating local policy and, second, that dependence on central government funding orients local government politicians towards Whitehall and away from their constituents.2 Opposing the view that central government finance inevitably leads to central control of local government are Ashford3 and Dearlove.4 Ashford finds, in a study of the relation between central government aid to local authorities and local authority budgets, that the level of central government aid is not a good predictor of local activity. He goes on to suggest that the complexity of the relationship between central and local government may be a serious hindrance to central control. For both Ashford and Dearlove, the increasing financial role of central government does not inevitably translate into central control; they do not argue that central government is without influence over local government but that finance does not directly lead to control. This paper will argue that control is not one-dimensional, that there are areas of local autonomy that can develop (or that are maintained) despite central government control of finance. The argument will be made by explicating one set of conditions under which local governments maintain their autonomy and by examining a case in British policy in which the predicted results obtain. Understanding the conditions under which local autonomy develops helps us to predict what the central state can actually accomplish. Such an analysis can also

Coastal communities are becoming increasingly aware of the risks to local infrastructure from more frequent and severe flooding, more extreme storm surges, and sea-level rise. As local governments are responsible for the lion’s share of land use decision-making and infrastructure development in coastal communities in the United States, local governments in the coastal zone will play a key role in adapting to the changing climate. Local decision-makers are facing hard questions about whether to build new infrastructure, adapt existing infrastructure to new standards, continue maintaining existing infrastructure as is, or abandon infrastructure altogether. Monroe County, Florida, for example, has begun to factor sea-level rise considerations into decisions related to road improvement projects, creating specific design standards addressing elevation and working to weigh the benefits and costs of different adaptation options such as elevating roads. Local governments are making these decisions in the context of increasingly unreliable and aging road systems, all while meeting current stormwater criteria which may require drainage improvements. Local decision-makers also are recognizing that crucial infrastructure decisions that directly affect their adaptation success are sometimes out of their control. In the case of the City of Tybee Island, Georgia, for example, tidal flooding restricts access to U.S. Highway 80 on an ever-increasing basis—yet the highway, the only road leading to the island, is not under the city’s jurisdiction but that of the Georgia Department of Transportation. To further complicate matters for local governments, both taking action and failing to act could result in either tort or “takings” liability in cases where a poorly maintained road results in harm to life or loss of property value from diminished access. Using the duty of state and local governments to maintain roads as a focus, this Article explores the complexity of adaptation at the local level as the impacts of climate change become more pronounced. Specifically, this Article presents an analysis of coastal communities in four South Atlantic states—Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina—that are currently facing questions about how to protect property and infrastructure as sea levels rise and flooding increases. This Article distills the findings of an interdisciplinary research project funded by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), Florida Sea Grant, Georgia Sea Grant, South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium, and North Carolina Sea Grant. It also consists of a regional analysis comparing how tort and local government law can both further and hinder climate change resilience planning and climate adaptation efforts across these four states. Given that the federal government has offered little in terms of legislation, policy, or funding to direct or support climate adaptation activities, local efforts—and the litigation that inevitably results—are on the forefront of establishing the framework for defining adaptation policy more broadly and influencing the contours of tort and land use law. This Article, therefore, fills an important research gap in existing climate change literature, as it discusses how increased flooding at the local level is putting pressure on traditional conceptions of government duties, immunities, and authorities. This Article also uses roads as a case study to explore how sea-level rise is altering planning, maintenance, and funding for public infrastructure. This discussion focuses on local duties and responsibilities to build, rebuild, modify, or maintain existing roads for two primary reasons: (1) it is a widely shared function among jurisdictions and is the most obvious and visible type of infrastructure to the public, and (2) roads and highways, which are crucial to trade, defense, and nation-building, have long been under the purview of government regulation and funding in the United States. Recently, roads have also become a focal point in local government efforts to address rising sea levels and increased flooding. While sea-level rise may seem like a distant threat, many of its effects are being felt now, as low-lying coastal areas such as Norfolk, Virginia; Brunswick, Georgia; and Monroe County, Florida are experiencing increased nuisance or “sunny day” flooding occurring during seasonal or average high tides. Such flooding typically affects roads, temporarily closing them and increasing maintenance and repair costs. Residents who rely on these roads, often find themselves cut off from their homes, businesses, workplaces, schools, and local hospitals. In this way, sea-level rise and the flooding associated with it have become increasingly familiar and imminent, making roads the “climate change canary in the coal mine” for local governments. Part I of this Article briefly discusses recent sea-level rise issues and coastal science most relevant to the South Atlantic states—North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Part II analyzes and compares each state’s road ownership and maintenance duties, first by addressing the threshold question of ownership and jurisdiction, and then by explaining the multi-step analysis that governments must take to evaluate their duties to maintain roads in order to avoid liability. Part II also outlines the wide differences among the four states in our study area and observes a common thread, namely, that in almost each instance, local governments are faced with conflicting pressures that are likely to reward inaction over action and favor short-term political compromises over strategic investments in adaptation. This Part then details how counties and municipalities can discontinue their duties to maintain roads through the process of abandonment and how abandonment can lead to takings liability. Part III offers three proposals for encouraging coordinated adaptation action and protecting local governments that take action to address climate impacts: (1) redefining the scope of the duties that define reasonable conduct for governments in making decisions about public infrastructure in an era of rising sea levels; (2) defining the scope of sovereign immunity protections in a way that encourages innovative and creative decision-making in an era of climate uncertainty; and (3) calling for consistent adaptation duties and authorities at the state level as a crucial first step in mending the regulatory patchwork that currently exists at the state, county, and city levels in our four-state study area. Part IV concludes with a summary of observations and recommended next steps.

Local government debt plays an important role in promoting economic development, but with the continuous expansion of the scale of local government debt, coupled with the opacity of financial and debt information, local debt risk may be directly transformed into financial risk. Therefore, the potential mechanism of local government debt risk inducing systemic financial risk is studied to strictly control local government debt and prevent it at present. It is of great practical significance to mitigate systemic financial risk. At present, the research on local government debt mainly focuses on the mechanism of local government debt to amplify economic fluctuations, while the potential mechanism of local government debt risk to induce systemic financial risk is relatively few. From the perspective of local government bonds and land finance, the innovation of this paper is to depict the Chinese elements such as the maturity of local government bonds, the opacity of debt and financial information, and to integrate local government debt, land finance and financial intermediaries into the framework of general equilibrium to analyze the potential mechanism of systemic financial risk induced by local debt risk. This study finds that when the economy is facing negative productivity shocks, the decline in total output will inhibit the land demand of households and enterprises, and the decline in land prices caused by the decline in demand will reduce the land-related fiscal revenue of local governments. On the one hand, the decline of land-related fiscal revenue will reduce government expenditure; on the other hand, it will increase the pressure on local governments to repay debt and the risk of debt, which will lead to the rise of bond interest rates and the decline of bond prices. Lower bond prices will affect the balance sheet of financial intermediaries, resulting in increased leverage and risk premium of financial intermediaries. Under the balance sheet constraints, financial intermediaries will shrink corporate credit, resulting in an increase in systemic financial risk. Rising interest rates and tightening credit will restrain enterprises’ investment and land demand, further reduce total output and land prices, increase the debt risk of local governments, and form a financial accelerator mechanism in the economy, which will lead to the mutual reinforcement of the debt risk and financial risk of local governments and form a vicious circle. In addition, when financial risk rises, the default risk of local government debt is lower. Based on the trade-off between risk and return, financial intermediaries will hold more local government bonds. Credit squeeze brought by asset allocation changes will further strengthen the financial accelerator mechanism and strengthen the interaction between debt risk and financial risk. Meanwhile, although extending the bond maturity can reduce the pressure of local governments to repay their debt in the short term, the longer the bond maturity is, the greater the financial shock and economic volatility caused by local government debt risk are. The paper indicates that: for resolving local government debt risk and reducing the probability of systemic risk, we firstly need to improve the local government bond market, diversify local government bond investors, and change the current situation dominated by commercial banks; secondly, we should strengthen budget constraints and control the scale of local government debt; thirdly, we should rationally design the maturity structure of local government bonds, strengthen the transparency of local government finance and debt information, and play the role of market constraints; finally, when financial risk rises, the central bank can adopt non-traditional monetary policy to intervene in the market, which can reduce financial risk and social welfare losses.

The Routledge handbook of international local government

This thesis is intended for addressing issues of the local expropriation committee system by drawing the policy suggestion through theoretical considerations on the land expropriation system of the UK and of the US, and for finding a plan to improve the system by focusing on the examples of land expropriation of local governments. The US' Takings utilize a public hearing and the jury system. When property is expropriated through eminent domain, stakeholders and citizens share the necessity of the expropriation and its awareness through a public hearing, and project institutes (administrative organizations) file a lawsuit to a law court to exercise takings. In the case of Compulsory Purchase in the UK, the system should be based on laws established by the Parliament, and the resolution to use CPO is also decided by district councils. So the system is able to prevent power abuse. As a plan to improve the land expropriation committee of local governments, it is necessary to enhance the professionality of the local land expropriation committee, to expropriate lands by the analysis of land type, and to come up with alternative measures to prevent the rights of the expropriated.

PurposeRecent research has drawn attention to the tension between the Central and local governments in China regarding their roles in environmental protection. This paper aims to explore this tension and examine the extent to which local/provincial government’s environmental oversight has influenced the quality of corporate environmental disclosure in China.Design/methodology/approachA sample of 198 listed companies in heavily polluting industries were selected to examine the relationship between their environmental disclosure quality and the respective local government’s environmental oversight level.FindingsThe results provide evidence that local/provincial government’s environmental oversight significantly influences environmental disclosure in China. Despite the coercive pressure from the powerful Central government on corporate environmental disclosure, local/provincial governments are able to buffer the pressure and adjust the intensity of their environmental oversight on companies during the implementation of central policies to retain local economic and political interests. This may partially explain the persistent issue of low environmental disclosure quality in China.Research limitations/implicationsThis study enriches our understanding of the significant role of local governments in China in enhancing or sometimes discounting the regulatory enforcement of the Central government on corporate environmental disclosure, pointing to the need for concerted efforts by both local and Central governments to advance environmental disclosure development.Originality/valueResearch on environmental disclosure in developed countries has been well established in the literature. However, such research in developing nations is still limited, especially in China, the world largest developing country. The existing literature on environmental disclosure in China links it with either market demands, or regulatory enforcement from the Central government. The importance of local/provincial governments and their environmental oversight has long been ignored, which motivates this research.

In the process of China's promoting its economic growth and social development, the adjustment of the relationships between the central and local governments have played the key role. The decentralization policy implemented in China has resulted in great economic achievement but, at the same time, has created many difficult problems. Fiscal and investment decentralization, and other important decentralizations, have been the main levers for the central government to gear the relationships between central and local governments. However, these levers require a through examination. Decreases in the central government's revenue, enlarging regional disparties and the upheaval of the local-interest-centered activities are the unintended by-products of China's decentralization policy. To eliminate decentralization's negative impacts and overcome the shortcoings, relationships between the central and local governments need to be readjusted. While offering further discussion and making key suggestions in conclusion, the author thinks that some immediate measures should be taken. Enormous effort is dedicated to theoretical discussion and empirical studies on the cause and result of decentralization of China in transition.

Facing the double pressure of promoting economic growth and achieving the goal of "emission peak" by 2030, China must cut down the carbon emission intensity. Focusing on the typical characteristics of China's financial system arrangement, we theoretically analyze the mechanism of vertical fiscal asymmetry affecting carbon emission intensity and use a panel data from 30 Chinese provinces to conduct an empirical examination. The results show that (1) vertical fiscal asymmetry significantly increases the local carbon emission intensity. After a series of robust tests, such as replacement variables and sample data, the conclusion is still valid. (2) The analysis of regional heterogeneity shows that the influence of vertical fiscal asymmetry in carbon emission intensity is the largest in the central area of China, followed by the eastern provinces, and not evident in the western area. The rise in carbon emission intensity brought on by vertical fiscal asymmetry can be successfully reduced by the central transfer payment. The impact of vertical fiscal asymmetry on carbon emission intensity will be greatly lessened when the central transfer payment surpasses the threshold. (3) The mechanism test shows that vertical fiscal asymmetry increases the carbon emissions intensity by three paths: reducing the intensity of environmental regulation, strengthening local governments' dependence on land finance, and local government competition. The above analysis further enriches the relevant research on how China's vertical fiscal asymmetry system affects carbon emission intensity through land finance and local government competition while pointing out the role of transfer payment, and it can help to provide new ideas and empirical evidence for further improving the financial system and promoting the green development of the economy.

State intervention in housing has developed over many years and, as it has developed, the respective roles of central and local government have changed. For most of the history of active housing policy local authorities have been the favoured agencies for housing provision alongside the private sector. Latterly local authority housing provision has been in decline with sales to sitting tenants and large-scale transfers to registered social landlords occurring alongside low rates of new local authority housebuilding. The role of local authorities has shifted towards an enabling role with key roles for housing associations and their regulators alongside private provision. The powers and duties of local authorities and central government have expanded but the constraints, and in particular financial constraints imposed by central government, have increased considerably. Any attempt to describe or understand the operation of housing policy has to take account of the ways in which both public and private sector agencies involved in the housing market act in relation to housing. This chapter focuses on the framework for public sector administration relating to housing and on central and local government and housing associations. As was emphasised in Chapter 1, these institutions operate within a wider context in which there are a range of private sector agencies involved in the production of housing. In addition to builders and developers, others such as estate agents, solicitors, building societies and other financial institutions are involved in the production or consumption of housing.

Land has always been the focus of public debates among scholars, policy makers and local populations due to its scarcity in face of population explosion and rapid urban growth. This is particularly so in the case of China. In order to support an unprecedented rate of urbanization, the institutional mechanism of land expropriation has been widely adopted by the government of the People's Republic of China over the last three decades.
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\nHowever, the effect of this institutional mechanism in rural China has become increasingly controversial. On one side, it is one of the most powerful tools to assemble land for urban development. Moreover, by means of land expropriation and land conveyance, local governments are capable of collecting substantial revenues to fund urban development. On the other side, the exclusive power of local governments over land expropriation, which is derived from the land management system, makes it possible for local governments to manipulate the price at which land is taken from farmers. In practice, local governments expropriate suburban or rural land at a low price and then lease it at a much higher price in land market. Therefore, inequitable compensation for land expropriation has led to numerous conflicts and social tensions between local governments and land-loss farmers. The issue of land expropriation and compensation has been identified as one of most primary sources of social discontents and complaints.
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\nEven though a growing number of studies have been conducted on the urbanization and regional development in China, a thorough cause–effect elaboration of the issue of land expropriation and compensation in rural China has rarely been carried out within the political regime. This thesis analyzes the institutional framework of land expropriation and compensation in rural China from the perspectives of property rights and land management system. In addition, it discloses the opportunities for Chinese legal system to solve this issue by borrowing legal norms, wisdoms and experience from other jurisdiction, such as the United States and Germany. Furthermore, it aims to improve and reconstruct the legal framework of compensation by elaborating the concept of long-term reciprocity. Three primary questions would be elaborated in this thesis. Is the compensation for land expropriation in rural China equitable? If the compensation is not equitable, how has such an inequity been caused? And most importantly, how to improve the compensability of land expropriation?

A long-standing issue in politics and administration is how politicians and bureaucrats perceive themselves in their roles and relationships with their counterpart in the process of governance and development and which factors affect or configure the orientation or perception of the politicians and bureaucrats regarding politics-bureaucracy relationship in the political system. Like many other developed and developing countries, bureaucracy is the post-colonial reality of governance in Bangladesh. The elected politicians and non-elected official bureaucrats are the integral part of the administration in both the central and local government in Bangladesh. Probably the most elemental and theoretical debatable issue here is that - what will be the apt relationship between politicians and bureaucrats? And what are the relational effects on local governance and development? Thus, this inquiry empirically investigated the views and perceptions of the elected politicians and official bureaucrats to politics-bureaucracy relations and its effects on governance and development of Bangladesh in the context of local governance and development following the survey and case study methods. This study endeavored to undertake a theory based empirical research to figure out the theoretical paradigmatic perspectives from the existing literature on politics-bureaucracy relationship and an attempt has been made to identify “dichotomy” and “mutuality” as the major two models of the theoretical perspective by discussing the key variations and effectual deficiencies among the existing models, providing the argument that existing theoretical models are not identical and their characteristics are overlapping with either dichotomy or mutuality. Consequently, it also wanted to propose a logical modification of the existing relationship models by explaining some underpinning variables which underpin the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the process of governance. This study tried to develop a prospective third model of politics-bureaucracy relations focusing the light on symbiotic relationship between politicians and bureaucrats that is argued in this thesis as an interface between dichotomous and mutual relation, and an essential precondition or rational choice model of politics-bureaucracy relations for proper local governance and development as the theoretical construct. The empirical data and observation reveals that the theoretical models that already been discussed in the theoretical and conceptual framework cannot be found exactly in the context of politics-bureaucracy relations at the local government of Bangladesh. According to the perceptions of respondents and the empirical data, the relation is neither normatively dichotomous with political neutrality nor abundantly cohesive or mutual-interactive. However, some conditions of both dichotomy and mutuality are present in the relationship of local elected politicians and bureaucrats. In spite of that, empirical data reveals that the relation between local elected politicians and bureaucrats is conflicting and it is influenced by many components. The role perceptions and the patterns of relationships varies with the degree of social characteristics, alignment of interests, role perceptions, self-image and mutual interaction between local elected politicians and the official bureaucrats, which ultimately influence the level of local governance and development. The colonial and semi-colonial legacy, dominant attitude of the politicians and bureaucrats, politicization, distinctive self-image and mutual interaction are highly associated to the conflictual relationship. Moreover, the increased fusion of the political and administrative roles of the bureaucracy has complicated the perceptions of the bureaucracy in Bangladesh. The results of the empirical observation and statistical analysis demonstrate that the relational perceptions of politicians and bureaucrats are almost opposite and bureaucrats trend to dominate local governance and development by marginalizing the local elected politicians and thus conflict occurred between them which ultimately affect local governance and development significantly. In this milieu, this research propose the symbiotic model of relation that would be the rational choice for proper governance and development as the necessary conditions of symbiotic model are existing in the perspective of politics-bureaucracy relations at the local government in Bangladesh.

With the increasing debt accumulated by local governments, land finance has become an important issue worth paying attention to in the Chinas economy. Based on the political economy literature, this paper selects general public budget expenditure, regional GDP, per Capita GDP, urbanization rate of permanent people, and the development of the secondary industry as independent variables and the dependence on land finance of the local government as dependent variable. Panel data from 22 provincial local governments is collected for empirical research. The empirical results indicate that accelerating urbanization, general public budget expenditure have led to local governments obtaining extra-budgetary land fiscal revenue. The growth of regional GDP and the expansion of the secondary industry will bring revenue to the region, which will help reduce the dependence of local governments on land finance. The political economics research on land finance helps to understand the economic behavior of local governments in China and also contributes to understanding the issue of soft budget constraint.