11. The European Parliament

ABSTRACTThis paper asks whether the distinction between a working and a debating parliament can help us understand how the European Parliament (EP) can contribute to the legitimacy of European Union (EU) law-making. The paper discusses normative standards, practical challenges and institutional choices the EP faces in developing as either a working or a debating parliament. It sketches the particular configuration of working and debating parliament the EP has developed. All this allows the paper to identify a predicament. Only by working alongside the Commission and Council in shaping the detail of legislation is the EP likely to provide the in-depth scrutiny needed for standards of public control and public justification where legislation is authored by complex modern bureaucracies with huge informational advantages over parliaments. On the other hand, the EP’s success in developing practices that allow it to work alongside the Commission and Council throughout the legislative process may have been at some cost to the development of its role as a visible forum of public debate which communicates the political system to the public, and explains and politicises political choices. The paper concludes with some broad lessons for how parliamentary participation in EU law-making should be distributed between the European and national parliaments.

Elections to the European Parliament have been unable to capture the public’s interest— turnout remains far lower than most national elections and many who do vote appear more concerned with sending messages of approval to national political parties than electing representatives at the EU level. This paper seeks to explain why the public does not take these elections seriously. A common explanation is that the public simply does not care about EU politics. In addition to this ‘issue-based’ argument, this article considers where a lack of trust in the European Parliament itself may lead many individuals to abstain from EP elections. Using pre and post-election survey data, results suggest that perceptions of the EP indeed have a significant effect on the decision to vote in EP elections.

This Article discusses the usefulness of the concept of accountability, and of electoral accountability more precisely, for the analysis of the European Union (EU). Starting from the idea that the EU does not suffer so much from a democratic deficit but rather from a political one, it argues that much more attention should be given to the concrete mechanisms through which EU decision-makers are held accountable. Among the latter, elections to the European Parliament (EP) are of special interest as they provide – at least in theory – the most direct channel for institutional accountability as well as the necessary incentives for political actors to act responsively. However, the declining turnout in European elections and the lack of knowledge of the EU on the part of voters reveal flaws in accountability at the EU level. The latter are attributed to the internal working of the EP and to certain features of the electoral system for the election of its members.

This chapter examines the role of the European Parliament (EP) within the European Union's system of governance. It also considers the function and operation of the EP by focusing on three key areas of importance: the legislative work of the Parliament, its internal politics, and its representative role as a link between the electorate and EU decision-making processes. The chapter first charts the evolution of the EP before discussing its budgetary and legislative powers, along with its advocacy for constitutional change to bring Europe closer to its citizens. It then discusses the influence and internal politics of the EP as well as elections to the EP, noting that national parliaments are now able to block proposed EU legislation. It also describes the principal challenges facing the EP.

This dissertation provides a comprehensive account of the role of national parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance. It examines national parliaments in the European Semester, in relation to the European Stability Mechanism and the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance and challenges the view that the Euro crisis has only reduced the influence of national parliaments. The analysis moves beyond prerogatives and institutional capacities to actual parliamentary involvement. Scrutinising the different stages of the European Semester remains a challenge for many national parliaments that have been marginalised by this multilevel coordination and surveillance process. In case of the third rescue package for Greece, the overall involvement by national parliaments exceeded what legal provisions would have demanded. But both economic governance domains suffer from asymmetries between those national parliaments that are willing and able to become actually involved and those that are not. One possible remedy against these asymmetries would be to involve national parliaments into economic governance collectively. The provision of Article 13 TSCG and the Interparliamentary Conference established on this basis, however, fall short of collective involvement or joint scrutiny and the experience of negotiating the institutional design of the new Conference even suggests that any kind of joint parliamentary body for the Euro area would be very difficult to realise. As a general overhaul of the Economic and Monetary Union seems indispensable to make the common currency weather-proof, a more symmetric involvement of national parliaments is necessary to strengthen the legitimacy that they supply. In the European Semester this could be achieved via minimum standards for parliamentary involvement, but the tangled web of procedures for ESM rescue packages is likely to persist and interparliamentary cooperation can only be developed incrementally.

Journal Article The European Parliament and the National Parliaments and The Future of the European Parliament Get access The European Parliament and the National Parliaments. Edited by Valentine Herman and Rinus Van Schendelen. Teakfield, Farnborough: Saxon House. 1979. 304pp. £9.50.The Future of the European Parliament. By David Coombes. London: Policy Studies Institute. 1979. 136pp. (PSI Studies in European Politics, I.)Pb:£3.95. J. D. B. Mitchell J. D. B. Mitchell 1University of Edinburgh Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 56, Issue 2, April 1980, Pages 363–364, https://doi.org/10.2307/2615445 Published: 01 April 1980

This article is about political groups and non-attached members in the European Parliament (EP). Although the strengthening of the former to the detriment of the latter is an old as well as an incremental phenomenon, it is with the current legislature that the struggle between the two has become a central issue of the EP agenda. The peak is the case of the TDI Group (‘Bonino-Le Pen’), the first political group dissolved by the assembly itself, backed by an unprecedented judgment of the Court of First Instance, on the basis of the lack of political affinities between its members. At the same time as shedding light on the way political groups are conceived and the prerogatives they reserve, this episode emphasises the special imperatives of the EP internal organisation and helps to explain the most recent revision of the Rules of Procedure. The study reveals that over time the EP has increasingly enhanced the role of political groups to an extent that non-attached members consider prejudicial for the full exercise of the democratic mandate; moreover, it shows that the requirement of political affinities to form political groups is formal in nature so that only an explicit denial would entail its actual enforcement, as was the case for the TDI Group; finally, while emphasising that the EP's internal structure needs to be considered in the light of the special legislative role and unique transnational features of the institution itself, it warns that reference to other national models can be misleading.

Alongside other actors such as the European Ombudsman, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) plays what looks like, at first sight, a key role in improving the transparency of EU legislative procedures. To take two relatively recent examples, the <em>De Capitani v. European Parliament</em> (2018) judgment was perceived as a victory by those in favor of increased transparency of EU legislative procedures at the stage of trilogues, as was the <em>ClientEarth v. European Commission</em> (2018) judgment regarding the pre-initiative stage. Both rulings emphasize the need for “allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has formed the basis of a legislative act…[as] a precondition for the effective exercise of their democratic rights” (<em>ClientEarth v. European Commission</em>, 2018, §84; <em>De Capitani v. European Parliament</em>, 2018, §80). Nevertheless, while the CJEU’s case law may indeed contribute to improving the legislative process’ transparency, its impact on the latter is inherently limited and even bears the potential of having a perverse effect. This article sheds light on the limits of the CJEU’s capacity to act in this field and the potential effects of its case law on the EU institutions’ attitudes or internal organization.

The article focuses on the strategic evolution of the Italian Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle—M5S). The party was born in 2009 as a local and civic experience and it represents a new example of populism characterized by unprecedented traits. In 2010 the M5S obtained its first representatives during regional elections and in 2012 it achieved its first Major in a big town (Parma, in the heart of Italy). This path from the “people” to the political institutions has been completed between 2013 and 2014 with entry into National and European Parliament. The same process caused a lot of changes in party strategies and a strong debate inside the party in regards to its organisation and structure. The local case of Parma will work as an example of “overpromising populism” accused by the central office of a compromise-collusion with the “old” power. An analysis of national and sub-national context will serve as a verification of the idea that power participation leads to “moderation” of populists. In the final section we will hazard some hypothesis about the future of the party and its possible “government role” in a more comparative perspective.

The Budgetary Procedure in the European Union and the Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon

ABSTRACTExisting research on the European Union's (EU) multilevel parliamentary system builds on the hypothesis of parallel evolution, situating explanations for European Parliament (EP) empowerment at the EU level and explanations for national parliamentary powers in EU affairs at the national level. We propose the hypothesis of co-evolution, which specifies a connection between national and European arenas of parliamentarization. We study whether the EP's empowerment enhances or reduces pressure on national parliaments to strengthen their own EU-related competences. First, we argue that national parliamentary parties take conscious positions on the powers of the EP. Second, support for the EP among the party composition of national parliaments tells us whether parliaments regard the EP as a competitor or ally, feeling pressed, or relieved of the pressure, to strengthen their EU-related competences.

One of the defining features of the European Union is parliamentary involvement in its decision-taking procedures — a feature closely connected to some of the Union's other defining features, such as its lawmaking capacity, and also to early aspirations towards a more federal system. This involvement is twofold: first, having its own elected parliament — unique for an international structure — and through specific provisions in the Treaty (and a developing practice within Member States) to involve national parliaments. Initially, however, the involvement of parliaments was at the margins. The role of the European Parliament was essentially consultative, while the national parliaments had no recognized role under the Treaties and were, in most Member States, not heavily involved in European matters. This chapter gives a brief summary of how this has changed, notably through successive treaties that have taken the European Parliament from a talking shop to a co-legislature with the Council. It also describes the rights of COSAC, the declarations and subsequently protocols on national parliaments, culminating in the so-called ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ procedures under the Treaty of Lisbon. It evaluates the likely effects of these changes. Mention is also made of the occasions when national parliaments and the European Parliament have worked together to seek changes to the EU system, notably the Parliamentary Assizes in Rome in 1990 and the 2002–03 Convention on the Future of Europe.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of changes in the internal structure of the Storting and nature of the legislative process on the quality of laws passed. The authors point out the essential elements of this process in the Storting, but also in the pre-parliamentary phase, defining the legislative process more broadly than is traditionally done. They also emphasize the importance of consensus in political culture and political pragmatism in making high-quality laws. Both of these features are present in Norwegian parliamentarism and are its distinguishing features compared to other European countries. The amendment to the Basic Law of the Kingdom of Norway in 2007 established a unicameral structure of the Storting on pragmatic grounds. Contrary to the fears of some researchers and politicians, this has not resulted in a decrease in the quality of legislation, especially in the provisions of laws. At the same time, it has put in order and streamlined the legislative process in parliament, giving deputies the opportunity to focus on other matters related to fulfilling their mandate as representatives. The unicameral Storting is nowadays, in the unanimous opinion of researchers, one of the most efficiently and effectively functioning parliaments in Europe in carrying out its functions.

Relatively little attention was paid to the European Parliament in large swathes of integration literature prior to, or even in the years following, direct elections. Webb, for instance, makes only one reference to the Parliament in her review of integration theories (and then only to say that no change is expected).1 George ignores it in his ‘European Integration in Theory and Practice’,2 as does Taylor in his own review of European integration theory.3

This study deals with the question of how German members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent the German model of religion–state relations at the European level. Based on a survey and interviews with German MEPs as well as a content-analysis of German MEPs’ speeches, motions and parliamentary questions during the seventh term of the European Parliament (EP), our study demonstrates that this model is represented in three dimensions. First, German MEPs reflect the close cooperation between the churches and the state in Germany, primarily on social issues, through largely church- and religion-friendly attitudes and relatively frequent contacts with religious interest-groups. Second, by referring to religious freedoms and minorities primarily outside the EU and by placing Islam in considerably more critical contexts than Christianity, German MEPs create a cultural demarcation line between Islam and Christianity through their parliamentary activities, which is similar to, though less politicised than, cultural boundaries often produced in public debates in Germany. Third, our study illustrates similar patterns of religious affiliation and subjective religiosity among German parliamentarians in both the EP and the national Parliament, which to some degree also reflect societal trends in Germany. Yet our data also suggest that European political elites are more religious than the average German population. If the presence of religion in terms of religious interest-groups and arguments is included, the EP appears to be more secularist than the German Parliament.