2 - Copyright works

The Treatment of Parodies Under Copyright Law in Seven Jurisdictions: A Comparative Review of the Underlying Principles

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Uspostavljanje modela filmske edukacije u srednjoj školi

Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies

Political Fair Use

A small but thriving philosophical industry is engaged in the ontology of art: the avowed aim is to specify the kind ofthing an artwork is, or the ontological category to which an artwork belongs. Here is Amie Thomasson's description of the enterprise:The central question for the ontology of art is this: sort of entities are works of art? Are they physical objects, ideal kinds, imaginary entities, or something else? How are works of art of various kinds related to the mental states of artists or viewers, to physical objects, or to abstract visual, auditory or linguistic structures? Under what conditions do works come into existence, survive, or cease to exist?1And here is Guy Rohrbaugh's description:Ontologists offer a map of reality, one divided into such broad, overlapping territories as physical and mental, concrete and abstract, universal and particular. Such a map provides the setting for further philosophical investigation. Ontologists of art seek to locate works of art in this wider terrain, to say where in our universe they fit in. Their governing question is, thus, What kind ofthing is a work of art?2Music is among the artforms frequently targeted by the enterprise. Julian Dodd, for example, says Wynton Marsalis composed In This House, On This Morning in 1992. But what is the nature of the thing he composed? Dodd undertakes the project of addressing . . the categorial question: the issue of which ontological category works of music belong to.3 In similar spirit, Jerrold Levinson asks What exactly did Beethoven compose?. . . what sort ofthing is it, this quintet which was the outcome of Beethoven's creative activity?4 And Stephen Davies, reflecting upon philosophical theories of music ontology, says Philosophers argue over whether musical works are classes, types, or kinds, over whether they are universale or particulars, over whether they are created or discovered, and over whether musical works, as well as their performances, consist of sounds . . ..5Such questions appear reasonable: we wish to know what sorts of entities are in the world, and - should artworks find place in the inventory - what sorts of things they are. But given puzzles and complexities involving essence, individuation, metaphysical explanation, and the relation between objects and practices, it is not clear what constitutes successful answers to such questions; nor is it clear whether the ontologist of art provides anything not already provided by critics, historians, and consumers of art. The situation is no clearer within that subindustry concerned specifically with the ontology of music. One upshot of these concerns is that artworld ontologists might be engaged in a dubious enterprise.Others have voiced skepticism about the value of ontological inquiry in the arts;6 but the skepticism I advocate here is more global, grounded in general methodological concerns about the explanatory and/or justificatory power of ontological theories.The structure of the discussion is as follows: Sections I and II address the kind of explanation - if any - that artworld ontologies might plausibly be construed as providing. Part III muddies the waters by acknowledging that artworld ontology might not, after all, be in the business of explanation, and offers alternative pictures of the ontologist's goals. Parts IV-VI broach the disturbing possibility that art-ontological theories provide nothing over and above information already provided by the art historian and sociologist of art; and traditional concerns about modality and essence motivate the idea that ontologies of art and music are nothing more than reifications of theorists' commitments to the relative importance of certain artwork properties.7 Later sections explore several efforts to salvage and legitimize the practice of artworld ontology but conclude that prospects for such salvation are dim.IArt is not science. Granted, there is artistry in science: physics requires creativity and imagination; and there is science in art: painting and musical composition require problem solving and effective use of resources. …

Doctrine of Exhaustion in Relation to Copyright Law in India and Parallel Imports

While instructional developers usually think of "copyright problems" in terms of reproducing and using materials produced by others in their instructional systems, there is another aspect of the "copyright problem" that is perhaps more important to the developer in his/her own professional career. The copyright problem is "who holds the copyright on materials developed jointly by a subject matter expert and an instructional developer." The concern of most developers is "how can I protect my rights as joint author and joint copyright holder of the materials?" This paper presents a case study that illustrates what can happen if the developer is not aware of how the copyright law affects him/her. It then discusses some key elements of the new copyright law. It concludes with some practical suggestions for instructional developers pertaining to procedures they can follow to protect themselves in the critical area of copyright.

The article reveals the main properties of winged words, as well as the amount and the sources of winged words borrowed from German into the modern Belarusian literary language.The sources of origin of the winged words are subdivided into singular (primary and secondary) and complex.Primary sources include borrowings of winged words from the German sources exclusively. The primary sources of origin have winged words borrowed from original German sources only (literary texts and the works of folklore, mass communication texts, the names of artworks, the sayings of famous people, anonymous literary texts, the nicknames of famous people and literary characters). Literary texts as the sources of winged words include fiction works (prose works are a novel, a short story; poetic works are a poem, drama, a verse, an epigram; tragedy and drama are dramatic works), biographical works, journalistic works, philosophical works, scientific and popular science works, the texts of musical works (a song, a libretto), etc.Secondary sources promoted the spread of winged words from German and other sources. The secondary origins of the winged words are not original. The main sources of the expressions that have become winged due to their use in secondary sources can be either German (oral-colloquial texts, literary works, anonymous literary texts) or non-German sources (literary and folklore works, the sayings of famous people).Complex (two or more) sources are represented by two diachronic patterns: «Non-German + German», «Non-German + German + Non-German». The author gives special attention to the amount and the origin of those winged words, which came into Belarusian language from non-German sources via German throughout the history.

A property right (ius in rem, real right) is an abstract legal concept which relates to an object, referred to as “thing” or “res,” or imprecisely, but commonly, “property.” This object of property is a product of legal categorisation; it may be represented by a physical thing or it can be an abstract legal creation itself, as is the case with an intellectual property right. In any event, for the law the “property-object” (whether tangible, intangible or purely intangible) is the product of a legal conceptualisation. The law (private law) creates any res or thing, whether corporeal or not, through the legal concept of real rights. That enables legal recognition of the res in question. The material object (if there is one) only becomes a res in law if real rights are attached to it. Therefore, real rights and res are both “property”, and particularly with (purely intangible) intellectual property, property rights and property objects merge into one. The abstract conceptual res typically has a reifier to make it recognisable in the material world and for the purpose of social interactions. This reifier can be a corporeal object, in which case it is a direct reifier (a table being a direct reifier and incident of a res, chattel), but, for example in case of copyright, a chattel may act not only as direct reifier of the notional personal (moveable) property right (e.g. a canvas of a painting, the score of a symphony, the paper of a manuscript), but also as an indirect reifier of the notional copyright (artistic work, musical work, literary work). The chattel in question represents directly the personal/moveable property (but does not constitute it, because the res remains a legal concept), and, in addition, the chattel represents indirectly the copyright in the work which is expressed and recorded in the chattel in question (a painting, sculpture etc.).

The dominant explanatory/justificatory framework informing scholarly commentary on copyright law, policy and theory today – certainly in the US – is law and economics. From this perspective, copyright law exists to underpin markets in certain categories of ‘information good’ (copyright works). These markets in turn function to ensure that the private costs and benefits of information production and consumption line up (more or less) with the social costs and benefits of these activities, ie that ‘free-riding’ on the efforts of information producers is (more or less) curtailed. A widely held view is that this tradition of what might be called ‘copyright-law-and-economics’ is now deeply divided – between adherents to what Glynn Lunney has called ‘copyright’s incentives-access paradigm’ on the one hand, and proponents of what Mark Lemley has called the ‘full value’ or ‘absolute protection’ paradigm on the other. Absolute protection theorists tend towards the view that all uses of copyright works should be capable of being controlled (and so priced) by the right-owner; incentives-access theorists distinguish between uses the control of which would affect the information producer’s incentives ex ante, and those that would not, and recommend that copyright protection should extend to the former category only. This paper examines the features that are said to distinguish the two paradigms from each other, focusing especially on the approach each recommends to copyright’s scope (ie the issue of what uses of copyright works properly constitute copyright infringements). Particular attention is paid to the efforts of critical economists of intellectual property law such as Lemley and Brett Frischmann to retrieve and advance versions of the incentives-access paradigm with a view to counteracting the disadvantages for society they believe are associated with the absolute protection paradigm. Ultimately, however, I conclude that too much has been made of the distinction, and that the debate over which paradigm should have priority in determining the contours of copyright policy distracts attention from a more fundamental issue – the hegemony of economic analysis generally in organising the conceptual and normative universe of legal scholars working in this area. Thus while sympathetic to the impulse underlying the efforts of Lemley and Frischmann – a concern to resist the seemingly relentless expansion of copyright towards the horizon of absolute right-holder control of all uses of copyright material – I argue that their lingering adherence to the presuppositions of economic analysis has stymied their well-meaning efforts to account for the social value of ‘information’ in terms distinct from the merely economic measure of price. My overall aim here is to suggest that, because of its presuppositions, economic analysis – in whatever paradigm it may be packaged – offers at best a blinkered perspective on both copyright law and the field of social life that copyright law affects. I conclude by proposing Jurgen Habermas’s social theory as an alternative framework in relation to which critics of copyright expansionism might fruitfully orient themselves in the future.

The Colour of Copyright

While the commercial distribution channels of popular music (such as record retailers, radio stations, video channels, web stores), attribute authorship to performers, copyright law requires that a ‘musical work’ be invented ex post facto out of the ‘sound sculpture’ produced by the artist (and others, such as the producer) in the recording studio. This article explains how copyright law came to privilege some types of authorship, discusses the potential effects of recognizing a multiplicity of authorial contributions in the production of music, and argues for a closer correspondence of legal and aesthetic understandings of culture.

The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has transformed the creation of literary, artistic, and musical works, challenging conventional legal frameworks that tie copyright protection to human authorship. In Tanzania, the Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act [Cap. 218 R.E. 2023] defines an author strictly as a “natural person,” thereby excluding autonomously works generated with the assistance of AI from copyright protection. This exclusion raises significant legal, economic, and technological concerns, particularly as AI continues to influence creative industries. This paper examines Tanzania’s copyright legal framework for protecting works generated with the assistance of AI. Using doctrinal legal research methodologies, the study evaluates international legal instruments, including the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, and legal practices in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom. Jurisdictions offer diverse approaches, ranging from strict human authorship requirements to recognition of copyright in computer-generated works under specific conditions. The paper is guided by theoretical frameworks, including the Romantic, Lockean, Utilitarian, and Personality theories of copyright. These are used to analyse whether the justifications for human-centred copyright law can extend to AI-generated creativity. The study indicates that Tanzania’s legal framework does not accommodate the evolving nature of authorship brought about by AI technologies, thereby creating a gap in protection, enforcement, and innovation. The study suggests that Tanzania’s current framework is insufficient to address the evolving nature of AI authorship. The study proposes a reform that updates the definition of authorship to encompass human-AI collaborative works. These reforms would align Tanzania’s copyright system with global trends, encourage technological creativity, and provide fair legal protection in the digital age.

The Aesthetics or Theory of Reception, which analyzes the meanings of literary works and the function of the reader with a reader-response perspective, is an original aesthetic theory that spread from Germany to the world and then to the other branches of art in late 1960s. In the dialogue between the received work of art and the receiver, the style and duration of reception differ fundamentally in each branch of art. As in literary works, the experience of reading and understanding the work in other realms of art depends on the language of the art form. Reception Aesthetics mainly investigates such matters as the conditions under which a work of art is to be comprehended, the styles of comprehension and their results. This study analyzes the changes in the conditions and styles of reception during a dialogue with works of Ceramic Art, and the refreshing influence of reception period on the work with an experimental approach. The reception period is analyzed in the exemplary ceramic works of J. Miro. There are two reasons why the works of Miro were selected for analysis. First, Miro is a versatile artist who has influenced not only contemporary art of painting but also the art of ceramics with his ceramic works. His contribution to ceramic art can be exemplified within his works. Second is the advantage provided by the contribution to the experimental period of analysis through publications about Miro in art literature and the advantage of the evaluating the findings of reception. It is thought that the reception period is a period of art-work analysis that responds to a wider recipient audience about the work of art. It is also considered to involve a period of synthesis revitalizing the work of art with each new receiver. A flexible and explicit approach in the evaluation of work of art will support the formation of aesthetic life and communication among a wider recipient audience.