8. Strategic assessment and grand strategy

Transition in the Middle East, the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis and the United States' rebalance to Asia are key trends that will have an impact on transatlantic relations and European defence. As US priorities shift, a common European 'grand strategy' could encourage the development of a shared vision to help Europe order its priorities and begin to respond to the new, post-austerity context of world politics and shrinking defence budgets. Will these changes be enough to quicken Europe's currently shrivelled strategic thinking? In any scenario, given its relative weight and role as an interlocutor with the US, the United Kingdom will remain vital to any developing European security and strategy agenda, although its broader relations with the European Union will complicate this relationship. How it proceeds will also help to define the boundaries of this nascent European security order. This article charts these key global trends, relates them to current debates in European security and strategy and maps opportunities and constraints faced by Europe and the UK in developing a grand strategy in an increasingly 'American-lite' European neighbourhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nation-Building and Foreign Policy in India: An Identity–Strategy Conflict presents an evaluation of Indian foreign policy. It analyses the unusual concern of Indian strategic thinking about political values. The book argues that in Indian foreign policy, there has been a shift from a strict concern for national interest towards idealist considerations. Thus creating what the author calls an ‘idealist inflection’. This inflection does not have its roots in cultural aspects or grand strategy. Instead, it is best understood with reference to the political process of nation-building, characterised by the specific choices and decisions taken by the two leading protagonists of the Indian National Movement – Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. The values they chose to place at the heart of India’s national identity have spilt into the country’s foreign policy.

This paper develops a framework for examining the grand strategies of great powers through the use of the role contestation literature. We first identify national role conceptions advocated by leaders and political factions, and then compare them to detect contestation between their favored foreign policy roles. We argue that long-term consensus on certain roles may coalesce into the enduring ingredients of grand strategies, while the existence of a high amount of role contestation between leaders and political factions over roles may suggest foreign policy is guided by more temporary foreign policy beliefs. We explore this argument through an illustrative case of contemporary China. Our findings identify substantial variation between the national role conceptions of China's leaders and their factions over time. Of particular note, we find that (1) President Xi Jinping seems to be experiencing a much higher amount of role contestation within the party on more nationalistic and aggressive roles than his predecessors, and (2) certain roles, such as developer, Tianxia, regional leadership, and internal developer, are very consistent among both leaders and their factions over time such that these roles can be considered as part of China's grand strategy. This study shows how role theory might inform the analysis of grand strategy by offering a means of observing enduring features of grand strategy that could be applied more broadly to other countries.

Grand strategy offers an effective framework to understand and explain how and why a state interacts with other actors in a given way and how it combines various military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural instruments to achieve its ends in a largely coherent fashion. Yet, the term “grand strategy” conjures different meanings and attitudes, with some treating it as synonymous with strategy and foreign policy, thus raising questions about its relations with policy and politics. History teaches us that grand strategy remains a demanding enterprise, partly because of actors’ differential status and partly because its time horizon (mid to long term) subjects it to unforeseen conditions that threaten to derail it. However, does this make grand strategy impossible? Modern grand strategic scholarship is studded with tensions, but this must not eclipse research advances. In fact, the more disconnected controversies are from empirical contexts, the more they tend to become ends unto themselves. The first controversy relates to the definition of grand strategy and the best way to chart its landscape; the second deals with the sources of grand strategy (internal vs. external, material vs. ideational); and the third revolves around the feasibility of grand strategy in a capricious and fast-paced environment. These tensions are both defining, in the sense that they outline the state of the field, and productive, as they point toward future research avenues.

During much of the Cold War, India chose to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy posture. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War forced India to redefine its foreign policy and search for a new place in the emerging international order. However, almost 20 years on, India’s foreign policy still appears to lack a coherent strategic doctrine. This article identifies some of the domestic factors that hampered the development of a post-Cold War ‘grand strategy’. It argues that the emergence of coalition governments at the national level since the early 1990s, the country’s federal structure, weaknesses in India’s foreign policy institutions and the lack of a strategic culture within the country together constrain India’s search for a post-Cold War foreign policy.

At present, security environment in East Asia is becoming increasingly fraught, characterised by the growing strategic rivalry between the US and China. Meanwhile, Japan is faced with the challenge of formulating such a foreign policy approach that would both ensure its national security and avoid further escalating the US-China conflict. In these circumstances, it is of interest to examine the views of Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009–2010) on Japan’s foreign policy and its role in the international community. This article analyses Hatoyama’s attitudes and rhetoric within the context of Japanese political elites’ longstanding search for alternatives to the Yoshida Doctrine, which underpinned Japan’s grand strategy throughout the Cold War. While the Prime Minister’s attempts to modify Japanese diplomatic approach have often been considered incoherent or “naïve”, the author argues that, drawing partially from the concepts pertaining to Japan’s role on the international stage that were introduced in the 1990s, Hatoyama consistently advocated the formulation of a new strategy. While admitting that some of Hatoyama’s proposals were not well-thought-out and went beyond the political mainstream, the author posits that he pursued the same goal as previous Japanese leaders, namely achieving balance in Japan’s relations with the US and China. The parameters of Hatoyama’s strategy were different from both the Yoshida Doctrine and the emerging course towards a more robust security policy, which was fully implemented under the second administration of Abe Shinzo (2012–2020). This strategy was based on Japan’s proactive role in upholding global stability through non-military means, reducing its dependence on the US, deepening integration in East Asia, and achieving friendly ties with China. The objectives of this article are to analyse Hatoyama’s political philosophy, identify the similarities and differences between it and other key contemporary foreign policy initiatives, as well as examine the Prime Minister’s approach towards foreign-policy making. The sources include Hatoyama’s speeches and writings as well as a range of academic literature devoted to analysing his foreign policy with an emphasis on the works of Japanese scholars.

The research examines the main problems of a grand strategy in the US foreign policy. Attention is paid to the conceptual understanding of this term, its historical development, and the current state. The article analyzes the positions of American foreign policy elites and the expert community regarding the problem of the US self-positioning in the outside world. The article consists of three parts. The first analyses the main conceptual provisions of the “grand strategy” as a term. It describes its development from a military term, reflecting the general tactics in interstate confrontation to its comprehensive understanding as a coordination principle of long-term and medium-term goals with short term actions. The second part of the article focuses on the American foreign policy elites, their approaches, as well as public opinion on this issue. It is noted that the ideology of global leadership has become an important component of the establishment's thinking. It largely impedes the development of new foreign policy concepts and, as a result, reformatting the grand strategy. The third part is devoted to the positions of the expert community on the issue of grand strategy. Four main versions are considered: "Offensive", "Selective engagement", "Offshore Balancing", "Zero-sum". The author comes to a conclusion that the US foreign policy mixes several types of strategies at the moment. It is noted that as China strengthens, the United States faces a new competition, which, unlike the Soviet threat, implies not military-political, but economic confrontation. The implementation of the scenario of a "new Cold War" between Washington and Beijing can define the new goals of the grand strategy. At the same time, this also creates an ideological dilemma of recognizing a new challenge, an increasing alternative for American global leadership - the idea of which is still popular among representatives of American foreign policy elites.

This chapter starts with a historical exposé of the development of Sweden’s foreign policy from the early 1800s up until the end of the Second World War. The chapter then analyses grand strategy in Swedish foreign and security policy from the Second World War to 2007. Four foreign and security policy roles are identified during this period: the autonomous security seeker, based on the policy of neutrality together with a strong national defence; the autonomous activist, expressed through Sweden’s engagement for peace and development; and the subordinate role of the hesitant European, which then transformed into a dominant role of integrationist European after the end of the Cold War, when Sweden’s membership of the European Union (EU) became a top priority. The analysis reveals how the autonomous security-seeker role held the position as master role during the period studied, with the autonomous activist and the hesitant European as complementary roles during favourable conditions.

Reviewed by: Japan's Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role Paul Midford (bio) Japan's Peace-building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a More Active Political Role. By Lam Peng Er. Routledge, New York, 2009. xi, 171 pages. 75.00. This is a must-read book for anyone seeking a comprehensive understanding of Japan's foreign and security policies. It contains surprises even for experts well versed in Japanese foreign policy. I suspect many other specialists will at best be only dimly aware of Japan's activism in peace and human security promotion in Mindanao, Sri Lanka, and Aceh, or of Japan's continuing support for East Timor and Cambodia, before picking up Lam's book. This work could have at least two additional subtitles. One would be "The Fukuda Doctrine and Japan's Relationship with Southeast Asia." The other would be "The Role of Domestic Politics." In short, Lam brings a bird's-eye view from his perch in Singapore to understanding Japan's relationship with Southeast Asia while using his expertise in Japanese domestic politics to show how this influences foreign policy. Although shedding light on a significant but hitherto obscure aspect of Japanese foreign policy, Lam's book nevertheless engages the main academic debate in the field today, namely, whether Japan is "normalizing" into a great power that uses military force as an instrument to promote national objectives abroad. Looking at this issue from his unique angle, Lam is fully convincing when he argues that Japan has found its niche in international security: non-combat-related peace building. Lam is similarly persuasive in arguing that those promoting the idea of Japan "normalizing" into a military great power have overlooked this development: "In their accounts of the trajectory of Japan's role, purpose and identity in the world, Pyle, Samuels and Green have missed out an important direction in the nation's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War—the quest to end civil wars and begin post-conflict reconstruction" (p. 4). One might add to Lam's list of leading "normalizing" literature Christopher W. Hughes's Japan's Remilitarisation.1 On the other hand, Lam's volume joins a growing literature challenging the normal-nation thesis.2 [End Page 498] Lam is also convincing when he asserts that his study of five cases of Japanese peace building reveals that "claims that Tokyo's peace-building is reactive, ad hoc and essentially driven by Washington" are "off the mark" (p. 6). Indeed, there is little indication that the United States has ever pushed participation by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in UN peacekeeping missions, any more than it has seriously promoted UN peacekeeping itself. Finally, Lam insightfully observes that "Tokyo's dispatch of the SDF to East Timor . . . did not attract any disquiet or misgivings from its Asian neighbors as had earlier been the case with Cambodia, when there was the perception that deploying the SDF abroad was merely a prelude to Japan seeking to become a great military power again" (p. 41). The demonstration effect of Tokyo's peaceful and beneficial dispatch of the SDF to Cambodia thus reassured Asian nations, suggesting that peace building can empower Japan to "forge an identity as an active and positive 'peace-loving' country acceptable to its citizens and Asian neighbors" (p. 5). Less convincing is Lam's contention that the Fukuda Doctrine is not an extension of the Yoshida Doctrine as many observers claim but a radical departure from it, because the former calls for Japan to play a political role while the latter, in Lam's eyes, calls for avoiding any external political role. One may question Lam's understanding of the Yoshida Doctrine, but he at least notes the disagreement. More dubious is his insinuation that the two are equivalent if not competing doctrines (p. 19), when in fact the Yoshida Doctrine is a grand strategy, however implicit, while the Fukuda Doctrine, despite its explicit articulation, is a regional diplomatic strategy. The Fukuda Doctrine is silent on most important aspects of Japan's security, such as the U.S.-Japan alliance and potential threats. Most doubtful is Lam's claim that the...

Despite growing interest in China, scholars continue to grapple with its reemergence as a major power, offering gloomy predictions of a fraught geopolitical landscape. More recent analyses, however, stemming from constructivist thinking, explore the relevance of China’s history, geography, and culture in shaping its foreign policy. Encapsulated in the grand strategy concept, this perspective highlights China’s long-standing preoccupation with its periphery and emphasis on peace. Problematically, current scholarship offers little insight as to whether periphery countries also share this benign view of China. Aimed at addressing this gap, this article explores China’s role in Myanmar’s peace process, using ‘grand strategy’ to analyze over 50 interviews with diverse stakeholders in Myanmar. Based on the data, this article finds that China’s support for Myanmar is perceived to be economically driven, often at the expense of peace, implying that the historically inclined perspective of grand strategy requires rethinking.

This chapter investigates the most ascendant ideas at work in America's rise to become a global power and then a superpower after the end of World War I. Segmenting US foreign policy since 1919 by “grand strategy” would seem to require grand simplification. Even those administrations commonly identified as practicing quintessential grand strategy appear more inchoate when approached from the protagonists’ perspectives at the time. To give one such example, the sequence of foreign policy innovations that the United States spearheaded from 1945 to 1949 were collectively possessed of considerable foresight. But they were also a series of strategies advocated by various actors at different times with motives that do not necessarily reduce to a mono-strategic essence. Even in regard to post-1945 US foreign policy, a period that has been sub-divided by many distinguished scholars, it is difficult to identify clearly demarcated grand strategies that provide overarching clarity. The chapter focuses on the ascendant ideas that have informed policymaking, shaped public discourse, forced other ideas into decline, and that can perhaps even be identified as “representative” of particular eras.

The article analyzes the guiding imperatives behind Russia’s grand strategy in the Mideast, including both its domestic decision-making institutional idiosyncrasies and the wider geopolitical considerations at play. It discusses the evolution of Russian strategy after the so-called “Arab Spring” events and into the present day, taking care to individually analyze Moscow’s most important bilateral relationships. The review begins by addressing Russia’s anti-terrorist intervention in Syria, before progressing to some words about the two competing foreign policy factions present in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After outlining the key differences between the Liberal and Military-Security camps, the work then broadly explains how their rivalry fi gures into the formulation of Russia’s overall grand strategy in the Mideast. Following that, it logically proceeds to examine the other bilateral relationships that are of signifi cance to Moscow, beginning with Turkey, Iraq, and Israel, and ending with Saudi Arabia and Iran. The goal of the research is to establish a very general understanding of how Russia’s foreign policy is presently practiced in the Mideast, how and why it got to where it is today, and forecast on the prospects for its further development. In doing this, the article relies on empirical observations and references several under-discussed news items that have evaded wider scrutiny. It also makes use of a few academic sources in proving that the geopolitical environment in which Russia conducts its present foreign policy was largely shaped by the US’ legacy of Hybrid Wars on the region, which in hindsight created fertile ground for the revolution in Russia’s Mideast strategy. In summary, Russia seeks to replace the US as the Mideast countries’ most preferred and trusted partner, capitalizing off of Washington’s decline in regional infl uence brought about by the disastrous rise of Daesh and the controversial perceptions over the Iranian nuclear deal in order to fi ll the strategic void that’s been created in America’s wake, and as of the end of 2016, Moscow has been wildly successful.

This chapter examines the evolution of U.S. foreign policy on environmental issues over four decades, from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama. It first considers U.S. environmental multilateralism and foreign environment policy before explaining how the United States, despite being widely regarded as an environmental leader during the Cold War period, has increasingly become an environmental laggard in the post-Cold War period. The chapter attributes the decline in U.S. leadership to the country’s new status as the sole superpower, the more challenging character of the new generation of global environmental problems that emerged in the late 1980s, the structure of the U.S. economy and political system, and key features of U.S. grand strategy.

This book provides a descriptive and analytical narrative of the evolution of US foreign policy towards Iraq at the supra-national (global), national (Arab Iraq) and sub-national (Iraqi Kurdistan) levels. The book is unique in that it presents a sophisticated insight into the two major components of US Iraq policy. To achieve this, it addresses US foreign policy towards both Arab Iraq and an entirely original analysis on US policy towards the Iraqi Kurds as components of a larger US Iraq policy, dictated by the supreme US Grand Strategy. The book also examines whether US foreign policy towards Iraq has been one of continuity or change – a dimension that has not been illustrated in any other publication. The book deals intelligently and at great length with the events surrounding US Iraq policy in three distinct phases, going back to, 1979 with regard to Arab Iraq, and 1961 in respect to the Kurdish liberation movement, covering all subsequent US administrations including the Obama presidency. It provides a thorough examination of US interests in Iraq and reasons for the 2003 invasion and its aftermath. It also engages with the intellectual roots of US foreign policy, presenting an intricate reaction of views, objectives and agendas. This work will be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East studies, US Foreign Policy and Security studies.

Artificial intelligence is transforming global resource systems and reshaping the foundations of corporate governance. This paper develops the Architecture of Intelligent Governance (AIG), a hybrid governance framework that integrates AI-enabled analytical capabilities with human judgment, ethical reasoning, and strategic foresight. Drawing on evidence from energy systems, supply chains, critical mineral dependencies, agribusiness, and emerging quantum-computing infrastructures, the analysis demonstrates how AI enhances forecasting precision, strengthens transparency, and supports more adaptive decision-making in environments characterized by volatility and interdependence. At the same time, the paper introduces a criticality perspective to examine the systemic risks associated with AI, including energy intensity, technological concentration, and algorithmic opacity. These risks underscore the need for leadership models that extend beyond technical expertise to encompass interpretive judgment, ethical stewardship, cultural competence, and long-term strategic thinking. The unified leadership framework presented here positions leadership as the human anchor of intelligent governance, ensuring that AI-enabled decisions remain aligned with organizational values and societal expectations. The AIG model offers a comprehensive approach to governing AI-intensive systems, advancing a vision of corporate governance that is resilient, transparent, and oriented toward long-term sustainability.