A Framework for Social Ontology

ABSTRACTBrian Epstein’s The Ant Trap is a praiseworthy addition to literature on social ontology and the philosophy of social sciences. Its central aim is to challenge received views about the social world – views with which social scientists and philosophers have aimed to answer questions about the nature of social science and about those things that social sciences aim to model and explain, like social facts, objects and phenomena. The received views that Epstein critiques deal with these issues in an overly people-centered manner. After all, even though social facts and phenomena clearly involve individual people arranged in certain ways, we must still spell out how people are involved in social facts and phenomena. There are many metaphysical questions about social properties, relations, dependence, constitution, causation, and facts that cannot be answered (for instance) just be looking at individual people alone. In order to answer questions about (e.g.) how one social entity depends for its existence on another, we need different metaphysical tools. Epstein thus holds that social ontological explanations would greatly benefit from making use of the theoretical toolkit that contemporary analytical metaphysics has to offer. He focuses specifically on two metaphysical instruments: grounding and anchoring. This paper examines Epstein’s understanding and use of these tools. I contend that Epstein is exactly right to say that contemporary metaphysics contains many theoretical instruments that can be fruitfully applied to social ontological analyses. However, I am unconvinced that Epstein’s tools achieve what they set out to do. In particular, I will address two issues: (1) How is grounding for Epstein meant to work? (2) Is anchoring distinct from grounding, and a relation that we need in social ontology?

Rom Harré was a philosopher of science who is especially known for his contributions to psychology. But a lot of his writings can also be regarded as exercises in social theorizing and in tackling issues of the social ontology. This paper will argue that he introduced three innovations in the thinking about social ontology: (i) the primacy of conversations and speech acts as the ‘substance’ of the social world; (ii) the distinction between different epistemological realms when dealing with the social ontology and (iii) the introduction of a new way to think about the levels of the social reality. Moreover, it will be argued that throughout the many concepts and models Harré used to explain and understand the social reality, lays a remarkable unity and consistency in how he pictures and theorizes the society and social phenomena. Using the conceptual scheme developed by Maddi, a Harré inspired general social theory is presented that can also be read as an attempt to provide a synthesis/summary of his social theory, complemented with some insights developed by other scholars. It is proposed to label this theory as the Spoken World Theory. One of the distinct features of that theory is that it demonstrates that social and psychological phenomena are so entangled that it makes no sense to separate them and study them from a single social science’s disciplinary perspective.

Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change , Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998, £30.95, xxi+1098 pp. (ISBN 0-674-81647-1) Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, £16.99 paperback, xiii+407 pp. (ISBN 0-19-823820-7) Social epistemology versus social ontology About a dozen years ago I started a journal and wrote a book, both with the name social epistemology (Fuller 1988; Fuller 1996). In the intervening years a few intrepid philosophers and sociologists have tried to map this area, and the two books under review represent two very important, yet very different, efforts from both sides of the disciplinary divide. But before proceeding further, I should say that ‘social epistemology’ is not the only rubric that philosophers and sociologists have used to map a common conceptual space. To be sure, in the days when Popper and Wittgenstein aroused passions, ‘philosophy of the social sciences’ could lay fair claim to that goal. Much of the work of Gouldner, Habermas, Foucault and Bourdieu is also easily interpreted as exercises in social epistemology, as each in its own way theorises the place of the knower in the production of social knowledge. However, at the same time, there has been considerable resistance to social epistemology amongst both philosophers and sociologists in Britain. (It is no coincidence that Collins and Goldman are American.) Instead, what may be called social ontology turns out to be the terms in which philosophy and sociology have sought common ground, and much of what today passes for ‘social theory’ – especially that which takes Anthony Giddens as a significant presence – falls under this rubric (Fuller 1995).

Social ontologists commonly think that our ideas about social entities, and about other people also inhabiting the social realm, play an important role in making those entities into what they are. At the same time, we know that our ideas are often indeterminate in character, which presumably would mean that this indeterminacy should carry over to the social realm. And yet social indeterminacy is a neglected topic in social ontology. It is argued that this neglect can be traced to how a particular approach that favors ahistorical reconstructions in making sense of social entities has come to dominate social ontology. If we think beyond the parameters set by this approach, however, we can see that recognizing indeterminacy as a pervasive phenomenon in the social realm might open up new interpretative possibilities in relation to different social categories. This argument is at least partly in line with recent calls for a move towards nonideal social ontology.

How do social hierarchies – “the ordering of actors as superior or inferior to one another in socially important respects” – form? This chapter focuses on the processes by which social stratification emerges in and through practice. The focus is on concrete, ordinary situations in which practitioners interact. In fact, most of the arguments that I advance in the following pages are not specific to the international or diplomatic realm. This should not come as a surprise, to the extent that my starting point – the notion that practices structure interactions – applies to any social sphere, from the family to the workplace and so on. In fact, my main theoretical sources of inspiration, sociologists Erving Goffman and Pierre Bourdieu, never produced a single piece of work that would qualify as IR. Beyond multilateral diplomacy, then, any kind of configuration with minimal dynamic density – from the classroom to dispersed social networks online – is prone to the same dynamics of social stratification that I theorize here. In order to illustrate my framework, though, the last part of the chapter connects the theoretical framework back to the world of multilateral diplomacy. Practice theory is a large and diverse movement in social theory as well as in IR theory and there currently is much debate going on about what practices are, what they do, where they come from, how best to study them and so on. In this book I put forward one particular take on practice theory, which combines the sociological approaches of Goffman and Bourdieu. Essentially, I turn to Goffman in order to theorize the productive effects of practices and to make sense of the micro-processes of social dramaturgy. From Bourdieu, I retain an interest in the power politics and agonistic nature of practice and practical mastery. Each of these influences will show quite clearly, I think, in what follows. Needless to say, though, the approach that I develop here does not exhaust the variety of practice theories that are currently on offer in IR and beyond. At the risk of oversimplifying, practice theory may be construed less as a substantive social theory than as a thick methodology. Perhaps its most important contribution to knowledge development, to stay at a fairly basic level, is in specifying the unit of analysis: practice, that is, socially meaningful patterns of action.

Almost from the very beginning of economic science the notion of capital has been the subject of numerous controversies. The main reason for the concept's controversial nature is that it explains interest and profit. In Marxian theory, where 'manner of production' determines forms of activities, mutual relationships and life of individuals, capital appears as a social phenomenon i.e. social relation. Goods and money are not capital by themselves but become capital in the capitalist way of production. Economics mainstream is based on methodological individualism upon which explanation of social phenomena and processes must be derived from individual behavior and motivation. Capital, therefore, is not a product of capitalism as a socially and historically specific form of economic organization, but is rather perceived as connected to the individual and his or her rational behavior. Rational choice is the basic and sometimes the only explanatory factor in the neoclassic theories of capital. Although theories of human and cultural capital point out the interdependence between individual activity and choice on the one hand, and social position on the other hand in the process of capitalization, the connection remains in the background and somehow unclear. A more explicit indication of the interdependence between social structure and choice can be found in the theory of social capital. The goal of this paper is to explore the role of rational choice theory in explaining the nature of capital.

In the social sciences and humanities it is fashionable to use the language of a theory of society. While orthodoxy in these disciplines has often meant a commitment to the advancement of objective knowledge, to understanding the world it really is, theory has usually involved attempts to reveal the philosophical incoherence and political perniciousness of that commitment. The social disciplines, according to advocates of theory, must play a role in changing the world so as to help emancipate those on the margins of society by providing them with insights and intellectual tools. In a provocative study of social theory, Stephen Leonard takes these emancipatory goals as standards against which theory must be judged. Leonard shows how such goals are established but not met by those thinkers usually associated with the idea of a theory--such as Marx, the members of the Frankfurt School, Habermas, and Foucault. Drawing on examples of critical theory in practice, he shows how dependency theory, Paulo Freire's pedagogy, liberation theology, and feminist theory contribute to a clearer understanding of how social and political emancipation can be pursued in ways that are philosophically rigorous and theoretically sound.

Finding time to present and discuss theories at CSCW events has proven a perpetual challenge. This workshop takes up this cause by facilitating an open-ended discussion about how diverse strands of social theory not only align with but support innovative CSCW research. The workshop will focus on three guiding questions: How, when, and to what end can social theory benefit CSCW research? What recent developments in social theory could be especially impactful for CSCW research today? What can CSCW research contribute to social theory? With an aim to building a new community of practice, the workshop will provide an open forum for scholars and practitioners to probing the merits and limitations of social theory for CSCW research. We welcome participants with diverse theoretical interests, ranging from organizational theory to intersectionality, social materiality to pragmatism, practice theory, and beyond.

In this paper, we draw insights from Theodor W. Adorno’s views on objects to demonstrate the relevance of the subject-object-oriented model of social theory. By engaging closely with his notion of the ‘preponderance of the object’, we develop an account of social ontology that blends substantial, relational, and processual ontologies. We highlight the usefulness of Adorno’s social ontology in addressing contemporary social concerns related to subject-object relations, such as the reification of consciousness and objectification. Furthermore, we emphasize its significance in light of distorted subject-object relations. Considering these aspects, we argue that subject-object oriented social theory is more inclusive and relevant than the intersubjective model that emerged after the linguistic turn in Critical Theory.

We propose a novel information visualization approach for an analytical method applied in the social sciences. In social network analysis, social structures are formally represented as graphs, and structural properties of these graphs are assumed to be useful in the explanation of social phenomena. A particularly important such property is the relative status of actors in a given network.

The French sociologist and epistemologist Raymond Boudon is best known for his defense of methodological individualism and liberalism, and his nonutilitarian notion of rationality in the explanation of social phenomena. He was the author of a vast body of work on diverse subjects, including education, social stratification, social mobility, the sociology of knowledge, and values and beliefs. Three closely related themes circumscribe Boudon's sociology: antideterminism, antiutilitarianism, and antirelativism. With Michel Crozier, Alain Touraine, and Pierre Bourdieu, Boudon was part of the second generation of French intellectuals who helped to solidify sociology as an academic discipline in France.

THERE is a somewhat dogmatic belief in certain schools of anthropology that those events which can be explained psychologically and those which can be explained structurally are mutually exclusive. Thus, it is often written that psychological variables are not suitable as explanatory devices for social events. Frequently those who believe that psychological explanation has no place in the social sciences do not support this view with logical or empirical evidence but merely refer their audience to the assertions of some eminent authority who has held similar views. For example, Needham (1962:4), who holds that psychological explanations are inapt to the solution of sociological problems supports this belief primarily by selectively quoting Durkheim's assertions on the subject. Service (1962:201) does much the same in a recent work intended as an advanced introduction to primitive social organization. These appeals to authority have no place in any work that aspires to scientific standards of validity. The canonization of the method and theory of the pioneers in social science can only lead to sterile repetitions of their work. The purpose of scholarship is not to ritualize, but to question. The intent of this paper is to examine the role of psychological variables in the explanation of social phenomena. This necessarily entails a delineation of the relationships between psychological and structural explanation. In doing this, I am in no way attempting to say the final word on the subject but merely to present what I think is a clarification useful in the formulation and analysis of problems. For my point of departure, I view explanation as involving two elements. The thing or event to be explained and the process of explanation itself. The event may be either positive or negative; i.e., we try to explain not only why certain events occur but also why certain ones do not occur. Analytically, the two approaches are quite different since one is based on observations in the real world and the other on logical considerations alone. For example, it is known that FZD marriage is associated with matrilineality. This is an empirical event of which we may inquire why it occurs and hope to find an explanation in human behavior. On the other hand, it is known that FZD marriage is not associated with matrilocality in matrilineal groups. It is again proper to inquire why this is so, but can we again hope to find an explanation in human behavior? I think that we might consider this possible, but I also believe that it is first necessary to inquire whether the association is logically possible. By this, I mean that it is acceptable to look for empirical explanations of what in fact exists, since anything that exists is obviously possible, but what does not exist is purely a construct and constructs must first be analyzed to determine whether they have logical validity. Thus, it may readily be seen

The Polish philosopher Czesław Znamierowski (1888–1967) was perhaps not a pur sang phenomenologist; however, he was significantly inspired and influenced by Reinach's A priori foundations of the civil law. In 1921, a few years before Gerda Walther, Edith Stein and Dietrich von Hildebrand, he started publishing articles and books on what he called "social ontology." The social ontology which emerges from these writings, and which we sketch out in our essay, is remarkably similar to, and yet no less strikingly different from, the social ontologies of these phenomenological classics, the latter no doubt due to Znamierowski's at times not quite accurate criticism of Reinach, but even more due to Znamierowski's own acumen and unconfessedly phenomenological insightfulness. We explain his conceptual apparatus, his "social acts" and "social facts", his "social bearing" and "social function", and the rest of it; we also amply illustrate this with examples provided by Znamierowski himself and by ourselves. We try to show that Znamierowski in virtue of his method, the substance of his thought, and also his style, and not just in virtue of the influences he had absorbed, was a de facto phenomenologist, even though he did not call himself such. Last but not least, we attempt to demonstrate that Znamierowski's social ontology is by and large correct and can be put to fruitful use even today, rather than be of merely historical interest.

In recent years, food waste has received growing interest from local, national and European policymakers, international organisations, NGOs as well as academics from various disciplinary fields. Increasing concerns about food security and environmental impacts, such as resource depletion and greenhouse gas emissions attributed to food waste, have intensified attention to the topic. While food waste occurs in all stages of the food supply chain, private households have been identified as key actors in food waste generation. However, the evidence on why food waste occurs remains scattered. This paper maps the still small but expanding academic territory of consumer food waste by systematically reviewing empirical studies on food waste practices as well as distilling factors that foster and impede the generation of food waste on the household level. Moreover, we briefly discuss the contributions of different social ontologies, more particularly psychology-related approaches and social practice theory. The analysis reveals food waste as a complex and multi-faceted issue that cannot be attributed to single variables; this also calls for a stronger integration of different disciplinary perspectives. Mapping the determinants of waste generation deepens the understanding of household practices and helps design food waste prevention strategies. Finally, we link the identified factors with a set of policy, business, and retailer options.

Modern transportation has given rise to and facilitated the movement and mobility of populations. While much critical attention has been drawn to the permanent migration of the mobile population, very few scholars in the field of sociolinguistics have stressed the temporary movement of the group of travelers who are subsumed under the appellation, “the sojourner”. In addition, previous research predominantly focused on non-English speakers sojourning to English-dominant countries (Haneda and Monobe, 2009; Lee, 2008; Own, 1999), thus largely neglecting the multilingual contexts in Asia. To fill this scholarly gap, small-scale research was conducted by employing two frameworks, Social Network Theory (Milroy, 1980) and Community of Practice (Wenger, 1998; Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1992), to examine linguistic practices and identity positioning of Southeast Asian (SEA) sojourners when they interact with Hongkongers and other sojourners. In particular, it tackles a more complex language contact situation in which two major lingua francas, namely English and Mandarin, are available. This study was conducted in a higher education dance school in Hong Kong and three SEA sojourn students were recruited. Multi-faceted identities and multiple communities of practices are found: (1) at Communal Level: Cantonese is the shared linguistic repertoire of this dance community and three SEA sojourn students form the weakest ties with local students; (2) at Group Level: both Mandarin and English are adopted and stronger ties are established with other overseas sojourn students; and (3) at Individual Level: Singapore English is the dominant code choice used among these three SEA sojourners and they are bound together by the strongest ties. Instances of trilingual code-mixing and code-switching are also found in the interaction among the sojourners and Hong Kong locals. The two theories, Social Network Theory and Community of Practice, are complementary in accounting for the social organization of multilingual communities. Ultimately, this study demonstrates the complexity of multilingual communities with the aforesaid language contact in Hong Kong as a case in point.