A generalization of the Second Incompleteness Theorem and some exceptions to it

In spite of the many efforts made to clarify von Neumann's methodology of science, one crucial point seems to have been disregarded in recent literature: his closeness to Hilbert's spirit. In this paper I shall claim that the scientific methodology adopted by von Neumann in his later foundational reflections originates in the attempt to revaluate Hilbert's axiomatics in the light of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Indeed, axiomatics continues to be pursued by the Hungarian mathematician in the spirit of Hilbert's school. I shall argue this point by examining four basic ideas embraced by von Neumann in his foundational considerations: a) the conservative attitude to assume in mathematics; b) the role that mathematics and the axiomatic approach have to play in all that is science; c) the notion of success as an alternative methodological criterion to follow in scientific research; d) the empirical and, at the same time, abstract nature of mathematical thought. Once these four basic ideas have been accepted, Hilbert's spirit in von Neumann's methodology of science will become clear.

One of the highlights of modern logic is Godel’s incompleteness theorem. It tells us that, e.g. formal arithmetic is incomplete, i.e. there is a statement φ such that neither φ nor ¬φ. can be proved. It put an end to Hilbert’s optimistic claim that (at least) Peano’s axiom system would prove all its true statements. The proof of Godel’s theorem makes extensive use of the theory of computable (or recursive) functions. There is a self-contained elegant presentation of the required parts of recursion theory. The basic trick is the arithmetization of formal theories, in particular arithmetic that can treat (coded versions of) statements inside its theory. The arithmetization is carried out for Gentzen’s natural deduction.

This article continues our study of axiom systems that can verify their own consistency and prove all Peano Arithmetic's ?1 theorems. We will develop some new types of exceptions for the Semantic Tableaux Version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.

This paper explores the relationship borne by the traditional paradoxes of set theory and semantics to formal incompleteness phenomena. A central tool is the application of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to systems of second-order arithmetic and set theory in which various “paradoxical notions” for first-order languages can be formalized. I will first discuss the setting in which this result was originally presented by Hilbert & Bernays (1939) and also how it was later adapted by Kreisel (1950) and Wang (1955) in order to obtain formal undecidability results. A generalization of this method will then be presented whereby Russell’s paradox, a variant of Mirimanoff’s paradox, the Liar, and the Grelling–Nelson paradox may be uniformly transformed into incompleteness theorems. Some additional observations are then framed relating these results to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, the intensionality of arithmetization (in the sense of Feferman, 1960), and axiomatic theories of truth.

Gödel's incompleteness theorem states that there is no system of axioms and rules of inference such that the totality of all assertions deducible from the axioms is the same as the totality of all true assertions in arithmetic (indeed, for every consistent system one can construct effectively a true but unprovable assertion). The present article is devoted to a proof of this theorem, based on the concepts and methods of the theory of algorithms; the necessary information from the theory of algorithms is provided. The paper does not require specialized knowledge of any kind (in particular, none from mathematical logic), but assumes only a familiarity with elementary mathematical terminology and symbolism.