A Model Grassroots Approach for Incident Command System Implementation1

Since the establishment of the Incident Command System (ICS), many discussions have centered on its design, using the failure or success of disaster response to evaluate the effectiveness of this system. However, even prior to implementation, there are certain pre-conditions that must be first satisfied by responders. Two major factors underlying these pre-conditions, that strongly influence the eventual design and consequent functioning of the ICS, are pre-disaster established trust and relationships. This research utilizes qualitative methods to explore the importance of pre-disaster established trust and relationships in the implementation of the ICS. Twenty-eight in-depth qualitative interviews were completed and analyzed. From looking at how ICS users make a variety of different decisions regarding the establishment of the incident command, the setting up of overall response goals and objectives, the implementation of the Incident Action Plan, the selection of new ICS leaders, and the working arrangements made with volunteers, it can be observed that relationship and trust are two very important factors that dictate the successful implementation of the ICS. Based on this analysis, three conclusions could be drawn in this research: (1) any thorough evaluation of the ICS should also include an analysis of any existing pre-conditions, (2) future ICS training should cover strategies to build relationships and trust between response organizations, and (3) additional research should be conducted to understand other factors that influence the implementation of the ICS at scene of disaster.

During the wildfires in California in the 1970s, the Incident Command System (ICS) was developed to create a standardized approach for firefighters to use in order to conduct an efficient response effort. Over the last 44 years, this system evolved into an all-hazards system used all over the world to mitigate a myriad of incidents from hurricanes to terrorist attacks to oil spills. Although ICS was developed as a standard system, both internationally and within the United States, this system and the training on this system were not always implemented or conducted in the same manner. The size and scope of the response which followed the 2010 Macondo Well Blowout (Deepwater Horizon) reinforced the need for continual, standardized training in ICS. Public and private sector response organizations have all become engaged in this effort to standardize the training used to prepare responders to participate as members of an Incident Management Team. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) model for ICS is now recognized as this standard internationally. Changes in the regulatory landscape since the implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 have served to increase NIMS ICS acceptance and utilization among federal, state and local government agencies, as well as U.S.-based private industry. Recently, response organizations from around the world have begun training in NIMS ICS. This global standardization will enhance the response posture of the entire response community. Examples of training and exercises conducted all over the world will illustrate the initialization of international standardization of ICS.

This study examined whether the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 affected the United States (US) Coast Guard performance characteristics with respect to incident response. The periods analyzed consisted of a decade before versus a decade after implementation of the legislation. Using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the p-value approach (p < 0.05), six hypotheses were tested to determine whether statistically significant differences in response attributes existed during the 10 years before versus the 10 years following the passing of the legislation. Four significant hypothesis-testing outcomes represented differences in the number of incidents, incident responses, cumulative lives lost, and lives lost after notification.

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.

Dear Editor, Preparing and increasing efficiency in hospitals in disasters need to launch a common protocol named Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS). HEICS provide more coordination between hospitals and other institutions involved in emergency incidents by utilizing logical management structure, duty descriptions, creating clear reporting channels as well as developing a common and simple nomenclature system. Researches indicated that applying and establishing HEICS is necessity for Iranian hospitals and it can be helpful for use in both emergency and non-emergency situations, such as moving the facilities dispensing medications to hospital staff, or planning for a large hospital or community event. Developing training program on HEICS for hospital managers as well as establishing it seems necessary regarding our country’s condition. In this paper we point out establishing HEICS have to be in agenda for policy maker’s managers in Iranian health system and affiliated hospitals. Critical incidents are sudden, unanticipated events or situations that require quick decisions. Experiences from all around the world show that confusion and chaos are the most common issues which are confronted in hospitals when there is a serious crisis (1). Clearly a timely and effective management system with accurate organization and proactive plans and activities could minimize negative consequences of such incidents and maximize efficiency of emergency services (2-4). Incident command system (ICS) is currently the most common system of incident management in the world, gaining more recognition due to its successful outcomes (2, 4). In ICS, the incident commander, is responsible for directing other peoples to be well organized and involved. ICS is founded on some basic principles, which ensure using resources effectively, and on the other hand, reduce disturbances in decision making and doing proper operations, by responsible organizations (5). In other words, successful response to crisis requires coordination among all hospital wards and units as well as collaboration with pre-hospital emergency forces (such as EMS, Red Crescent agency), police, firefighting in order to make sure communication lines are established. Although certain level of flexibility needed to respond to variety of crisis (6). Instead of ICS, preparing and increasing efficiency in hospitals in such circumstances, a common protocol named Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) has been proposed which is extracted from basis ICS (2). HEICS was created in the late 1980s as an important foundation for the 5815 registered hospitals in the United States in their efforts to prepare for and respond to various types of disasters (7). In fact, HEICS is an incident management system composed of some specific roles in the form of an organizational table. Each of these roles has a specific mission during crisis situation, and there is a list of individual job description which guide appointed person in the crisis situation carefully. Actually HEICS allows providing as much responsibilities as required at any time, and it means more effectiveness and lower cost. Thus HEICS has capability of adapting with different kinds of incidents and crisis in any scale (8-10). HEICS provide more coordination between hospitals and other institutions involved in emergency incidents by utilizing logical management structure, duty descriptions, creating clear reporting channels as well as developing a common and simple nomenclature system (2, 4, 11). HEICS provides a commanding system which doesn’t rely on specific people, but it is flexible (6). Significant and effective features in HEICS, especially in its third version (1998) have made it one of the most common and most comprehensive hospital management systems. In developing the fourth edition of HEICS, the value and importance of using an incident management system to assist as well with daily operations, preplanned events, and non-emergency situations became apparent. Thus, the HEICS was created as a system for use in both emergency and non-emergency situations, such as moving the facility, dispensing medications to hospital staff, or planning for a large hospital or community event (7). Developing training program on HEICS for hospital managers as well as establishing it seems necessary regarding our country’s condition. In spite of the necessity of establishing such a system, many developing countries still do not have to establish this system. According Yarmohammadian and his colleagues, barriers for HEICS establishment in Iranian hospitals are classified into two categories: internal and external. Internal barriers are related to health care sector and external barriers are referred to out of health care sector. Some of internal barriers include high cost implementation, lack of motivation in the hospital managers and staff, lack of common language, lack of competitive atmosphere for progress and excellence, involvement of administrative managers in daily activities, lack of empowerment, lack of feeling the need for crisis management, and lack of knowledge in managers. External barriers include lack of authorities support and non-commitment of managers, lack of qualified managers, absence of statutory requirements, too many decision maker authorities, lack of administrative culture for crisis management, poor communication and coordination in crisis team, constant change in regulations, and lack of emergency incident command system in the country (12). According to these barriers some solutions are: using other people’s experience and preparation of training packages related to unexpected disasters, support of department of ministry of health and considering extra and specific budget for it, concept building in different dimensions, creating interest in personnel, appointing qualified managers, training and informing managers in all levels in order to create shared language among them and culture-making, designing instructions and legal bylaws for hospitals and legal requirements, elimination of daily and limited concerns of managers and removing complex administrative processes, inclusion of emergency incident management in managers’ job description and regarding it in evaluation of hospital managers, preparation of indexes and standards related to implementation of circular by managers and selection of managers, job description and monitoring of managers, establishment of regular committee for managers so that they can have planning and implementation of this system in macro level and creating a single organization in the whole community (12-14). It is concluded that, since this system is one of the necessary needs of hospitals, it is recommended that such barriers should be eliminated and responsible entities including Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME) and affiliated hospitals provide codified and ordered plans for establishment of this system. MoHME through approving and notifying rules and regulations can be established such valuable and proactive system for affiliated hospitals as well as private ones.

This paper describes the important regulatory changes underway in the United States (US) that will dramatically affect the design, construction, and operation of offshore terminals for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG). Numerous US oil and gas companies are developing projects to build offshore terminals for importing LNG into the US. As the offshore LNG terminal concept applies new technology, regulatory and technical design rules that will apply to these facilities are rapidly evolving. With the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (DWPA) (33 USC 1501-1524) has been amended to include natural gas, fundamentally altering the regulatory process for offshore LNG terminals. Whereas the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the US Coast Guard (USCG) previously played important roles in permitting and regulating onshore LNG facilities, the USCG and the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) now share the primary responsibility of regulating these facilities offshore, with subsidiary roles played by other federal agencies and the involved states. This paper examines the USCG's new role in offshore LNG terminal development, as well as the major requirements the DWPA imposes on applicants. The USCG will soon publish implementing regulations. DWPA requirements that previously applied to oil, now provide clues regarding the likely environmental review process. Although the USCG will be moving to the Department of Homeland Security, siting and operational oversight for deepwater ports is expected to remain with the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (SECDOT). This paper examines the Deepwater Port regulatory process and describes how these complex licensing requirements could affect the proposed siting, commercial viability, and environmental regulatory review of offshore LNG terminals. This paper also examines current efforts by various classification societies to develop technical guidance regarding the design, construction, and ongoing maintenance of offshore LNG terminals. The ABS Guidance Notes on Building and Classing Offshore LNG Terminals will be presented as an example of classification society efforts to fill the US regulatory void that currently exists for the technical requirements of offshore LNG terminals. In conclusion, this paper proposes a process to combine current regulations with classification society guidance as an effective means of developing appropriate design, construction, and operational requirements for offshore LNG terminals. Such a process may be helpful to US regulators in expediting the regulatory approval process for offshore LNG terminals currently being developed. Finally, this paper assists developers of offshore LNG terminals in understanding the complex US regulatory process and developing effective strategies to expedite critical regulatory approvals. The US Regulatory Scheme for LNG Terminals Prior to the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 by Congress, and its signing by President Bush on November 25, 2002, FERC had jurisdiction over the siting of LNG import terminals under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. FERC asserted that this authority applied to both onshore and offshore LNG terminals.

In response to a 2010 mandate from Congress, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) produced a specifically-designed Risk Assessment for Potentially Polluting Wrecks in U.S. Waters that was then provided to the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG). A total of 87 risk assessments were presented to the USCG for inclusion into Area Contingency Plans required for all coastal, marine and Great Lakes waters in the U.S. under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (33 U.S. Code § 1321) in May 2013. USCG relies on NOAA for expertise in response and contingency planning and as a resource trustee for both natural resources and underwater cultural heritage. The USCG has used the RULET assessments to foster dialogue with both the potentially affected public and responders and to start thinking through general issues associated with shipwrecks that may have historical significance in additional to being potential pollution hazards. Over the past three years, several surveys of opportunity have provided an opportunity for concurrent assessments of historical and cultural significance and site-specific assessment of pollution potential. Several wrecks have been downgraded in terms of their risk, one has been remediated, one patched (FERNSTREAM, USNS MISSION SAN MIGUEL.). Surveillance and monitoring efforts have provided additional insight to specific wrecks and even helped identify wrecks that were excluded from the assessment (COIMBRA, W.E. HUTTON, USS MURPHY). Surveys have moved two wrecks across international boundaries (or rather provided new locations for TB ARGO and MV COAST TRADER.) In-water assessments have lead to unexpected pollution response challenges, such as those associated with the TB ARGO. As salvage and response technologies develop and additional surveys of opportunity take place the new information provides for continued refinement of the contingency plans and protects our environmental and economic resources along the coast. This paper will provide an evaluation and an update as to the overall effectiveness of this assessment effort to date. Activities since 2013 have significantly moved forward the understanding and engagement on the issue by responders, trustees and the public regarding potentially polluting wrecks in U.S. waters and have provided insight to other jurisdictions dealing with similar challenges.

The initial development of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) was conducted through an extensive research, development, and application program initiated by the United States Forest Service in the 1970s and 1980s. Known as FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies), the complex development process produced these two major management systems that are now central to the Department of Homeland Security’s National Incident Management System (NIMS). Despite the prominence of NIMS, very little information is widely available regarding the original research and development of ICS and MACS. This paper explores the extensive product development and consensus process used to create ICS and MACS, plus the implementation process that propagated these landmark systems that continue to expand in prominence for incident management and coordination during emergencies and disasters. Through analysis of historical documents and interviews with professionals centrally involved in FIRESCOPE, this paper chronicles the evolution of ICS and MACS, including a summary of their varied courses following the end of the original 10-year FIRESCOPE Program initiative.

Risk factors for severe outcomes among members of the United States military hospitalized with pneumonia and influenza, 2000–2012

Safety standards applying to the development and operation of Lockheed's subsea production system are discussed. Past and future actions to meet safety standards, and a review of performed operations with the impact of these operations on safety improvements are included. Introduction The Lockheed one-atmosphere subsea completion system, when fully developed, will comprise permanent subsea chambers and mobile service permanent subsea chambers and mobile service systems. The subsea chambers, called wellhead cellars, manifold centers, and pumping stations, will contain wellhead equipment, control systems, machinery and pumps, manifolds, instrumentation, and other equipment essential for the controlled production of oil and gas. Flowlines and control production of oil and gas. Flowlines and control cables will interconnect the subsea chambers to facilitate transport of oil and gas and transmission of control data. The service system transports men and equipment to the subsea chambers using a service capsule with a surface-connected umbilical providing electric power, life support, and other services required for work in the subsea chambers. This work initially consists of installing production and control equipment, pulling in flowlines, and testing pressure and drift, followed by maintenance, repair, pressure and drift, followed by maintenance, repair, and service of subsea chambers, production and control equipment, flowlines, and control cables. Operational hardware includes a wellhead cellar installed in the Gulf of Mexico in the summer of 1972 at a water depth of 375 ft; and a Gulf of Mexico service system based in Houma, La., used for the 1972 well installation and a subsequent routine re-entry in 1973. Several standard wellhead cellars have been engineered:non-TFL cellars (for applications not using pump-down tools),TFL cellars (for pumpdown tool application), andsplit cellars for wet tree installation. The development of the first manifold center is well under way. The manifold center is being landtested and is scheduled for installation in the Gulf of Mexico later this year. To meet the needs of the off shore industry in the North Sea area, a second service system is now being built. It is scheduled to be operational by July 1, 1976. It is the intent of this paper to discuss the safety principles of Lockheed's subsea production system principles of Lockheed's subsea production system and to describe actions already taken and safety features being implemented. Safety Standards There are a considerable number of safety regulations, standards, guidelines, principles, etc., established and controlled by several government agencies and private societies. The U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) private societies. The U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) are examples of regulatory bodies, and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) are typical certifying societies. In addition, insurance companies may have specific safety requirements that must be met before insurance coverage can be obtained at reasonable rates. The design engineer, the project engineer, and the operations superintendent are responsible for compliance with all these regulations, standards, guidelines, and requirements. JPT P. 427

Drawing on the contingency theory of strategic conflict management, this study examines how the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) used Twitter to communicate during Hurricane Harvey. A content analysis was conducted on tweets (N = 273) by using stances along the contingency's continuum, finding that the USCG frequently adopted stances on both sides of the continuum's spectrum throughout the disaster event. The analysis of USCG tweets provides a real‐world case study of how Twitter is used by organizations to strategically communicate with the public during a disaster event. Like many disaster aid organizations, the USCG must balance competing goals of assisting the impacted population, while continuing to secure funding from the U.S. government. The current study contributes to contingency theory of strategic conflict management literature by applying the theory to a disaster, providing tangible evidence that disaster communication research should consider incorporating different stances across the continuum, sometimes simultaneously, that could help guide strategies, ultimately helping the organization and public being affected during a disaster.

The COVID-19 pandemic has stretched limited public health resources beyond measures, particularly at the local level. What started as an interesting report of pneumonia of unknown etiology in late December 2019 in Wuhan, China, bloomed into an international crisis by mid-January 2020. However, it was not until late January, when the first case was reported in the United States, that a new reality took shape for US public health agencies. After all, severe acute respiratory syndrome never made it to this country, and the only 2 cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome here were imported and never spread. Local public health agencies are notoriously short-staffed and underfunded. Therefore, when a crisis looms, personnel from a multitude of areas within the agencies are called upon to help out. Under its innovative and forward-thinking leadership, the St. Louis County Department of Health internally implemented the Incident Command System, a component of the National Incident Management System. While reassignment of individuals to new responsibilities under a new and temporary reporting structure did not always go perfectly, Incident Command System kept its promise to be adaptable to a fast-evolving situation, to clearly outline needed areas of responsibility, and to provide scaffolding that kept the Department of Health functional in chaotic times. It was able to be implemented quickly within hours of the first confirmed COVID-19 case in St. Louis County and enhanced the quality and timeliness of the public health response. This experience is being shared to provide a model of how organizations with limited personnel can use the Incident Command System to reorganize and meet unexpected challenges with increased success.

Introduction:More and more hospitals are using the Hospital Incident Command System (HICS) for organizational management under emergency conditions. HICS is an incident management system based on principles of the Incident Command System (ICS), which assists hospitals and healthcare organizations in improving their emergency management planning, response, and recovery capabilities for unplanned and planned events. This study aims to explore how Chinese hospitals manage their organizations with HICS in Mass Casualty Incidents (MCI).Aim:To explore the feasibility of HICS in Chinese hospitals under MCI.Methods:A combination of literature analysis and empirical research was used in this study. Through case studies and experience summarization, the necessity and feasibility of the incident command system (ICS) and the emergency medical response system (EMRS) was demonstrated in the early stage of MCI. Based on this, a new "1 SECTION-5 GROUPS-10 TEAMS " model was proposed, and its value of practical application was discussed in MCI.Results:Multiple resources must be mobilized In MCI, and it is necessary to establish an ICS and an EMRS as soon as possible in the early stages of MCI. The earlier ICS is set up, the more initiative can be taken. The "1 SECTION-5 GROUPS-10 TEAMS" model proposed in this study has a good effect on the practice of drills and rescues, indicating that this model has a certain promotion effect in the hospital's response to MCI.Discussion:The "1 SECTION-5 GROUPS-10 TEAMS" model has high feasibility and can be further verified in the subsequent rescue practice.

number: 1141175 Chevron Thailand commenced using a form of the Incident Management System (ICS) for response to emergency incidents and conducted ICS training and hosted a large scale oil spill response exercise in 2017 and 2018 to increase Crisis Management Team (CMT), Asset Management Team (AEMT) and On-site Response Team (ORT) competency and team readiness, including maintaining relationships with organizations that provide emergency response support i.e. Thai government agencies, association and contractors. On 23 June 2018, 12 members of a Thai boys soccer team along with their coach became trapped in a cave in northern Thailand when flood waters cut them off from the entrance. Chevron Thailand Management in Bangkok was contacted by the US Embassy Bangkok requesting Chevron Thailand to assist with providing personnel and resources for the rescue operations. Separately, the Thai Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) also called for industry support in the rescue mission. This paper will present details of how Chevron Thailand utilized their preparedness training using ICS in responding to risks within Chevron Thailand's operations to take a leading role in assisting the Royal Thai Governments rescue of the 13 trapped soccer team members. The paper will also show how collaboration with Government officials in Company training and exercise events lead to not only a good working relationship but also better knowledge of the capabilities that Chevron Thailand can bring to the table in responding to any emergency incident.

National Marine Sanctuaries preserve and protect unique national treasures in our coastal environments. They are not immune from threats posed by marine transportation accidents. NOAA has been working with the U.S. Coast Guard and state partners to ensure that emergencies in sanctuaries are met with the most effective and protective response possible. NOAA developed an emergency response exercise called Safe Sanctuaries 2005 (SS2005) to highlight NOAA's ability to deliver data, observations, forecasts, and expertise during emergencies threatening life, commerce, or the environment. SS2005 revolved around an 800-foot cargo vessel carrying 200,000 gallons of fuel grounding near Elbow Reef in the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary. Such grounding would injure coral habitat and historical artifacts and threaten other resources with spilled oil. This scenario provided a setting for integrating people and capabilities across NOAA. The exercise objectives stressed NOAA's internal and external communications, procedures for deploying technical capabilities during emergencies, and the health and safety of NOAA response personnel. The exercise included a tabletop component in March 2005 and field operations in April 2005. The April field operations demonstrated observation, information processing, modeling and forecast capabilities from across NOAA. Real-time metrological and oceanographic observation capabilities were deployed at the grounding site and integrated with weather and pollution forecasts. A navigation response team surveyed the area in support of salvage operations, providing immediate navigation chart updates. NOAA also joined forces with the State of Florida to survey environmental impacts from the grounding and oil. The information from all of these activities was integrated by a NOAA scientific team supporting a unified command comprised of U.S. Coast Guard, State of Florida, and the private sector. A significant component of the exercise focused on providing training in emergency response management, including the use of the Sanctuaries Hazardous Incident Emergency Logistics Database System (SHIELDS) and the Incident Command System. Training included field staff from multiple agencies, providing an opportunity to build the personal relationships necessary for effective emergency response. A post exercise debriefing helped identify gaps in operational capabilities, areas requiring further research, and training that could enhance future operations. The training, tabletop, and field exercises provided an opportunity to both demonstrate NOAA's operational capabilities and to analyze future requirements.