A Neurocomputational Perspective

Notes on Contributors

Literally speaking, "Philosophy of biology" is a rather old expression. William Whewell coined it in 1840, at the very time he introduced the expression "philosophy of science". Whewell was fond of creating neologisms, like Auguste Comte, his French counterpart in the field of the philosophical reflection about science. Historians of science know that a few years earlier, in 1834, Whewell had generated a small scandal when he proposed the word "scientist" as a general term by which "the students of the knowledge of the material world" could describe themselves, and distinguish themselves from artists. The term "philosopher", Whewell argued, was too wide. A new generic term, more or less equivalent to the French term "savant", was needed in order to prevent the disintegration of science that seemed to flow from its specialization in modern times.1 When Whewell first introduced the terms "philosophy of science" and "philosophy of biology" in his 1840 Philosophy of the inductive sciences, the latter term was merely a special branch of "philosophy of science". The expression "philosophy of science" itself had two justifications: firstly, this phrase expressed the idea that "science" remained cognitively coherent enough to justify a critical enquiry into its methodological unity and its foundation; secondly, the phrase "philosophy of science" was required in order to distinguish a properly "philosophical" enquiry from a "historical" approach to science. Although Whewell's 1840 Philosophy of the inductive sciences 2 had approximately the same chapter structure as his 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences 3 (that is, a series of chapters successively devoted to the concept of science in general, and although there was considerable overlap between the contents of the two books, then to particular sciences), its theoretical purpose was different. Clearly, Whewell was not willing to confuse the genres of history and philosophy as Auguste Comte had done in his 1830 Cours de philosophie positive.4 Note also that the word "biology" was still extremely rare in English when Whewell used it in 1840. In fact, Whewell's 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences does not make use of the word "biology": Whewell successively examines "botany", "zoology", "physiology" and "comparative antomy" as special branches of "analytico-classificatory science", then discusses palaeontology as a special case of the "palaeo-etiological sciences". Three years later, in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell does use "biology" as a generic term for all the sciences dealing with life. The various sciences which were separately examined in the previous book are now collectively considered. Furthermore, the main philosophical problem raised by biology is its dual nature: biology is both nomological and a historical science. Modern philosophers of biology are generally unaware of the story of the origins of the expression "philosophy of biology", but Whewell's dual theoretical nature of biology is still a major concern for modern "philosophy of biology".

Notes on Contributors

The conceptual dichotomy of Erklaren and Verstehen (explaining vs. understanding) has a revealing dual status. On the one hand, it has something of an antiquated air to it, as we loosely associate its origins with the work of Wilhelm Dilthey and other nineteenth-century German philosophers who are not widely read any more, at least not within contemporary Anglo-American history and philosophy of the human sciences. At the same time, however, remnants of the dichotomy still come up in various guises and in various areas of contemporary philosophy and philosophy of science. One example is the long-standing debate over the logical status of action explanations (“reasons vs. causes”) in philosophy of mind (Davidson 1980), and associated issues of “teleological explanations” and the explanatory status of laws of nature in the philosophy of the human sciences (Dray 1957; Hempel 1965; von Wright 1971). Another is the question of whether the subject matter of the social sciences requires a special type of interpretative, hermeneutic, or perhaps even empathetic, “access” (Collingwood 1946; Winch 1964; Taylor [1971] 1985). More recently, there has been renewed interest in the question of how to explicate our capacity to interpret another person’s actions (see the recent suggestion that the “theory-theory” vs. “simulation theory” distinction is similar to some aspects of the Erklaren/Verstehen distinction) (Kogler and Stueber 2000). And within mainstream analytical philosophy of the social sciences, one of the central topics has long been the question of whether social facts/events can be reduced to the explanations of the actions of individuals (e.g., Kincaid 1997), raising questions about the units at which explanatory and/or interpretive efforts ought to be directed. (“individualism” vs. “holism”). This question can be traced back to early twentieth-century debates in economics and other emerging social sciences (Udehn 2001).

Mary Kate McGowanAssistant Professor of Philosophy at Wellesley College. She works in metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of science. Forthcoming articles include ‘Gruesome Connections’ in Philosophical Quarterly and ‘Privileging Properties’ in Philosophical Studies.Anthony SkillenRecently retired as lecturer in the Philosophy Department of the University of Kent at Canterbury.Charles D. TarltonProfessor of Political Science at the University of Albany. In recent years he has written on Locke, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. He is currently engaged in an analysis of the structural ambiguities of Rousseau's Discours sur l'origine et les fondaments de l'inegalité parmi les hommes.Stephen J. BoulterSenior Lecturer in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University. His research areas include the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science and medieval philosophy.Gabriele De AnnaA tutor in the Philosophy Department at St Andrews and research fellow at the University of Padua, Italy. He has published papers in American, British and Italian journals and is the author of the forthcoming book, Realismo Metafisico e Rappresentazione Mentale (Padua: Il Poligrafo).Roy SorensenRoy Sorensen seeks Fame and Fortune as a Dartmouth College philosophy professor. He is the author of Blindspots, Thought Experiments and Pseudo-Problems, and most recently Vagueness and Contradiction.David BeiseckerAssistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He has published articles in the philosophy of mind and language, with an eye towards writing a book on the metaphysics of mind and meaning.

One of the most prominent developments in 20(superscript th) century western philosophy was the outburst of analytical philosophy. Not only can we find its influence within the fields of linguistic analysis, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of the mind, we can also see its impact in the study of political philosophy. Quentin Skinner stands out as one of the most important theorists. Besides making clear the implication of speech-act theory in Skinner's methodology, the purpose of this article is to respond to a common critique of Skinner: namely that Skinner seems to overemphasize the importance of the author's intention to restore the meaning of texts, since this accentuation of intention leads to a seemingly unacceptable conclusion that the literal meaning of the texts itself is non-essential. The author of this article, however, tries to argue that this critique is based on a misunderstanding of Skinner's idea. Since, for Skinner, meaning is a cluster concept which contains several levels of significance, it would be far from enough to merely focus on the literal meaning of any text. To fully understand a work, it is necessarily to take into account the author's intention.

Volume I: 1. Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before by Martin Davies and Stein Helgeby.- 2. John Anderson Arrives: 1930s by Mark Weblin.- 3. The Influence of Wittgenstein: 1940s by Graeme Marshall.- 4. Reconstruction and Enthusiasm by Brian F. Scarlett.- 5. Political Polarisation: 1960s by John Burnheim and Paul Crittenden.- 6. Turbulent Times: 1970s by Aubrey Townsend.- 7. Achievements of the 1980s by Lynda Burns.- 8. The Canberra Plan and the Diversification of Australasian Philosophy: 1990s by John Quilter.- 9. Philosophers in Schools: 2000s by Graham Oppy. Volume II: 10. From Conventionalism to Scientific Metaphysics by Brian Ellis.- 11. Metaphysics by John Bigelow.- 12. Epistemology by Stephen Hetherington.- 13. Philosophy of Language by Frederick Kroon with Appendix: The University of Melbourne, Philosophy of Language, and the Oxford Connection by Denis Robinson.- 14. Philosophy of Religion in Australasia: Philosophy of Religion in Australia by Peter Forrest and Philosophy of Religion in New Zealand by John Bishop & Ken Perszyk.- 15. Aesthetics and Philosophy of Music in Australasia: Aesthetics in Australasia: 1945-2005 by Ismay Barwell and Philosophy of Music in Australasia by Justine Kingsbury.- 16. Moral Philosophy in Australasia by Justin Oakley.- 17. Environmental Philosophy by Freya Matthews.- 18. Feminist Philosophy by Catriona Mackenzie.- 19. Black Swan: A History of Continental Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand by Robert Sinnerbrink & Matheson Russell.- 20. Logic by Ross Brady & Chris Mortensen.- 21. History and Philosophy of Science by Brian Ellis, Rod Home, David Oldroyd, Robert Nola, Howard Sankey, Keith Hutchison, Neil Thomason, John Wilkins, John Forge, Philip Catton & Ruth Barton.- 22. Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science since 1980 by Elizabeth Schier & John Sutton.

In this chapter we survey Australasian philosophy of mind and cognition since 1980. In some of the fields we address, the boundaries between philosophy and related disciplines blur, with scientists participating actively in philosophical debates and philosophers in turn working in independent research groups in automated reasoning, Artificial Intelligence, cognitive science or cognitive neuropsychiatry. We seek to cite a large enough array of primary sources by Australasian philosophers to give readers significant initial guidance in each area. First we look in some detail at the mainstream debates about consciousness and physicalism which arose directly out of the earlier history of Australian materialism. We then work through the driving theories in cognitive science from its outset, through classical and connectionist versions of the computational theory of mind, and on to ideas about dynamical and extended cognition. Finally, and more briefly, we address a number of key issues or special topics with tight links to that history of foundational theories in cognitive science, looking at folk psychology and theory of mind, delusions and philosophy of psychiatry, and then discrete topics such as emotion, perception and memory.

Notes on Contributors

It has been a recurring theme in the philosophy of mind that folk psychology is autonomous. This paper has three goals. First, it aims to clarify what the term 'folk psychology' could mean in different contexts. Four widespread senses of the term are distinguished and the one eligible for autonomy is picked out. Secondly, a classic argument for autonomy is introduced and motivated. This is the argument from the normativity of folk psychology, based on its constitutive rationality. According to this argument, mentalistic concepts are to be understood as components of prescriptions for a rational course of action, rather than descriptions. Thirdly, limits of the argument from normativity are demonstrated. At best, the argument applies to merely a small segment of explanations in terms of mentalistic vocabulary, as the latter is meant to convey much more than simply normative content about the rational profile of an agent.

Postdoctoral Researcher, Finnish Centre of Excellence in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Department of Politics and Economic Studies, Helsinki University, Helsinki, Finland Research and Teaching Associate, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK Socrates Professor in Philosophy and Technology and the Humanist Tradition, Technical University Eindhoven, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

Francisco J. Ayala

The purpose of the article is to analyze the concept of contextual emergence as well as its selected applications in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In the first section the author presents the general assumptions of the emergentist model of reality. He stresses that the concept of emergence can be applied to the description of various levels of organization of nature: one of these levels is that of mental-cognitive processes, analyzed within the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In the subsequent sections, he introduces the definitions of contextual emergence and systemic causation and he points to their selected applications to mental-cognitive systems. In the concluding part, he presents the ideas of Gerald Edelman and Michael Gazzaniga on the role of contextual explanations as well as the concepts of emergence in the philosophy of biology and cognitive neuroscience. He also indicates the possibility of incorporating the concept of contextual emergence into active externalism and the extended cognition theory.

In the late middle ages, chemistry was the science and technology closest to philosophy, the material realization of the method of analysis and synthesis. No longer. Contemporary philosophy is concerned with many sciences—physics, psychology, biology, linguistics, economics—but chemistry is not among them. Why not? Every discipline has particular problems with some philosophical coloring. Those in quantum theory are famous; those in psychology seem endless; those in biology and economics seem more sparse and esoteric. If, for whatever reason, one’s concern is the conceptual or theoretical problems of a particular science, there is no substitute for that science, and chemistry is just one among others. Certain sciences naturally touch on substantive areas of traditional philosophical concern: quantum theory on metaphysics, for example, psychology on the philosophy of mind, and economics and statistics on theories of rationality. In these cases, there is a special interest in particular sciences because they may reform prior philosophical theories or recast philosophical issues or, conversely, because philosophy may inform these subjects in fundamental ways. That is not true, in any obvious way, of chemistry. So what good, then, what special value, does chemistry offer contemporary philosophy of science? Typically philosophical problems, even problems in philosophy of science, are not confined to a particular science. For general problems—problems about representation, inference, discovery, explanation, realism, intertheoretic and interdisciplinary relations, and so on—what is needed are scientific illustrations that go to the heart of the matter without requiring specialized technical knowledge of the reader. The science needed for most philosophy is familiar, not esoteric, right in the middle of things, mature and diverse enough to illustrate a variety of fundamental issues. Almost uniquely, chemistry fits the description. In philosophy of science, too often an effort gains in weight and seriousness merely because it requires mastery of an intricate and arcane subject, regardless of the philosophical interest of what it says. Yet, surely, there is something contrived, even phony, in illustrating a philosophical point with a discussion of the top quark if the point could be shown as well with a discussion of the ideal gas law.

The year 2012, in one sense, marks the 40th Anniversary of our Society, for it was in 1972 that John Lachs suggested to some of his colleagues interested in American Philosophy that they consider starting a new organization. The following year, this “American Philosophy” group held a symposium on “Possibilities for American Philosophy” at the Western Philosophy Association meeting. At that time the group’s name was changed to “Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy,” and in 1974 the first independent annual meeting of the Society was held at Vanderbilt University.1 The Society’s name has stimulated contention for various reasons, but reflecting on forty years of this group, I want to say “we have come a long way.” Philosophy has advanced because of the work of this group and others whose philosophical vision is compatible with our vision. And what is that vision? In my view, it at least involves three types of action and reflection: (1) “respecting, exploring, and ‘mining’ the past” for its own value as well as to ground and stimulate creative thought about both philosophical and contemporary world problems; (2) “acting in the present” by questioning the status quo, clarifying issues of human life so that more effective solutions to personal and social problems would be found and, as philosophers, becoming “public” and “engaged”; and (3) enriching the future of philosophical and human reflection in at least the following four ways. First, we are using and should continue to use the resources of our tradition to enrich the exploration of contemporary philosophical issues whether in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, aesthetics, ethics, social and political philosophy, or philosophy of religion. Second, in contention against the continuing segmentation of philosophy into splinter interest groups, we are and