A portable fuel analyzer

BackgroundRecently, numerous studies have revealed an increase in complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) use in US civilian populations. In contrast, few studies have examined CAM use within military populations, which have ready access to conventional medicine. Currently, the prevalence and impact of CAM use in US military populations remains unknown.MethodsTo investigate CAM use in US Navy and Marine Corps personnel, the authors surveyed a stratified random sample of 5,000 active duty and Reserve/National Guard members between December 2000 and July 2002. Chi-square tests and multivariable logistic regression were used to assess univariate associations and adjusted odds of CAM use in this population.Results and discussionOf 3,683 service members contacted, 1,446 (39.3%) returned a questionnaire and 1,305 gave complete demographic and survey data suitable for study. Among respondents, more than 37% reported using at least one CAM therapy during the past year. Herbal therapies were among the most commonly reported (15.9%). Most respondents (69.8%) reported their health as being very good or excellent. Modeling revealed that CAM use was most common among personnel who were women, white, and officers. Higher levels of recent physical pain and lower levels of satisfaction with conventional medical care were significantly associated with increased odds of reporting CAM use.ConclusionThese data suggest that CAM use is prevalent in the US military and consistent with patterns in other US civilian populations. Because there is much to be learned about CAM use along with allopathic therapy, US military medical professionals should record CAM therapies when collecting medical history data.

The US Navy, including the US Marine Corps and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP), has a robust radiological protection and monitoring program meeting (and typically exceeding, in the name of conservatism) federal law requirements. The program covers the variety of ways in which the Navy produces and uses ionizing radiation and radioactive sources: in medicine, nuclear ship propulsion and repair, industrial and aircraft radiography, and myriad other unique uses in carrying out its vital mission. In executing these programs, thousands of people across the world are employed as active-duty Sailors and Marines, government civilians, and government contractors. These workers include physicians, reactor operators, radiation safety officers, and nuclear repair workers, to name but a few. The health protection standards for these workers are promulgated in the publicly available Navy Medicine P-5055 Radiation Health Protection Manual (NAVMED P-5055), published February 2011 with Change 2 published December 2022, and are applicable to Navy and Marine Corps and NNPP radiation protection programs. The NAVMED P-5055 outlines the individual medical requirements for those qualified and able to receive exposure to ionizing radiation as part of their duties and requires that "Radiation workers receive focused medical examinations to establish whether or not cancer is present which would medically disqualify a person from receiving occupational radiation exposure." Additionally, without scientific or medical basis, the NAVMED P-5055 requires disqualifying those employees who have a history of cancer, cancer therapy, radiation therapy including radiopharmaceuticals received for therapeutic purposes, or bone marrow suppression from drawing dosimetry, entering radiation areas, or handling radioactive material. This policy, which exists regardless of lifetime occupational radiation dose or projected future radiation dose, applies to all cancers except adequately treated basal cell carcinoma. The policy is not supported by relevant scientific and medical literature; does not align with reasonable professional ethical standards; does not conform to US Navy radiological training, which stipulates the assumed increased risk of developing cancer from Navy and Marine Corps and NNPP occupational radiation exposure is small; and removes critical leadership and mentoring capability from the workforce unnecessarily. This article discusses in detail (1) this policy and its ramifications to the Navy and Marine Corps and NNPP workforce and (2) recommendations, benefits, and impacts for the Navy and Marine Corps and NNPP to remove this policy and still maintain a robust radiation protection program.

Neuromusculoskeletal injuries (NMSKI) are very common in the military, which contribute to short- and long-term disability. Population-level NMSKI, limited duty (LIMDU), and long-term disability episode counts in the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) from December 2016 to August 2021 were extracted from the Musculoskeletal Naval Epidemiological Surveillance Tool. The incidence of NMSKI, LIMDU, and long-term disability was calculated. A hurdle negative binomial regression evaluated the association of body region, sex, age, rank, age by rank, and service branch on NMSKI, LIMDU, and long-term disability incidence. From December 2016 to August 2021, there were 2,004,196 NMSKI episodes (USN: 3,285/1,000 Sailors; USMC: 4,418/1,000 Marines), 16,791 LIMDU episodes (USN: 32/1,000 Sailors; USMC: 29/1,000 Marines), and 2,783 long-term disability episodes (USN: 5/1,000 Sailors; USMC: 5/1,000 Marines). There was a large-magnitude protective effect on NMSKI during the pandemic (relative risk, USN: 0.70; USMC: 0.75). Low back and ankle-foot were the most common, primarily affecting female personnel, aged 25-44 years, senior enlisted, in the USMC. Shoulder, arm, pelvis-hip, and knee conditions had the greatest rates of disability, with female sex, enlisted ranks, aged 18-24 years, and service in the USMC having the most salient risk factors. Body region, sex, age, rank, and branch were the salient factors for NMSKI. The significant protective effect during the pandemic was likely a function of reduced physical exposure and limited access to nonurgent care. Geographically accessible specialized care, aligned with communities with the greatest risk, is needed for timely NMSKI prevention, assessment, and treatment.

Modern US Marine Corps (USMC) combat tactics are dynamic and nonlinear. While effective strategically, this can prolong the time it takes to transport the wounded to surgical capability, potentially worsening outcomes. To offset this, the USMC developed the Forward Resuscitative Surgical System (FRSS). By operating in close proximity to active combat units, these small, rapidly mobile trauma surgical teams can decrease the interval between wounding and arrival at surgical intervention with resultant improvement in outcomes. Case series. Echelon 2 surgical units during the invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Ninety combat casualties, consisting of 30 USMC and 60 Iraqi patients, were treated in the FRSS between March 21 and April 22, 2003. Tactical surgical intervention consisting of selectively applied damage control or definitive trauma surgical procedures. Time to surgical intervention and outcome following treatment in the FRSS. Ninety combat casualties with 170 injuries required 149 procedures by 6 FRSS teams. The USMC patients were received within a median of 1 hour of wounding with the critically injured being received within a median of 30 minutes. Fifty-three USMC personnel were killed in action and 3 died of wounds for a killed in action rate of 13.5% and a died of wounds rate of 0.8% during the invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. All Marines treated in the FRSS survived. The use of the FRSS in close proximity to the point of engagement during the initial, dynamic combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom prevented delays in surgical intervention of USMC combat casualties with resultant beneficial effects on patient outcomes.

In the United States, a great deal of time and money has been spent on studying the lessons of the Falklands campaign. In the eternal dialectic between the attack and the defense, the Theodosian walls surrounding Constantinople remain unique in their span of supremacy. Senior US Navy officials insist that the campaign has proved the need to build big carrier battle groups. The Royal Navy, as skilled, sophisticated and experienced as the US Navy, was for weeks unable to destroy a single German-built Argentine conventional submarine which was stalking the British task force. The US Navy should, in addition, concern itself more with the state of the US merchant fleet. The Falklands again confirmed the need for heavy naval gunfire support of ground troops; this has been neglected over the years in the United States, and has been of great concern to the US Marine Corps.

The Bush administration has announced its decision to increase the end-strength of the US Army and US Marine Corps by 92,000 troops over the next five years. That number would include and make permanent the previously authorised temporary increases of 30,000 and 5,000 personnel respectively, and would add another 35,000 soldiers to the active army and 22,000 to the active marine corps. Adding 7,000 and 5,000 soldiers to their ranks in each of the next five years, the two services would reach totals of 547,000 and 202,000, respectively, by 2012. However, it is a matter for debate whether the army, in particular, can reach the given end-strength figure, and, if it can, what cost this will incur both in terms of achieving the target and then paying for a larger force.

Arthropod transmitted diseases can have a significant impact on Military readiness. To limit exposure to disease carrying arthropods, the US Military uses the Department of Defense (DoD) Insect Repellent System, which calls for proper wear of a treated uniform, using topical repellent on exposed skin, taking prophylaxis, and sleeping under a bed-net. Both the US Army and Marine Corps use insect repellent treated uniforms. These treatments do provide an initial level of protection to the Warfighter but degrades with laundering and wear. With the rising threat of vector-borne diseases, there is a need to enhance protection to Warfighter through improved uniforms.

In recent years, commemorative naming has been discussed and called into question in the U.S. military, and with the establishment of the Confederate Naming Commission by Congress in 2021, representatives for branches of the US military and Department of Defense were tasked with evaluating commemorative practices associated with valorizing Confederate history. In this paper, we focus specifically on place naming patterns on US Marine Corps bases through an engagement with military archives. These archives are part of a hegemonic control of memory that sits uncomfortably at the intersection of the racialized history of the Armed Forces and its growing reliance on a multi-cultural America. We argue and find early evidence that the archives constitute contested terrain and the commemorative audits conducted by military institutions are a potentially fraught practice given possible self-interest and potential lack of a critical perspective on the past and place. We encountered many of the difficulties that complicate name reform and the commemorative audits, such as negotiated access to the physical archives and data, inconsistent practices and documentation which contributed to an incomplete audit, and conflicts with institutional interest. Even with the Confederate Naming Commission’s recent reports and recommendations for renaming some military bases and structures, there remains a demand for greater attention to the audits of commemorative place names utilized to make such recommendations. This demand necessitates a recognition that the legacy of racism and racial violence goes far beyond the years of the Confederacy, particularly regarding the landscapes of the United States military.

<div class="htmlview paragraph">Corrosion inspection of vehicles can provide useful information in evaluating material performance, optimizing future systems and predicting maintenance needs of fielded systems. However, most data is taken on field notes or inspection forms and transcribed into computer databases for analysis. This method allows for errors in data entry and omission (e.g., not completing vital information). In support of the US Marine Corps and US Navy we have developed field portable, computer-based data collection systems. These systems allow the users to easily record corrosion information, automate the data upload procedures and allow users to instantly access and evaluate information. This paper will discuss the work we've performed in brief and provide examples of programs and desktop applications that have been developed.</div>

Charged with monitoring the huge civilian press corps that descended on Hue during the Vietnam War's Tet offensive, US Army Captain George W. Smith witnessed firsthand a vicious twenty-five day battle. Smith recounts in harrowing detail the separate, poorly coordinated wars that were fought in the retaking of the Hue. Notably, he documents the little-known contributions of the South Vietnamese forces, who prevented the Citadel portion of the city from being overrun, and who then assisted the US Marine Corps in evicting the North Vietnamese Army. He also tells of the social and political upheaval in the city, reporting the execution of nearly 3,000 civilians by the NVA and the Vietcong. The tenacity of the NVA forces in Hue earned the respect of the troops on the field and triggered a sequence of attitudinal changes in the United States. It was those changes, Smith suggests, that eventually led to the US abandonment of the war

<title>ABSTRACT</title> <p>The advent of both new bidirectional communications capabilities and increasing levels of automation to offload driver workload is requiring the vehicle’s architecture to evolve substantially. Military vehicles of the US Armed Forces are subject to even greater cybersecurity threats. New vehicle hardware includes many sensors, cameras and other systems to capture road, weather and traffic conditions. These systems will be communicating the data both internally and externally from the vehicle. In addition, the vehicles will send and receive data via multiple communications protocols. Each of these communication protocols have unique capabilities and inherent weaknesses with regard to secure communications. With this vehicle evolution, and with the pervasive cyber threats, the vehicle will have to be architected for holistic vehicle cyber situational awareness. The US Army and US Marine Corps need to be fully versed and trained to recognize threats and effectively deal with them. In addition, satellite, cellular and WiFi systems not only communicate to and from the vehicle, but to the equipment installed for specific military purposes, as well as to the warfighter’s nomadic, or carried-in devices such cellphones, tablets, laptops and others.</p>

We offer a theoretical framework to advance our understanding of the psychology of transgender service members—the most understudied and mysterious class of US military personnel. Using grounded theory methods with interview data collected from clandestinely-serving active-duty, guard and reserve military members from the US Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps who self-identified as transgender or transsexual, we reveal a latent structure of Self Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000). The variance in our data heavily centers around the concepts of autonomy, competence and relatedness, illustrating how post-DADT military personnel policy, which excludes open transgender service, impacts the mental well-being of transgender service members.

This article considers logistics and supply in the China Relief Expedition. In the China campaign, as in all armed conflicts, the availability of matériel and subsistence determined what military options were available to commanders. In 1900, because of a strong industrial base and a burgeoning logistical network, the US Army, Marine Corps, and Navy demonstrated an increased capacity and capability to project power on hemispheric scales. Throughout the entirety of their intervention in China, Americans moved animals, artillery, medical supplies, men, ordnance, and subsistence across great distances – over sea and land, to and within the theatre of operations – with remarkable efficiency under difficult conditions. Thus, the China Relief Expedition was instructive for the US profession of arms, and pointed to a future in which large-scale combat operations on land and at sea would require careful integration and more extensive logistical support than military operations of nineteenth-century conflicts.

Every day except for Sundays, holidays and typhoon days hundreds of huge dump trucks enter the US Marine Corps' Camp Schwab at Henoko, in northern Okinawa, carrying landfill – dirt, sand, stones – and dump it into the sea offshore from the base. Eventually, they hope, they will be able to dump enough to support an airstrip on top of the pile, and transform Schwab from a camp into a superbase. Every day except for Sundays, holidays and typhoon days, Okinawans and their supporters from Japan and abroad carry out a sit-in at the gate aimed at preventing, or at least slowing, the entry of these trucks. This sit-in has continued now for more than 1700 days – possibly qualifying for the Guinness Book, if anyone would take the trouble to make the application. Okinawans have any number of reasons for opposing this new base: the fact that the land reclamation will probably kill one of the world's last undamaged coral gardens in the adjacent Oura Bay; the fact that US bases have always brought with them crimes, accidents and pollution; the fact that mainland Japan's refusing to accept this base but forcing it on tiny Okinawa is a straw-that-breaks-the-camel's-back act of discrimination. And there is the fact that this and all the other bases here trample on Okinawa's essentially peace-loving sensibilities.

Much has been written on the government of Japan's determination to provide a new base for the United States Marine Corps at Henoko on Oura Bay in northern Okinawa and to transfer the existing, obsolescent, dangerous and inconvenient Futenma Air Station to it. When the agreement to “return” the Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to Japan was first reached (April 12, 1996), it was to occur “within five to seven years.” As the 20th anniversary of that agreement loomed early in 2016, the Marine Corps' “Marine Aviation Plan 2016” amended the already several times pushed back transfer/reversion date to “fiscal year 2025” (October 2024-September 2025). Admiral Harry Harris, Commander-of US Pacific forces presented that date in evidence to Congress early in 2016. But even as that 2025 date was being reluctantly accepted in Washington, at the beginning of March 2016, Japan despatched its top security official, Yachi Shotaro, to Washington to seek the Obama government's understanding (and presumably also its permission) for a further substantial delay. Once the US consented, the Abe government came to an “out-of-court” March 4 agreement (discussed in this paper and in the following opinion essays by Okinawans) with Okinawa Prefecture, that involved a complete and indefinite suspension of site works at Henoko. Lt. General Robert Neller, commander of the US Marine Corps, told a Senate military affairs committee meeting that that suspension could be expected to last a further 12-months. President Obama, advised of the impending delay, merely responded with “So there will be nothing happening for a while then.”