Abductive Reasoning in Intuitionistic Propositional Logic via Theorem Synthesis

Intuitionistic logic encompasses the principles of reasoning which were used by L. Brouwer in developing his intuitionistic mathematics, beginning in [Bro07]. Intuitionistic logic can be succinctly described as classical logic without the law ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ of excluded middle. Brouwer observed that this law was abstracted from finite situations and its application to statements about infinite collections is not justified. One of the consequences of the rejection of the law of excluded middle is that every intuitionistic proof of an existential sentence can be effectively transformed into an intuitionistic proof of an instance of that sentence. More precisely, if a formula of the form ∃xϕ(x) without free variables is provable in the intuitionistic predicate logic, then there is a term t without free variables such that ϕ(t) is provable. In particular, if ϕ ∨ ψ is provable, then either ϕ or ψ is provable. In that sense intuitionistic logic may provide a logical basis for constructive reasoning. A formal system of intuitionistic logic was proposed in [Hey30]. A relationship between the classical propositional logic PC and intuitionistic propositional logic INT was proved by Glivenko in [Gli29], namely a PC-formula ϕ is PC-provable if and only if ¬ ¬ϕ is INT-provable. Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic was developed in [Kri65].

This article aims to generate all theorems of a given size in the implicational fragment of propositional intuitionistic linear logic. It was presented at the 36th International Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP).

Intermediate logics are logics stronger than intuitionistic logic I but weaker than classical logic C. Most of them are motivated by their semantical characterization. In this chapter we see how the goal-directed approach can be extended to this area by analysing two case-studies. We have seen in the previous chapter that intuitionistic logic is complete with respect to the class of finite Kripke models. One can refine the completeness theorem and show that intuitionistic logic is complete with respect to Kripke models whose possible-worlds structure form a finite tree. Given a Kripke model M = (W, ≤, w 0, V), we can concentrate on the structure (W, ≤, w 0), which is a finite tree, and forget about the evaluation function V for atoms. We write λ(E) for the set of labels occurring in E. Changing the terminology a bit, we will speak about models based on a given finite tree (W, ≤, w 0), since varying V we will have several models based on it. The completeness result can then be re-phrased to assert that intuitionistic logic is complete with respect to the class of finite trees, that is to say, with respect to Kripke models based on finite trees. This change of terminology matters as we are naturally lead to consider subclasses of finite trees and ask what axioms we can add to obtain a characterization of valid formulas in these subclasses. For instance here are two natural subclasses: (1) for any n, the class of finite trees of height ≤ n; a finite tree T = (W, ≤, w 0) is in this class if there are not n + 1 different elements w 0, w 1, ... , w n , such that $${w_o} \leqslant {w_1} \leqslant ... \leqslant {w_n}hold.$$ This means that all chains are of length ≤ n. Valid formulas in these subclasses are axiomatized by the axioms BH n of the next section. (2) for any n, the class of finite trees of width ≤ n; a finite tree T = (W, ≤, w 0) is in this class if there are not n different elements which are pairwise incomparable. Valid formulas in these subclasses are axiomatized by taking the axiom schema $$V_{i = 1}^n({A_i} \to {V_{i \ne j}}{A_j})$$ for finite width trees of width ≤ n. Notice that for n = 2, we have the axiom $$({A_1} \to {A_2}) \vee ({A_2} \to {A_1})$$ which gives the well known logic LC introduced independently by Dummett [1959] and Gödel [1932] that we have already mentioned in the previous chapter. This axiom corresponds to the property of linearity: the models are finite ordered sequence of worlds (i.e. there are not two incomparable points). KeywordsInduction HypothesisClassical LogicProof SystemIntuitionistic LogicKripke ModelThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Chapter 7 - On some extensions and expansions of the basic logics

A semantical proof of Craig's interpolation theorem for the intuitionistic predicate logic and some intermediate prepositional logics will be given. Our proof is an extension of Henkin's method developed in [4]. It will clarify the relation between the interpolation theorem and Robinson's consistency theorem for these logics and will enable us to give a uniform way of proving the interpolation theorem for them.

The purpose of the research presented in this paper is to extend the author's results on sequent forms of Herbrand theorems for classical and intuitionistic logics onto classical and intuitionistic modal sequent logics. It was found that the technique reported at the SYNASC 2008 symposium and based on the original notions of admissibility and compatibility can satisfactorily be applied for proving Herbrand theorems for the logics under consideration in the sequent form.

We consider a general format for sequent rules for not necessarily normal modal logics based on classical or intuitionistic propositional logic and provide relatively simple local conditions ensuring cut elimination for such rule sets. The rule format encompasses e.g. rules for the boolean connectives and transitive modal logics such as S4 or its constructive version. We also adapt the method of constructing suitable rule sets by saturation to the intuitionistic setting and provide a criterium for translating axioms for intuitionistic modal logics into sequent rules. Examples include constructive modal logics and conditional logic $\mathbb{VA}$ .

Prawitz suggested expanding a natural deduction system for intuitionistic logic to include rules for classical logic constructors, allowing both intuitionistic and classical elements to coexist without losing their inherent characteristics. Looking at the added rules from the point of view of the Gödel-Gentzen translation, led us to propose a general method for the coexistent combination of two logics when a conservative translation exists from one logic (the source) to another (the host). Then we prove that the combined logic is a conservative extension of the original logics, thereby preserving the unique characteristics of each component logic. In this way there is no collapse of one logic into the other in the combination. We also demonstrate that a Gentzen calculus for the combined logic can be induced from a Gentzen calculus for the host logic by considering the translation. This approach applies to semantics as well. We then establish a general sufficient condition for ensuring that the combined logic is both sound and complete. We apply these principles by combining classical and intuitionistic logics capitalizing on the Gödel-Gentzen conservative translation, intuitionistic and S4 modal logics relying on the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski conservative translation, and classical and Jaśkowski’s paraconsistent logics taking into account the existence of a conservative translation.

Intuitionistic logic has developed as a result of certain philosophical views on the foundation of mathematics, known as intuitionism. Intuitionism was originated by L. E. J. Brouwer in 1908. The first Hilbert style formalization of the intuitionistic logic, formulated as a proof system, is due to A. Heyting (1930). In this chapter we present a Hilbert style proof system I that is equivalent to the Heyting’s original formalization and discuss the relationship between intuitionistic and classical logic.

I propose a new semantics for intuitionistic logic, which is a cross between the construction-oriented semantics of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov and the condition-oriented semantics of Kripke. The new semantics shows how there might be a common semantical underpinning for intuitionistic and classical logic and how intuitionistic logic might thereby be tied to a realist conception of the relationship between language and the world.

We present some applications of intermediate logics in the field of Answer Set Programming (ASP). A brief, but comprehensive introduction to the answer set semantics, intuitionistic and other intermediate logics is given. Some equivalence notions and their applications are discussed. Some results on intermediate logics are shown, and applied later to prove properties of answer sets. A characterization of answer sets for logic programs with nested expressions is provided in terms of intuitionistic provability, generalizing a recent result given by Pearce. It is known that the answer set semantics for logic programs with nested expressions may select non-minimal models. Minimal models can be very important in some applications, therefore we studied them; in particular we obtain a characterization, in terms of intuitionistic logic, of answer sets which are also minimal models. We show that the logic G3 characterizes the notion of strong equivalence between programs under the semantic induced by these models. Finally we discuss possible applications and consequences of our results. They clearly state interesting links between ASP and intermediate logics, which might bring research in these two areas together.

A Lindström theorem for intuitionistic first-order logic

Full classical S5 in natural deduction with weak normalization

A theorem for embedding a first‐order linear‐time temporal logic LTL into its intuitionistic counterpart ILTL is proved using Baratella‐Masini's temporal extension of the Gödel‐Gentzen negative translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic. A substructural counterpart LLTL of ILTL is introduced, and a theorem for embedding ILTL into LLTL is proved using a temporal extension of the Girard translation of intuitionistic logic into intuitionistic linear logic. These embedding theorems are proved syntactically based on Gentzen‐type sequent calculi.

We present three different functional interpretations of intuitionistic linear logic ILL and show how these correspond to well-known functional interpretations of intuitionistic logic IL via embeddings of IL into ILL. The main difference from previous work of the second author is that in intuitionistic linear logic (as opposed to classical linear logic) the interpretations of !A are simpler and simultaneous quantifiers are no longer needed for the characterisation of the interpretations. We then compare our approach in developing these three proof interpretations with the one of de Paiva around the Dialectica category model of linear logic.