Absolute Zero: Delivering the UK's climate change commitment with incremental changes to today's technologies

Disasters caused by the climate crisis continue around the world. Record-breaking heatwaves and floods continue in Korea, and the scale of damage is gradually increasing. In order to respond to the climate crisis, the world is striving to achieve carbon neutrality, and Korea is one of the target countries. Because carbon neutrality is not just a recommendation, but an obligation to be legalized and followed by domestic law, countries around the world are enacting carbon neutrality laws to respond to the climate crisis. The UK is a country that has legislated greenhouse gas reduction targets to respond to the climate crisis early. In the United Kingdom, the people, private companies, organizations, and the country have come together to deal with disasters caused by the climate crisis and to respond to it, and have proceeded with various policies and legislation to respond to the climate crisis. Afterwards, the Climate Change Committee was established based on the 「Climate Change Act」 to promote policies to respond to the climate crisis. The Climate Change Commission maintains political neutrality and consistently promotes climate policies, gaining a lot of trust from the government and the public as an institution specializing in responding to the climate crisis. Korea also introduced various climate crisis response policies from the UK, one of which is the UK Climate Change Commission. Korea has established the ‘2050 Carbon Neutral Green Growth Committee’ modeled on the UK’s Climate Change Committee to play a role as a central organization in Korea’s climate crisis response policy. However, unlike the United Kingdom, where the Climate Change Committee was established early, there are some points for improvement in Korea because the system for achieving the goal of carbon neutrality was introduced not long ago. Therefore, we would like to analyze the UK's Climate Change Committee and discuss the improvement plans of Korea's 2050 Carbon Neutral Green Growth Committee, which will play a central role in responding to the climate crisis in the future.

Institutional design, decision making and innovation.- Abatement costs vs. compliance costs in multi-period emissions trading - the firms' perspective.- Generous allocation and a ban on banking - implications of a simulation game for EU emissions trading.- Emissions trading and innovation in the German electricity industry - impact of possible design options for an emissions trading scheme on innovation strategies in the German electricity industry.- A dynamic game of technology diffusion under emissions trading: an experiment.- Sustainability entrepreneurship in the context of emissions trading.- Investment and management strategies under emissions trading.- Optimal strategies for emissions trading in a Putty-Clay Vintage Model.- Strategic production management of companies participating in the European greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme.- Decision making in the emissions-market under uncertainty.- The impact of climate policy on heat and power capacity investment decisions.- Implications of the European emissions trading scheme for strategic energy management in small and medium enterprises.- Management and optimization of environmental data within emissions trading markets - VEREGISTER and TEMPI.- Emissions trading with changing future commitments - some initial thoughts.- Emissions trading and business administration.- Emission Trading North - important findings from a business perspective.- Corporate greenhouse gas management in the context of emissions trading regimes.- Accounting for emission rights.- The role of stakeholder driven corporate governance - the example of BP's climate change strategy.- Emissions trading and effects on financial markets.- Effects of emissions trading schemes existing and being implemented.- The EU emissions trading scheme and its competitiveness effects upon European business - results from the CGE model DART.- Implementing the EU emissions trading directive in Spain: a comparative study of corporate concerns and strategies in different industrial sectors.- UK's climate change levy and emissions trading scheme: implications for businesses' productivity and economic efficiency.- The sources of emission reductions: evidence from U.S. SO2 emissions from 1985 through 2002.- Policy-business interaction in emissions trading between multiple regions.- The changing role of the project mechanisms in emissions trading.- Prevailing technologies and locations of CDM projects: the current situation compared with expectations.

Despite the recent proliferation of national climate change advisory bodies, very little is known about what advice they provide, to whom, and when. To address these gaps in the literature, this article systematically analyses all 700 of the recommendations made by the UK Climate Change Committee (CCC) in the period 2009–20. The CCC is one of the oldest climate change advisory bodies of its kind in the world and its design has been widely emulated by other countries. For the first time, this article documents how the CCC’s mitigation and adaptation recommendations have changed over time with respect to their addressee, sectoral focus and policy targets. It reveals that they became: more numerous per year; more cross-sectoral in their nature; clearer in targeting a specific addressee; and more focused in referring to specific policy targets. By drawing on Fischer’s synthesis of policy evaluation to derive a measure of policy ambition, it also reveals that despite many of its recommendations being repeated year after year, the CCC has become more willing to challenge the policy status quo. It concludes by identifying future research needs in this important and fast-moving area of climate governance, notably understanding the conditions in which the recommendations of advisory bodies (do not) impact national policy.

The author explains how the European emissions trading scheme will work and what it means for the UK's climate change policy. Trading of carbon dioxide emissions across Europe, which will involve power generators, iron and steel makers, glass and cement makers, paper manufacturers and a host of others whose combustion plant is rated at 20 MW or above, will begin in 2005, with the possibility that other greenhouse gases, some many times more polluting, will follow close behind. The principle of the scheme, known as and trade, is relatively simple. Each EU country will set an annual limit, or cap, on the number of tonnes of carbon dioxide that can be emitted in any one year, which will be equal to the aggregate of all participants' emissions. This figure will then be broken down progressively, to caps for each sector, and, finally, for each individual site, for example, a power station or factory. The cap will form the site's emissions target for the year. Emissions will be measured, and at the year-end, each site will be required to produce the number of certificates, known as and having a value of one tonne of carbon, that exactly matches its emissions. Though, at least at first, the bulk of the allowances will be issued for free, this allocation will reduce along with the cap. As their supply of free allowances dwindles, plant operators will have to act in order to ensure their allowances match the site's emissions at year's-end. They can do this by physically cutting emissions, through, for example, more efficient operation of the site or switching to a cleaner fuel. Or, if the operator finds it impractical or too costly to make cuts, it can buy allowances to top up to the number required by its emissions from the open market, where the price of carbon is set by supply and demand.

UK's climate change plans incoherent, says scientist

Energy consumption is fundamentally necessary for human well-being. However, although increasing energy consumption provides substantial improvements in well-being for low and intermediate levels of development, incremental increases in consumption fail to provide improvements for “super-developed” countries that exhibit the highest levels of development and energy consumption. The aim of this note is, therefore, to quantitatively explore the global emissions debt and climate change commitment associated with the gap in energy consumption between the energy-saturated super-developed countries and the rest of the world. Adopting Kates’ identity, I calculate that elevating the current populations in the non-super-developed countries to the energy and carbon intensities of the United States is akin to adding the fossil-fuel CO2 emissions of more than 15 United States to the global annual total, implying cumulative emissions of almost 4000 GT CO2 from 2010 through 2050. The inevitability of continued emissions beyond 2050 suggests that the transition of non-super-developed countries to a US-like profile between now and 2050 could, by itself, plausibly result in global warming of 3.2 °C above the late-twentieth century baseline, including an extremely high likelihood that global warming would exceed 1.2 °C. Global warming of this magnitude is likely to cause regional climate change that falls well outside of the baseline variations to which much of the world is presently accustomed, meaning that a US-like energy-development pathway carries substantial climate change commitment for both non-super-developed and super-developed countries, independent of future emissions from the super-developed world. However, the assumption that all countries converge on the minimum energy intensity of the super-developed world and a carbon-free energy system between now and 2050 implies cumulative CO2 emissions of less than 1000 GT CO2 between 2010 and 2050, along with a less than 40 % probability of exceeding 1.2 °C of additional global warming. It is, therefore, possible that intensive efforts to develop and deploy global-scale capacity for low-carbon energy consumption could simultaneously ensure human well-being and substantially limit the associated climate change commitment.

Plant species have responded to recent increases in global temperatures by shifting their geographical ranges poleward and to higher altitudes. Bioclimate models project future range contractions of montane species as suitable climate space shifts uphill. The species–climate relationships underlying such models are calibrated using data at either ‘macro’ scales (coarse resolution, e.g. 50 km × 50 km, and large spatial extent) or ‘local’ scales (fine resolution, e.g. 50 m × 50 m, and small spatial extent), but the two approaches have not been compared. This study projected macro (European) and local models for vascular plants at a mountain range in Scotland, UK, under low (+1.7 °C) and high (+3.3 °C) climate change scenarios for the 2080s. Depending on scenario, the local models projected that seven or eight out of 10 focal montane species would lose all suitable climate space at the site. However, the European models projected such a loss for only one species. The cause of this divergence was investigated by cross‐scale comparisons of estimated temperatures at montane species' warm range edges. The results indicate that European models overestimated species' thermal tolerances because the input coarse resolution climate data were biased against the cold, high‐altitude habitats of montane plants. Although tests at other mountain ranges are required, these results indicate that recent large‐scale modelling studies may have overestimated montane species' ability to cope with increasing temperatures, thereby underestimating the potential impacts of climate change. Furthermore, the results suggest that montane species persistence in microclimatic refugia might not be as widespread as previously speculated.

UK environment and climate change politics

This paper analyses environmental narratives in the legislative stages presented in UK white papers, the Prime Minister's speeches, and the Queen's speeches, all of which were released between 1997 and 2011, during the regimes either of New Labour (1997–2010) or of the currently governing Coalition (2010–). This research acknowledges that the link between risk perception and environmental policy is strong because environmental policy narratives either reflect or influence risk perceptions, or both. The findings of this research demonstrate that the risk of climate change has emerged as a key agenda due to combined risk perceptions on economy and environment. Subsequently, that risk has developed a connection to the risk of energy scarcity and energy facilities. Nuclear power has posed a possible resolution to the energy risk, but at the same time, it has posed another kind of risk too. Under the Coalition government, the risk of natural diversity loss emerged while the risks of climate change and energy continued. The dynamics of the negotiation among different risk perceptions would depend on the power relations among the groups.

Stakeholder groups raise concerns regarding corporate commitment to climate change issues, as climate change is a big global problem. The impact of eco-innovation and climate governance on business climate change commitment is examined in this research. The pressure on manufacturing companies to become more ecologically conscious or "greener" is growing. This study investigates the function of comprehensive quality management and its impact on corporate sustainability, drawing on the resource-based view and sustainable development theory. This research also concentrated on the function of green innovation as a mediator. The intensity of eco-innovation, determined by dividing environmental expenses over revenues, is a score derived from the Eikon database indicating a company's ability to cut environmental costs. We also discover a positive correlation between climate change commitment and governance. We contend that businesses can mitigate climate change risks and possibilities by incorporating climate change problems into governance. According to our empirical research, managers and politicians should encourage the deployment of eco-innovative technology and include climate change issues in governance to increase business commitment to climate change.

We investigate the relationship between climate change commitment and systemic risk using a sample of 211 international banks over the period 2011–2020. We hypothesize that banks that are more committed to climate change, which is measured by a score scale provided by the Carbon Disclosure Project, contribute less to systemic risk. Furthermore, we expect that banks that slip into the lowest score category by not even providing sufficient information on their climate change activity (“worst rating”), and banks that reduce their commitment along the climate change score scale will increase their exposure to systemic risk (“downgrade” effect). The results confirm all our hypotheses. Banks’ commitment to climate change is an important driver of systemic risk, and the level of this commitment also matters. We demonstrate the effectiveness of climate change management in reducing a bank’s contribution to the overall financial crisis and thereby increasing financial stability. Our study confirms the importance of the efforts to combat climate change for the benefit of financial stability.

This paper assesses the importance of a strategic legal framework for action against climate change, using the UK Climate Change Act as an example. Passed in 2008, the Climate Change Act is one of the earliest and most prominent examples of framework legislation on climate change. It contains several innovative features that have since been replicated in other framework laws. We use stakeholder interviews to assess the strengths of the Act and whether it has succeeded in creating an integrated, informed and forward-looking policy process. Respondents felt that the Act had established a firm long-term framework with a clear direction of travel. However, they differed on whether the Act provided sufficient policy certainty and protection against political backsliding. Most respondents felt that the Act had changed the institutional context and the processes through which climate change is addressed. As a result, interviewees believe that the Act has helped UK climate policy to become better informed, more forward looking and better guided by statutory routines. Key policy insights A strong legal framework with statutory targets, processes and institutions can be an important tool for effective climate change governance. A broad-based framework law can make action on climate change more predictable, more structured and more evidence-based. The UK Climate Change Act is a model for such framework legislation, with important institutional features that have already been emulated in other framework laws. The main such features are statutory short-term and long-term emissions targets, a new independent advisory body (the Committee on Climate Change), clear accountability and an iterative approach to adaptation planning.

The concept of anthropogenic climate change is now understood in the discipline of International Relations (IR) as an urgent environmental problem enveloping the globe. It underlies recent claims that humanity’s impact on the Earth’s natural systems is so consequential that a new geologic epoch has begun: The Anthropocene, or the ‘human age’. Yet, IR’s increasing engagement and use of these scientific concepts raises significant questions the discipline has yet to address. For instance, if global climate change appeared in international politics only as recently as the late-1980s, what spurred this sudden emergence? If the Anthropocene appeared only after 2000, then how does this new concept affect the way we now think about global politics, the Earth, and even ourselves? This thesis answers these questions by arguing that the concepts of global climate change and the Anthropocene are neither immutable nor universal scientific truths or natural objects. Rather, they emerged when technological advances in nuclear physics and models tracing bomb radiocarbon intersected with the ways states govern their territories and subjects. The global nature or ‘climatic globality’ of these concepts, therefore, is a manner of conducting and steering human conduct and action by establishing the boundaries of subjectivity when they are thought. This is what Michel Foucault called governmentality. It is demonstrated in this thesis through a genealogical tracing of climate change in IR, focusing on how nuclear sciences, computational modelling technologies, and regimes of international governance, overlapped to form the climatic globality IR now takes for granted. Combining genealogy with the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, a new form of global governmentality becomes evident. Through a technological and metaphysical subjectivism with the carbon atom as its substrate, the human self now asserts itself from atomic to global scales, as the maker, master, and steward, of the Earth.

Editorial and News

Local governments are on the frontline of planning and implementing climate change adaptation (CCA). However, knowledge of the status and determining factors of local level public investment in CCA is limited. This study examined approaches to monitor local government investments in CCA. It attempted to (1) understand the state of public investment in CCA by local governments in the Philippines and (2) examine the determining factors of this investment using local climate change expenditure tagging data from the 2016 Annual Investment Programs of Philippine local government units (LGUs). The data were documented by and obtained from the Climate Change Commission, a policymaking body of the Philippine government. The Philippines has experienced climate-and water-related disasters and is expected to become more vulnerable to climate change. The country has been prompt in institutional and legal responses to climate change. The results show that CCA investment ratios are not related to the fiscal scale of LGUs. No clear link between CCA investments and flood risk was evident. Rather, the study suggests that central-local government relationships, the scope of CCA measures, and political connections affect CCA investment by LGUs.KeywordsClimate change adaptationLocal governmentPhilippinesMonitoring