Abyssal lines in borders, race, and knowledge

In this paper, I want to begin to contemplate the possibility that the concept of culture could one day be thought outside modern Western thought, via a reading of Martin Heidegger's 'Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer'. As we shall see, for Heidegger, the dominant position here is representationalism. And so a large part of what I want to do here is to begin to shake the concept of culture from these dominant representationalist moorings.

Just four days before Germany’s September parliamentary elections, posters urging voters to support “Putin for Chancellor” reportedly started appearing near the Reichstag parliament building in Berlin. An image of one of these posters plastered on the side of a building was published online by the Stockholm-based conservative news site Free West Media. Upon closer examination of the photo, it was clear that it had been doctored, and unclear whether the posters had ever actually existed. Nevertheless, inspired by the incident, Zavtra, the most prominent extreme-right newspaper in Russia, published a fantastical work of short fiction about an underground German movement conspiring to elect Vladimir Putin as Germany’s leader.The editor-in-chief of Zavtra is Russian ultranationalist Alexander Prokhanov, who made his name as a Soviet publisher. After founding another far-right magazine in the 90s, he began collaborating with the younger Alexander Dugin, whom Prokhanov praises as “perhaps the only ideologue in Russia.” For decades, these torchbearers of the Russian extreme right have been prolific writers and publishers, and have dabbled in a mix of ultra-conservative organizations and think tanks. Their newest endeavor, a group called the Izborsky Club, is arguably the first organized and successful ultranationalist think tank in Russia, and has incorporated different far-right factions under a single umbrella.Founded in 2012 and headed by Prokhanov, the Club is a self-described “intellectual circle”—a group of 47 philosophers, criminologists, journalists, businessmen, and even Orthodox bishops dedicated to promoting revanchist notions of Russian superiority on the international stage. (The Club is named after Izborsk, the town where it was conceived.)The members’ stated objective is geopolitical—not only to forge a more “just” world order, but also to promote Russia’s key role in it. They advocate “Eurasianism,” an anti-West political movement championed by Dugin that seeks to expand Russian territory to encompass the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia. The resulting totalitarian, Russia-led Eurasian Empire would confront and eventually overthrow the West, as well as the democratic and liberal values it stands for. Like the Kremlin, the Club is haunted by the perceived threat of a Western sponsored “color revolution”—a term used to describe the wave of mostly non-violent civil uprisings that spread across the former Soviet Union in the early 2000s—emerging in Russia. To avoid this, the izborists believe that Russia must implement Stalin-era industrialization, convert the Eurasian Economic Union into an autarky, and merge the government with the Russian Orthodox Church.In addition to Prokhanov’s Zavtra, Dugin runs and contributes to various multilingual blogs—including Geopolitica.ru and The Fourth Political Theory—and hosts a YouTube channel. Collectively, the Club’s members have written hundreds of texts. Prokhanov alone has published more than 40 books and Dugin’s neofascist Foundations of Geopolitics, released in 1997, remains a textbook at many institutions of higher education in former Soviet countries, offering a Eurasianist take on how to elevate Russia’s status in the post-Soviet world. The izborists regularly make appearances as lecturers at conferences, pundits on talk shows, and participants in televised debates.While the Izborsky Club’s only direct line to the Kremlin is Sergei Glazyev—an adviser to President Putin who has decried the “genocidal” effects of International Monetary Fund and U.S.-driven economic reforms in post-Soviet Russia—other members have previously held government positions and enjoyed close relations with Putin. Bishop Tikhon of the Russian Orthodox Church, a Club member, is referred to as Putin’s personal confessor, and the Russian Minister of Culture, Vladimir Medinsky, was present at the Club’s inauguration.Dugin, the most famous izborist, was formerly an adviser to State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov and to Sergei Naryshkin, a prominent member of the ruling United Russia party. He has also organized his own political parties, one of which was banned in 2007 on charges of extremism. But while Dugin’s access to Putin’s inner circle is often overblown in the Western press, his theories have gained traction over time. He served for five years as chairman of the Sociology of International Relations Department at Russia’s prestigious Moscow State University. Before being dismissed in 2014 after a petition with more than 10,000 signatures claimed he inappropriately politicized his lectures, Dugin managed to establish the Center for Conservative Research to disseminate his teachings. That Center went on to spawn other ultraconservative clubs and institutions, many of which now fall under the auspices of the Izborsky Club.Despite their reach, the izborists by no means enjoy popular support, and their domestic political influence is limited. They also have a bad habit of infuriating potential supporters. In 2015, Prokhanov inflamed religious officials in the southwestern region of Saratov by supplicating before an icon that depicted Stalin surrounded by Russian wartime generals and crowned by four saints and the Virgin Mary and Child. The office of the bishop labeled the action a “frank provocation” and a “gross distortion of religious and patriotic feelings,” calling for church bodies and authorities to be cautious about cooperating with the izborists and Prokhanov personally.That same year, the Club, along with other ultranationalist groups, openly criticized Putin for withdrawing support for the Novorossiya, or “New Russia” project—an imagined confederation of states in southeastern Ukraine, where armed conflict broke out in 2014. In response, the predominantly state-controlled media restricted the ability of the izborists to broadcast their ideas—which, after being conveniently aligned with authorities’ goals at the height of the conflict, were deemed too extreme. The crackdown illustrated how the Kremlin exploits and checks nationalist groups. As Donald Jensen, a former U.S. diplomat to Russia, explained, “the Kremlin tries to control them because they are a potential problem.”In June 2014, a delegation of more than two dozen members of the Izborsky Club gathered at the Livadia Palace in Crimea. The visitors, dressed in pastels and casual beige business attire, surveyed the summer retreat of the Russian tsars, trailing behind Prokhanov. Later, they would stoop to kiss Crimean soil and say a prayer on a Black Sea Fleet battleship. But before that pageantry took place, they wandered amid manicured shrubbery, imported palms, and the occasional World War II-era army tank—a reminder that Crimea was not only an imperial vacation spot, but also the location of the 1945 Yalta Conference, where Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt divvied up the postwar world, and, in the eyes of the izborists, severely hindered Russia’s global ambitions.Framed by the white granite palace, the izborists assembled for a picture, clasping their hands and raising their arms to the sky. They were there to claim victory. Sixty years after Khrushchev haphazardly gifted the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine, it had finally returned to its rightful owner: the Russian Federation.Pulled away from his colleagues, Nikolai Starikov, a writer and the co-chairman of the conservative, pro-Orthodox Great Fatherland Party, greeted reporters from Russian state news. He drew a continuum from the Yalta Conference to just four months earlier, when, in March 2014, a disputed referendum returned the Crimean peninsula to Russia. To the izborists, Starikov told journalists, the annexation was “the starting point of a certain development of events, not only in Russia, but in the world.”The annexation was central to Dugin’s master plan. For Russian Eurasianists, “liberating” southeastern Ukraine is the first step to getting Russia better access to the European continent. Four years before the story in Zavtra, Dugin spoke on Russian state television about conquering Europe and transforming it into a Russian protectorate. “Some countries are behind the U.S., but more and more will listen to Russia,” he said. “A new, large continental alliance is emerging as a confederation of Europe and Eurasia, [from] Lisbon to Vladivostok.”Another step is building international alliances. Pro-Kremlin political currents have existed in Germany since the post-WWI period, when some saw a Russo-German alliance as an antidote to the humiliating economic measures imposed on Germany. Today, Russian ideologues like Prokhanov and Dugin are strengthening ties with Western counterparts, such as German publisher Jürgen Elsässer. Elsässer was once an extreme leftist opposed to German reunification, but now he runs the ultraconservative Compact Magazine, which holds that there has long been a Eurasian alliance between Germany and Russia. An outspoken proponent of Russian aggression in Ukraine, Elsässer condemned the “NATO fascists” and the U.S.-backed “coup government” in Kyiv back in March 2014, and was also vocal in his support for the pro-Russian separatists in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. Like the izborists, he makes frequent media appearances and is a prolific writer.In September, as populist waves rose and broke around the world, Germany’s far-right party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), entered parliament, becoming the first nationalist conservative party to do so in the country for over half a century. While the party never clearly defined its agenda, AfD captured a remarkable 13 percent of the vote, winning nearly 90 seats. Their success may have been buttressed by external support: In the run-up to the election, Kremlin-sponsored propagandistic broadcasts targeted the more than 4 million German citizens of Russian descent, playing to contentious issues—Chancellor Angela Merkel’s economically liberal agenda, her inclusive migration policy, and the subsequent rise of anti-immigrant sentiment.The connections between Elsässer and the Russian extreme right are evident on the glossy front pages of Compact, which the editor, an outspoken supporter of the AfD, publishes as the party’s “member magazine.” He interviewed Dugin in 2013, and Elsässer and his followers get special attention from Russian state media, where he serves as the voice of conservative Germans to Russian audiences. A 2014 issue of the magazine even published several of Putin’s “most important” speeches translated into German. “Putin is demonized by our media and politicians,” Elsässer told the Russian state-sponsored news organization RT (formerly Russia Today) at the Russian House of Science and Culture in Berlin during the issue launch. “We wanted to create pro-Putin arguments . . . so everyone is able to make up their own minds about it.”Ultimately, Izborsky Club members are minority voices that the Kremlin considers among many other nationalist perspectives. But in their dissemination of extremist views through media and public appearances, they move the center further right, creating a permission structure that enables the Kremlin to assimilate their ideas. Even if the Club does not overtly inform the state agenda, “when the Kremlin finds it convenient” to borrow elements of their ideology—their promotion of ethnic Russian supremacy, neo-Soviet imperialism, or the fusion of the Russian Orthodox Church with the state—“they turn on the tap,” said Mark Galeotti, a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations, Prague, and an expert in Russian history and security. “When it becomes inconvenient, they turn it off.”Though the Kremlin refuses to openly support the Club’s beliefs, its apparent interest in assisting international populist movements, meddling with European and U.S. elections, and undermining liberal values adhere to Izborsky objectives and move them forward, even if the two camps may diverge in their ultimate goals. For instance, last year’s massive Russia-sponsored campaign to hack the U.S. presidential election and sabotage Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton aligned with both Izborsky and Kremlin aims.The Club also seems to function as a conservative threshold in Russian politics, barring the Kremlin from appealing too strongly to liberal ideas or to the West. “Putin doesn’t talk about Malorossiya [a derogatory term for Ukraine meaning “Little Russia”], but he doesn’t let Ukraine move toward the West” for fear that sacrificing Ukraine would create too much resistance from extremists, said Jensen, the former U.S. diplomat. And no matter how much the Kremlin publicly disavows the Club, it also needs them. “The state is actually quite happy with this [club],” added Galeotti, the historian who specializes in Russia. “Once you have this collection of barking far-right people . . . it makes you look centrist.”By manipulating connections that have existed for decades between the European and Russian far right, the Kremlin is attempting to improve Russia’s international reputation and simultaneously lower opinions of the U.S. and its allies. In Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir, political scientist Anton Shekhovtsov describes the relationships between international far-right groups as decentralized and derived from a variety of “partly overlapping, partly convergent initiatives.” This is evident in organizations like Sergei Naryshkin’s International Parliamentary Forum, a Russia-based platform for fostering dialogue among pro-Kremlin Westerners, and Europe of Nations and Freedom, a far-right political cohort within the EU Parliament nurtured by Marine Le Pen, France’s former far-right presidential candidate, and Geert Wilders, a far-right politician from the Netherlands.But from a strategic perspective, the organization of a Russian-European far-right coalition would need to transcend distinct national identities and interests to build a coherent, transnational movement. While the far right has globalized in spite of its anti-globalist posturing, not all values are universally accepted. For example, Islamophobia, embraced by the AfD and fanned by the European migration crisis, is not framed the same way in Russia. Russian Eurasianists generally support Muslims who take an anti-American stance.While the izborists have exerted a quiet pull on Russian domestic politics, it’s difficult to see how their Russia-first ideology could initiate concrete changes beyond former Soviet borders. The nationalism built into far-right philosophies suggests that opportunities for global collaboration will only be sought insofar as they further national interests. Germans won’t elect Putin as their chancellor, as Zavtra fantasized—AfD’s manifesto declares that the party wants to uphold a “sovereign nation state for the German people.” Nonetheless, these problems remain in the distance. For now, the Club seems to be thriving. Last September, with the blessing of Governor Georgy Poltavchenko, the Izborsky Club announced it will open a new branch in St. Petersburg—its 28th regional office, including its headquarters near the Kremlin in Moscow. In Russia’s northern capital, its members will “fight for souls and minds, which . . . were implanted into the economy of consumption under the guise of democracy,” and continue their quest to delineate “the Russian world.”

Abstract: The history of the reception of Foucault in China (1989-2019) is part of the process of China's reconstructing of its academic tradition after the reform and opening-up, when the control of Marxist ideology was loosened and when Western modern thought flowed into the Chinese academic community in large quantities. The Foucauldian reception can be best understood not so much in relation to previous domestic Marxist or conservative discourses, but in its competition with the thought of other Western thinkers who were introduced around the same time, such as Marin Heidegger, Max Weber, and Leo Strauss. This article studies on the one hand the broad influence of Heidegger in Philosophy, Weber in social theory and Strauss in political philosophy since the 1980s, and on the other hand how Foucault's reception has to be situated and viewed in relation to the reception of these other thinkers, negotiating its position and image in a competition that involves not only several disciplines of social sciences but also changing political positions such as the New Left, liberalism and culture conservatism in the history of China in the past forty years.

이 글에서는 전쟁이 갖는 의미와 역할에 대해 논구했던 대표적인 서양근대 사상가들의 전쟁관을 고찰한다. 다수의 서양 근대사상가들은 전쟁 현상을 적극적으로 부정하거나 거부하지 않았고 오히려 국가운영과 정치활동에서 불가피하게 겪어야 하는 하나의 필요악으로 간주하였다. 이 글에서 다룬 마키아벨리, 홉스, 클라우제비츠, 헤겔 등도 예외가 아니다. 그럼에도 우리는 서양 주류학자들의 이른바 승전론(勝戰論)이나 낙관적인 전쟁해석을 맹목적으로 따를 것이 아니라, 오히려 역사 속에서 정의와 공존의 이상에 기초해서 평화의 가치를 역설한 인물들을 기억하고 그 이념을 계승하도록 노력해야 할 것이다. 우리는 일차적으로 선별된 서양근대 사상가들의 전쟁론에 내포되어 있는 이념적 특성과 그것의 한계를 분석할 것이다. 나아가 우리는 이를 바탕으로 해방이후 서구사상의 수용과 해석에 치중함으로써 사상적, 현실적 차원에서 그로부터 막대한 영향을 받아 왔지만, 냉철한 현실인식과 독자적인 가치판단에 따른 전쟁과 평화관을 제시하지 못한 채 여전히 분단과 휴전 상태에 머물고 있는 우리 한국사회에 시사하는 바가 무엇인지 음미할 것이다.

La producción de conocimientos inscripta en el binomio modernidad/colonialidad ha condicionado nuestra forma de ver, pensar, sentir e interpretar el mundo. Desde esta matriz de pensamiento, el mundo llamado «objetivo» es un mundo muy alejado de la experiencia humana. Es un mundo inventado por un sujeto que se piensa a sí mismo como «observador neutro». Como lo señala Mignolo (2014), las políticas teo y ego lógicas del conocimiento se basaron en la supresión de la sensibilidad y la localización geo-histórica del cuerpo. He aquí la paradoja de la Modernidad: por un lado crea al sujeto cognoscente y al mismo tiempo lo elimina del proceso de producción de conocimientos. El sujeto es pensado como una superficie reflectante. Es capaz de formarse una imagen de la naturaleza externa, anterior e independiente de él. Siguiendo esta lógica de pensamiento, las Ciencias Sociales se han distanciado de aquello sobre lo cual teorizan. Han puesto al mundo y lo que acontece en él en situación de lejanía y extrañamiento, con el supuesto de construir un conocimiento científico objetivo y fiable. El Trabajo Social no ha quedado ajeno a este proceso de colonialidad del saber. Este trabajo intenta ser un aporte al proceso de construcción de conocimientos en clave decolonial. Esto necesariamente implica un giro epistemológico en la producción de conocimientos. Implica también pasar de la disciplina a la indisciplina. Para este trabajo, nos basamos en contribuciones de la epistemología del sur, la epistemología feminista y la llamada epistemología otra o pensamiento fronterizo.

In this article, we examine the potential of collaborative online international learning as a borderland third space for global citizenship education. Border thinking is used as a mode of critical questioning and reflection of ways of relating to the world, of feeling, acting, living and inhabiting the world that emanates from plural knowledges disrupting modernity and repositioning alternative knowledge traditions. After discussing the central concepts of collaborative online international learning and global citizenship education, and unpacking border thinking and third space as a lens, we provide four illustrative autoethnographic vignettes from which we then discuss collaborative online international learning and global citizenship education critically. We conclude that by bringing together students to engage in a collaborative learning task that they would be unable to complete on their own, participants have a personal and collective opportunity to appreciate each other’s microsocial realities better. We argue that the potential for becoming in the collective borderlands of collaborative online international learning can deepen students’ learning and understanding of global citizenship education as inclusive, decolonising, Indigenising, critical and transformative. However, collaborative online international learning for global citizenship education should not be deployed uncritically as an online pedagogy, assuming inclusivity. Rather, it can be a core component of holistic learning practice, if it is deliberately used as a borderland third space where valuable learning through reflection and openness to discomfort advances a global mindset.

This essay attempts to problematize the fixed and bounded notion of culture in global narratives and deconstruct the practices of knowing the Other through the lens of border thinking. In order to challenge the colonial apparatus of classification, I first demystify the static notion of national identity through an example of the ideological formation of Koreanness in Dansaekhwa, the monochrome painting in Korea, in the context of global art. The first section includes my reflective narrative in light of the discussions of representation, Othering, and positionality. This section also addresses the issue of speaking about and for the Other, and how it contributes to the colonial discourse through the network of representation and interpretation. The second section addresses decolonial aspects of Lee Bul’s works and their connection to decolonial aestheSis. In the last section, I make a few suggestions regarding what art educators might consider in order to move beyond the colonial discourse in global narratives. The suggestions include critical reflexivity in the works of representation and the importance of border thinking to imagine decoloniality and to claim for subaltern perspectives.

This is a commentary on ‘The Principle of the New World Order’, a geopolitical essay written by Japanese Philosopher, Kitarō Nishida in 1944. This essay has been a source of postwar controversy over the philosophical justification of Japan’s involvement in the Second World War and the relationship between Japanese thoughts and Western colonial domination in Asia. As a text of Japanese formal geopolitics, the essay is a historical example to illustrate how Japanese academics geopolitically situated their country and themselves within the imperial rivalry during the War. The essay attracted not only criticisms that problematized Nishida’s approach to politics (imperialism and nationalism) and justification of the War, but also positive reviews that appreciated his proposal of a multicultural worldview countering Western modernity (i.e. the world dominated by the West). The translation of the essay is not easy to read but contains important insights into how to see the current world (dis)order under hegemonic powers.

Processes of knowledge production and the powerful role of the formation of opinions and patterns of interpretation are to a great extent implicit or linked with tacit knowledge. Critical reflection on knowledge production is one of the key issues in doing qualitative research. Research workshops involving students offer the opportunity to critically reflect on research practice, in particular on the analysis of empirical data. The communicative activity of analysing empirical data supports questioning tacit knowledge and implicit assumptions, encouraging critical reflection on the knowledge production processes. Drawing on a research workshop on qualitative research methods for students whose focus was on issues of the social response to migrants and refugees the paper highlights some of the challenges that appear when doing research on ethnically sensitive topics.

Wandering: An Essay on Histories, Genders, Mobilities, and Forms

This paper examines the epistemological model based upon the Enlightenment paradigm that underlies Modern Western thought and discusses other forms of writing and production of knowledge. Based on the the work of Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben and others, we consider the production of knowledge in darkness. We start out with an evaluation of the effects of an epistemology of light and the potential of thought in the absence of light. We present an analysis of the relationship of that epistemology with forms of organization and urban lighting, as well as the production of invisible subjectivities. In a writing exercise conducted in a zone of shadows, we relate a story which binds the production of light and shadow and their productive power within contemporary urban society. Finally, this study affirms the power of shadows and the need to devise strategies that allow us to write in or with darkness and with those invisible subjectivities which inhabit it.Keywords: epistemology, writing, cities, subjectivities, powerResumoNesse artigo refletimos sobre o modelo epistemológico pautado na ideia de luzes constituinte do pensamento Ocidental Moderno, discutindo outras formas de escrever e produzir conhecimento. A partir de autores como Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin e Giorgio Agamben, propomos uma reflexão sobre a produção do conhecimento no escuro. Iniciamos abordando os efeitos da epistemologia da luminosidade e a potência de se pensar nas sombras. Em seguida, analisamos a relação dessa epistemologia com as formas de organização e iluminação das cidades e a produção de subjetividades invisíveis. Em um exercício de escrita a partir de uma zona sombria, trazemos uma história que amarra a produção de luzes e sombras e seu poder produtivo na sociedade urbana contemporânea. Ao final, afirmamos a potência das sombras e a necessidade de construção de estratégias que nos permitam escrever no e com o escuro e com aquelas subjetividades invisíveis que o habitam.Palavras-chave: epistemologia, escrita, cidade, subjetividades, potência AbstractThis paper examines the epistemological model based upon the Enlightenment paradigm that underlies Modern Western thought and discusses other forms of writing and production of knowledge. Based on the the work of Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben and others, we consider the production of knowledge in darkness. We start out with an evaluation of the effects of an epistemology of light and the potential of thought in the absence of light. We present an analysis of the relationship of that epistemology with forms of organization and urban lighting, as well as the production of invisible subjectivities. In a writing exercise conducted in a zone of shadows, we relate a story which binds the production of light and shadow and their productive power within contemporary urban society. Finally, this study affirms the power of shadows and the need to devise strategies that allow us to write in or with darkness and with those invisible subjectivities which inhabit it.Keywords: epistemology, writing, cities, subjectivities, powerAbstractThis paper examines the epistemological model based upon the Enlightenment paradigm that underlies Modern Western thought and discusses other forms of writing and production of knowledge. Based on the the work of Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben and others, we consider the production of knowledge in darkness. We start out with an evaluation of the effects of an epistemology of light and the potential of thought in the absence of light. We present an analysis of the relationship of that epistemology with forms of organization and urban lighting, as well as the production of invisible subjectivities. In a writing exercise conducted in a zone of shadows, we relate a story which binds the production of light and shadow and their productive power within contemporary urban society. Finally, this study affirms the power of shadows and the need to devise strategies that allow us to write in or with darkness and with those invisible subjectivities which inhabit it.Keywords: epistemology, writing, cities, subjectivities, power

The discourse on “environmental conservation” is highly dynamic and has generated controversies of epic proportions in conservation sciences and environmental anthropology. Given the nebulous nature of conservation, coupled with the varying interpretations evoked by the deployment of the concept across different disciplines, a more robust understanding of the notion calls into question its practical manifestations and application in particular situated contexts – particularly within the conservation sciences and environmental anthropology. In Zimbabwe, conservation by the state has tended to favour and privilege Western scientific models at the expense of the “indigenous” conservation practices of local people, as informed by their indigenous epistemologies. This paper thus represents an attempt to rethink conservation in Zimbabwe, adopting the Norumedzo communal area in south-eastern Zimbabwe as its case study. The choice of Norumedzo is based on the fact that this is one area where the highly esteemed and delicious harurwa (edible stink bugs, Encosternum delegorguei) are found. As a result of these insects being valued as “actors” and the appreciation shown to both Western and indigenous epistemologies, conservation in the area has enjoyed considerable success. To this end, this paper lends support to the arguments of Walter Mignolo and Ramon Grosfoguel in their advocacy for critical border thinking in issues of knowledge regarding environmental conservation.

ABSTRACTEngaging with critical border literature, this article examines how racial and religious categories are mobilized in materializing EU borders in the Balkans. Exploring the tensions that emerge in Muslim communities in post-Socialist and post-conflict Macedonia during the Syrian “refugee crisis” in 2015, it looks at how racialized categorizations of difference are deployed along the Balkan Route to differentiate local, white European Muslims from refugee Arab Others. Through policy analysis and fieldwork, the article questions the standard, colour-blind and equal-to-all European integration by highlighting political divisions that emerge within Muslim communities. While these tensions were present long before the ongoing refugee crisis, this article argues that the current geopolitical context allows for these tensions to be utilized in the surveillance and securitization of EU border regimes.

There is a great deal of confusion in the West regarding the meaning of Jihad and the role it is playing in shaping the Muslim world. Indeed, it has acquired a pejorative connotation in the minds of many Westerners. The purpose of this discussion is to present an accurate understanding of the concept of Jihad.Islam emerged in the seventh century in Arabia. It grew rapidly and in less than a hundred years established the early Islamic state—an empire stretching from Spain across North Africa, and from the Middle East to the borders of China. It was a state greater in size than the Roman Empire at its zenith.The historical importance assigned to Islam has been controversially assessed. Some have denied that it is a significant world force, others have “grudgingly” recognized its importance while others have seen it as a pivotal event in world history. We take this latter view: Islam should be recognized as a major force of revolutionary change in the world order. Harold Berman, a contemporary commentator on law and revolution in the west, gives a list of six revolutions which changed the Western world. He provides a helpful list of patterns which emerged from those revolutions which he identifies as fundamental change, rapid change, violent change, lasting change, and change in the whole social system. Each revolution sought a legitimacy in fundamental law, a remote past, and an apocalyptic future. Each took more than one generation to establish its roots. Each eventually produced a new system of law which embodied some of the major purposes of the revolution and which changed the Western legal tradition, without destroying it. The appearance of Islam in the seventh century meets these criteria. Using Berman's framwork Islam can be viewed as truly revolutionary.

This paper seeks to summarise the interplay between utopian and dystopian thinking throughout the twentieth century with a particular focus on the city. The gradually shrinking appeal of the socialist utopia and its replacement with the globalised free–market as a ‘revanchist utopia’ left socialist utopian thinking in a state of disarray towards the end of the previous century. Utopian thinking, both as a literary and political genre has been rendered marginal in contemporary political practices. Urban dystopia, or ‘Stadtschmerz’, is now prevalent in critical Western thinking about city and society. It is concluded that the declining political impact of critical urban research is caused partly by its lack of engagement with crafting imaginative alternative futures for the city. The works by Sennett, Sandercock and the Situationists, among others, may contain elements to reverse the current utopian malaise in urban research.