Acting Solely from Good Motives and the Problem of Indifference

Is being rational, moderately reasons-responsive, normal and following the law enough to safeguard our actions from blame? Adolf Eichmann, as Hannah Arendt shows, was in possession of the above characteristics, followed the law and acted out of seemingly good motivation. Yet he managed to contribute to an unjust and immoral system, eventually leading to the deaths of millions of people. In this paper I aim to show that much like Eichmann we too, engage in various oppressive systems around us, despite being rational, normal, reasons-responsive and law abiding. We may not be actively participating in large scale genocide like him, but by driving a gas car and consuming meat or living in a society where systemic racial injustice occurs we nonetheless manage to contribute to both racism and climate change. It is evident that merely fulfilling the criteria to be held morally responsible for our actions, being in possession of good intent and being cognizant of the law are not enough to prevent us from severe moral transgression. I propose that engaging in dialogue with people outside of our immediate communities serves as an important epistemic check against which we measure our actions and enables us to criticize our own moral standards, hopefully preventing us from transgressing morally in a way similar to Eichmann’s.

Rapid progress of artificial intelligence in digital advertising will have a major impact on the consumer. The aim of this article is to explicate this effect by defining the problem as a gap between the rationality of artificial intelligence and the vulnerability of the consumer in decision-making in the context of new researches in the field of cognitive psychology and behavioural economics. To prevent the increasing possibilities of unethical and hidden manipulations of the consumer in online advertising, some ethical theories and the possibility of their implementation in algorithms and legislation are examined. Theoretical research shows enormous lack of interdisciplinary cooperation for development of an appropriate ethical theory for the purpose of its implementation into artificial intelligence in business processes. Traditional moral theories are unable to solve new complex issues because of their too narrow focus on moral principles. An alternative ethical theory based on sustainability principles is proposed. It adheres to the principles of economics, latest findings of cognitive psychology, and uses artificial intelligence for its implementation. Sustainable evolutionary ethics opens up new research questions that can be solved only interdisciplinary.

According to critics such as Bernard Williams, traditional ethical theories render it impossible to lead good and meaningful lives because they emphasize moral duty or the promotion of external values at the expense of the personal commitments that make our lives worth living from our own perspective. Responses to this criticism have not addressed the fundamental question about the proper relationship between a person's commitments to moral values and her commitments to non-moral or personal values. In this article, I suggest that we think about this relationship by reflecting on the way that a prudentially virtuous person who has commitments to both moral and non-moral values would regard these commitments. I argue that people with the virtue of balance do have reasons to act in accordance with their moral commitments, but that whether or not these reasons are overriding depends on the type of commitment in question.

The background of this research is the status and significance of an ethics of care of the self in the history of morality. I followed the following methodology: I attempted to come to nuanced, critical understanding of the Foucault’s conceptualisation of morality in Volumes II and III of The History of Sexuality. In the ‘Ancients’, Foucault uncovered an ‘ethics-oriented’ as opposed to a ‘code-oriented’ morality in which the emphasis shifted to how an individual was supposed to constitute himself as an ethical subject of his own action without denying the importance of either the moral code or the actual behaviour of people. The main question was whether care of the self-sufficiently regulated an individual’s conduct towards others to prevent the self from lapsing into narcissism, substituting a generous responsiveness towards the other for a means-end rationale. I put this line of critique to test by confronting Foucault’s care of the self with Levinas’s primordial responsibility towards the other and put forward a case for the indispensability of aesthetics for ethics. In conclusion, I defended the claim that care of the self does indeed foster other responsiveness.Intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary implications: Foucault’s ethics, understood as an ‘aesthetics of existence’ has profound intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary implications, as it challenges traditional ethical normative ethical theories and engages with various fields of philosophy, social sciences and humanities. Interdisciplinary fields greatly influenced by Foucault’s ethics include: psychology, literary, cultural, gender and sexuality studies, medical ethics, anthropology and history, among others.

Proponents of the idea that law has assumed an endemically closed character consider that there are severe limits to the possibility of successful legal regulation in highly complex and socially differentiated societies. This idea reaches its most radical form in the theory of law as an autopoietic system which suggests that the autonomous individual at the core of most traditional legal theory should be replaced by the self-creating and self-maintaining legal system. Advocates of this theory suggest that legal scientists and practitioners should reject traditional rationales of legal regulation and adopt a new, and more modest, mode of legal rationality called reflexive law. In this article, we argue, first, that the idea that specialized autopoietic subsystems have epistemic primacy is flawed and, second, that this initial argument coupled to a conception of the function of law which is held in both autopoietic theory and more traditional conceptions of law reveals an insight into the possibility of effective legal regulation in complex societies. Specifically, effective legal regulation in complex societies requires a reformulation of reflexive law so that basic principles of political morality are incorporated within its autonomous domain.

Moral philosophy has laid out theories for conduct during wartime and the use of nonviolence. Yet, how do these theories map onto people’s actual behavior? A first set of studies tested people’s use of Just War principles in evaluating wartime conduct. Adelman, Orazano and Leidner show that people utilize the jus in bello principles of necessity, discrimination and proportionality to judge the justness of wars, but to different degrees, depending on their moral principles. A second set of studies experimentally investigates whether nonviolence is a viable strategy for social movements struggling against oppression. Adelman, Orazano and Leidner provide converging evidence for a model of nonviolent struggles in Bahrain, Iran, and the United States, demonstrating that nonviolent movements are more effective at generating support and increasing membership. In sum, people do largely seem to behave as philosophical theories have prescribed, but sometimes in a way limited by psychological bias.

Although no specific treaties govern the use of air power, a significant body of rules based on general international humanitarian law (IHL) constrains the use of air power in armed conflicts. Scenes of carnage resulting from the application of air power to urban environments underscore the need to balance humanitarian concerns with operational necessity. With the principles of distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and humane behaviour as the point of departure, this chapter focuses on air-to-ground targeting – the aspect of air power that comprises the majority of IHL issues. It addresses four modern areas of debate, drawing on the principles of targeting: strategic targeting of war-sustaining objects, the issue of human shields, the use of remotely piloted aircraft, and autonomously operated aerial systems. Modern counter-insurgency operations have increased the complexity of the traditional battlespace with their greater focus on prevention of collateral damage. With robots increasingly becoming part of the Western arsenal, IHL and the moral code become essential; for Western democracies, law and ethics constitute the first line of defence. The study of IHL should assist all those involved in planning, leading, and executing air operations. The politically desirable and technologically possible must never be allowed to trump IHL.

A case from 1996 in Oregon in which citizens' legally public motor vehicle information was disseminated on a World Wide Web site is considered. The case evoked widespread moral outrage among Oregonians and led to changes in the Oregon records laws. The application of either consequentialist or non-consequentialist moral theories to this and other informational privacy cases is found to be inadequate. Adjudication of conflicting desires is offered as the appropriate analytical model for moral disputes. The notion of adjudication offered here diverges from traditional moral theories in its indeterminate nature.

This article is in reaction to recent articles in Advances In Nursing Science by Yarling and McElmurry and Bishop and Scudder, which interpret the nursing ethic as grounded in the social reform of the institution or in the role of the nurse on the health care team. It is argued here that covenantal relationships between the nurse and the patient provide a more substantial foundation for the nursing ethic. Arising from the moral principle of fidelity, this model furnishes guidance for the nurse, a link for the nursing ethic with traditional moral theory, and, most important, a grounding in the unique experience of the nurse-patient relationship.

The Family and Religious Education in the Digital Age Childs Religious-Moral Development and New Parental Roles This work analyzes the profound transformation experienced by the family institution in the digital age on a sociological, theological, and pedagogical interdisciplinary basis. The core thesis is that despite macrosocial processes such as globalization, individualization, and digitalization narrowing the familys traditional structural and functional roles (production, education, protection), the family retains its primary and irreplaceable role in shaping the individuals psychosocial and religiousmoral identity. The study aims to present a holistic pedagogical framework to safeguard the childs innate (fıtrî) development of faith and morality against the challenges posed by the digital age to the family institution. The work stands as one of the most comprehensive analyses in the field, employing a document analysis that delves into traditional and contemporary sociological theories. The study scrutinizes the transformation of the family and the distinctive cultural dynamics of the Turkish family structure, aiming to be a significant contribution to Turkish family literature. The main focus of the book is the view that religious education and moral education are two fundamental and inseparable disciplines and that the permanence of this education hinges upon adherence to the basic principles of Islamic Pedagogy. Within the context of Religious Education Principles and Methods, it is demonstrated that the Prophetic Method (Nebevi Yöntem) applied by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) perfectly encompasses principles emphasized by modern education, such as love, compassion, and developmental steps. This method advocates for new parental attitudes, prioritizing the strengthening of the childs will and conscience to foster self-control, rather than adopting detrimental approaches like oppressive, indifferent, or inconsistent parenting. A key emphasis is placed on the Digitalization process, where mass communication tools function as a third parent and threaten moral values. These challenges necessitate transforming the family-centered approach and the parental responsibility of being a role model (Üsve-i Hasene) into active spiritual guidance. The fundamental idea is reinforced that the family institution is not merely a biological union but a sacred trust that ensures the continuity of the social structure and aims to guide the individual toward both religious and moral maturity. The work integrates the universal values of Islam and the methods of Islamic Pedagogy with findings from modern psychology and sociology to present a holistic and applicable solution framework to the crisis in question. Keywords: Religious Education; Family; Digital Age; Moral Development; Parental Attitudes; Child

In the past few decades, the progressive political ideal of strong central governments or collective morality being necessary to enforce cooperative behavior has become widely-accepted. However, many philosophers throughout history, especially that from the classical liberalism tradition, have espoused free market, open society ideals arguing not only that governments are the source of much of the immorality and conflict many are afraid of, but also that man left in a free environment can and will cooperate and develop naturally moral systems that allow for economic and societal development. Robert Axelrod, more recently, studied this debate using the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game from traditional game theory and applied computer science to find that, indeed, cooperation can arise naturally even between selfish prisoners. This paper develops the study further by examining more realistic situations of PD games involving multiple players, using computer simulations, i.e. agent-based modeling, and finds that Axelrod’s original conclusions hold true.

In the latter half of this century, there have been two mostly separate threads within ethical theory, one on 'superogation', one on 'common-sense morality'. I bring these threads together by systematically reflecting on doing more than one has to do. A rich and coherent set of concepts at the core of common-sense morality is identified, along with various logical connections between these core concepts. Various issues in common-sense morality emerge naturally, as does a demonstrably productive definition of doing more than one has to do. I then present an interpreted model-theoretic framework with the expressive power to generate truth-conditions for the core concepts, and the explanatory power to predict and explain the independently motivated logical connections between these concepts. The framework also has a certain heuristic power for 'discovering' substantive ethical theories that can derivatively generate the model-theoretic framework for the core concepts. Two theories discussed are expansions of traditional theories; two others, each giving pride of place to justice, are devised to resonate with more recent concerns. Methodologically, it is hoped that the approach within might suggest the possibility of bridging another gap: that between formal and informal studies of moral notions.

This dissertation assessed from a legal-doctrinal, theoretical, and empirical perspective whether ‘alternative criminal sanctions’ may be ‘adequate’ for international crimes being punished in transitional contexts, according to international (criminal) law and transitional justice theory. The thesis has as a case study the sanctioning regime of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement signed by the Colombian government and the former guerrilla group, the FARC-EP. The Colombian case presents a rich context for assessing this complex issue since it is the first time a State Party to the International Criminal Court's statute has signed a peace accord that prima facie allows perpetrators of international crimes to receive non-custodial sanctions. Accordingly, the purposes of the thesis were: i) assess the conformity of alternative criminal sanctions with international law; ii) explore the theoretical justifications and goals of such sanctions for international crimes in transitional contexts; iii) empirically examine the perceptions of stakeholders from Colombia about this type of sanctions and the factors informing those perceptions. One finding is that there are no fixed standards for (in)adequacy of sanctions. However, specialised courts and bodies dealing with international crimes have identified criminal penalties consisting of prison sentences proportional to the gravity of the crime and culpability as one of the standards to determine adequacy. Nevertheless, States have great deference when determining the range and proportionality of sentences and the ICC’s penalties regime is not meant to be a standard setting for national jurisdictions. Consequently, although the primary form of punishment under the RS is imprisonment, State Parties are not obligated to adopt the same modes of punishment and range of penalties as part of their national legal frameworks. Given the nature of international crimes and the circumstances of transitional societies, existing criminal punishment goals and practices are largely unjustified in transitional contexts. Moral and practical reasons exist why the standards and principles of traditional punishment theories should not be used as standards by which the justice of the sanctions is assessed. Therefore, if criminal-law responses are adopted, any duty to punish, either at the national or international level, should be broader and contextualize the principles and standards according to the circumstances and aims of TJ. This thesis’ theoretical contribution offers a substantive account of the values, processes and outcomes that alternative criminal sanctions must fulfil to be justified and considered adequate, in line with the punishment rationales that remain valid in transitional contexts. Accordingly, the thesis proposes a third route of criminal sanctions and the re-constructive sanctions, a new conceptualization of alternative sanctions adopting restorative justice aims. Furthermore, it proposes a contextualized principle of proportionality that incorporates specific forward-looking interests of the transition in the assessment of the adequacy of sentences. The empirical contribution sheds light on the theoretical and practical promises, dilemmas, and challenges of the framework in Colombia. Such findings have larger implications for our understanding of concepts such as justice, accountability, reparation or reintegration, and for the characterisation and expressive functions of alternative criminal sanctions for international crimes in Colombia and beyond.

This 1998 paper outlines an early form of Divine Motivation (DM) theory. In this theory, all moral concepts are derivative from the concept of a good motive, the most basic component of a virtue, where a motive is an emotion that initiates and directs action toward an end. The paper then argues that the motivations of one person in particular are the foundation of all moral values: God. The theory is structurally parallel to Divine Command theory, but it has several advantages over DC theory without the well-known problems. DM theory does not face a dilemma parallel to the famous Euthyphro problem, nor does it have any difficulty in answering the question whether God could make cruelty morally right. Unlike DC theory, it explains the importance of Christology in Christian ethics, and it provides a unitary account of all evaluative properties, divine and human.

The set of core just war principles contains a proportionality principle but not a legitimate authority principle. In this chapter, the ideas of proportionality and authority are elucidated by means of comprehensive moral principles of distributive justice and autonomy. A purpose of the first part of the chapter is to propose and support a generalised just war principle of proportionality that is applicable by all sorts of responsible agents to all forms of armed conflict. It is a deontological principle that incorporates the idea of human rights. Additional topics considered in this first part include global distributive justice, risk acceptance and noncombatant immunity, reasonable hope (or chance or likelihood or prospect) of success, minimum force, and alternative military actions. In the second part of the chapter, the following question is answered negatively. Should the set of core just war principles contain a principle of ‘legitimate (or right or proper or competent) authority’? Topics discussed in the second part include a moral principle of autonomy, moral authority, legal authority, global citizenship and armed revolution, nonmilitary measures and global citizenship, morally reforming the Security Council, and global governance and the Security Council.