An Introduction to First-Order Logic

We consider various extensions of first-order logic. Informally, a logic 𝓛 is an extension of first-order logic if every sentence of first-order logic is also a sentence of 𝓛. We also require that 𝓛 is closed under conjunction and negation and has other basic properties of a logic. In Section 9.4, we list the properties that formally define the notion of an extension of first-order logic. Prior to Section 9.4, we provide various natural examples of such extensions. In Sections 9.1–9.3, we consider, respectively, second-order logic, infinitary logics, and logics with fixed-point operators. We do not provide a thorough treatment of any one of these logics. Indeed, we could easily devote an entire chapter to each. Rather, we define each logic and provide examples that demonstrate the expressive power of the logics. In particular, we show that none of these logics has compactness. In the final Section 9.4, we prove that if a proper extension of first-order logic has compactness, then the Downward Löwenhiem–Skolem theorem must fail for that logic. This is Lindstrom’s theorem. The Compactness theorem and Downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem are two crucial results for model theory. Every property of first-order logic from Chapter 4 is a consequence of these two theorems. Lindström’s theorem implies that the only extension of first-order logic possessing these properties is first-order logic itself. Second-order logic is the extension of first-order logic that allows quantification of relations. The symbols of second-order logic are the same symbols used in first-order logic. The syntax of second-order logic is defined by adding one rule to the syntax of first-order logic. The additional rule makes second-order logic far more expressive than first-order logic. Specifically, the syntax of second-order logic is defined as follows. Any atomic first-order formula is a formula of second-order logic. Moreover, we have the following four rules: (R1) If φ is a formula then so is ￢φ. (R2) If φ and ψ are formulas then so is φ ∧ ψ. (R3) If φ is a formula, then so is ∃x φ for any variable x.

Separation logic is used as an assertion language for Hoare-style proof systems about programs with pointers, and there is an ongoing quest for understanding its complexity and expressive power. Herein, we show that first-order separation logic with one record field restricted to two variables and the separating implication (no separating conjunction) is as expressive as weak second-order logic, substantially sharpening a previous result. Capturing weak second-order logic with such a restricted form of separation logic requires substantial updates to known proof techniques. We develop these and, as a by-product, identify the smallest fragment of separation logic known to be undecidable: first-order separation logic with one record field, two variables, and no separating conjunction. Because we forbid ourselves the use of many syntactic resources, this underscores even further the power of separating implication on concrete heaps.

On the expressive power of counting

Formalizing Dijkstra's predicate transformer wp in weak second-order logic

A logic family is a bunch of logics that belong together in some way. First-order logic is one of the examples. Logics organized into a structure occur in abstract model theory, institution theory and in algebraic logic. Logic families play a role in adopting methods for investigating sentential logics to first-order like logics. We thoroughly discuss the notion of logic families as defined in the recent Universal Algebraic Logic book.

The twentieth-century mathematician Thoralf Skolem is known principally for two achievements. The first is the statement and proof of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. The second is his construction of countable nonstandard models of Peano arithmetic and set theory when these theories are expressed in first-order (predicate) logic. The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, for which Skolem gave several proofs, showed that no first-order axiom system can characterise a unique infinite model. Skolem regarded this theorem as casting doubt on the belief that mathematics can be reliably founded on formal axiomatic systems alone. He discovered that first-order logics are necessarily incomplete descriptions of their intended models. There is a vivid contrast between the comprehensive syntactic expressive power of first-order theories and their very limited power to constrain their models to a priori desired models. The startling conclusion he derived from his theorem is known as ‘Skolem’s paradox’. It asserts that concepts such as cardinality must be interpreted relative to a given model and thus have no absolute meaning. Anticipating modern model theory, in a later paper he gave a direct construction of a nonstandard model of first-order arithmetic based on plus and times by a method which anticipated the ultraproduct construction of models of first-order theories. He realised that it might be possible to construct new models for set theory which demonstrate the consistency or the independence of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis. The first goal was realised in the early 1930s by Kurt Gödel’s introduction of the notion of constructability for consistency proofs. The second goal was realised in the early 1960s by Paul Cohen’s introduction of the notion of forcing for independence proofs, for which he was awarded the Field’s medal in 1966.

By limiting the range of the predicate variables in a second-order language, one may obtain restricted versions of second-order logic such as weak second-order logic or definable subset logic. In this note, we provide an infinitary strongly complete axiomatization for several systems of this kind having the range of the predicate variables as a parameter. The completeness argument uses simple techniques from the theory of Boolean algebras. This article is dedicated to our friend John N. Crossley on the occasion of his 86th birthday.

One of the previous articles in this column was devoted to the zero-one laws for a number of logics playing prominent role in finite model theory: first-order logic FO, the extension FO+LFP of first-order logic with the least fixed-point operator, and the infinitary logic L∞,ω. Recently Shelah proved a new, powerful, and surprising zero-one law. His proof uses so-called strong extension axioms. Here we formulate Shelah’s zero-one law and prove a few facts about these axioms. In the process we give a simple proof for a “large deviation” inequality a la Chernoff. 1 Shelah’s Zero-One Law Quisani: What are you doing, guys? Author: We2 are proving a zero-one law which is due to Shelah. Q: Didn’t Shelah prove the law? A: Oh yes, he proved it all right, and even wrote it down [14]. Q: So what is the problem? Can’t you read his proof? 1Mathematics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1109, USA; partially supported by a grant from Microsoft Research. 2The record of the conversation was simplified by blending the two authors into one who prefers “we” to “I”.

Approximate pattern matching and transitive closure logics

This article is a rewriting of my Ph.D. Thesis, supervised by Professor G. Sabbagh, and incorporates a suggestion from Professor B. Poizat. My main result can be crudely summarized (but see below for detailed statements) by the equality: first-order theory of F[Xi]i∈I = weak second-order theory of F.§I.1. Conventions. The letter F will always denote a commutative field, and I a nonempty set. A field or a ring (A; +, ·) will often be written A for short. We shall use symbols which are definable in all our models, and in the structure of natural numbers (N; +, ·):— the constant 0, defined by the formula Z(x): ∀y (x + y = y);— the constant 1, defined by the formula U(x): ∀y (x · y = y);— the operation ∹ x − y = z ↔ x = y + z;— the relation of division: x ∣ y ↔ ∃ z(x · z = y).A domain is a commutative ring with unity and without any zero divisor.By “… → …” we mean “… is definable in …, uniformly in any model M of L”.All our constructions will be uniform, unless otherwise mentioned.§I.2. Weak second-order models and languages. First of all, we have to define the models Pf(M), Sf(M), Sf′(M) and HF(M) associated to a model M = {A; ℐ) of a first-order language L [CK, pp. 18–20]. Let L1 be the extension of L obtained by adjunction of a second list of variables (denoted by capital letters), and of a membership symbol ∈. Pf(M) is the model (A, Pf(A); ℐ, ∈) of L1, (where Pf(A) is the set of finite subsets of A. Let L2 be the extension of L obtained by adjunction of a second list of variables, a membership symbol ∈, and a concatenation symbol ◠.

The Ordered conjecture of Kolaitis and Vardi asks whether fixed-point logic differs from first-order logic on every infinite class of finite ordered structures. In this paper, we develop the tool of bounded variable element types, and illustrate its application to this and the original conjectures of McColm, which arose from the study of inductive definability and infinitary logic on proficient classes of finite structures (those admitting an unbounded induction). In particular, for a class of finite structures, we introduce a compactness notion which yields a new proof of a ramified version of McColm's second conjecture. Furthermore, we show a connection between a model-theoretic preservation property and the Ordered Conjecture, allowing us to prove it for classes of strings (colored orderings). We also elaborate on complexity-theoretic implications of this line of research.KeywordsLinear OrderOrder LogicRelation SymbolPreservation PropertyInductive DefinitionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

We now discuss the model theory of (classical) first-order logic together with partial interpretations. As in the propositional case, the syntax of partial firstorder logic is essentially the same as in the classical case. The main difference from classical first-order logic is the model theory, and the resulting formal axiomatics. The reader is referred e.g. to Smullyan [94] for a comprehensive discussion of classical first-order logic.

The ability to reason and think in a logical manner forms the basis of learning for most mathematics, computer science, philosophy and logic students. Based on the author's teaching notes at the University of Maryland and aimed at a broad audience, this text covers the fundamental topics in classical logic in an extremely clear, thorough and accurate style that is accessible to all the above. Covering propositional logic, first-order logic, and second-order logic, as well as proof theory, computability theory, and model theory, the text also contains numerous carefully graded exercises and is ideal for a first or refresher course.

We define a natural notion of standard translation for the formulas of conditional logic which is analogous to the standard translation of modal formulas into the first-order logic. We briefly show that this translation works (modulo a lightweight first-order encoding of the conditional models) for the minimal classical conditional logic $\mathsf {CK}$ introduced by Brian Chellas in [3]; however, the main result of the article is that a classically equivalent reformulation of these notions (i.e., of standard translation plus theory of conditional models) also faithfully embeds the basic Nelsonian conditional logic $\mathsf {N4CK}$ , introduced in [11] into $\mathsf {QN4}$ , the paraconsistent variant of Nelson’s first-order logic of strong negation. Thus $\mathsf {N4CK}$ is the logic induced by the Nelsonian reading of the classical Chellas semantics of conditionals and can, therefore, be considered a faithful analogue of $\mathsf {CK}$ on the non-classical basis provided by the propositional fragment of $\mathsf {QN4}$ . Moreover, the methods used to prove our main result can be easily adapted to the case of modal logic, which makes it possible to improve an older result [10, Proposition 7] by S. Odintsov and H. Wansing about the standard translation embedding of the Nelsonian modal logic $\mathsf {FSK}^d$ into $\mathsf {QN4}$ .

This thesis consists of four independent papers. In the first paper, joint with Kechris, we study the global aspects of structurability in the theory of countable Borel equivalence relations. For a class K of countable relational structures, a countable Borel equivalence relation E is said to be K-structurable if there is a Borel way to put a structure in K on each E-equivalence class. We show that K-structurability interacts well with various preorders commonly used in the classification of countable Borel equivalence relations. We consider the poset of classes of K-structurable equivalence relations for various K, under inclusion, and show that it is a distributive lattice. Finally, we consider the effect on K-structurability of various model-theoretic properties of K; in particular, we characterize the K such that every K-structurable equivalence relation is smooth. In the second paper, we consider the classes of Kn-structurable equivalence relations, where Kn is the class of n-dimensional contractible simplicial complexes. We show that every Kn-structurable equivalence relation Borel embeds into one structurable by complexes in Kn with the further property that each vertex belongs to at most Mn := 2n-1(n2+3n+2)-2 edges; this generalizes a result of Jackson-Kechris-Louveau in the case n=1. In the third paper, we consider the amalgamation property from model theory in an abstract categorical context. A category is said to have the amalgamation property if every pushout diagram has a cocone. We characterize the finitely generated categories I such that in every category with the amalgamation property, every I-shaped diagram has a cocone. In the fourth paper, we prove a strong conceptual completeness theorem (in the sense of Makkai) for the infinitary logic Lω1ω: every countable Lω1ω-theory can be canonically recovered from its standard Borel groupoid of countable models, up to a suitable syntactical notion of equivalence. This implies that given two theories (L,T) and (L',T'), every Borel functor Mod(L',T') → Mod(L,T) between the respective groupoids of countable models is Borel naturally isomorphic to the functor induced by some L'ω1ω-interpretation of T in T', which generalizes a recent result of Harrison-Trainor, Miller, and Montalban in the case where T, T' are ℵ0-categorical.