An Introduction to the Indian Criminal Justice System

The Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia has implemented the chamber system to achieve judicial consistency and fulfil the fundamental objectives of law, namely legal certainty, justice, and expediency. However, despite this effort, inconsistencies in judicial decisions remain prevalent, particularly in civil and criminal cases at the district and high court levels. This study employed a normative juridical approach supported by case analysis to examine the effectiveness of the current chamber system in achieving judicial consistency and to identify structural weaknesses that hinder its optimal implementation. The results reveal that judicial inconsistencies are found in several court decisions, such as the Baturaja District Court Decision Number 1/Pdt.G.S/2016/PN Bta, which deviates from the Supreme Court Decision Number 2904 K/Pdt/2014, and the Supreme Court Circular Letter was deviated by Palembang High Court Decision Number 3/PID/2025/PT PLG. Law implementation inconsistencies even exist in similar cases at first instance level, as in the South Jakarta Court Decision Number 484/Pdt.G/2013/PN Jkt.Sel differs from the Bandung District Court Decision Number 514/Pdt.G/2013/PN Bdg, even within the same institution, such as the Baturaja District Court Decision Number 36/Pdt.G.S/2023/PN Bta differs from the Baturaja District Court Decision Number 1/Pdt.G.S/2016/PN Bta. Based on the findings of this study, strengthening the chamber system by establishing civil and criminal chambers at both appellate and first-instance courts is essential to ensure uniformity in judicial decision-making and achieve judicial consistency, a manifestation of legal certainty within Indonesia’s judicial framework.

Forensic economics experts (FE) working with attorneys engaged in litigation, whether consulting, preparing a report, or testifying at deposition or trial, generally are expected to have some knowledge (1) of the state’s statutory and case law regarding allowable damages and methods; and (2) that certain topics (e.g., taxes, collateral sources) should not be mentioned or considered at certain times since a mistrial could result. This situation creates a tension: forensic economics experts are economics experts and are not attorneys, but nonetheless must have a reasonable understanding of the relevant state law. In this vein, the Journal of Forensic Economics (JFE) continues to publish a series of articles on the ways such damages are calculated in different state jurisdictions, one state at a time.2 The state of South Dakota is included in this issue and this paper adds Illinois to the list. Following the format of previous articles in this JFE series, Section II provides a listing of the controlling statutes, general case law, and court rules. Section III discusses the concept of earning capacity which appears throughout PI and WD case law in Illinois. Section IV discusses discounting to present value. Fringe benefits are discussed in Section V, while Section

With society scrutinizing the American criminal justice system, a standard of ethics becomes ever so important for law enforcement officials, members of the bench, and correctional personnel. Creating a code of conduct not only benefits the individual players in the criminal justice system but it also protects the integrity of each institution. Unfortunately, one of the most important judicial branches in the criminal justice system, the United States Supreme Court, does not have, nor follow an ethical code of conduct. This creates a problem for criminal justice practitioners, the media, and society. This article examines the current requirements for a sitting Supreme Court Justice when facing an ethical dilemma and addresses the steps a Justice should take. The Justices have responded by questioning the need for a code of conduct and have challenged recently proposed legislation to address ethical concerns raised by the media as it has investigated the actions and behaviors of the Justices on the High Court. Addressing the critical issue of enforcement, the authors support the oversight of an Inspector General to address ethical issues facing the members of the U.S. Supreme Court

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Australian constitutional development in the past decade has been the advent of the constitutional protection of political communication. One important effect of this development has been to focus Australian constitutional debate on the long standing and rich tradition of constitutional protection of speech in the United States. Reference to American constitutional law is not unprecedented. The United States Constitution has long been a source for Australian constitutional lawyers. It was extensively referred to by the framers of the Australian Constitution and over the century since the framing, it has been a constant point of reference for the High Court of Australia. However, the influence of the First Amendment is particularly significant since the Bill of Rights and the other rights provisions of the United States Constitution have traditionally been thought of as a part of the American constitutional tradition which Australia does not share. The influence of American constitutional jurisprudence, and specifically First Amendment law, in the High Court of Australia has never been more significant than in the most adventurous of its decisions on the freedom of political communication: Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times and Stephens v West Australian Newspapers. Here, the High Court significantly expanded the protection of political communication by adopting a rule similar to the New York Times v Sullivan doctrine. That is, the Court limited the capacity of political figures to bring actions for defamation. However, most unusually for recent decisions of the High Court, these cases were reconsidered and considerably reformulated by the Court only three years after they were first announced, in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission. The short life of these cases appears to lend fuel to those who argue against the use of the American precedent, and specifically First Amendment jurisprudence, in interpreting the Australian Constitution. In this article, I will join those who have expressed such concerns. My focus, however, is somewhat different from previous analyses. I will consider a difference between the two systems that has been overlooked: the different jurisdictions of the highest appellate courts. The High Court, unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, has jurisdiction to hear appeals from all courts, state and federal. In hearing these appeals, it has jurisdiction over matters of common law as well as federal law and the Constitution. The significance of the High Court's role as the interpreter of the common law was highlighted by Theophanous and Stephens. In those cases, argument was addressed to the High Court on both the protection of freedom of speech by the Constitution and by the common law of defamation. Had it been so inclined, the Court could have avoided the constitutional issue entirely through a decision on the common law. However, the principal basis of the decision of the majority was the Constitution. In my view, the Court’s failure to appreciate the significance of its common law jurisdiction helps explain where the High Court went wrong in Theophanous and Stephens, and how it might have avoided facing so serious a challenge to recent cases as it did in Lange. Before proceeding to make this point, however, I devote Part I of this article to explaining the nature and origins of the High Court’s jurisdiction on matters of common law and compare it to the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. In Part II, I outline Theophanous and Stephens and compare the constitutional approach of the majority to the common law approach of two of the dissenting Justices. Part III contains the heart of my argument. I consider how the High Court ought to proceed when a case before it can be decided either by the common law or by interpretation of the Constitution. I argue that the common law brings with it significant advantages so that in many cases where the two overlap, the High Court ought to prefer the common law and I use Theophanous and Stephens to illustrate my point. In Part IV, I identify more precisely the kinds of cases in which the benefits of a common law solution should lead the High Court to prefer it and defend my argument against some of the most obvious objections to it. Finally, in Part V, I consider the reformulation of the Theophanous doctrine in Lange and the extent to which that decision is responsive to the critique I have launched.

Why women first joined high courts (supreme courts, constitutional courts, and high appellate courts) when they did is the topic of chapter 2. Drawing on the book’s cross-national data set, this chapter explains why women broke the judicial glass ceiling sooner on some courts than others. To consider the influence of multiple factors on the timing of the first woman and given that some courts have never appointed women, the chapter uses an event history model. The cross-national analysis reveals that the more women completing tertiary education relative to men, the faster the first woman is appointed. Further, the results make clear that the judicial glass ceiling is not broken in a domestic vacuum: after other high courts in the geographic region have a woman justice, the faster the appointment of the first woman, and the first woman high court judge is appointed sooner the more advocacy organizations are connected to the international women’s movement.

INTRODUCTION In November 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Whole Woman 's Health v. Cole (1) the first reproductive rights case to reach the court since Gonzales v. Carhart (2) eight years before. In the intervening time, states have passed an astonishing number of laws and regulations that encroach on women's access to abortion. Many such laws ostensibly aim to protect the woman and her fetus. Yet these same laws do so by imposing medically unnecessary and onerous procedural requirements on women, (3) which can erect massive barriers to abortion access for individuals. Other state laws aim to regulate not the activities of women, but those of abortion providers, who are not a protected class. The reproductive rights movement terms these laws Targeted Regulations of Abortion Providers, or TRAP laws. (4) State legislatures' passage of TRAP laws accelerated after the Supreme Court's decision in Carhart, which was taken to signal judicial willingness to uphold state laws that aim to protect an unborn fetus at the expense of reducing a woman's ability to choose. (5) This Note focuses on admitting-privileges laws, a type of TRAP law that requires physicians who provide abortions to obtain staff privileges at a hospital within a certain distance from their clinics. Without these required privileges, physicians performing abortions risk civil and criminal penalties. These laws are especially concerning because they give area hospitals an effective veto over a clinic's operations, effectively outsourcing the power to deny licenses to private entities. Admitting-privileges decisions are often discretionary for hospital administrators; a hospital's denial of admitting privileges also lacks state oversight or external appeals. Admitting-privileges laws are being ratified throughout many states, but have proven resistant to traditional substantive due process challenges. In addition to traditional undue burden analysis, a multipronged approach to reproductive rights litigation and advocacy is necessary. Part I of this Note sets forth a brief history of the right to choose an abortion and the current federal legal framework. Then, it details recent state legislative and ballot initiatives aimed at regulating abortion providers. Part II explains the complications of using the undue burden doctrine in constitutional challenges to state action, as illuminated by recent cases litigating admitting-privileges laws. It further introduces private-delegation challenges as an alternative method to examine the constitutionality of these laws. Part III looks at the history of private-delegation challenges with respect to admitting- privileges laws and touches on other possible avenues to challenge admitting-privileges regulations. I. Abortion in the Post-Roe Era In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, which recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a right to privacy that extends to a woman's decision to have an abortion. (6) Roe's effect was remarkable. Before Roe, each individual state regulated abortions and the accessibility thereof with their traditional police powers. At the time of the decision, four states had repealed anti-abortion laws, while thirteen had begun reforms of their abortion laws. (7) Almost all the rest banned abortion in most cases. (8) After the Supreme Court identified a right to choose an abortion grounded in the federal Constitution, the annual number of legal abortions rose through the 1970s, leveling off in the 1980s. (9) After Roe, the Supreme Court also decided Doe v. Bolton, (10) which assessed the elaborate procedural barriers to abortion erected by the state of Georgia and invalidated some of them for being not reasonably related to the state interest (11) or redundant. (12) Doe has been interpreted to signal that just as states may not prevent abortion by making the performance a crime, states may not make abortions unreasonably difficult to obtain by prescribing elaborate procedural barriers. …

Since 1995, the Chilean Supreme Court counts with specialized chambers for knowing determinate matters. One of the main objectives in creating these specialized chambers consisted in assuring a more certain and uniform application of the law. This article focuses on the case-law produced by the Supreme Court's criminal chamber, trying to assess the extent to which the goal of a uniform application of the law was achieved during the years 1995-2002. In order to do so, the study utilizes the conceptual framework elaborated by relevant American research on the following of precedents, assuming that a more uniform application of the law is the natural result of that kind of court behavior. According to that research, the degree to which the precedents set by a Supreme Court are actually followed can be ascertained in two levels: first, by examining the phenomena within the Supreme Court itself, where a justice's precedential attitude depends on a low level of salience of the issue addressed, which in turns depends on specific historical circumstances (Spaeth & Segal); second, by studying the issue in a 'vertical' direction, that is, through the examination of the extend to which the behavior of lower court's is congruent with the jurisprudence elaborated by the Supreme Court, which depends on certain institutional conditions studied under the principal/agent relationship model (Songer, Segal & Cameron). This study examines precisely the degree of precedent-following exhibited by the Criminal Chamber of the Chilean Supreme Court and by the country's High courts with regard to five precedent-setting cases decided by the former. After an extensive analysis of court decisions and in depth-interviews of Supreme Court's justices and High Court's judges, as well as criminal-lawyers, the study concludes that the introduction of a Supreme Courts' Criminal Chamber has produced ambivalent, if not poor, outcomes in terms of a uniformity of its jurisprudence, both within the Criminal Chamber itself and at the High courts' level.

Introduction Melvin I. Urofsky The other day I was looking at the Court’s docket for this year, and realized that while the specifics may have changed—there are more cases dealing with technology, for example— the heart of the docket is what it has been for more than eight decades: important ques­ tions of constitutional and statutory interpre­ tation. In the course of recent research, I read through some volumes of U.S. Reports for the mid-1920s, before the Judges’ Bill of 1925 took force and reoriented the Court. While one would run across the occasional case that would have been important in any Term, a vast majority of the cases involved matters of pri­ vate law or obscure state regulation. ChiefJus­ tice William Howard Taft wanted to make the Court primarily a constitutional tribunal, and he succeeded brilliantly. It is hard to believe that a historian reading about the cases during the Rehnquist and Roberts eras would dismiss the vast majority ofthem as “unimportant.” The Court itself, of course, since the founding of the nation, has been critical to the successful operation of the great experi­ ment, and this issue looks at some of those events in which the Court played a part. In some instances, it did so through expound­ ing principles in a decision, and Thomas Cox examines one of the most important of those cases, Gibbons v. Ogden. Moreover, as histo­ rians have understood for a long time, it is not only the jurisprudential issue that counts, but also how that decision plays out against the context of changing economic and social conditions. Mr. Cox does an admirable job of explicating this. The Supreme Court never ruled on the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, but mat­ ters arising under America’s first “internal se­ curity act” did come up before some of the lower courts. Given how active the judiciary is regarding current security measures, Arthur Garrison’s examination of how judges treated the early laws is instructive. In the last issue of the Journal, we ran the first part of Theodore Vestal’s exami­ nation of how the Court during the Warren years engaged in public diplomacy, a role then somewhat alien to the Justices. Since then, of course, members of our High Court have be­ come familiar figures as they travel overseas during the summer recess and speak to jurists v vi JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY and legal academics in other countries. In this issue, we have the conclusion of Mr. Vestal’s study. A few years ago, the Supreme Court His­ torical Society’s annual lecture series dealt with advocacy before the High Court. At the time, we heard from many people who wanted to know why we did not include this person or someone else who was a great advocate. (One was reminded of Justice Brandeis’s comment that Robert H. Jackson ought to be made So­ licitor General for life!) There were, ofcourse, many other lawyers who practiced before the Supreme Court who were very good, but in a series one can only deal with a few. Here we make up for at least one omission, as Jeremy McLaughlin examines the role of one of the great orators ofthe nineteenth century, Henry Clay, in his Supreme Court practice. Todd C. Peppers has graced the pages of the Journal before. In this issue, he looks at a topic very close to my own heart: the relation­ ship between Justice Louis Brandeis and his clerks. It was far different from those of say Holmes, Frankfurter, or Brennan, but when I interviewed several of his clerks many years ago, all spoke of their year with Brandeis in terms ofawe. Finally, as ever, we are indebted to Grier Stephenson for keeping us up to date on recent historiography. The interest in the Court never seems to wane—which is fortunate for all of us—and Grier performs an invaluable service in his efforts to sort out the books in front of us. As always, enjoy! ...

eroG .v hsuB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors

Article 138: Enlargement of the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Jurisdiction is the fulcrum of any court or legislature. Jurisdiction for statutory intellectual property in Nigeria is vested in the centre in a federal system of government where legislative and adjudicatory powers are shared between federal and constituent governments. Historically, the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court (FHC) and State High Court (SHC) has been notoriously ambivalent in many issues – passing off being one of them. The passing off of intellectual property has been particularly problematic because of its common law origin and nature especially in the absence of a federal statute on it. This article reviews three different decisions of the Nigerian Supreme Court over time and argues that the Supreme Court may not have considered the ramifications of the different constitutions in those cases. It argues the position that the FHC should not exercise jurisdiction over passing off of intellectual property (common law tort) until there is a federal statute creating a substantive law on passing off. The jurisdiction lies with the SHC. It supports this position with the 1999 Constitution, state laws on torts as existing laws and the experience of Canada and the United States, and hopes the Supreme Court will, at the earliest opportunity, overrule or correct itself; or that the legislature will intervene.

Although federal circuit and district court judges are placed within a federal hierarchy, and receive legal and judicial training that emphasizes the importance of the judicial framework and its structure, such judges are also subjected to other pressures such as the types of litigants within the courtrooms as well as their local political environment. Furthermore, such judges are apt to form their own views about politics and legal policy and are often appointed by presidents who approve of their ideological leanings. Thus, federal courts are caught between competing goals such as their willingness to maximize their preferred legal policy, and their place within the judicial hierarchy. This dissertation applies hierarchy and impact theory to assess the importance of the judicial framework and its socialization, by analyzing both the judicial opinions and votes of federal circuit and district court judges in obscenity cases during a four-decade period (1957-1998). The research presented here finds the influence of higher court precedent to correspond in part with the conception of a judicial hierarchy. An analysis of citations of Supreme Court precedent (Roth v. United States (1957) and Miller v. California (1973)) in lower court majority opinions suggests low levels of compliance: lower courts at the circuit and district court level do not signal to the Supreme Court their acceptance of High Court doctrine; thus, except for 'factual' cases, most circuit and district court decisions do not comply formally with higher court precedent. An analysis of judicial votes, however, suggests that a Supreme Court doctrinal shift (to Miller v. California) influences lower court decisions only at the circuit court level. Further investigation suggests that Supreme Court precedent has a greater influence in circuit courts than in district courts: not only is the magnitude greater for circuit (versus district) court decisions, such results occur when controlling for such factors as the appointing president, regional variations, various constitutional claims and types of litigants. Thus, it appears that the influence of Supreme Court doctrine is much stronger in the circuit courts (only one step removed from the Supreme Court) than in district courts yet the hierarchy is influential nonetheless.

The paper terminates by outlining the multimedia UI of a prototype of the KR based Innovation Expert System (IES), which tests a claimed classical as well as emerging technology invention under the Substantive Law (SPL) of any National System (NPS), in particular under the 4 §§ 101/102/103/112 of 35 USC, as interpreted by the Supreme Courts' KSR/Bilski/Mayo decisions. Already this IES prototype is capable of indicating the amazing power of the Patent induced by this US Highest Courts' SPL precedents as to such tests for a claimed invention. It works semi-automated when testing in explorative mode and fully automated/real- time when testing in confirmative mode. Developing this powerful Technology has been enabled by performing substantial Mathematical KR research about recent US Highest Courts' patent precedents published by Mathematical KR research papers and amicus briefs submitted to the US Supreme Court and CAFC as to KR insights so obtained into the problems of SPL precedents, e.g. when dealing with claimed emerging technology inventions.  Index Terms—SPL (substantive patent law) and KR based claimed inventions' tests, a KR based IES prototype and its UI, emerging technologies inventions, the supreme court's KSR/Bilski/Mayo decisions and their notions of inventive concept/preemptivity/abstract idea, the CAFC's recent precedents

APA Boosts Advocacy Efforts In Courts, State Houses

Roe v Wade, Dobbs, and the Future of Graduate Medical Education.