Analysis of a Measured Launch

As the platform mobility increases, it becomes increasingly susceptible to theft. Stolen data is often regarded as being more valuable than the notebook hardware itself. Thus, the need to protect user data and secrets is underscored in a mobile computing environment. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is defined as a hardware instantiation which has been proposed by the TCG (Trusted Computing Group) for trust computing. TPM offers facilities for the secure generation of cryptographic keys, and limitations on their use, in addition to a hardware pseudo-random number generator. It also includes capabilities such as remote attestation and sealed storage. A TPM can be used to authenticate hardware devices. Since each TPM chip has a unique and secret RSA key burned in during production, it is capable of performing platform authentication. The TPB (Trusted Platform Board) is an expansion of the TPM for enhancing the efficiency and usability of the TPM chip. In addition to the TPB functions supporting high-standard trust environments within the hardware standard of the system in this paper, we develop the v-TMS (Visual Trustworthy Monitoring System) that provides visualization of real-time monitoring for the behavior of system resources (process, memory, network, users, etc.) with TPB and system software for hardening of OS and applications. Moreover, v-TMS is not only a web-based computing environment for system resources but also a real-time monitoring system for a trust computing environment.

Trusted Computing (TC) is a technology developed and promoted by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), and aims to enhance the overall security, privacy and trustworthiness of a variety of computing devices. The core of the trusted computing technologies of TCG is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a tamper-resistant module embedded in a platform, which is implemented by a TPM chip and designed to resist software attacks and moderate hardware attacks. TPM includes non-volatile storage, a set of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) and an engine for cryptographic operations. Based on TPM and TCG Software Stack (TSS), a suite of mechanisms can be realized, including memory curtaining, protected execution, secure I/O, sealed storage, platform measurement and remote attestation. As a fundamental secure computing module, TPM is the root trust module to establish security and trust in digital computing, communication and networking. Basically, it can support secure booting and trustworthy software installation, private data protection and Digital Rights Management (DRM), as well as remote attestation- based trusted communications and collaboration. There is significant research currently in the field of trusted computing, in both academia and industry. Recent efforts focus on TC module development and extension, trustworthy software assurance, Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), trusted collaboration and trusted storage. The recent advance of Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) offers hardware-assistant TEE, which allows user code execution in a private region of memory, called enclave, in an untrusted third party. This technology attracts special attention and motivates innovations of many applications.

Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a key component designed to enable computers achieve greater security. Several vulnerabilities discovered in the TPM highlight the necessity of formal analysis. The procedure invoking an API may be regarded as several interactive processes between the TPM and a user. As a result, the current study formalized the API specifications proposed by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) using applied pi calculus. Meanwhile, two authentication properties between them were also described in a formalized way. With the help of the tool ProVerif, the flaw of the command TPM_CertifyKey was discovered. It was also confirmed on the TPM emulator. Subsequently, the modified API was presented and its authentication properties could be satisfied after verifying again. Results show the model is valid. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11591/telkomnika.v11i2.2034

3 - Overview of the TPM Architecture

Trusted computing (TC) is considered to be one of the newly developed technologies on improving computer security and creating a trustworthy environment. Although the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has defined specifications/or TC, including that of trusted platform module (TPM), criteria on compliance testing is still not available. It is important that the design and implementation of TPM and other components follow the specifications, as incompliance may lead to crucial security impacts. In this paper, a test mechanism checking TPM commands is instrumented into TPM application, so that conformance to standards can be examined before TPM's functional execution to validate its compliance with the specifications. Furthermore, this paper also initially puts forward the concept of "chain of compliance", which enhances the trustworthiness of computing platforms by verifying the conformance of their components.

<p>A computer hijacked by a malware may pretend that it is normal as usual and retrieve secrets from storage of itself and other victim computers. By adopting trusted computing technology a computer’s former health status cannot be forged. Computers can thus detect the change of health status of a hijacked computer and prevent the leakage of the secrets. As Trusted Computing Group (TCG) proposed Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specification, IBM implemented software TPM (sTPM) and utilities for engineer who wants to learn the operating principle of TPM. Meanwhile, the blooming of tiny size, but powerful, computers, e.g. Raspberry Pi 2 (Rpi2), attract ones to develop some dedicated applications on the computers. In this article, we report the verified steps for installing new sTPM version on RPi2. After the installation, we also test the functionality and evaluate the performance of the sTPM with some major TPM Commands. The real behaviour of and the traffic between the host computer and the emulated TPM can thus be learned easily.</p>

Cloud computing platforms constructed on Trusted Computing Technology are commonly referred to as trusted cloud computing. The core component of this technology is known as Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Its specifications are given by the consortium known as Trusted Computing Group (TCG). Though TPM is an immovable module and is fixed inside any computer, yet its credentials can be shared with other devices. This paper presents the accessibility model for Virtual Machine (VM) of a distributed trust protocol which is based on TPM, through which consumer's credentials are shared to other trusted devices. These credentials essentially describe the integrity of VM.

This paper describes the direct anonymous attestation scheme (DAA). This scheme was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) as the method for remote authentication of a hardware module, called Trusted Platform Module (TPM), while preserving the privacy of the user of the platform that contains the module. DAA can be seen as a group signature without the feature that a signature can be opened, i.e., the anonymity is not revocable. Moreover, DAA allows for pseudonyms, i.e., for each signature a user (in agreement with the recipient of the signature) can decide whether or not the signature should be linkable to another signature. DAA furthermore allows for detection of known keys: if the DAA secret keys are extracted from a TPM and published, a verifier can detect that a signature was produced using these secret keys. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model under the strong RSA and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

To prevent unauthorized access to protected trusted platform module (TPM) objects, authorization protocols, such as the object-specific authorization protocol (OSAP), have been introduced by the trusted computing group (TCG). By using OSAP, processes trying to gain access to the protected TPM objects need to prove their knowledge of relevant authorization data before access to the objects can be granted. Chen and Ryan's 2009 analysis has demonstrated OSAP's authentication vulnerability in sessions with shared authorization data. They also proposed the Session Key Authorization Protocol (SKAP) with fewer stages as an alternative to OSAP. Chen and Ryan's analysis of SKAP using ProVerif proves the authentication property. The purpose of this paper was to examine the usefulness of Colored Petri Nets (CPN) and CPN Tools for security analysis. Using OSAP and SKAP as case studies, we construct intruder and authentication property models in CPN. CPN Tools is used to verify the authentication property using a Dolev---Yao-based model. Verification of the authentication property in both models using the state space tool produces results consistent with those of Chen and Ryan.

Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a scheme that enables the remote authentication of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) while preserving the user's privacy. A TPM can prove to a remote party that it is a valid TPM without revealing its identity and without linkability. In the DAA scheme, a TPM can be revoked only if the DAA private key in the hardware has been extracted and published widely so that verifiers obtain the corrupted private key. If the unlinkability requirement is relaxed, a TPM suspected of being compromised can be revoked even if the private key is not known. However, with the full unlinkability requirement intact, if a TPM has been compromised but its private key has not been distributed to verifiers, the TPM cannot be revoked. Furthermore, a TPM cannot be revoked from the issuer, if the TPM is found to be compromised after the DAA issuing has occurred. In this paper, we present a new DAA scheme called Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) scheme that addresses the above limitations. While still providing unlinkability, our scheme provides a method to revoke a TPM even if the TPM private key is unknown. This expanded revocation property makes the scheme useful for other applications such as for driver's license. Our EPID scheme is efficient and secure in the same security model as DAA, i.e. in the random oracle model under the strong RSA assumption and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Virtualization and cloud computing can help an organization achieve significant datacenter savings in hardware costs, operational expenditures, and energy demands while achieving improvements in quality of service and business agility. The combination of a hardware based root of trust such as trust platform module (TPM) on virtual machine (VM) based system have being widely adopted. In this paper, combined with the trusted computing and cloud computing security, we establish a trust system with a certificate authority (CA) and trusted platform module (TPM). It takes the CA as the root of trust cloud computing platform. The servers use the TPM through the operations of acquisition, registration, certification for the certification and the operations of new construction, launch, running, transfer and maintenance for the virtual machine (VM). To implement the trusted ensure of the security, it designs the trusted module which take the TPM as the core, and develops the VM as a complete trust system with a measurement algorithm. It can be used into the VM authentication mechanism and the access user authentication mechanism of the VM.

In the specification of Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Object-Independent Authorization Protocol (OIAP) is the protocol which guarantees the security of the communication between TPM and its users. Nowadays, there are many TPM manufacturers having made their own TPM. However, some of the TPM manufacturers don't implement the TPM completely according to the specification of TPM. In this paper, BAN logic is used to construct an ideal model of OIAP. The security of the OIAP implemented by some TPM manufacturers is analyzed with the initial hypothesis and the logic postulate. From the result of analyzing, the inappropriate implementation of OIAP by the TPM manufacturers would lead to a replay attack, and the data in the data integrity register (DIR) and non-volatile (NV) storage would be contaminated by this attack.

Verifiable trust is a desirable property for computing platforms. Current trusted computing systems developed by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) provide verifiable trust by taking immutable snapshots of the whole set of platform components. It is, however, difficult to use this technology directly in virtualized platforms because of complexity and dynamic changes of platform components. In this paper, we introduce a novel integrity management solution based on a small Software-based Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM) that provides a trusted link to the integrity measurement chain in the TCG technology.Our solution makes two principal contributions: The first is a key management method, by which a verifier can be convinced that the SRTM is a trusted delegatee of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The second is two integrity management services, which provides a novel dependency relation between platform components and enables reversible changes to measured components. This extended abstract of the paper focuses on the key management method and shows the high level idea of these two services. Details of the dependency relation, the reversible changes, and the Xen implementation may be found in the full version of the paper.KeywordsIntegrity measurement and reportingplatform virtualizationsoftware-based root of trust for measurement

13 - Establishing a TPM Owner

Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) are small, inexpensive chips which provide a limited set of security functions. They are most commonly found as a motherboard component on laptops and desktops aimed at the corporate or government markets, but can also be found on many consumer-grade machines and servers, or purchased as independent components. Their role is to serve as a Root of Trust - a highly trusted component from which we can bootstrap trust in other parts of a system. TPMs are most useful for three kinds of tasks: remotely identifying a machine, or machine authentication; providing hardware protection of secrets, or data protection; and providing verifiable evidence about a machine's state, or attestation. This book describes the primary uses for TPMs, and practical considerations such as when TPMs can and should be used, when they shouldn't be, what advantages they provide, and how to actually make use of them, with use cases and worked examples of how to implement these use cases on a real system. Topics covered include when to use a TPM; TPM concepts and functionality; programming introduction; provisioning: getting the TPM ready to use; first steps: TPM keys; machine authentication; data protection; attestation; other TPM features; software and specifications; and troubleshooting. Appendices contain basic cryptographic concepts; command equivalence and requirements charts; and complete code samples.