ARAP: Demystifying Anti Runtime Analysis Code in Android Apps

A majority of today's mobile apps integrate web content of various kinds. Unfortunately, the interactions between app code and web content expose new attack vectors: a malicious app can subvert its embedded web content to steal user secrets; on the other hand, malicious web content can use the privileges of its embedding app to exfiltrate sensitive information such as the user's location and contacts. In this paper, we discuss security weaknesses of the interface between app code and web content through attacks, then introduce defenses that can be deployed without modifying the OS. Our defenses feature WIREframe, a service that securely embeds and renders external web content in Android apps, and in turn, prevents attacks between em- bedded web and host apps. WIREframe fully mediates the interface between app code and embedded web content. Un- like the existing web-embedding mechanisms, WIREframe allows both apps and embedded web content to define simple access policies to protect their own resources. These policies recognize fine-grained security principals, such as origins, and control all interactions between apps and the web. We also introduce WIRE (Web Isolation Rewriting Engine), an offline app rewriting tool that allows app users to inject WIREframe protections into existing apps. Our evaluation, based on 7166 popular apps and 20 specially selected apps, shows these techniques work on complex apps and incur acceptable end-to-end performance overhead.

The dramatic rise of Android application (app) marketplaces has significantly gained the success of convenience for mobile users. Consequently, with the advantage of numerous Android apps, Android malware seizes the opportunity to steal privacy-sensitive data by pretending to provide functionalities as benign apps do. To distinguish malware from millions of Android apps, researchers have proposed sophisticated static and dynamic analysis tools to automatically detect and classify malicious apps. Most of these tools, however, rely on manual configuration of lists of features based on permissions, sensitive resources, intents, etc., which are difficult to come by. To address this problem, we study real-world Android apps to mine hidden patterns of malware and are able to extract highly sensitive APIs that are widely used in Android malware. We also implement an automated malware detection system, MalPat, to fight against malware and assist Android app marketplaces to address unknown malicious apps. Comprehensive experiments are conducted on our dataset consisting of 31 185 benign apps and 15 336 malware samples. Experimental results show that MalPat is capable of detecting malware with a high $F_1$ score (98.24%) comparing with the state-of-the-art approaches.

As many malicious apps have been distributed in Android markets, it is urgent to fix the vulnerabilities exploited by these apps and develop effective mitigation methods. In this paper, we identify a common vulnerability in many Android apps. This vulnerability is rooted in an unprotected Android component, called "Activity". Utilizing this vulnerability, a malicious app can stealthily and cannily collect sensitive user data. To better understand this issue, we have built "ActivityHijacker", an app that can detect the right moment to hijack the Activity component and intercept a user's password while it is being inputted in real time. To assess the prevalence of this vulnerability, we further analyzed 8 Android OSs (version 2.x to 5.x) and 22 banking apps collected in January 2016 from various Android markets. Our results show that all these Android OSs and apps are susceptible to the vulnerability; 14 out of 22 banking apps can be hijacked without any prompts. We further present a mitigation mechanism that restricts the Activity component to authorized apps.

The visual recognition of Android malicious applications (Apps) is mainly focused on the binary classification using grayscale images, while the multiclassification of malicious App families is rarely studied. If we can visualize the Android malicious Apps as color images, we will get more features than using grayscale images. In this paper, a method of color visualization for Android Apps is proposed and implemented. Based on this, combined with deep learning models, a multiclassifier for the Android malicious App families is implemented, which can classify 10 common malicious App families. In order to better understand the behavioral characteristics of malicious Apps, we conduct a comprehensive manual analysis for a large number of malicious Apps and summarize 1695 malicious behavior characteristics as customized features. Compared with the App classifier based on the grayscale visualization method, it is verified that the classifier using the color visualization method can achieve better classification results. We use four types of Android App features: classes.dex file, sets of class names, APIs, and customized features as input for App visualization. According to the experimental results, we find out that using the customized features as the color visualization input features can achieve the highest detection accuracy rate, which is 96% in the ten malicious families.

Due to the widespread of Android apps in our daily life, vulnerable or malicious apps have become two major threats on clients’ privacy. Taint analysis is one of the most widely used approach for detecting information leakage by tracking sensitive flows through the apps in accord with specific taint propagation rules and predefined sensitive sources and sinks. However, most existing static taint analysis tools, including FlowDroid, IccTA, etc., neglect the semantics of detected flows, especially for conditional branch in apps, which may cause a precision loss in practical environment. In this paper, we propose NLEU, a semantic-based taint analysis approach to improve the precision of traditional flow tracking techniques, which introduce a new dimension of information, i.e., the program’s semantics, for vetting Android apps. At the same time, NLEU can eliminate the insensitive flows of flow tracking techniques. The NLP techniques are adopted to extract the program semantics from codes and their comments. Through the experiments and evaluations, the result show that NLEU can improve the overall performance effectively compared with the traditional tools.

Security of authentication protocols heavily relies on the confidentiality of credentials (or authenticators) like passwords and session IDs. However, unlike browser-based web applications for which highly evolved browsers manage the authenticators, Android apps have to construct their own management. We find that most apps simply locate their authenticators into the persistent storage and entrust underlying Android OS for mediation. Consequently, these authenticators can be leaked through compromised backup channels. In this work, we conduct the first systematic investigation on this previously overlooked attack vector. We find that nearly all backup apps on Google Play inadvertently expose backup data to any app with internet and SD card permissions. With this exposure, the malicious apps can steal other apps' authenticators and obtain complete control over the authenticated sessions. We show that this can be stealthily and efficiently done by building a proof-of-concept app named AuthSniffer. We find that 80 (68.4%) out of the 117 tested top-ranked apps which have implemented authentication schemes are subject to this threat. Our study should raise the awareness of app developers and protocol analysts about this attack vector.

While Android has become most popular OS in mobile phone market, more and more Android app developers are suffering from intellectual property infringement because it’s easy to extract the assets stored in the Android apps and to decompile Android apps to Java source code. This issue also poses threats to users’ privacy. In this article we reviewed the existing protection approaches for the protection of the source code and assets in Android apps, demonstrated the reason why Java Native Interface (JNI) approach can help improve the protection provided by existing approaches, developed 4 Android demo apps with 2 experiments conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of protection provided by the combination of Encryption and JNI approaches.

In recent years, with the growing popularity of smartphones, the number of Android malware shows explosive growth. As malicious apps may steal users' sensitive data and money from mobile and bank accounts, it's important to detect potential malicious behavior in real time. To achieve this goal, we propose a dynamic behavior inspection and analysis framework for malicious behavior detection in Android apps. A customized Android system is built to record apps' API (Application Programming Interface) calls, permission uses, and some other runtime features such as user operations. We also develop an automated testing platform to test massive samples so as to collect dynamic app behavior records. Then we exploit these records to extract apps' runtime features of both user interaction and app dynamic behavior for benign and malicious behavior classification. The experimental results show that the app behavior classification can reach an accuracy of 99.0%, identifying 71.8% instances of malware samples by running each app for only 18 minutes.

Inspired by the human immune system, we explore the development of a new Multiple-Detector Set Artificial Immune System (mAIS) for the detection of mobile malware based on the information flows in Android apps. mAISs differ from conventional AISs in that multiple-detector sets are evolved concurrently via negative selection. Typically, the first detector set is composed of detectors that match information flows associated with malicious apps while the second detector set is composed of detectors that match the information flows associated with benign apps. The mAIS presented in this paper incorporates feature selection along with a negative selection technique known as the split detector method (SDM). This new mAIS has been compared with a variety of conventional AISs and mAISs using a dataset of information flows captured from malicious and benign Android applications. This approach achieved a 93.33% accuracy with a true positive rate of 86.67% and a false positive rate of 0.00%.

Unity is the most popular cross-platform development framework to develop games for multiple platforms such as Android, iOS, and Windows Mobile. While Unity developers can easily develop mobile apps for multiple platforms, adversaries can also easily build malicious apps based on the “write once, run anywhere” (WORA) feature. Even though malicious apps were discovered among Android apps written with Unity framework (Unity apps), little research has been done on analysing the malicious apps. We propose static and dynamic reverse engineering techniques for malicious Unity apps. We first inspect the executable file format of a Unity app and present an effective static analysis technique of the Unity app. Then, we also propose a systematic technique to analyse dynamically the Unity app. Using the proposed techniques, the malware analyst can statically and dynamically analyse Java code, native code in C or C ++, and the Mono runtime layer where the C# code is running.

Device (DA) capabilities for mobile devices, e.g., remote locking/wiping, or enforcing password strength, were originally introduced to help organizations manage phone fleets or enable parental control. However, DA capabilities have been subverted and abused: malicious apps have used DA to create ransomware or lock users out, while benign apps have used DA to prevent or hinder uninstallation; in certain cases the only remedy is to factory-reset the phone. We call these apps Deathless Device Administrator (DDA), i.e., apps that cannot be uninstalled. We provide the first systematic study of Android DA capabilities, DDA apps, DDA-attack resistance across Android versions, and DDA-induced families in malicious apps. To enable scalable studies of questionable DA behavior, we developed DAAX, a static analyzer which exposes potential DA abuse effectively and efficiently. In a corpus of 39,459 apps (20,467 malicious and 18,992 benign) DAAX has found 4,135 DA apps and 691 potential DDA apps. The static analysis results on the 4,135 apps were cross-checked via dynamic analysis on at least 3 phones, confirming 578 true DDAs, including apps currently on Google Play. The study has shown that DAAX is effective (84.8% F-measure) and efficient (analysis typically takes 205 seconds per app).

Mobile apps frequently request access to sensitive data, such as location and contacts. Understanding the purpose of why sensitive data is accessed could help improve privacy as well as enable new kinds of access control. In this article, we propose a text mining based method to infer the purpose of sensitive data access by Android apps. The key idea we propose is to extract multiple features from app code and then use those features to train a machine learning classifier for purpose inference. We present the design, implementation, and evaluation of two complementary approaches to infer the purpose of permission use, first using purely static analysis, and then using primarily dynamic analysis. We also discuss the pros and cons of both approaches and the trade-offs involved.

With 20 million installs a day [1], third-party apps are a major reason for the popularity and addictiveness of Facebook. Unfortunately, hackers have realized the potential of using apps for spreading malware and spam. The problem is already significant, as we find that at least 13% of apps in our dataset are malicious. So far, the research community has focused on detecting malicious posts and campaigns. In this paper, we ask the question: Given a Facebook application, can we determine if it is malicious? Our key contribution is in developing FRAppE---Facebook's Rigorous Application Evaluator---arguably the first tool focused on detecting malicious apps on Facebook. To develop FRAppE, we use information gathered by observing the posting behavior of 111K Facebook apps seen across 2.2 million users on Facebook. First, we identify a set of features that help us distinguish malicious apps from benign ones. For example, we find that malicious apps often share names with other apps, and they typically request fewer permissions than benign apps. Second, leveraging these distinguishing features, we show that FRAppE can detect malicious apps with 99.5% accuracy, with no false positives and a high true positive rate (95.9%). Finally, we explore the ecosystem of malicious Facebook apps and identify mechanisms that these apps use to propagate. Interestingly, we find that many apps collude and support each other; in our dataset, we find 1584 apps enabling the viral propagation of 3723 other apps through their posts. Long term, we see FRAppE as a step toward creating an independent watchdog for app assessment and ranking, so as to warn Facebook users before installing apps.

In most of the approaches aiming at investigating Android apps, the release time of apps is not appropriately taken into account. Through three empirical studies, we demonstrate that the app release time is key for guaranteeing performance. Indeed, not considering time may result in serious threats to the validity of proposed approaches. Unfortunately, even approaches considering time could present some threats to validity when release times are erroneous. Symptoms of such erroneous release times appear in the form of inconsistencies with the APIs leveraged by the app. We present a tool called MoonlightBox for uncovering time inconsistencies by inferring the lower bound assembly time of a given app based on the used API lifetime information: any assembly time below this lower bound is considered as manipulated. We further perform several experiments and confirm that 1) over 7% of Android apps are subject to time inconsistency, 2) malicious apps are more likely to be targeted by time inconsistency, compared to benign apps, 3) time inconsistencies are favoured by some specific app lineages. We eventually revisit the three motivating empirical studies, leveraging MoonlightBox to compute a more realistic timeline of apps. The experimental results confirm that time indeed matters. The accuracy of release time is even crucial to achieve precise results.

We discuss the capability of a new feature set for malware detection based on potential component leaks (PCLs). PCLs are defined as sensitive data-flows that involve Android inter-component communications. We show that PCLs are common in Android apps and that malicious applications indeed manipulate significantly more PCLs than benign apps. Then, we evaluate a machine learning-based approach relying on PCLs. Experimental validations show high performance for identifying malware, demonstrating that PCLs can be used for discriminating malicious apps from benign apps.