Are internally consistent forecasts rational?

We derive internal consistency restrictions on short-, medium- and long-term oil price forecasts. We then analyse whether oil price forecasts extracted from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) satisfy these internal consistency restrictions. We find that neither short-term forecasts are consistent with medium-term forecasts nor that medium-term forecasts are consistent with long-term forecasts. Using a more complex expectation formation structure featuring a distributed lag structure, however, we find stronger evidence of internal consistency of medium-term forecasts with long-term forecasts.

Conditional Macroeconomic Forecasts: Disagreement, Revisions and Forecast Errors

Currency forecast errors and carry trades at times of low interest rates: Evidence from survey data on the yen/dollar exchange rate

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we propose a framework to evaluate the subjective density forecasts of macroeconomists using micro data from the euro area Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). A key aspect of our analysis is the use of evaluation measures which take account of the entire predictive densities, and not just the probability assigned to the outcome that occurs. Overall, we find considerable heterogeneity in the performance of the surveyed densities at the individual level. However, it is hard to exploit this heterogeneity and improve aggregate performance by trimming poorly performing forecasters in real time. Relative to a set of simple benchmarks, density performance is somewhat better for GDP growth than for inflation, although in the former case it diminishes substantially with the forecast horizon. In addition, we report evidence of an improvement in the relative performance of expert densities during the recent period of macroeconomic volatility. However, our analysis also reveals clear evidence of overconfidence or neglected risks in expert probability assessments, as reflected in frequent occurrences of events which are assigned a zero probability. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

We develop models that take point forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) as inputs and produce estimates of survey-consistent term structures of expectations and uncertainty at arbitrary forecast horizons. Our models combine fixed-horizon and fixed-event forecasts, accommodating time-varying horizons and availability of survey data, as well as potential inefficiencies in survey forecasts. The estimated term structures of SPF-consistent expectations are comparable in quality to the published, widely used short-horizon forecasts. Our estimates of time-varying forecast uncertainty reflect historical variations in realized errors of SPF point forecasts, and generate fan charts with reliable coverage rates.

This paper examines asymmetry of the loss function of professional forecasters for output growth, inflation, and exchange rate forecasts, based on the survey of professional forecasts (SPF) data of three South Asian countries (India, Indonesia, and Singapore). Our results provide India’s unbiased output growth forecasts and under-predicted inflation and exchange rate forecasts; Indonesia’s broadly unbiased forecasts; and Singapore’s under-predicted output growth forecasts and unbiased inflation and exchange rate forecasts. Testing the rationality of all three countries’ SPF forecasts, we find that all are rational under an asymmetric loss function but not under a symmetric loss function.

An Evaluation of Inflation Forecasts from Surveys using Real-Time Data

In November 2007, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced a change in the way it communicates its view of the economic outlook: It increased the frequency of its forecasts from two to four times per year, and it increased the length of the forecasting horizon from two to three years. The FOMC does not release the individual members' forecasts or standard measures of consensus such as the mean or median. Rather, it continues to release the forecast information as a range of forecasts, both the full range between the high and the low and a central tendency that omits the extreme values. This paper uses individual forecaster data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) to mimic the FOMC's method for creating their central tendency. The authors show that the midpoint of the central tendency of the SPF is a reliable measure of the consensus, suggesting that the FOMC reporting method is also a reliable measure of consensus. For the dates when both are available, the authors also compare the relative forecast accuracy of the FOMC and SPF consensus forecasts for output growth and inflation. Overall, the differences in forecast accuracy are too small to be statistically significant.

Introduction In recent years the availability of relatively long panel data on expectations obtained from surveying professional forecasters has made it possible to test the validity of different expectations formations mechanisms in a scientific manner. The use of panel data enables the econometrician to decompose forecast errors into macroeconomic aggregate shocks for which forecasters should not be held responsible, and forecast specific idiosyncratic errors and biases for which they should be held accountable. Muth (1961) suggested that theories of expectation formation should be consistent with the economic model being considered, and defined expectations to be rational if they are equal to mathematical expectations conditional on the set of all information relevant for forecasting. Since the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) has wide-ranging implications for economic theory and policy, it is not surprising that several economists have used survey data on expectations in order to test REH directly. Using the American Statistical Association – National Bureau of Economic Research (ASA-NBER) survey of professional forecasters, Zarnowitz (1985) has performed tests of rationality of forecasts of inflation and other macroeconomic variables. He found that the inflation forecasts did not satisfy rationality; even though many of the other forecasts were rational. Keane and Runkle (1990) have argued that the inability of most researchers to accept REH is due to the use of incorrect methodology.

This paper investigates the accuracy and heterogeneity of output growth and inflation forecasts during the current and the four preceding NBER-dated US recessions. We generate forecasts from six different models of the US economy and compare them to professional forecasts from the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The model parameters and model forecasts are derived from historical data vintages so as to ensure comparability to historical forecasts by professionals. The mean model forecast comes surprisingly close to the mean SPF and Greenbook forecasts in terms of accuracy even though the models only make use of a small number of data series. Model forecasts compare particularly well to professional forecasts at a horizon of three to four quarters and during recoveries. The extent of forecast heterogeneity is similar for model and professional forecasts but varies substantially over time. Thus, forecast heterogeneity constitutes a potentially important source of economic fluctuations. While the particular reasons for diversity in professional forecasts are not observable, the diversity in model forecasts can be traced to different modeling assumptions, information sets and parameter estimates.

On the external validity of experimental inflation forecasts: A comparison with five categories of field expectations

On the External Validity of Experimental Inflation Forecasts: A Comparison with Five Categories of Field Expectations

For a sample of companies traded on the Mexican Bolsa, fundamental analysis is used to investigate the value of financial statement information to investors after the December 1994 currency devaluation. Associations with contemporary returns show that earnings in the year of the devaluation lose value relevance, but fundamental signals, which incorporate the more detailed accounting information provided in financial statements, retain considerable explanatory power (R2 is 25 percent). After the devaluation, fundamental signals based on changes in selling and administrative expenses and changes in gross margin are significant in several analyses, including predictions of future earnings, analysts' forecast revisions, and analysts' forecast errors. Because analysts underutilize those signals, an opportunity exists after the devaluation for a substantial profit from a zero investment trading strategy.

We evaluate whether professional forecasters incorporate valuable information from public discussions on social media. The study covers the case of inflation in Argentina for the period 2016–2022. We find solid evidence consistent with inattention. A simple indicator of attention to inflation on social media is shown to anticipate professional forecast errors. A one standard deviation increment in the indicator is followed by a rise of 0.4% in mean forecast errors in the subsequent month and by a cumulative increment of 0.7% over the next 6 months. Furthermore, social media content anticipates significant revisions in forecasts that target multiple months ahead inflation and calendar year inflation. These findings are different from previously documented forms of inattention. Consistent results are verified by implementing out‐of‐sample forecasts and using content from an alternative social network. The study has implications for the use of professional forecasts in the context of policymaking and sheds new evidence on the nature of imperfect information in macroeconomics.

Whereas strong demand is a key factor driving high inflation in the US, inflation in the Euro Area is mainly due to adverse external supply shocks (in Europe, energy prices are much higher due to the war in Ukraine). Standard monetary policy response to such shocks is to accommodate first-round effects, to fight spiralling inflationary expectations in order to prevent second-round effects. Long run inflation expectations — as measured by the survey of professional forecasters — still seem to be well anchored. The ECB’s announced tightening intends to dampen rising household’s inflation expectations. Given the current high uncertainty about the economic outlook, a soft landing calls for modest, data-dependent steps, allowing for a reversal in case the outlook worsens.