ASEAN and environmental sustainability

Transboundary haze has become almost an annual environmental issue in the Southeast Asia region, especially for Malaysia due to the Indonesian fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra. Consequently, this has also become one of the main regional concerns for environmental security of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, ASEAN has continually failed to effectively mitigate haze through regional engagement known as the ASEAN Way, which consists of consultation and consensus and upholds sovereign right and non interference policy. Adherence to these principles by member states has undermined the haze mitigation efforts and raised a big question mark as ASEAN has used all diplomatic channels but was not successful in addressing the problem. Since the haze issue does not only affect Indonesia but also neighbouring countries, the ASEAN Way practices need to revamp addressing transnational issues. Therefore, this chapter has reviewed 40 relevant articles and reports with the aim of providing secondary data support that argues the ASEAN Way of regional engagement has become a challenge to various nontraditional security issues with the main focus on transboundary haze pollution.

This article examines network governance (NG) within the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its sectoral communities, specifically the ASEAN Economic Community, the ASEAN Political-Security Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The goal is to explore NG’s importance in fostering cooperation among ASEAN member states and addressing regional challenges. The study begins by providing an overview of ASEAN and its objectives, highlighting the crucial role of NG in promoting collaboration and policymaking through ASEAN processes. It then offers a comprehensive literature review that evaluates the conceptual framework of NG and previous research related to its significance for ASEAN. The article further explores theories and scholarly works discussing NG within ASEAN, offering insights into key themes and discussions in the literature. Specific examples from the three sectoral communities are included based on an analysis of ASEAN NG mechanisms and structures. The evaluation of NG effectiveness in tackling regional challenges considers the contributions of state actors, such as government representatives and non-state actors (NSAs), including civil society organizations and private sector entities. This analysis reveals the inherent challenges and opportunities in implementing NG within ASEAN frameworks. It also underscores the importance of collaborative efforts between state actors and NSAs and the need for supportive institutional frameworks and mechanisms to enhance NG effectiveness in ASEAN. Overall, this article aims to deepen the understanding of NG within ASEAN, illuminating its role in promoting regional integration, addressing challenges, and advancing development across ASEAN’s three sectoral communities.

ABSTRACTThe term ‘security community’ refers to the development of a regional consensus of shunning war as a means of settling disputes among participant states. Assuming this basic premise of a security community, this article positions ASEAN as a unique security community by arguing that it is contingent upon the socio-cultural norms practiced in ASEAN member states’ societies. The conceptual framework of a traditional security community is inapplicable to ASEAN as it does not have any supra-national institutions which can bind its members to compliance towards regional norms. The societal norms of member states give ASEAN a regional identity consciousness that is based upon informality and a unique normative structure. The intention of this article is to deconstruct these societal or popular socio-cultural norms and examine how they influence decision making at the elite level.

INTRODUCTION The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has continued to pursue a free and open investment regime to promote more investment flows and investment integration in the region. On one hand, an increase in investment flows will sustain economic growth and improve social conditions in terms of employment and technology transfer. On the other, integration will create better investment environment with lower cost and time efficiency. Despite the global economic turbulence in 2008–09, the trend of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to ASEAN has continuously improved due to strong macroeconomic foundations, increasingly favourable investment climate, and improving policy environment in ASEAN. The attractiveness of ASEAN has considerably increased since the Blueprint of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was signed in November 2007. The Blueprint incorporates several high-impact agreements such as the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), and ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). These agreements help create a more favourable economic environment for investors and traders in the region by increasing the region's attractiveness for investment, production and trade. Additionally, the ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Person (MNP) that was signed in November 2012 also aims to facilitate movement of businessmen and professionals in the region. Institutional capacity was also strengthened with the establishment of the ASEAN Investment Forum (AIF) in 2011, with the participation of lead investment agencies from each ASEAN country. Altogether, many regional measures have been undertaken to promote investment climate and strengthen the region's investment environment, resulting in a more free flow of investment across ASEAN. In addition to the regional initiatives, each ASEAN Member State (AMS) has also introduced measures to further improve their investment climate and facilitate investment flows, i.e., liberalizing their investment regimes, opening up more industries for investment, providing more attractive investment incentives, and simplifying investment procedures and taxation. This chapter aims to describe the transitional process of ASEAN's regional investment integration as well as its impacts on FDI flows in the region, both inflows and outflows. Empirical evidence are presented together with a discussion on the implications of ASEAN's efforts towards regional integration under the AEC initiatives and key deliverables. The availability of ASEAN investment data, particular the outflow foreign direct investment (OFDI), is limited.

This article provides a new piece for two of the puzzles of institutionalized cooperation in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). First, with regard to the organization's four decades of existence, there has always been a marked gap between ASEAN's rhetorical goals of cooperation and its actual achievements. What explains these systematic failures of implementation? Second, from the outset, ASEAN was criticized for its light institutionalization, which failed to deliver the substantial cooperation goals. Despite selected institutional reforms, ASEAN's autonomy has not increased remarkably and it has not made any major institutional innovations. Why does ASEAN design institutions it does not use? Why does this transformation gap occur? The author suggests a sociological institutional explanation and argues that major impulses for cooperation have come from outside Southeast Asia, most importantly from Europe. By mimicking the European integration process, ASEAN member states have effectively created an isomorphic organization. The Association's institutional development reflects a concern for international legitimacy and less an objective functional demand arising from the specific interactions of member states. This copying process has led to network governance within the organization.

This article explores the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) initiatives, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area, the ASEAN Economic Community, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, as well as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) initiatives, including the New Development Bank, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the BRICS Business Council and the proposed BRICS payment system. The study seeks to answer three key questions: If BRICS adopts similar mechanisms and initiatives to those of ASEAN, would it become more relevant or attractive for ASEAN member states? Given that ASEAN was formed in 1967 and has taken nearly 50 years to develop its current mechanisms, structure and non-interference principle, can BRICS learn from this model to enhance its own regional cooperation and integration more effectively? What are the potential economic impacts and strategic considerations for ASEAN if more ASEAN member states join BRICS? The article concludes that while BRICS offers significant benefits and could potentially overshadow ASEAN, it is imperative for ASEAN to innovate and improve its mechanisms to remain relevant in the evolving geopolitical landscape.

This chapter investigates some common challenges faced by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states, and provides policy suggestions from the regional perspective. It looks at the future of the e-commerce market and reviews the actions that have been taken at regional and national level. The chapter draws on attention to the challenges from connectivity, services, labour skills, and rules and regulations and suggests some policy options to be included in ASEAN member states (AMS) ‘to-do’ lists. Therefore, when designing a digital economy strategic plan, AMS should not only consider their domestic market or the ASEAN market, but also think about wider coverage that includes the Chinese market and other big markets in the region. AMS face challenges from development gaps existing across different parts of the country, especially between metropolitan and remote/rural areas. AMS all have included digital economy and e-commerce in their national plans.

Expert insights into the impact of aeropolitics on regional air market integration in ASEAN

Dynamic evaluation of green development level of ASEAN region and its spatio-temporal patterns

As of 2021, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States (AMS) have made significant strides toward Aichi Biodiversity Target 11, collectively protecting 15.57% of terrestrial areas and 4% of coastal and marine areas. This study presents the findings of the third edition of the ASEAN Biodiversity Outlook by the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (ACB) to evaluate the region’s progress in both quantitative coverage and qualitative elements such as ecological representation, connectivity, and management effectiveness.The analysis reveals that while terrestrial coverage approached the 17% global target, marine protection lags significantly behind the 10% goal. Furthermore, protection of areas of importance for biodiversity is incomplete; while 37% of Key Biodiversity Areas (KBAs) are protected, 44% are only partially protected, and only 11% of critical Alliance for Zero Extinction (AZE) sites are fully covered. Qualitative assessments indicate a critical data deficit, with Protected Area Management Effectiveness (PAME) assessments completed for only a mere 4.34% of the marine network. Currently, estimates of OECM coverage are unavailable at the regional level, despite the potential of Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs) to contribute significantly to connectivity and coverage targets. Furthermore, connectivity analysis reveals that even where coverage targets are met, design deficiencies result in low ecological connectivity.To address these gaps and to achieve the KM-GBF Target 3, the study recommends accelerating the ASEAN Heritage Parks Programme, legally recognising Other Effective Area-based Conservation Measures (OECMs), and aligning national targets with regional goals to ensure sustainable, equitable, and effective conservation outcomes. There is a need to expand protected area networks and identify OECMs that will encompass ecoregions in the terrestrial, marine, and inland waters, including the areas of particular importance for biodiversity with a wider representation of trigger species from different taxonomic groups. Enhancing cooperation with IPLCs in the creation, control, and management of areas outside of protected area boundaries will also greatly enhance the capacity and capability of the AMS to meet succeeding conservation targets in the post-2020 scenario.Keywords: ASEAN Biodiversity, OECMs, Key Biodiversity Areas, IPLCs

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has acknowledged food loss and waste (FLW) as a major problem, as seen from their published guideline for sustainable agriculture and action plan. However, ASEAN’s diversity has become a challenge in creating a general solution, opting for state-level solutions. Research on the distinguished difference between food loss (FL) and food waste (FW) is lacking, especially regarding ASEAN member states (AMS), which this study intends to change. This study focuses on Indonesia and the Philippines, the top contributors to FLW within ASEAN, and having similar strategies for achieving sustainable agriculture through self-sufficiency, as case studies to understand their initiatives, priorities, and to what extent they have implemented strategic priorities (SPs) stated in the action plan. A secondary data collection method using correlating keywords from official ministry websites and documents was used. This study has identified the initiatives Indonesia and the Philippines have done since 2022. Furthermore, it has been found that despite the similar strategies for achieving sustainable agriculture, both have different priorities between FL and FW. The most active initiatives, such as Indonesia’s Food Rescue Program (Gerakan Selamatkan Pangan) (GSP), focus more on FW, while the Philippines’ KADIWA focuses on FL. Both countries must decentralize their initiatives from only one part of FLW since both FL and FW are influential to them. Lastly, there is still a lack of initiatives focusing on SP 2 of the ASEAN action plan, reducing agrochemicals.

This chapter describes how ASEAN member states’ mechanisms of decision-making have developed since the regional grouping’s inception. It details how concepts of confidence-building measures (CBMs) have given rise to contradictions within negotiation mechanisms developed to address the South China Sea disputes. It also recounts the historical process behind the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional negotiation structure and shows the internal constraints and the nature of the problems the group faces as it seeks to progress from CBMs to preventive diplomacy (PD). Since its inception, the negotiating dynamic related to the South China Sea has experienced friction between states seeking a way to accommodate all interests and those motivated by individual gains. The first group includes the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Track II negotiation forums like the Indonesia Workshop, while the second includes more assertive states such as China.

Despite the diversity of contexts and circumstances in which competition laws are developed and exist, many countries have enacted competition laws that are broadly similar. To learn more about the dynamics shaping the development of competition law at the national, regional, and international levels, this article investigates the development of competition law in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, a region whose competition laws remain underexplored. This article undertakes a case study on the drafting of competition law in the ASEAN member states with the most recently drafted and/or enacted new comprehensive competition laws, that being Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and the Philippines. It finds that, while there were differences in the processes of drafting and enacting competition law in these countries as well as in their local contexts, their competition laws are similar in many respects. The case study also finds that intermediaries facilitated the processes of translation and adaptation that occurred in developing competition law in these ASEAN member states. This article argues that the important role that intermediaries played in developing competition laws was a key reason for the broad convergence of these competition laws across their diverse local settings.

T n HE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) has the reputation of being the most successful indigenously produced regional organization in the developing world.' Much of that reputation is attributable to ASEAN's apparent internal cohesion and international effectiveness. In the post-cold war era, ASEAN hopes to build on its success by shaping the emerging security relations of the Asia-Pacific through new mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). However, ASEAN's influence on Southeast Asia's regional security environment during the cold war was both more nuanced than is commonly recognized and dependent on a set of unique circumstances. ASEAN's experiences with regional security in the cold war are not readily transferred to the post-cold war era. This paper is a discussion and evaluation of ASEAN's efforts to manage its regional security environment (i.e., to affect the actors and events shaping security in Southeast Asia). The main argument of this paper is that ASEAN's ability to manage regional security in Southeast Asia has been, and is, limited by two factors: one, the interests and actions of the great powers, which have defined the parameters of ASEAN's security policies; and two, divergent security perceptions and interests within ASEAN, which have defined the limits of intraorganizational cooperation and made it difficult to evaluate the significance of ASEAN's stated security objectives. ASEAN has improved relations between its member states, but these achievements are contingent on its success as a larger regional actor. The ASEAN member states remain mostly motivated by narrow understandings of their self-interests, which are not always congruent and can undermine ASEAN's unity and ability to function effectively. ASEAN's present efforts to incorporate Vietnam, Burma, Laos and, eventually, Cambodia, may exacerbate this problem. This paper is broken into five sections. After a brief historical overview, I review ASEAN's stated regional security objectives and the political and

Truancy among adolescents may negatively affect the achievement of academic goals. The aim of the study was to investigate the prevalence and correlates of school truancy in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. The analysis included 28 419 school children aged 13–15 years from seven ASEAN member states that participated in the Global School-based Student Health Survey (GSHS) between 2007 and 2013. The overall prevalence of past 30 day truancy across six ASEAN countries (excluding Brunei) was 24.8%; ranging from below 20% in Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam to more than 30% in Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In multivariable logistic regression analysis, socio-demographic factors (older age, being male, the experience of hunger), externalising behaviour (tobacco use, alcohol use, having been in a physical fight, being bullied, having sustained an injury), and lack of protective social-familial factors (lack of peer support and lack of parental or guardian support) were found to be associated with truancy. High rates of truancy were found in ASEAN member states calling for interventions aimed to reduce truancy considering identified associated factors.