Asinius Pollio, Gaius

Among the various changes which affected Greek cities during the late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods with regard to political practices and political culture, the disappearance of the concept of dēmokratia from the public discourse is certainly one of the most striking features. Although dēmokratia had been a core value during the whole Hellenistic period, as Greek cities asserted their ability to maintain their own institutions, the cessation of democratic references from the Augustan age represents a turning point in Greek political culture. This paper surveys the meanings of dēmokratia in the few known instances during the Imperial period and explores the reasons why local elite in Greek cities decided to cull this term from their vocabulary to describe contemporary situations. It shows that, while the absence of the concept of dēmokratia alone is insufficient to prove that any form of democratic practices was abolished, the use of more neutral expressions such as politeia, which had an Aristotelian flavour, is certainly indicative of the predominant role which was now played by conservative aristocrats in the government of Greek cities.

The history of war is replete with examples of novel diseases that have suddenly and unexpectedly erupted into human consciousness. As we noted in Section2.2, ancient Greek historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides, and Diodorus Siculus provide classical accounts of the devastation wrought by mysterious war pestilences—diseases which, in many instances, elude classification in modern disease systems, and to which the appellation ‘antique plague’ is occasionally given (Smallman-Raynor and Cliff 2004b: 66–73). In more recent times, we saw in Table 1.7 how maladies such as the idiopathic English sweating sickness, along with venereal syphilis, typhus fever, and yellow fever, appeared— ostensibly for the first time—in association with wars of the late medieval and early modern periods. In the twentieth century, trench fever (World War I, 1914–18), scrub typhus (World War II, 1939–45), and Korean haemorrhagic fever (Korean War, 1950–3) provide further instances of the emergence phenomenon (Macpherson et al. 1922–3; Philip 1948; Gajdusek 1956). In addition to sponsoring apparently wholly new conditions, military conflict has also promoted the re-emergence of many infectious and parasitic diseases. Recent examples include African trypanosomiasis (Ugandan Civil War, 1979–86; Berrang Ford 2007), diphtheria and tuberculosis (Tajikistan Civil War, 1992–7; Keshavjee and Becerra 2000; Usmanov et al. 2000) and epidemic louse-borne typhus fever (Burundian Civil War, 1993–2005; Raoult, Ndihokubwayo, et al. 1998). Figure 8.1 illustrates schematically the sample factors that underpin the warrelated emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases. As Price-Smith (2002: 129) observes, military conflict acts ‘as a direct disease ‘‘amplifier,’’ creating those physical conditions (poverty, famine, destruction of vital infrastructure, and large population movements) that are particularly conducive to the spread and mutation of disease’. High-level population mobility and mixing, differential patterns of disease exposure and susceptibility, the breakdown of public health infrastructure, and insanitary living conditions are all pertinent to an understanding of the (re-)emergence complex (Lederberg et al. 1992: 110–12). Additional factors also attain prominence. Within the schema of Figure 8.1, heightened exposure to the zoonotic pool has played a particularly important role in the war-related precipitation of disease emergence and re-emergence.

BOOK REVIEWS7I However, the book suffers from a narrative so poorly written as to be distracting . There are numerous small errors relating to general Civil War history. The photographs of gravemarkers reproduced in the book are often fuzzy and hard to read, and printed transcriptions are frequently not given. Behind this book (andWolf's as well) is the problem ofhow to establish the Jewish identity of CivilWar-era individuals, civilian or military. In spite ofthese flaws,Young's contribution to the literature of Jewish military participation in the Civil War is a valuable one. Growing from his military background (West Point class of 1 952), strong Jewish identification, and proximity to the burial sites of Civil War Jewish dead in and near Chattanooga, Young's focus on those Jews who made the ultimate sacrifice in the Civil War is constant throughout the book and unique in the literature. He gives us their names, tells some of their stories, and urges us to remember them and their deeds. Allan D. Satin Hebrew Union College Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse ofManifest Destiny and the Coming ofthe Civil War. By MichaelA. Morrison. (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1997. Pp. 396. $49.95.) It is impossible for a short review to dojustice to a study of this size and complexity ; but, to be succinct, this book is a masterpiece. As with the best recent scholarship on the late antebellum period, Michael A. Morrison's magisterial study defies easy categorization; although predominantly political, this vast survey also draws heavily from intellectual and cultural studies. No historian who pretends to understand the sixteen-year countdown to Civil War will be able to ignore it. Morrison has little sympathy with ethnocultural or revisionist approaches to the war's origin. The cause of the conflict, he bluntly observes, was slavery. The appalling prospect of unfree labor in the western territories began the transition from a healthy interparty discussion over the economic wisdom of manifest destiny to a sectionalized argument over slavery extension. Put simply, restrictionists claimed to be upholding the legacy of the Revolution by attacking a governmental conspiracy determined to crush majority rule and the democratic process, while proslavery advocates replied that the break with Britain was to be understood as a defense of minority rights and the sanctity of property in the face of a despotic power. Even before the Mexican War, Morrison demonstrates , Southern politicians of both parties defined the territorial question in terms oftheir equal rights in the republic. Resolved to uphold their Revolutionary heritage, statesmen of both sections increasingly came to regard each other as a reactionary threat to the Union as it was framed by the patriot elite. By focusing on this shared political heritage, as well as on commonalities of language and religion, Morrison depreciates cultural differences between the 72CIVIL WAR HISTORY sections. In the process, he perhaps underestimates the extent to which unwaged labor fastened a fundamentally nonmarket society upon the Old South. Northern activists and Southern politicians, in his view, shared a collective—not disparate —Revolutionary heritage. Many specialists in the Revolutionary era may disagree. But one of the many virtues of Morrison's sophisticated theme is its adaptability; historians who suspect that the South always had interpreted the meaning of 1776 differently from the North precisely because of their peculiar institution can concur with the theory that both sides marched into battle secure in the belief that they were throwing off a tyrannical yoke. Given the imposing size and scope of this study, it seems downright churlish to suggest that Morrison should have included the voices ofwomen in his work. The use of recent studies on political rallies staged by Whig women on behalf ofparty candidates, forexample, would only have strengthened Morrison's theory of a thoroughly politicized citizenry. The author also overstates the extent to which the South industrialized in the years before the war. These are quibbles. Morrison's research is stunning. His footnotes—unfortunately placed at the end of the text and regrettably devoid of historiographical discussion—reveal research conducted in 405 collections in forty repositories and in 149 newspapers and magazines. Elegant, witty (mystery fans will note a good number of...

130 ■ NEW YORK HISTORY New York at War: Four Centuries of Combat, Fear, and Intrigue in Gotham. By Steven H. Jaffe. New York: Basic Books, 2012, 404 pages, $29.99 Cloth. Reviewed by Michael G. Gunther, Georgia Gwinnett College What did David De Vries, Fernando Wood, and A. Philip Randolph share in common? Or, conversely, what can one learn from the careers of Peter Stuyvesant, George Washington, and Fiorello La Guardia? As inane as these questions may seem at first glance, the answers become startlingly clear and relevant upon reading New York at War, an exciting book seeking to “restore a military dimension to New York’s history—a dimension that has been largely erased from the city’s historical narrative and public memory” (xvi-xvii). Historian Steven Jaffe’s experiences working for the South Street Seaport and the New-York Historical Society prepared him well for the daunting task of researching and writing this comprehensive, yet exhilarating analysis of New York City’s military history. On the one hand, Jaffe draws on and engages relatively recent, highly-regarded scholarly works by historians such as Donna Merwick, Jill Lepore, and Craig S. Wilder. Yet his personal connections to the city, and working knowledge of how to present complex ideas to a general audience, shine through in New York at War. Adroitly avoiding the encyclopedic urge, Jaffe has done well in identifying and contextualizing important themes in New York City’s military history. One theme is certainly the virtual omnipresence of military sites, relics, and ruins around the five boroughs and tri-state area. The reader learns about Battery Park, Jamaica Pass, Sandy Hook, Governors Island, and the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and, better yet, derives a sense of why the locations mattered at different times in New York’s past. A related theme is the vulnerability of New York City to enemy attacks and the importance of military defense in the origin and subsequent development of municipal and state political institutions. One expects to read the oft-told story of the British invasion of 1776, and of the Cold War emphasis on missile defense, but, in between, Confederate and German plots serve as grimly useful lessons (sometimes, with a dose of “comic opera”) for our time (195). Book Reviews 131 Another significant set of themes involves the openness of New York City to immigrants and the shifting waves of social divisions that, in times of war, spawned repression and sometimes violent conflict. One poignant example of Jaffe’s thematic complexity involves Fraunces Tavern, where, in 1783, General George Washington bade farewell to his officers. In 1975, the reconstructed historic landmark and restaurant was the site of a bombing —causing four fatalities—by radical Puerto Rican revolutionaries in the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN). The Tavern bombing prompts Jaffe to meditate on the contested meaning of historic sites and, more importantly for his argument, on the complicated nature of divisions between and within ethnic and religious communities. He concludes this section by restating “an old paradox . . . newcomers to the city found in New York a home, but also a political and economic order some blamed for their homeland’s troubles” (327). At first glance, the audience for New York at War may seem limited to northeastern scholars and aficionados who share an abiding interest in the history of the “Empire City.” However, it has also drawn attention from American military historians, and may serve as an instructive local case study in upper-level courses on military, urban, and New York history. In dealing with such weighty issues as the “slave conspiracy” of 1741, the draft riot of 1863, and the antiwar movement of 1917-1918, Jaffe marries scholarly engagement with moving personal anecdotes from well-chosen primary sources. For example, in his chapter on the Civil War, Jaffe makes use of the diary of Maria Lydig Daly to spotlight criticisms of President Lincoln and of abolitionists—especially within the Irish community—as context for the draft riot, but also to touch on wartime opportunities for women, such as those embraced by Daly’s friend, Harriet Whetten, a nurse. Deeper within chapters, he holds attention with brief, touching scenes such as...

This chapter identifies pertinent trends in the scholarship of late republican and early imperial Roman art, from the early second century bce to the end of the Augustan period. By looking at specific themes and case studies, such as mythological terracottas, historical reliefs, decorative marble statues from elite villas, so-called neoattic art, and honorific as well as funerary portraits, the essentially eclectic nature of artistic themes and styles across a range of media and materials is illustrated. Moreover, based upon these case studies, the chapter explores the relations between stylistic choice and aspects like class, society, and politics. From this it becomes clear that the systematic use of archaizing, classicizing, and Hellenistic styles in the late republican and early imperial period was deeply rooted in a vibrant community of commissioners and artists who acted under the influence of profound sociopolitical transformations in Rome, central Italy, and the wider Mediterranean.

Reviewed by: A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War by Williamson Murray, Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh Mark Hertling A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War. Williamson Murray and Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0691169408. 616pp., cloth, $35.00. Students expect several things from a composite history, and A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War delivers for our nation’s most destructive conflict. It provides incisive, accurate, informed, and flowing accounts of each of the major campaigns along the timelines of the Civil War. The authors accurately describe the actions on the ground in the eastern, western, and trans-Mississippi theaters in effective detail, and the ground analysis is complemented with extensive information on the effects of the blue and brown water naval campaigns. Descriptions of the flow of battle are supplemented with keen insights regarding the personalities of key commanders on both sides, and the authors provide substantive information on how various positive or toxic leadership styles influenced results of campaigns and battles. There are requisite strategic, operational/campaign and tactical battlefield maps to supplement the narrative and additional graphics contribute to understanding the uniqueness of this conflict; two of my favorites are an overlay comparing the U.S. continent with Napoleon’s Europe and another showing the proliferation of railroad lines between 1850 and 1860. Additionally, many early reviews correctly proclaim how this book is valuable for two additional key reasons. First, the authors draw on more recent Civil War scholarship, especially regarding the culture and the motivations of the two different field armies. Second, this work posits the Civil War as the first “modern war,” due to size and scale of the two armies, the continuous fighting conducted over a long period of time, and the projection across a continent made possible by the Industrial Revolution. All of these strengths add to the fact that the book is certainly well written and carefully edited as a composite history. [End Page 320] Two unique things about this book make it a required addition to any Civil War student’s bookshelf. First, authors Murray and Hsieh are not typical historians. Murray has penned insightful works on a range of subjects, and he has written on myriad topics, such as military effectiveness, net assessments, innovation, grand strategy and hybrid warfare. His ability to weave information from those fields into various historical analyses has contributed to the education of a generation of military officers—majors through generals—at different service schoolhouses. His analysis is almost like applying sabermetrics to military history. Hsieh—while younger than Murray—is of a similar ilk. Hsieh’s service as professor and resident scholar for the sea services at the U.S. Naval Academy likely keeps him on his toes, but one must understand he started at Annapolis only after gaining pragmatic understanding of the battlefield by serving an operational stint as a State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team chief during the surge in Iraq. Prior to that, he was a postdoctoral fellow in strategy and security studies at Yale, and these experiences likely allow him a measure of understanding of the dynamics of conflict few historical scholars possess. These two authors are not typical historians, so it comes as no surprise that A Savage War is not a typical work of history. Second, military histories appropriately and properly focus on what occurred, searching for details on the movements, the commands, the effects of resources and actions on reaching a military objective. Works where historians attempt to address why things occurred or how lessons from a conflict might be applied in the future are appropriately subjected to extensive critiques and continuous debate. This is to be expected, as historians usually can’t read the minds of long-dead commanders. But this work cites the philosophy, military theory, and even psychology of the day in interjecting the works of Clausewitz, Thucydides, de Tocqueville, and the training model provided by Thayer and others. All these masters contributed to the teachings of the day, and given the majority of commanders on both sides matriculated from West Point, it’s helpful to explain how this scholarship...

Reviewed by: Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction by Allen C. Guelzo Rachel A. Shelden Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Allen C. Guelzo. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-01998-4328-2, 592 pp., paper, $19.95. For almost twenty years, Allen C. Guelzo, Henry R. Luce III Professor of the Civil War Era at Gettysburg College, has been at the forefront of Civil War–era scholarship. In particular, he has focused his analytical efforts on the life and legacy of Abraham Lincoln, publishing books covering the Lincoln-Douglas debates, the origins of the Emancipation Proclamation, and Lincoln’s presidential leadership, among others. Guelzo’s recognition of the sixteenth president’s central place in American memory helps provide a frame for Fateful Lightning, a new textbook-length overview of the Civil War period. The book begins with Lincoln’s second inaugural address, delivered only weeks before John Wilkes Booth gunned down the president. In the address, Guelzo explains, Lincoln identified three causes of the war: the politics of the Union, the sociology of the South, and the problems of territorial expansion. These causes introduce the sectional problems that led to warfare in Guelzo’s first three chapters. Ultimately, he argues, these problems produced a “fatal sequence of public events” from 1820 to 1861 that “can be visualized as a game of balances, with the Union as the balance point along the beam, and the two rays representing the interests of North and South, slave and free” (54). The meat of Guelzo’s book then covers the Civil War primarily from the perspective of northern political and military events. Here Guelzo focuses in particular on the [End Page 237] movement toward emancipation and the impact of the war on northern society. Chapters 4 and 5 take the war through 1862, covering important signposts such as Winfield Scott’s Anaconda Plan, the rise of George B. McClellan, and Ulysses S. Grant’s successes in the West. The next three chapters weave more thematic topics through the first half of the war, detailing the life of the common Civil War soldier, the rise of northern industry in supplying the Union army, and military and political command during 1863. The final wartime chapters pay lip service to events and changes in northern and southern society, ranging from conscription, bread riots, and religion to African American soldiers, women, and refugees. A final chapter, titled “A Dim Shore Ahead,” takes the reader from Sherman’s March to the 1876 election. In this section Guelzo focuses a mere thirty pages on the period of Reconstruction, recounting details of the Andrew Johnson and Grant administrations such as impeachment, the rise of carpetbaggers and scalawags, the Panic of 1873, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and the Redeemers. Guelzo concludes the book with a short epilogue touching on army veterans, the Lost Cause, and the lasting effects of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the southern economy. Guelzo’s gift for engaging storytelling will make Fateful Lightning a success for those interested in a broad view of the Civil War period. Guelzo has a firm command of the political events of the mid-nineteenth century, and his description of military movements is both easy to read and skillfully explained. Unsurprisingly, his attention to detail in Lincoln’s life shines through in sections on Lincoln’s relationship with his cabinet, his often overblown differences with the Radical Republicans, and even his nightmares. Still, Guelzo’s work is less likely to resonate with scholars of the period. Although he has read extensively on the political and structural forces that shaped the Civil War era, any real engagement with the experiences of average Americans—from women and African Americans to northern laborers and southern yeomen—remains absent. Nor does the section entitled “further reading” in the back of the book provide a roadmap for engaging with these subjects. Most problematic is the failure to provide an introduction or conclusion that could direct the reader to his scholarly contribution to Civil War–era history. Instead, Guelzo peppers the text with a few choice historiographical debates, many of which seem out...

Reviewed by: “We Gave Them Thunder”: Marmaduke’s Raid and the Civil War in Missouri and Arkansas by William Garrett Piston and John C. Rutherford Andrew Fialka “We Gave Them Thunder”: Marmaduke’s Raid and the Civil War in Missouri and Arkansas. By William Garrett Piston and John C. Rutherford. (Springfield: Ozarks Studies Institute of Missouri State University, 2021. Pp. xiv, 343. Paper, $29.95, ISBN 978-1-7346290-1-9; cloth, $39.95, ISBN 978-1-7321222-3-9.) “We Gave Them Thunder”: Marmaduke’s Raid and the Civil War in Missouri and Arkansas is a refreshing take on traditional military history. Grounded in up-to-date secondary literature and straightforward about slavery’s role in causing the Civil War, this monograph brings modern scholarship to its intended audience—“descendants” in Missouri and Arkansas to whom Marmaduke’s Raid still matters (p. 2). William Garrett Piston and John C. Rutherford note how simultaneous events in the western theater, such as the battle of Stones River, overshadowed the raid’s importance and how the larger and better-preserved site of the battle of Wilson’s Creek still dominates Civil War memory in southwest Missouri. The raid has not fared much better in academia—no other monograph-length treatment exists, and the raid receives scant coverage in applicable syntheses, including James M. McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, 1988), Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones’s How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana, 1983), and Jay Monaghan’s Civil War on the Western Border, 1854–1865 (Boston, 1955). In addition to bringing the raid’s larger story to light, Piston and Rutherford illustrate the logistical chess game played by Union and Confederate commanders attempting to control the St. Louis–Fort Smith corridor—a possible “back door” for Confederates to capture St. Louis and turn the tide in the trans-Mississippi theater—while constantly having their troops siphoned off to larger battlefields in the East (p. 22). Military matters take up the bulk of the book. Piston and Rutherford expertly summarize Missouri’s unique, and often confusing, position both on the American frontier and as a border state. Chapters 1–2 explain Missouri’s multiple governors—the ousted secessionist Claiborne Fox Jackson and provisional Unionist Hamilton Rowan Gamble. They also detail the state’s many fighting forces, including volunteer regiments, which focused on opening the Missouri River to the Union navy and controlling the aforementioned St. Louis–Fort Smith corridor; the Missouri State Militia, a homegrown state security and counterguerrilla force; and the Enrolled Missouri Militia, which called all able-bodied and loyal men into emergency service (without making a particularly good distinction between those who were loyal and disloyal). The narrative peaks in chapters 6 and 8, which offer blow-by-blow accounts of the battles of Springfield and Hartville, complete with corresponding battle maps. Union forces held off fierce attacks in Springfield thanks to hastily constructed fort defenses and a clever use of cavalry units to buy additional time for preparation. In Hartville, outnumbered Union forces again held off Confederate raiders, this time thanks to securing the high ground northwest of the town and utilizing brush to hide their lack of strength. The attention to detail in this book’s presentation makes it particularly enjoyable to read. The maps, created by Jim Coombs, a maps and GIS librarian at Missouri State University, are very helpful. The numerous color images [End Page 367] are vivid and will be appreciated by anyone enthusiastic about material culture. The lack of academic jargon in the prose makes even lengthy tactical passages easy to follow. This is accessible scholarship. “We Gave Them Thunder” has few shortcomings. I took issue with how Piston and Rutherford justify not including more stories of women and children, white or Black. The authors assert that “very few sources detail their experiences” (p. 2). Yet there are nearly three thousand records from Missouri’s Union Provost Marshal Papers for Greene, Webster, and Wright Counties alone (an area that includes Springfield, Hartville, and their connecting road). Civil War historians focused on Missouri have utilized the Provost Marshal Papers to uncover the histories...

Don Carlos Buell: Military Philosophy and Command Problems in the West Stephen D. Engle The fundamental component in understanding command problems in the Civil War is understanding the commanders. They alone had the potential to make the difference between success and failure, and military commanders had to know themselves—their own talents and liabilities. Those who failed to evolve with the changing circumstances of the war found themselves with an incomplete idea of the war. The ability, or rather inability, to achieve consistency in combining science and common sense with art ultimately came to define commanders. The ideological framework produced by such a blend was illustrative of commanders who ranged from those who were effective but careless, brash, and bloody to those who emphasized the science of war and were masters of preparation but ineffectual in defeating the enemy. These two military philosophies reflected the works of two prominent eighteenth-century European theorists, Henri Jomini and Marshal Maurice comte de Saxe.1 T. Harry Williams was perhaps the first historian to offer a scholarly explanation ofthe application ofthese philosophical views to the Union command structure during the Civil War. He examined a group of generals who, like Jomini, favored a maneuver rather than fighting to achieve victory. Among the most prominent members of this class was George B. McClellan, who considered the capture of Manassas and Yorktown his greatest military achievements ofthe war because he seized them by '"pure military skill'" and "without 1 Baron Henri Jomini, The Art ofWar, trans. G. H. Mendall and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1862); Maurice comte de Saxe, Reveries orMemoirs upon theArt ofWar (London, 1757; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971); Karl von Clausewitz, The Principles of War, trans. L. J. Matthijs Jolies (New York: Random House, 1943); Henry W. Halleck, Elements of MilitaryArtandScience, 3d ed. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1863); Joseph T. Glatthaar, Partners in Command: The Relationships between Leaders in the Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 236. Civil War History, Vol. XLI, No. 2 © 1995 by The Kent State University Press 90CIVIL war history loss of life."2 Another was Don Carlos Buell, whom Lew Wallace considered an example of what Jomini called "Logistico, or the Practical Art of Moving Armies." Buell appeared to adhere to scientific warfare and had difficulty adapting to a more modern and complex war, which for Williams reflected the "spirit of Marshal Saxe."3 Conversely Williams also examined the so-called "modern" Union commanders , "who were able to grow and who could employ new ways of war." Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Philip Sheridan, for example, reflected this new model, for they displayed an improvisational quality that reflected war as an art, entailing risk and unpredictability. Grant's recognition of the political nature of the Civil War, for example, marked him an instrument by which to define the "modern general." Thus "character of will" and "common sense" rose above the "dogmas of traditional warfare."4 In fact, Jomini and Saxe were much more complex than Williams characterized them. Their interpretation of war included a critical degree of flexibility and reason that naturally resided in and varied with the personality ofthe commander . Jominian ideas, as taught at West Point prior to the Civil War, failed to acknowledge inherent qualities of commanders. Much ofJominian theory was common-sense logic and did not teach or inspire leadership or genius. West Pointers studied little strategy but much engineering. This technical approach to war strongly reinforced their minimal exposure to concepts of Jomini and suffocated originality. According to Stephen E. Ambrose, "West Pointers could not become great or even good generals because the curriculum at the Academy was designed to stifle all imagination."5 But West Point was never designed or 1 T. Harry Williams, "The Military Leadership of North and South," in David Donald, ed., Why the North Won the Civil War (i960; reprint. New York: Collier Books, 1969), 42-44. Analysis of Civil War generalship has been the subject of much scholarly work. See for example, David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), esp. chap. 5; J. C. F. Fuller, "The Place of the American Civil War...

HOW THE CIVIL WAR DICTIONARY CAME INTO BEING Mark M. Boatner III When the head of the Chicago Civil War Round Table phoned about my giving talks to her group and the Milwaukee CWRT, we pulled a subject out of the air: "How The Civil War Dictionary Came Into Being ."1 As soon as this started appearing in the monthly newsletter, which included the complete speakers' schedule for the 1986-87 season, I had misgivings. These increased with each successive issue of thenewsletter. My talk was scheduled as the last of the season for each group, so I had months of leisure to repent an act made in haste. Who really cared how I wrote the book? My subject would keep them away in droves, I suspected. It was not reassuring when the woman who got us into this situation phoned to say that the MilwaukeeCWRT had canceled out. Did I mind? Again taken by surprise, I did not think fast enough to suggest that the Chicago CWRT drop out also. At the eleventh hour, however, reassuring events occurred. Several people wrote to say they were looking forward to the meeting in Chicago . Then the editor of this quarterly asked me to consider making an article out of the talk. "You may recall recent articles in Civil War History on Battles and Leaders and the genesis of the Official Records," his note said. That is heady company! After much organizational turbulence within the David McKay Company , a new president assured me that he intended to go ahead with the long-delayed plans to issue an extensively updated new sixteenth printing. Meanwhile, the competition I had been expecting for thirty years had finally appeared in the form of the Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedh of the Civil War.2 That seemingly uninspired topic suddenly appeared to be a good one. It had become even timely. 1 Mark M. Boatner III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1969) 2 Patricia Faust, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1986). Civil War History, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, © 1988 by The Kent State University Press 198civil war history The Civil War Dictionary (CWD) might well be titled "What ever happened to J. D. Cox?" The book idea came to me soon after I started teaching military history at West Point in 1956. Like most new instructors , I was only a lesson ahead of the students. One day a cadet asked that question. In the Antietam campaign, starting at South Mountain, where he succeeded Jesse L. Reno as corps commander, Cox was a star. His name was not mentioned again during the course. Other instructors frequently got similar "good questions." All we could do was to say we'd find the answer before the class met again. It occurred to me that if instructors wrote a memo-for-record whenever they dug up an answer, these could be posted in loose-leaf books that in due course would make a valuable work of reference. Despite a negative reaction from fellow instructors, I presented the idea officially, in writing. More than the expected disapproval, I got an admonishment evocative of a famous "second endorsement." When a subordinate persisted in resubmitting a third request in writing for a furlough Nathan Bedford Forrest allegedly scribbled on it, "I have tole you twict goddammit No!"3 No-longer-wanted property in the Old Army, including horses and mules, was stamped or branded "I. C," meaning "Inspected and Condemned ." I believed the government had a refusal option on my book because the idea had come to me "in line of duty." Now that my creature bore an official "I. C," it was mine alone. I had three misgivings. First, whether I could hack it, if readers will forgive the pun. Second, whether others were ahead of me. Third, whether the growing public enthusiasm for our Civil War would be sustained long enough to make my labor worthwhile. My Military Customs and Traditions was being published about this time by David McKay.4 When I went to New York and casually sprang the idea for the Civil War book on Kennett L. Rawson, president of this famous old company, he hit...

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CIVIL WAR ARTICLES: 1965 Compiled by Ada M. Stoflet I. General Cunliffe, Marcus. "Recent Writing on the American Civil War." History, L, 26-35. Dodwell, H. B. "American Civil War." Contemporary Review, CCVI, 192-204. [A chronology.] 'The Final Assembly of the Civil War Centennial Commission and the State Historical Society's Spring Tour." Illinois State Historical Society. Journal, LVIII, 190-199. Larson, Norman C. "The Confederate Centennial: A Report." North Carolina Historical Review, XLII, 216-223. McWhiney, Grady. "Who Whipped Whom? Confederate Defeat Reexamined ." Civil War History, XI, 5-26. Robertson, James I., Jr. "The Two-Sided War." Kansas Historical Quarterly , XXXI, 63-66. Stoflet, Ada M., comp. "A Bibliography of Civil War Articles: 1964." Civä War History, XI, 178-203. Temple, Wayne C. "Last Assembly of the Civil War Centennial Commission ." Lincoln Herald, LXVII, 83-90. II. Slavery and the Antebellum South Craven, Avery O. "Historical Adventure." Journal of American History, LI (1964), 5-20. [Manning-Chestnut family in antebellum South Carolina .] Duram, James C. "A Study of Frustration: Britain, the USA and the African Slave Trade, 1815-1870." Social Science, XL, 220-225. Fishlow, Albert. "Antebellum Interregional Trade Reconsidered." American Economic Review, LIV (1964), 352-364. Hill, Leonard U. "John Randolph's Freed Slaves Settle in Western Ohio." Cincinnati Historical Society. Bulletin, XXIII, 179-186. Jenkins, John H., ed. "Murder the Entire White Population." Texana, III, 180-182. Katz, William. "Another Slave Freed." Journal of Negro History, L, 121-123. Logan, Gwendolyn Evans. "The Slave in Connecticut during the Revolution ." Connecticut Historical Society. Bulletin, XXX, 73-80. 156 Lucdncham, Bradford F. "Schoolcraft, Slavery and Self-Emancipation." Journal of Negro History, L, 118-121. Lynd, Staughton. "Rethinking Slavery and Reconstruction." Journal of Negro History, L, 198-209. Mathews, Donald G. "Methodist Mission to the Slaves, 1829-1844." Journal of American History, LI, 615-631. Miller, William L. "Note on the Importance of the Interstate Slave Trade of the Ante Bellum South." Journal of Politicai Economy, LXXIII, 181-187. Moore, John Hammond. "A Hymn of Freedom—South Carolina, 1813." Journal of Negro History, L, 50-53. Neyland, Leedell W. "The Free Negro in Florida." Negro History Bulletin , XXIX, 27-28+. Parker, Franklin. "Philip Vickers Fifthian: Northern Tutor on a Southern Plantation." Journal of the West, IV, 56-62. Proctor, William G., Jr. "Slavery in Southwest Georgia." Georgia Historical Quarterly, XLIX, 1-22. Reinders, Robert C. "The Free Negro in the New Orleans Economy, 1850-1860." Louisiana History, VI, 273-285. Rice, Otis K. "Coal Mining in the Kanawha Valley to 1861: A View of Industrialization in the Old South." Journal of Southern History, XXXI, 393-416. Schnell, Kempes. "Anti-Slavery Influences on the Status of Slaves in a Free State." Journal of Negro History, L, 257-273. Sio, Arnold A. "Interpretations of Slavery: The Slave Status in the Americas." Comparative Studies in Society and History, VII, 289-308. SuTCH, Richard. "The Profitability of Ante Bellum Slavery—Revisited." Southern Economic Journal, XXXI, 365-377. "A Reply" by Edward Saraydor, 377-383. Takai, Ronald. "The Movement to Reopen the African Slave Trade in South Carolina." South Carolina Historical Magazine, LXVI, 38-54. Williams, William Henry, ed. "Ten Letters from William Harris Crawford to Martin Van Buren." Georgia Historical Quarterly, XLIX, 65-81. WiNNiNCHAM, Mrs. Davto. "Sam Houston and Slavery." Texana, III, 93104 . Wax, Darold D. "Negro Imports into Pennsylvania, 1720-1766." Pennsylvania History, XXXII, 254-287. Wooster, Ralph A. "Membership in Early Texas Legislature, 1850-1860." Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXIX, 163-173. III. Antislavery and Sectionalism "Abraham Lincoln's Hartford Speech of 5 March 1860." Kentucky. University . Libraries. Bulletin, XXV (October, 1964), [1-4]. "Anti-Slavery Song Books in Thoreau's Library." Emerson Society Quarterly , No. 36 (III Quarter, 1964), Parts 2 and 3, 52-121. Carroll, Kenneth L. "William Southeby, Early Quaker Antislavery 157 158civil war history Writer." Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXXIX, 416-427. "A Checklist of Literary Contributions to The Liberator." Emerson Society Bulletin, No. 40, Part 3, 133-150. CoNCLETON, Betty Carolyn. "George D. Prentice and Bloody Monday: A Reappraisal." Kentucky Historical Society. Register, LXIII, 218-239. [Election day, August 6, 1855, culminating first state campaign of Native American Party.] Dunson, A...

Objective: Over the past 15 years, Yuli Veterans Hospital (YVH) in Taiwan has developed the Yuli model to reform long-stay care for psychiatric patients. The development of the Yuli model could be divided into pre-early (1998–1999), early (2000–2006) and late (2007–2008) periods according to the setting-up of the community facilities. In the pre-early period, a vocational rehabilitation program was established for psychiatric patients in YVH. In the later periods, the independent living skills training and the program for social reintegration were instituted in the community facilities. This study aimed to evaluate mortality among the long-stay patients with schizophrenia during the three periods. Methods: In all, 2457 patients with schizophrenia who had been hospitalized for at least one year initially were retrospectively followed from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2008. Compared with the general population in Taiwan, we calculated the age- and sex-specific standardized mortality ratios (SMRs) of those patients by cause of death during the three periods. Results: Most of the patients were male (81.3%). The mean ± SD age of the patients was 57.83 ± 16.95 years. The all-, natural- and unnatural-cause mortalities of the patients were nearly two times greater than those of the general population during the whole study period. Compared with those in the pre-early and early periods, all patients in the late period had the lowest mortality gaps. In the pre-early, early and late periods, the all-cause SMR were 5.40 (95% confidence interval (CI) = 4.27–6.81), 2.90 (95% CI = 2.20–3.79) and 1.17 (95% CI = 0.54–2.22), respectively, for the 50–69-year-old male patients. Nearly half of all the patients who participated the whole comprehensive rehabilitation program belonged to this sex and age group (N = 156, 46.6%). Conclusions: With the setting-up of community facilities for the comprehensive rehabilitation program, the mortality gaps among the 50–69-year-old male patients apparently decreased using the Yuli model.

To report on the experience with a selective prophylactic permanent pacemaker (PPx-PPM) implantation strategy in patients with pre-existing right bundle branch block (RBBB) undergoing transcatheter aortic valve replacement (TAVR). Pre-existing RBBB is an independent predictor for PPM after TAVR and has been linked to increased mortality. Hospital patient flow and longer-term clinical endpoints were compared for TAVR patients with pre-existing RBBB treated in a period with and without selective PPx-PPM strategy (2013-2020). A total of 260 patients were included: 170 in the early period without PPx-PPM strategy and 90 patients in the late period with selective PPx-PPM strategy. A PPx-PPM was implanted in 44% of patients in the late period. Overall, 69% versus 80% of all patients in the early versus late period ended up with a PPM (p=.06). Streamlined transfemoral TAVR was routinely used from 2017-in this series of patients, both TAVR procedural time and hospital length of stay (LoS) were significantly shorter in the late versus early period (mean procedural time: 70 vs. 83 min and LoS ≥5 days: 15% vs. 40%; p < .05). No difference in all-cause/cardiovascular mortality was observed between both strategies, whereas cardiac rehospitalization was significantly higher for patients treated in the early versus late period (hazard ratio 2.33 [1.04-5.26]; p=.042)-this mainly due to (sub)acute PPM-implantation early after discharge. Selective prophylactic PPM implantation in TAVR candidates with pre-existing RBBB results in shorter TAVR procedural time and hospital LoS and prevents early cardiac rehospitalization related to complete heart block.

The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of different sequences of pulmonary artery and vein ligations during lobectomy on blood micrometastasis of non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC). Cytokeratin 19 (CK19)/adhesion molecule CD44v6 mRNA were used as markers. A total of 30 NSCLC patients undergoing pulmonary lobectomy were randomly divided into pulmonary artery (PA)-first and pulmonary vein (PV)-first groups according to the order of artery or vein ligation (15 cases in each). Fluorescent quantitative-RT-PCR (FQ-RT-PCR) was used to detect the mRNA expression of CK19 and CD44v6 in pulmonary venous blood at the early and late periods during surgery, and ΔCt values were calculated. Meanwhile, the peripheral blood samples from 10 healthy volunteers were selected as the control. ΔCt values of CD44v6 and CK19 of NSCLC groups at the early period during surgery were 7.83±1.70 and 10.76±2.74, while those of the control group were 9.17±1.04 and 12.76±2.36. The expression of CD44v6 and CK19 genes in venous blood of NSCLC groups was significantly higher than that of the control group (P<0.05). In addition, the ΔCt values of CD44v6 and CK19 in the early and late periods during surgery in the PA-first group were 7.92±1.97 vs. 5.67±2.11 (P= 0.008) and 11.21±3.14 vs. 8.60±4.02 (P= 0.05), respectively. The expression of CD44v6 and CK19 in the late period were both significantly higher than those in the early period, while neither the ΔCt value of CD44v6 nor that of CK19 in the early vs. late periods in the PV-first group exhibited statistically significant differences (7.95±1.91 vs. 7.74±2.10 and 10.60±3.15 vs. 10.30±2.98) (P<0.05). Surgical manipulation itself may stimulate the occurrence of blood micrometastasis and the ligation of the PV first during surgery may help prevent blood micrometastasis.

The influence of constitutional variation upon the absorption and stability to hydrogen ions of certain halogenated derivatives of fluorescein