Attack Path Analysis and Cost-Efficient Selection of Cybersecurity Controls for Complex Cyberphysical Systems

The increasingly witnessed integration of information technology with operational technology leads to the formation of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) that intertwine physical and cyber components and connect to each other to form systems-of-systems. This interconnection enables the offering of functionality beyond the combined offering of each individual component, but at the same time increases the cyber risk of the overall system, as such risk propagates between and aggregates at component systems. The complexity of the resulting systems-of-systems in many cases leads to difficulty in analyzing cyber risk. Additionally, the selection of cybersecurity controls that will effectively and efficiently treat the cyber risk is commonly performed manually, or at best with limited automated decision support. In this work, we propose a method for analyzing risk propagation and aggregation in complex CPSs utilizing the results of risk assessments of their individual constituents. Additionally, we propose a method employing evolutionary programming for automating the selection of an optimal set of cybersecurity controls out of a list of available controls, that will minimize the residual risk and the cost associated with the implementation of these measures. We illustrate the workings of the proposed methods by applying them to the navigational systems of two variants of the Cyber-Enabled Ship (C-ES), namely the autonomous ship and the remotely controlled ship. The results are sets of cybersecurity controls applied to those components of the overall system that have been identified in previous studies as the most vulnerable ones; such controls minimize the residual risk, while also minimizing the cost of implementation.

Naval forces rely heavily on Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) to conduct operations and achieve mission success. As CPS infrastructure becomes exposed to the contested world through networks, CPS security becomes much more important. In a CPS, the cyber components manage the physical components. ONR proposes that the overall goal for CPS resiliency is to have the physical systems behave properly regardless of fault and disruption. Our approach to CPS resiliency focuses on the physical components. We observed that the inertia of the physical components provides a natural but limited resilience, and is capable of tolerating short-term disruption without affecting the health and safety of the CPS. This and the fact that a CPS has a large difference between physical and cyber time scales, enables a unique approach to CPS resiliency. We present Byzantine Fault Tolerant++ (BFT++), a cyber resilient architecture that engineers the cyber components to be brittle against attack, which consequently forces cyber attacks and related disruptions to be short-lived and within tolerance of the physical system’s inertia.

Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), widely used in pervasive computing, integrate computation in the cyber world with control of physical processes. Developing CPS is challenging because interactions between physical and cyber components are complex and often unpredictable. Traditional debugging techniques can detect bugs in the cyber world, but bugs introduced from physical components and induced by limitations in the software interface to physical hardware are still difficult to detect. My research will capture the state of art and the state of the practice in verification and validation of CPS. Based on this, I will design middleware that combines models of the physical world with programming-language based assertions to help developers to design, develop, and debug robust CPS applications with ease.

As cyber systems increasingly converge with physical infrastructure and social processes, they give rise to Complex Cyber–Physical–Social Systems (C-CPSS), whose emergent behaviors pose unique risks to security and mission assurance. Traditional cyber–physical system models often fail to address the unpredictability arising from human and organizational dynamics, leaving critical gaps in how cyber risks are assessed and managed across interconnected domains. The challenge lies in building resilient systems that not only resist disruption, but also absorb, recover, and adapt—especially in the face of complex, nonlinear, and often unintentionally emergent threats. This paper introduces the concept of ‘responsible resilience’, defined as the capacity of systems to adapt to cyber risks using trustworthy, transparent agent-based models that operate within socio-technical contexts. We identify a fundamental research gap in the treatment of social complexity and emergence in existing the cyber–physical system literature. To address this, we propose the E3R modeling paradigm—a novel framework for conceptualizing Emergent, Risk-Relevant Resilience in C-CPSS. This paradigm synthesizes human-in-the-loop diagrams, agent-based Artificial Intelligence simulations, and ontology-driven representations to model the interdependencies and feedback loops driving unpredictable cyber risk propagation more effectively. Compared to conventional cyber–physical system models, E3R accounts for adaptive risks across social, cyber, and physical layers, enabling a more accurate and ethically grounded foundation for cyber defence and mission assurance. Our analysis of the literature review reveals the underrepresentation of socio-emergent risk modeling in the literature, and our results indicate that existing models—especially those in industrial and healthcare applications of cyber–physical systems—lack the generalizability and robustness necessary for complex, cross-domain environments. The E3R framework thus marks a significant step forward in understanding and mitigating emergent threats in future digital ecosystems.

Guest Editorial

The identification and analysis of potential paths that an adversary may exploit to attack Cyber Physical Systems comprising sub-systems enables the comprehensive understanding of the attacks and the impact that may have to the overall system, thus facilitating the definition of appropriate countermeasures that will satisfy the pertinent security requirements. To this end, several attack modelling techniques can be employed, the attack graph being the most prevalent among them. Unfortunately, the discovery and analysis of all possible attack paths in an attack graph is not possible in systems even of a moderate size. In this work we propose a novel systematic method for discovering and analyzing attack paths in real-world scale interconnected Cyber Physical Systems. The method considers the criticality of each sub-system in discovering paths and the risk to the overall system that each path presents to analyze and prioritize paths. We illustrate the workings of the method by applying to the navigational Cyber Physical Systems of the Cyber-Enabled Ship to identify and analyze highly critical attack paths originating from the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and targeting the Autonomous Navigation System (ANS).

This paper describes a cyber-physical system approach for wide area control applications in power grids. Specifically, it is proposed to use cyber-physical system modeling methodology, to include explicit physical and behavior based models, to facilitate the application of traditional controller design and analysis to wide area control applications. Our proposed approach allows for modeling the physical elements of the power grid (e.g. transmission network, generation, loads and measurement devices), the cyber components (e.g. execution of reactive software algorithms in data processing and control software), and the concurrent and sequential interactions of cyber and physical components. The cyber-physical interactions are critical for wide area control applications due to the multiple spatial and temporal scales present in these systems. The modeling methodology is formulated into a classical closed loop controller which the plant and the controller contain cyber and physical elements. The proposed approach allows for studying the impacts of cyber-physical interactions, evaluating the effectiveness and resiliency of wide area controllers, and can be applied as a tool to benchmark and derive specifications for final designs. The methodology is applied to a phasor measurement unit based wide area control of a static VAR compensator in a MATLAB/Simulink environment.

One aspect of the digital transformation process in the shipping industry, a process often referred to as Shipping 4.0, is the increased digitization of on board systems that goes along with increased automation in and autonomy of the vessel. This is happening by integrating Information Technology with Operation Technology systems that results in Cyber Physical Systems on which the safe operations and sailing of contemporary and future vessels depend. Unavoidably, such highly interconnected and interdependent systems increase the exposure of the vessel’s digital infrastructure to cyber attacks and cyber security risks. In this paper, we leverage the STRIDE and DREAD methodologies to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the cyber risk of Cyber Physical Systems on board digitalized contemporary and future ships. Further, we propose appropriate cyber security baseline controls to mitigate such risks, by applying a systematic approach using a set of criteria that take into account the security requirements; the cyber risks; the possible attacks; and the possibly already existing controls, to select from the list of controls provided in the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) overlay of the NIST Guide to ICS Security. The results are expected to support the decision-making and the design of a security architecture for the cyber-enabled ship.

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are engineered solutions obtained through the seamless integration of computational algorithms and physical components. Nowadays, they are entitled to drive innovation and competition in different fields such as agriculture, building design and automation, energy, healthcare, transportation and, above all, industrial manufacturing. In fact, CPS technology is going to transform the way people interact with engineered systems — just as the Internet has transformed the way people interact with information. Among CPS technologies, measurement and networking ones play a fundamental role, being enrolled as the natural bridge between the cyber and physical components of a CPS. A number of interconnected sensors and transducers are claimed to give inner and outer, local measurement data that, once processed through suitable algorithms and analytics, have to provide reliable information about the effectiveness of the whole CPS and its interaction with the external world, as well as its health status for maintenance and troubleshooting purposes. So, great attention has to be paid to network models and architectures, to sensor forms and functions, in order to make CPSs properly integrate the continuous and the discrete, compounded by the uncertainty of open environments. The paper aims at opening a preliminary discussion on the role and features of measurement and networking technologies in CPS application fields, with special regard to industrial manufacturing, within a scientific community traditionally close to instrumentation and measurement (IM) issues, in order to stimulate and encourage useful and fruitful cross-fertilization. After some details concerning the general structure of a CPS, its typical architectural model and main features, a special focus is put on CPSs involved in industrial manufacturing along with measurement and networking facets. Some considerations about major measurement challenges that the CPS self-awareness feature poses in maintenance and troubleshooting operations are then drawn. Concluding remarks are finally reported.

PurposeIn recent years, the frequency and severity of cybersecurity incidents have prompted customers to seek out specialized insurance products. However, this has also presented insurers with operational challenges and increased costs. The assessment of risks for health systems and cyber–physical systems (CPS) necessitates a heightened degree of attention. The significant values of potential damages and claims request a solid insurance system, part of cyber-resilience. This research paper focuses on the emerging cyber insurance market that is currently in the process of standardizing and improving its risk analysis concerning the potential insured entity.Design/methodology/approachThe authors' approach involves a quantitative analysis utilizing a Likert-style questionnaire designed to survey cyber insurance professionals. The authors' aim is to identify the current methods used in gathering information from potential clients, as well as the manner in which this information is analyzed by the insurers. Additionally, the authors gather insights on potential improvements that could be made to this process.FindingsThe study the authors elaborated it has a particularly important cyber and risk components for insurance area, because it addresses a “niche” area not yet proper addressed in specialized literature – cyber insurance. Cyber risk management approaches are not uniform at the international level, nor at the insurer level. Also, not all insurers can perform solid assessments, especially since their companies should first prove that they are fully compliant with international cyber security standards.Research limitations/implicationsThis research has concentrated on analyzing the current practices in terms of gathering information about the insured entity before issuing the cyber insurance policy, level of details concerning the cyber security posture of the insured entity and way such information should be analyzed in a standardized and useful manner. The novelty of this research resides in the analysis performed as detailed above and the proposals in terms of information gathered, depth of analysis and standardization of approach made. Future work on the topic can focus on the standardization process for analyzing cyber risk for insurance clients, to improve the proposal based also on historical elements and trends in the market. Thus, future research can further refine the standardization process to analyze in more depth the way this can be implemented and included in relevant legislation at the EU level.Practical implicationsProposed improvements include proposals in terms of the level of detail and the usefulness of an independent centralized approach for information gathering and analysis, especially given the re-insurance and brokerage activities. The authors also propose a common practical procedural approach in risk management, with the involvement of insurance companies and certification institutions of cyber security auditors.Originality/valueThe study investigates the information gathered by insurers from potential clients of cyber insurance and the way this is analyzed and updated for issuance of the insurance policy.

Reliability assessment of a power system with cyber-physical interactive operation of photovoltaic systems

Cyber-physical production systems are highly flexible systems that enable adaptive production processes. In these systems, all participants of the production process possess individual information about themselves and are equipped with sensors, actors, and communication interfaces. They can interact with each other and autonomously develop and execute process relevant decisions. For each component, a standard process sequence and alternative process sequences are defined. If a deviation in the standard process occurs during the production of an individual component, the process participants can interact with each other and autonomously define an appropriate response strategy and execute it by using actors of the participants and the intralogistics. Regardless of the deviation, the manufacturing and assembly process of individual components in cyber-physical production systems can still proceed. For this purpose, process deviations and the response behavior of cyber-physical production systems are analyzed, modeled, and simulated, to illustrate the benefits of cyber-physical production systems and to develop a process deviation management system for actual, physical production systems based on cyber-physical systems.

Modern microgrids are networked systems comprising physical and cyber components for networking, computation, and monitoring. These cyber components make microgrids more reliable but increase the system complexity. Therefore, risk assessment methods are an imperative technology for cyber-physical systems to ensure safe and secure operations. The authors propose a reliability approach that utilizes the failure modes of power and cyber network key components to perform the risk analysis in microgrids. In this work, the authors have used the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) approach for risk assessment of microgrid systems and determine the influence of various failure modes on their performance. FMEA is one of the most effective methods to assess the risk involving the cyber components. It is the method of examining components, modules, and subsystems to determine failure modes in a system and their causes and consequences. A novel approach is proposed to calculate risk priority numbers based on factors like severity, occurrence, and detection. A risk matrix is calculated from the proposed FMEA worksheet, which acts as a graphical representation for evaluating components risk based on risk priority number or criticality metrics.

The article analyzes the domestic and international approaches of scientists and financial institutions regarding the interpretation of the concept of payment systems and proposes the author’s interpretation of this category as “an organizationally formed set of system participants and the relations between them regarding the transfer of funds based on recognized legal norms at the level of sovereign countries or at the international level. The peculiarities of the payment systems’ functioning and the possibility of taking into account the international standards for the exchange of financial messages ISO 20022 in the payment infrastructure of Ukraine were analyzed, which will allow to harmonize the Ukrainian payment area with the world, to expand the details of payments with additional information, to increase the level of service and efficiency of payments, to enrich the functional content of payment instruments for the benefit of banks and their customers, increase the level of automation of payments. It was determined that the area of the payment systems’ functioning belongs to the risky spheres of activity. The typification of the payment systems’ risks of banking and non-banking institutions, determined by the regulations of the National Bank of Ukraine, defines such types of risks as legal, payment, operational, systemic and financial risks. It is substantiated that the basis of the effective functioning of banking institutions in conditions of uncertainty is the identification and management of risks inherent in banking activity. At the same time, the emphasis is on the fact that a component of operational risk is such a type of risk as cyber risk, which is considered as the risk of realizing cyber threats to information resources and/or information infrastructure, as well as the consequences of such events. Because modern payment systems are intermediaries in the movement of funds, and therefore are at risk of negative influences, challenges, threats and dangers, which can lead to damage to the national interests of states, it is proposed to consider cyber risk as a separate type of risks of the payment systems’ functioning. In order to prevent, detect, respond, absorb cyber risk, and ensure adaptability and the ability to restore the payment system, the central bank of the state should increase the level of information security and cyber protection in the field of funds transfer. The information security policy of banks must be constantly supplemented and changed in accordance with the specified set of criteria for assuring information security.

This paper presents definitions characterizing the concepts regarding cyber-physical systems and dependability. Cyber-physical systems incorporate computing, communication and storage capabilities with monitoring and/or control of entities in the physical world in a dependably, securely, efficiently and real-time way. The challenges of cyber-physical system research are concerning: real-time system abstractions; robustness, safety and security; QoS composition; and nor least dependability. Dependability is first introduced as a global concept that subsumes the usual attributes of reliability, availability, safety, integrity and maintainability. The paper aims to define research challenges to achieve the dependability in cyber-physical hydropower systems. The significant challenge of the dependability in cyber-physical hydropower systems is evaluation of the system behavior in terms of interdependencies between cyber and physical components of the system.