Audit fee trends from 2000 to 2014

Impact of Section 201 of SOX on the Relationship between Audit and Non-Audit Fees

Purpose – This study aims to contribute to the understanding of audit pricing and the competitiveness of the audit fee market by examining audit fee stickiness. Design/methodology/approach – The authors explore the price behavior of audit fees in response to changes in the variables that are usually seen as their determinants, such as size, complexity, and risk in order to examine audit fee stickiness and the competitiveness of the market for audit services. Findings – The authors find that audit fees are sticky, i.e. audit fees do not immediately or fully adjust to changes in their determinants. Audit fees also respond to changes leading to an increase more quickly than they respond to changes leading to a decrease. The difference between positive and negative fee adjustments declines over periods longer than one year and is no longer significant when four-year periods are considered. Research limitations/implications – The study is limited to companies in the USA from 2000 to 2008. Future research should examine this issue in other settings and periods. Practical implications – The results suggest that the audit market is competitive, at least in the medium term. Originality/value – The study helps to explain why the audit fee model does not fully explain the level of audit fees; why audit fees are more likely to be too high than too low; and why auditor switches are commonly associated with larger changes in audit fees. The findings provide evidence that may be useful to managers and audit committees when managing their audit fees, auditors when considering the risks and opportunities associated with changes in the determinants of audit fees, and regulators concerned with the competitiveness of the audit market.

This study empirically investigates the relationship between negative new media coverage and audit fees by collecting a sample of nonfinancial listed companies on the main board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) from 2017 to 2019, along with data on negative new media coverage of official WeChat public accounts founded by the most influential national financial newspaper obtained using a crawler. This study revealed that: 1. Audit fees are significantly and positively related to negative news media coverage; 2. The increase in audit fees is due to the fact that if a listed company undergoes negative new media coverage, the accounting firm that audits the company will consequently increase risk premium and thus audit fees. We found no evidence that accounting firms spend more time and effort on audit work after a listed company experiences negative new media coverage; 3. Analyst-tracking has a moderating effect on negative new media coverage and audit fees, leading to an increase in audit fees; 4. Negative media reporting on non-state-owned enterprises is more likely to cause accounting firms to increase their audit fees than their state-owned peers, whereas "non-Big Four" accounting firms are more likely to increase their audit fees for companies with negative new media reports. This study, based on the differing impacts of negative new media coverage, intended to unravel the intricate relationship between different types of negative new media coverage and audit fees, help understand the mechanism whereby negative reporting impacts audit fees, and provides a benchmark for the development of a feasible audit fee system.

Introduction: Circa 1992, the dot.com sector created an irrational stock-trading market where the usual “financial” profiles of: Liquidity, Cash Flow from Operations, and Revenue generation were replaced by Ponzi-esque mayhem. To stabilize the markets, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] required a second audit opinion: the COSO Opinion on the adequacy of management’s system of Internal Control over Financial Reporting: [ICoFR].Study Focus: Three COSO-[ICoFR] designations are now required as public information: (i) A “clean” opinion [Is Effective], (ii) Deficiencies are noted, and (iii) Weaknesses reported. Our research interest is to determine, for a panel of randomly selected firms traded on the S&P500 for a eleven-year period: 2005 to 2015, the nature of the effect that the COSO deficiency reporting protocol has on (i) Audit Fees and (ii) the Market Cap of traded firms.Method: To this end we collected, using the Audit Analytics Ô[WRDSÔ] database, various categories of reported Audit Fees and also Market Cap information. This random sample was classified into two sets: the first group: Is Effective SEC 302 Designation and No COSO issues & the second group: Is Not 100% Effective for which there were SEC 302 Deficiencies or Weaknesses noted.Results: Inferential testing indicates that failure to attend to the PCAOB-COSO imperatives results in a relational where there are higher Audit Fees and a slippage of the firm’s Market Cap compared to the Is Effective Group. The PCAOB’s protocol to require the Audit of the firm’s ICoFR system and make that evaluation public information seems to be an excellent corrective “Carrot and Stick”.

In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.

This study explores the impact of increased audit work on audit effort and audit fees. Specifically, it analyses whether the magnitude of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adjustments affect audit hours and audit fees, and this relation varies depending on initial audit engagement. Using IFRS reconciliations and audit data in Korea, this paper provides evidence that audit hours as a proxy for audit effort is more closely associated with the level of audit work than audit fees. The study further documents that this finding is more pronounced for incumbent auditors. These findings suggest that increased audit work affects audit effort, and initial audit engagement has a negative impact not only on audit fees but also on audit hours. The findings of this paper should be of substantial interest to regulators, policy makers and financial managers who are interested in the cost of IFRS adoption.

SUMMARY The recent growth in non-audit services (NAS) at the major audit firms has the attention of auditing regulators. On several occasions recently, board members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have indicated that the rise in NAS may place auditor independence at risk (Harris 2014; Tysiac 2014). Impaired independence can result in audit failure, which includes situations when auditors fail to issue going-concern (GC) audit opinions to soon-to-be bankrupt companies. In this paper, I examine the association between the propensity of auditors to issue GC opinions and NAS fees (and audit fees) to 203 bankrupt companies during 2002–2013. In analysis, I find no significant relation between GC decisions and NAS fees and audit fees. My results may interest U.S. regulators, who recently expressed concerns about the threat to auditor independence from the spike in NAS at the major firms. Data Availability: Publicly available from sources identified in the paper.

Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Equipping Small Audit Firms with Big Resources

PurposeThis paper aims to examine how a firm’s exposure to economic policy uncertainty affects the auditors’ perceptions of financial reporting risk. Firms that are more sensitive to policy uncertainty are predicted to engage in more earnings management because these firms are more likely to experience greater uncertainty in future operations. Audit fees will reflect this reporting risk. On the other hand, auditors might feel more fee pressure from policy-sensitive firms because firms are more inclined to reduce spending in the face of uncertainty and subsequently charge lower fees.Design/methodology/approachThe author tests my hypothesis using U.S. data on audit fees and client characteristics of public companies between the years 2001 and 2021. The author estimates a standard audit fee model based on the audit fee literature (Hay et al., 2006) while also including the two policy sensitivity measures. This study uses panel data methods that allow time-series analyses, providing a powerful setting to test dynamic audit fee adjustment to improve the understanding of the audit market.FindingsThe results suggest that audit fee is higher for policy-sensitive firms than for policy-neutral firms. These results are robust to various proxies of policy sensitivity and various specifications designed to mitigate the endogeneity concerns. The study provides assurance that on average, auditor pricing reflects client risk adequately, mitigating the concern that auditors give in to fee pressure and compromise audit quality as a result.Research limitations/implicationsWhile the findings from this study should be of value to regulators and academics seeking to understand audit activities amid escalating macroeconomic uncertainty, when interpreting these results, several limitations must be considered. The study does not examine how external auditors evaluate risks tied to policy uncertainty. A comprehensive understanding of how and why external auditors respond to heightened policy uncertainty faced by firms could be better achieved through interviews with external auditors and audit committee members. In addition, while this study posits that auditors adjust their approach in response to changes in policy uncertainty, largely due to potential shifts in the risks of material misstatement, there might be additional factors at play that warrant higher audit fees post a change in policy uncertainty. For instance, specific policy changes may give rise to new risks or modify existing ones, thereby precipitating increased scrutiny of records and procedures as company directors’ demand. These aspects offer potential avenues for future research.Practical implicationsThis study underscores the significant role of policy sensitivity in determining audit fees and audit quality. Policy-sensitive firms present unique complexities and potential risks that require additional effort and vigilance from auditors. Auditors must develop a specialized understanding of sectors prone to policy fluctuations to navigate these unique challenges effectively. In addition, the role of professional standards boards and regulators in establishing guidelines for auditing policy-sensitive firms cannot be understated. Such guidelines could lead to more consistent audit practices and improved audit quality. Finally, by recognizing and effectively responding to the policy sensitivity of client firms, audit firms can mitigate their own risks, strengthen public trust and enhance the reliability of financial reports.Originality/valueFirst, this study adds to an emerging stream of auditing literature that focuses on how audit fees interact with a firm’s external environment by providing evidence of an unexplored implication, a firm-specific policy sensitivity. Second, my main construct, policy sensitivity, provides two distinct advantages over other variables used in prior studies that explore the relationship between audit fees and external firm environments. Third, this study answers the calls for research by De Villiers et al. (2013, p. 3), who identified the cost behavior of audit fees, especially over time, as an area not well understood.

Purpose The authors investigate whether the different tenure phases of executives have a differential effect on audit pricing. Two alternate views – career concern and power – can explain the effect of executives’ tenure on audit pricing. This paper aims to determine, which viewpoint dominates in explaining the relationship between audit pricing and executive tenure phases. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 11,198 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2016, the authors adopt an ordinary least squares regression model to assess the impact of the middle and long phases of executives’ tenure on audit fees. Findings Audit fees are significantly lower when executives enter the middle and long phases of tenure. The reduction in audit fees is greatest as both chief executive officers and chief financial officers enter the long tenure phase. Although audit fees gradually decrease as executive tenure is extended, they start increasing two years before the end of executive tenure. Furthermore, the negative association between the executive tenure phase and audit fees is greater when the executive is appointed externally. Finally, the long phase of executive tenure also mitigates the positive relationship between audit fees and internal control weaknesses. Research limitations/implications This study is based on US data. Future research may extend this study to other countries. Practical implications The findings are important to firms, practitioners and academicians, particularly, as the length of tenure of top executives has increased in recent years. By documenting that executives’ middle and long tenure phases reduce audit fees, the findings highlight the importance of maintaining executives in the firm. Finally, the findings have implications for investors, policymakers and auditors to identify companies with high audit risk. Originality/value This study is the first to document the impact of executives’ middle and long tenure phases on audit fees.

After the Big 6 merger exercise in 1998, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) has become the industry market leader that provides high quality audit services. Consequently, it has acquired a greater capacity to develop expertise and provide better quality audit services. It is expected that PWC charges fee premiums in return on investment for the capacity building. This study investigates how audit fee (AF) premiums and how it relates to auditors' industry specialisation and reputation. The study utilises data of 679 Bursa Malaysia listed companies in 2001 and 796 in 2005. AF premiums are calculated using the Simunic (1980) AF model. Industry specialisation is determined based on the number of audit clients at 20% threshold. Results indicate PWC obtains highest average AFs, hence, maintains its industry leadership. Results show that PWC does not charge AF premiums over and above the amount charged by the Big 5/4 regardless of whether they are industry specialists or not, except on smaller clients.

The economic determinants of audit fees have been examined extensively among public companies, both in the US (e.g. Simunic, 1980; Gist, 1992) and internationally (e.g. Anderson and Zhégal, 1994). These studies have been based on audits of publicly-traded firms, which were surveyed to determine the audit fees. In the US pension plan audit market, audit fees are publicly disclosed, eliminating the potential for response bias present in most other audit fee studies. Additionally, unlike the public company audit market, the pension plan audit market is not dominated by the Big Six accounting firms, and audit fees in the pension plan audit market are smaller than in the public company audit market. This study examines the generalisability of the audit fee model by applying the model in the pension plan audit context. In accord with other audit fee studies, results indicate that client characteristics, including client size and risk, are associated with pension plan audit fees. In contrast with other studies, findings regarding market factors do not suggest a difference in fee structures between Big Six and non-Big Six firms, and the results indicate that auditor changes do not affect pension plan audit fees.

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the effects on audit quality and audit fees of requiring the engagement partner to sign the audit report in the United Kingdom (U.K.). The effect of requiring the engagement partner to sign the audit report is timely since the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is considering mandating a similar requirement in the United States (U.S.). In the first year after the introduction of the signature requirement, we find a significant decline in abnormal accruals and the propensity to meet an earnings threshold, and we find a significant increase in the incidence of qualified audit reports and in earnings informativeness. In addition, audit fees are significantly higher in the post-signature period than in the pre-signature period. Moreover, we compare U.K. firms with a matched sample of U.S. firms and firms in other European countries in periods both before and after the U.K. adopted a signature requirement. Our results are generally consistent with the argument of improved audit quality in U.K. firms after the signature requirement is adopted. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

Do practitioner assessments agree with academic proxies for audit quality? Evidence from PCAOB and internal inspections

ABSTRACT: This study examines the impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on audit fees. We first build an analytical audit fee model to analyze the impact on audit fees for the change in both audit complexity and financial reporting quality brought about by IFRS adoption. We then test the model's predictions using audit fee data from European Union countries that mandated IFRS adoption in 2005. We find that mandatory IFRS adoption has led to an increase in audit fees. We also find that the IFRS-related audit fee premium increases with the increase in audit complexity brought about by IFRS adoption, and decreases with the improvement in financial reporting quality arising from IFRS adoption. Finally, we find some evidence that the IFRS-related audit fee premium is lower in countries with stronger legal regimes. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. Data availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.