Autopoietic Systems in General Phenomenal Domains

Explaining Maturana's Concept of Autopoiesis

A paradox lurks in the fact that obstinate 'Taylorist' organizations should learn to become 'learning' organizations. Argyris and Schon (1978) regard this paradox as a key problem in managing structural organizational change. Today's design-oriented methods, such as business process re-engineering (BPR) (Hammer and Champy, 1993; Davenport, 1993) and especially the modern variant of socialtechnical systems design (de Sitter et al., 1990), amply provide the tools for the redesign of the architecture of Taylorist organization processes but fail to tackle this key problem. They do not offer a method of implementing the new structures. In this article an attempt is made to provide for such a method. A 'redesign dialogue' is developed as a method for the successful management of change. The dialogue is based on a new way in which organizations are being conceptualized, i.e. as autopoietic systems (Luhmann, 1984). This conceptualization yields significant knowledge of the dynamics of the process of change and the opportunities for intervention. Besides providing a method of change, this article aims at offering a theoretical foundation for some of the current trends in organizational change, i.e. the increasing focus on participation, the vital importance of commitment, the emphasis on learning in the change process, the broadening of the consultant's role towards teacher and coach and the broadening of the manager's role to change advocate, change sponsor and change agent.

Reading what top researchers in psychology and sociology had to say on individuals’ sense of belonging in social contexts led me to consider Humberto Maturana’s chapter on how autopoiesis applies to the social domain. Maturana’s approach seemed promising for exploring the lack of belonging that marginalized people can feel when immersed in dominant social environments. However, the most well-known formulation of social autopoiesis, that of Niklas Luhman, solved the need for homogeneous components in autopoietic systems - required by Maturana and Verdana’s very definition of autopoiesis - by excluding a significant role for psychological systems from his model. Thus, the problem my article addresses could be expressed as, “How can a theory of social systems include and measure the contribution both of psychological components to the social domain and vice versa, as a way of understanding the significance of communications for marginalized people within a dominant social environment?”

Monika Kaup’s encyclopedic new study promises to be invaluable inasmuch as it organizes and reframes an impressive amount of scholarship from the past three decades of ecological thinking. Pulling together Bruno Latour’s theory of the “factish,” Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s autopoietic systems theory, Markus Gabriel’s ontological thought, and the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion and Alphonso Lingis is no small task—and is made no simpler by its application here to the ever-expanding genre known as “post-apocalyptic fiction.” The coherency of the study is a testament to Kaup’s often rewarding and always careful parsing of the theoretical terrain. What is more, New Ecological Realisms is ambitious in fully reimagining post-apocalyptic fiction within environmental theory while aspiring to map out the new mode of analysis its title names. Despite shared commitments with new materialism, ecocriticism, and related fields, Kaup intends to outline novel “context-based realist ontologies” viewed through the lens of literary criticism (23).New Ecological Realisms entertains close readings centered on Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy, José Saramago’s Blindness, Octavia Butler’s Parable series, and Cormac McCarthy’s Road. Kaup’s prose shines when she brings theory to bear on the literary examples in question, particularly in her discussion of Saramago’s novel. Kaup makes the inspired choice to connect systems theory—a discourse structured around questions of “observation” and “blind spots”—to Blindness, which details an epidemic vision-loss event in an unnamed city: “The newly white-blind protagonists in Saramago’s Blindness learn that to be blind means to be post-individual. Unlike the sighted, the blind cannot survive as autonomous individuals. . . . Survival is dependent on what Maturana and Varela call social coupling within self-organising collectives” (151). The collective “coupling” described in Blindness is indeed a singular social vision of survival after the ability to “see” is universally upended, a parable for the novel’s time as well as our own. Kaup argues that Blindness systemically addresses the failure of a certain kind of humanist, Cartesian project built on anthropological confidence in vision as the key metaphor for understanding. As Kaup puts it, the novel “literalises its critique of the Cartesian fiction of the disembodied observer by eliminating vision itself” (149). This observation is a prototypical example of how literary analysis functions in New Ecological Realisms: these texts almost always offer a fictional “literalization” of why a robust “new realism” is necessary to make sense of our age of ecological crisis.Ultimately, New Ecological Realisms plants its flag on the claim that post-apocalyptic fiction should be regarded as ontological rather than epistemological. “While postmodernism is an epistemology,” Kaup contends, “new realisms are ontologies” (213). The study thus aspires not just to advance ecological thinking but to clear the way for a new, holistic theory of literature after postmodernism. “Instead of determining whether things are real or constructed,” Kaup writes, “new realism asks: Where are things real? How do things become real that might initially have been constructed or unconstructed?” (19). With such questions the book discloses its indebtedness to object-oriented ontology and speculative realism and places itself firmly in the ambit of Edinburgh University Press’s Speculative Realism series, which offers some of the most interesting interventions in the widening scope of ecological studies.Kaup’s tone is at times inflated in its dismissal of competing or related theories—so much so, in fact, that many of the book’s polemics will surely polarize those trained in the more established traditions of the humanities. Kaup loses little time dispatching several decades’ worth of “constructivist” scholarship by calling that body of work a “failure.” New realism, in contrast, “searches for alternatives to both constructivism and materialist reductionism. Exposing constructivism’s hidden handicap, new realists note that it is predicated on the acceptance of the naturalist concept of the real” (26). The ableist metaphor notwithstanding, Kaup never makes plain why the “handicap” of constructivist thinking is “hidden,” or how a “naturalist concept of the real” offers the correction this area of scholarship so desperately needs. Yet on the need for a new direction, many would be keen to follow Kaup’s work—and will no doubt find a wide range of possibilities detailing how one might reshape reading practices and ontological thinking.A quintessential example of the study’s surprising antagonism toward other philosophical schools is revealed in its twofold rejection of posthumanism and new materialism. Describing one moment in Jane Bennett’s writing as “a series of rhetorical sleights-of-hands” (41) or arguing that “[Katherine] Hayles misconstrues autopoietic theory as a refurbished version of liberal humanism” (157) indicates the book’s sometimes inimical, jarring tone. Likewise, the monolithic “postmodern critic” is frequently deployed as a straw man for a head-in-the-sand scholar who behaves as if “reality,” as such, were an utter fabrication. In one anecdotal section of the introduction, Kaup paints this picture: Like the scientist in the lab, the postmodern critic in the lecture hall produces knowledge by identifying problems, invoking principles, giving reasons. But in order to get to their academic workplaces, the scientist and the scholar must move through the world, leave home, make their way to campus and walk to class. Their grasp of reality during these activities is pre-reflective, unquestioned, taken for granted. To demand justification that we are in contact with reality during these everyday transactions—as we do in the lecture hall—would be absurd: we just know because we are there. (29–30)The passage is laced with assumptions, including unchecked beliefs that “postmodern critics” question their contact with reality or deny commonsense observations about engagement with the material world. Furthermore, “we just know because we are there” is a strangely uncritical phrase with which to anchor such a position, even when it is viewed beyond the language of constructivism. One may justifiably applaud the project of “new ecological realism” in reclaiming so unassailable a stance, but what this claim means for our reading of post-apocalyptic fiction is less clear.Given how divorced these critiques of the so-called postmodern scholar seem from the arguments proper, such moments feel like later additions, perhaps an attempt to amplify the stakes of the study’s proposed new reading practice. Yet New Ecological Realisms excels not when it takes up arms in the debate about the future of the humanities but when it unites disparate theories into a coherent narrative of new realism. One great example comes in the book’s fourth chapter, where Kaup connects Latour to Gabriel: Gabriel’s rejection of a higher-order real corresponds to Latour’s principle of irreduction. . . . Just as, for Latour, no actor-networks are reducible to other actor-networks, for Gabriel, no field is reducible to another. . . . The rejection of the notion of a fundamental reality in turn has implications for the distinction between (surface) appearance and (hidden higher) reality posited by old realism. Gabriel’s new realism demolishes this dichotomy. There is no opposition between appearance and reality: insofar as existence is defined by the appearance of objects in fields of sense, appearance is reality. (210)Post-apocalyptic fiction, to put it simply, details the disruption felt when one realizes that appearance is reality. In an ecological frame, such disruption might arrive the moment that ignored warnings about ecological or toxic disaster breaks through the realm of imagined or theoretical risk. In this way, understanding the work of Latour, Gabriel, and others is indeed vital to the project of “rehabilitating the real after postmodernism” (197). We would do well to adapt our reading practices to know how to better identify and speak coherently about “reality.”The novels Kaup addresses all, in their own ways, demolish the dichotomy of appearance and reality, revealing the extent to which historical collapse engenders a newfound awareness of the “real.” For instance, The Road is a post-apocalyptic work of fiction not only because its plot engages with familiar tropes of the genre but also because, in its stripped-away landscape, it opens up new avenues for speaking about things that are “real.” In her reading of The Road, Kaup observes, “The paradox of the apocalyptic temporality of finitude is that by destroying history and world, it clears the space for remaking time and world. Both destructive and generative, apocalypse initiates a transition from one epoch to another” (263–64). Perhaps, in the end, that is what New Ecological Realisms is after: a remaking of history and world in the aftermath of those traditions that have left us no closer to salvation. It is an admirable project, to be sure, but one that could still benefit from making allies in different schools of thought who share a commitment to comprehending the “real” world—including those many mental and psychic worlds within it.

This essay was intended to answer the question of how we could enrich the substance of our discourse by drawing on the richness of other theoretical dialogues. In doing so, it explores the relationship of music and PA theorizing and organizing, at different levels. First, as explained by Humberto Maturana through his theory of autopoiesis, emerging from recursive consistencies of the human experience. His contributions are here connected to ideas developed by David Farmer and Michael Harmon, among others, to provide the theoretical bases of the case. Secondly, the relationship between musicking and PA theorizing is discussed as coherent correspondences of the constitutive elements of both: rhythm as time, melody as argument and harmony over all. The musical relevance of good PA theorizing is then explored in each of those terms.

The synthetic, integrative significance of biosemiotics as a modern interdisciplinary research program is under discussion in the article. Aimed at studying the cognitive and life activity of living beings, which are capable of recognizing signals and extracting the meanings, biosemiotics serves as a conceptual node that combines some important notions of theoretical biology, evolutionary epistemology, cognitive science, phenomenology, neuroscience and neurophilosophy as well as the theory of complex adaptive systems and network science. Worlds of perception and actions of living beings are built in the process of co-evolution, in structural coupling and in enactive interaction with the surrounding natural environment (Umwelt). Thereby the biosemiotic theories developed by the founders of biosemiotics (J. von Uexküll, Th. Sebeok, G. Prodi, H. Pattie) are conceptually closed to the system-structural evolutionary approach developed in synergetics by H. Haken and S.P. Kurdyumov, the conception of autopoiesis (H. Maturana and F. Varela), second-order cybernetics (H. von Foerster), the conception of enactivism in cognitive science (F. Varela, E. Thompson, A. Noë). The key to comprehending the processes of extracting and generating meanings is that every living organism lives in the subjectively built world (Umwelt), so that its Umwelt and its internal psychic organization become parts of a single autopoietic system. According to the well-known expression of G. Bateson, information is a not indifferent difference or a difference that makes a difference. Differences become information when a cognitive agent as an interpreter, acting as part of an autopoietic system, sees signs in these differences that make meanings.

We address the stability analysis of composite hybrid dynamical feedback systems of the type depicted in Fig. 1, consisting of a block (usually the plant) which is described by an operator L and of a finite-dimensional block described by a system of ordinary differential equations (usually the controller). We establish results for the well-posedness, attractivity, asymptotic stability, uniform boundedness, asymptotic stability in the large, and exponential stability in the large for such systems. The hypotheses of these results are phrased in terms of the I/O properties of L and in terms of the Lyapunov stability properties of the subsystem described by the indicated ordinary differential equations. The applicability of our results is demonstrated by means of general specific examples (involving C 0 -semigroups, partial differential equations, or integral equations which determine L ).

Using Rosenbrock's frequency domain approach [1], necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for a general series-parallel or feedback composite system to be controllable or/and observable. The conditions are given in terms of the state equations of the composite system and are very simple to compute. Using these results, it is shown that a general series-parallel feedback cascade system is controllable or/and observable for "almost all" interconnection matrices, provided some mild conditions on the subsystems are imposed.

Application of M-matrices to the stability problems of composite dynamical systems

This paper reports the results of an international survey on the place and role of psychology in cognitive science (CS). The respondents were psychological societies from 31 countries illustrating a variety of situations, from countries where psychology has been established as a science for a long time to countries where it has been established more recently and is still developing. The paper reviews topics covered by the CS approach, as well as research operations and initiatives taken in this domain. The analysis of responses reflects the belief that psychology, in general, has a central role in CS. This is based on epistemological considerations, as well as on the recognition of the methodological expertise of psychology for collecting and analyzing empirical data. Psychology is reported to have a unique integrative capacity and to take care to maintain the place of the human being at the centre of CS. Limitations and obstacles to the development of pluridisciplinary research on cognition are also reported, and information is provided on the training programmes in CS and the institutions that support research in this domain.

Systems are the most complicated entities and phenomena in abstract, physical, information, and social worlds across all science and engineering disciplines. System algebra is an abstract mathematical structure for the formal treatment of abstract and general systems as well as their algebraic relations, operations, and associative rules for composing and manipulating complex systems. This article presents a mathematical theory of system algebra and its applications in cognitive informatics, system engineering, software engineering, and cognitive informatics. A rigorous treatment of abstract systems is described, and the algebraic relations and compositional operations of abstract systems are analyzed. System algebra provides a denotational mathematical means that can be used to model, specify, and manipulate generic “to be” and “to have” type problems, particularly system architectures and high-level system designs, in computing, software engineering, system engineering, and cognitive informatics.

Systems are the most complicated entities and phenomena in abstract, physical, information, and social worlds across all science and engineering disciplines. System algebra is an abstract mathematical structure for the formal treatment of abstract and general systems as well as their algebraic relations, operations, and associative rules for composing and manipulating complex systems. This article presents a mathematical theory of system algebra and its applications in cognitive informatics, system engineering, software engineering, and cognitive informatics. A rigorous treatment of abstract systems is described, and the algebraic relations and compositional operations of abstract systems are analyzed. System algebra provides a denotational mathematical means that can be used to model, specify, and manipulate generic “to be” and “to have” type problems, particularly system architectures and high-level system designs, in computing, software engineering, system engineering, and cognitive informatics.

ZusammenfassungUm die in der bestehenden Literatur beschriebenen Effekte von Emotionen in der sozialen Sphäre in Luhmanns Theorie autopoietischer sozialer Systeme integrieren zu können, ist es notwendig zu zeigen, wie Emotionen - laut Luhmann psychische Phänomene - im Bereich des Sozialen relevant werden kön­nen, auch wenn nicht über sie kommuniziert wird. Der vorliegende Aufsatz nimmt Bezug auf Weinbachs Person/Habitus-Konstrukt und schlägt vor, dass Emotionen via die Adresse von »Personen« kommuniziert und/oder via die Adresse von »Habi­tus« wahrgenommen werden können, wobei sie in beiden Fällen soziale Relevanz er­langen. Emotionen dienen der Absicherung der Autopoiesis organischer, psychischer und sozialer Systeme. Sie stützen die Fortschreibung viabler sozialer Strukturen und regen die Veränderung solcher sozialer Strukturen an, die nicht mehr viabel erschei­nen. Daher können sie als Reflexionsressourcen nicht nur psychischer, sondern auch sozialer Systeme gesehen werden. Diese Konzeptualisierung von Emotionen lenkt unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die Bedeutung von Körpern für das Soziale. Sie legt nahe, dass die Rolle der Emotionen zu idiosynkratisch ist, um Emotionen einem anderen Begriff wie dem der symbolisch generalisierten Kommunikationsmedien zu subsu­mieren. Sie eröffnet weiterhin zusätzliche Möglichkeiten der Integration der psycho­logischen und psychotherapeutischen Literatur in die Luhmannsche Theorie.

The determination of the swept volume in a steam displacement process provides an early means to evaluate the project's progress. By determining the volume occupied by steam, and knowing the cumulative volume of steam injected, the heat losses from the injection interval and the ensuing heat efficiencies can be estimated. These parameters dictate the performance efficiency of the displacement project. Getty Oil Company has run pressure falloff tests in several steamflood projects located on the west side of the San Joaquin Valley. The first project tested had undergone nine months of continuous steam injection, with little apparent increase in oil production or wellhead temperatures in the displacement wells. The test data was analyzed using the theory presented in Eggenschwiler, et al.'s1 work and Walsh, et al.'s3 analytical procedure. The initial results are very encouraging and more-or-less consistent with the previous theoretical studies, implying that this type of testing can be a valuable tool for early evaluation of the viability of a steamflood project, with a minimal shut-in time and expense. Several more falloff tests were run in displacement projects having more history, temperature observation wells, and better control of reservoir properties. These tests were run to verify the analysis procedure and determine steamflood characteristics in projects designated as commercial successes. A simple numerical study using a thermal model was also used to further analyze the principles of the underlying theory and demonstrate the applicability of this particular simulator to pressure transient problems. The results of the numerical study are included.

This paper is the first one of a series devoted to the analysis of metabolic networks. Its aim is to establish the theoretical framework for this analysis. Two different lines of research are considered: the one about metabolism-repair systems ((ℳ, ℛ)), introduced by Robert Rosen as an abstract representation of cell metabolic activity, and the concept of autopoiesis developed by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. Both concepts have been recently connected by Letelier et al., determining that the set of autopoietic systems is a subset of the set of general abstract (ℳ, ℛ) systems. In fact, every specific (ℳ, ℛ) system is an autopoietic one, being the boundary, which specifies each system as a unity, the main element of autopoietic systems which is not formalized in Rosen's representation. This paper introduces the definition of boundary — a physical boundary and a functional one — for (ℳ, ℛ) systems in the context of a representation using category theory. The concept of complete (ℳ, ℛ) system is also introduced by means of a process of completion in categories which is functorial, natural and universal.