Beyond SHELL: the SSHELL framework for advancing Human Factors theory

This article examines the phenomenon of managerial irrationality within the context of IT projects – an area defined by high complexity, rapid change, and systemic uncertainty. The authors challenge the traditional notion of rationality as exclusively logical and analytical, emphasizing instead the role of intuition, affect, embodied experience, and cultural context in shaping managerial thinking. At the center of the discussion are paradoxical decisions that, while formally irrational, prove to be effective in practice. Drawing on contemporary research in cognitive science, psychology of emotions, philosophy of technology, and management studies, the authors argue that managerial action involves not only analytical reasoning but also an integration of logos, pathos, and an ethical sense of responsibility. Special attention is given to systems thinking as a form of meta-cognitive ethics, enabling managers to approach complexity not as a threat but as a vital condition for thought. The article introduces a threefold model of managerial thinking that includes: affect as a cognitive filter; intuition as a mechanism for internal orientation under uncertainty; and field thinking as a mode of perceiving latent structures and relational rhythms within teams. Empirical cases from IT project environments demonstrate how emotional patterns, affective culture, and intuitive action become decisive factors in overcoming critical challenges. The findings suggest that emotional awareness and the ability to “think from the body” serve as adaptive mechanisms where traditional algorithms fail. In its final section, the article proposes the concept of an «epistemology of co-being» as an alternative to technocratic reductionism. The future of management is envisioned not as a field of optimization and control but as an intersubjective practice where presence, ethical reflection, emotional resonance, and tolerance for ambiguity become central. In this framework, managerial irrationality is not a dysfunction but a gateway to deeper, meaning-driven modes of thinking. This research approach opens up prospects for a new management psychology – one that integrates intuition, affects, embodiment, and a philosophical sensitivity to context.

In low-income and middle-income countries, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, the COVID-19 pandemic has had substantial implications for women's wellbeing. Policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have highlighted the gendered aspect of pandemics; however, addressing the gendered implications of the COVID-19 pandemic comprehensively and effectively requires a planetary health perspective that embraces systems thinking to inequalities. This Viewpoint is based on collective reflections from research done by the authors on COVID-19 responses by international and regional organisations, and national governments, in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa between June, 2020, and June, 2021. A range of international and regional actors have made important policy recommendations to address the gendered implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on women's health and wellbeing since the start of the pandemic. However, national-level policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have been partial and inconsistent with regards to gender in both sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, largely failing to recognise the multiple drivers of gendered health inequalities. This Viewpoint proposes that addressing the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on women in low-income and middle-income countries should adopt a systems thinking approach and be informed by the question of who is affected as opposed to who is infected. In adopting the systems thinking approach, responses will be more able to recognise and address the direct gendered effects of the pandemic and those that emerge indirectly through a combination of long-standing structural inequalities and gendered responses to the pandemic.

INTRODUCTION The research project outlined in Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions seems intrinsically historical, philosophical, and psychological (Kuhn 1970). However, by and large, Kuhn never utilized research in the cognitive sciences that would have furthered his own paradigm in ways I think he would have found agreeable. Until his very last writings, psychology dropped out of Kuhn's post- Structure published articulations of his views just at the time that the cognitive revolution was beginning to provide accounts of representation, problem solving, and learning that I believe are pertinent to his intuitive insights. With hindsight one can construct significant parallels between the views of knowledge, perception, and learning developed in each. In what follows I will discuss in what ways some of Kuhn's insights might be furthered today in light of cognitive science research. Seen through a cognitive lens, Kuhn's little book seems all the more remarkable and insightful. Many of the issues with which he grappled have been the subject of entire areas of research in cognitive science, especially cognitive psychology. In the course of this essay I can only give brief indications of how Kuhn's thinking and research in areas of cognitive science have been running along parallel lines and of how one might, through cognitive-historical analysis, create some intersecting lines. In his Presidential Address to the Philosophy of Science Association, Kuhn expressed his abiding interest as being in “incommensurability and the nature of the conceptual divide between the developmental stages separated by … ‘scientific revolutions’” (Conant and Haugeland 2000, p. 228).

Incremental Conceptualization for Language Production discusses the simultaneous actions involved in thinking and speaking, as well as the piecemeal way in which individuals construct an internal representation of the external world and use this internal representation for speaking. Author Markus Guhe presents the first computational model that captures these observations in a cognitively adequate fashion. The volume is an innovative look at the mind’s process of producing semantic representations that can be transformed into language. The first section of the book illustrates four stages of conceptualization: construction of a conceptual representation; selection of content to be verbalized; linearization of the selected content; and generation of preverbal messages. Guhe then analyzes incremental processing — processing that takes place in a piecemeal fashion — and offers a blueprint of incremental models while discussing the dimensions along which the processing principles and the blueprint varies. Finally, incremental processing and conceptualization merge to form the incremental conceptualiser model (inC). The effective use of inC is demonstrated through simulations carried out with the implementation of the model. Intended for researchers in cognitive science, particularly cognitive modeling of language, this volume will also interest researchers in artificial intelligence, computational linguistics, psycholinguistics, and linguistics and psychology.

In contemporary political science, many believe that normative restrictions on armed conflict are an outgrowth of Western culture and the just war tradition. Drawing on historical evidence, which shows that political actors in Ancient China and the early Islamic empire endorsed civilian protection rules, I claim that such norms are more common than most International Relations (IR) theorists suppose. For IR theory, this raises an important puzzle: How can we explain why similar normative ideas emerged in human societies that are otherwise very different? Building on research in cognitive science, social psychology, and social neuroscience, I argue that most people have natural cognitive and emotional predispositions that bias the emergence and transmission of cultural norms that protect non-combatants. More specifically, capacities for perspective-taking and empathy shape how people interpret the limits of their moral commitments, and when these capacities are engaged, intuitional heuristics affect how they judge the morality of killing in war. What is more, I claim that three key contextual variables moderate the connection between innate moral intuitions and the development of civilian protection norms: (i) societal interdependence, (ii) the social empowerment of marginal actors, and (iii) the creation of norms in argumentative contexts that require impartial moral reasoning. I argue that rationalist and constructivist theories of norm emergence will be able to better explain the emergence, the durability, and the institutional design of the norms of war by incorporating this naturalistic theory of moral cognition.

In responding to Adler (2010) and Moertl, Boritz, Bryntwick, and Angus (2010), we elaborate three areas of discussion: (1) Defining the autobiographical memory narrative unit; (2) Clarifications regarding our approach to coding narrative memories; and (3) Potential future research. Our response highlights the importance of a coding system specific to long-term narrative memories, the need to distinguish clearly what is meant by narrative memory, and the value of creating a bridge between the study of narrative memory in psychotherapy and research in cognitive science and personality psychology.

The problem of concept representation is relevant for knowledge engineering and for ontology-based technologies. However, the notion of concept itself turns out to be highly disputed and problematic in cognitive science. In our opinion, one of the causes of this state of affairs is that the notion of concept is in some sense heterogeneous, and encompasses different cognitive phenomena. This results in a strain between conflicting requirements, such as, for example, compositionality on the one side and the need of representing prototypical information on the other. AI research in some way shows traces of this situation. In this paper we propose an analysis of this state of affairs, and we sketch some proposals for concept representation in formal ontologies which take advantage from suggestions coming from cognitive science and psychological research. In particular we take into account the distinction between prototype and exemplar accounts in explaining prototypical effects.

We report two experimental studies of human perceptions of robotic facial expressions while systematically varying context effects and the cultural background of subjects (n = 93). Except for Fear, East Asian and Western subjects were not significantly different in recognition rates, and, while Westerners were better at judging affect from mouth movement alone, East Asians were not any better at judging affect based on eye/brow movement alone. Moreover, context effects appeared capable of over-riding such cultural differences, most notably for Fear. The results seem to run counter to previous theories of cultural differences in facial expression based on emoticons and eye fixation patterns. We connect this to broader research in cognitive science – suggesting the findings support a dynamical systems view of social cognition as an emergent phenomenon. The results here suggest that, if we can induce appropriate context effects, it may be possible to createculture-neutral modelsof robots and affective interaction.

In cognitive science, there is a tacit norm that phenomena such as cultural variation or synaesthesia are worthy examples of cognitive diversity that contribute to a better understanding of cognition, but that other forms of cognitive diversity (e.g., autism, attentiondeficithyperactivitydisorder/ADHD, and dyslexia) are primarily interesting only as examples of deficit, dysfunction, or impairment. This status quo is dehumanizing and holds back much-needed research. In contrast, the neurodiversity paradigm argues that such experiences are not necessarily deficits but rather are natural reflections of biodiversity. Here, we propose that neurodiversity is an important topic for future research in cognitive science. We discuss why cognitive science has thus far failed to engage with neurodiversity, why this gap presents both ethical and scientific challenges for the field, and, crucially, why cognitive science will produce better theories of human cognition if the field engages with neurodiversity in the same way that it values other forms of cognitive diversity. Doing so will not only empower marginalized researchers but will also present an opportunity for cognitive science to benefit from the unique contributions of neurodivergent researchers and communities.

A cognitive ethnography of how bioengineering scientists create innovative modeling methods. In this first full-scale, long-term cognitive ethnography by a philosopher of science, Nancy J. Nersessian offers an account of how scientists at the interdisciplinary frontiers of bioengineering create novel problem-solving methods. Bioengineering scientists model complex dynamical biological systems using concepts, methods, materials, and other resources drawn primarily from engineering. They aim to understand these systems sufficiently to control or intervene in them. What Nersessian examines here is how cutting-edge bioengineering scientists integrate the cognitive, social, material, and cultural dimensions of practice. Her findings and conclusions have broad implications for researchers in philosophy, science studies, cognitive science, and interdisciplinary studies, as well as scientists, educators, policy makers, and funding agencies. In studying the epistemic practices of scientists, Nersessian pushes the boundaries of the philosophy of science and cognitive science into areas not ventured before. She recounts a decades-long, wide-ranging, and richly detailed investigation of the innovative interdisciplinary modeling practices of bioengineering researchers in four university laboratories. She argues and demonstrates that the methods of cognitive ethnography and qualitative data analysis, placed in the framework of distributed cognition, provide the tools for a philosophical analysis of how scientific discoveries arise from complex systems in which the cognitive, social, material, and cultural dimensions of problem-solving are integrated into the epistemic practices of scientists. Specifically, she looks at how interdisciplinary environments shape problem-solving. Although Nersessian's case material is drawn from the bioengineering sciences, her analytic framework and methodological approach are directly applicable to scientific research in a broader, more general sense, as well.

One perspective of a design process in the engineering design community is that it is largely a process marked and defined by a series of decisions. The fundamental assumption in most developed design decision support methodologies is that decision makers make rational choices; that is, choices that maximize the payoff for the predicted outcome. Decisions that do not maximize the predicted payoff are termed as mistakes or irrational choices and discarded. However, research in behavioral economics, psychology, and cognitive science has studied the human mind and suggested the notion of “bounded rationality” to explain decision errors. Bounded rationality refers to the intrinsic inability of human beings to accurately choose “rational” options prescribed by decision models such as expected utility. This paper extends the notion of bounded rationality within engineering design. Specifically, this paper studies the design of complex systems that require interaction among several different subsystems contributing to the overall product design. For convergent decentralized design problems, rational designers converge to equilibrium solutions that lie at the intersection of their individual rational reaction sets. These equilibrium solutions are usually not Pareto optimal and due to the dynamics of the designers’ interaction in collaborative design, it is rarely possible for them to converge to Pareto optimal solutions. However, when models for bounded rationality are introduced into individual designer behavior, it is seen that the converged solutions can improve the resulting solution. Bounded rational decisions within decentralized design are modeled, and the effects of propagating such decisions within a design process are studied.

Systems thinking offers a particularly useful worldview for dealing with increasing complexities faced by individuals. This paper explores the nature, assessment, and implications that systems thinking holds for individuals challenged by the shifting landscape of modern complex system governance. Following an introduction that identifies the main attributes of complex systems faced by individuals who engage in governance activities, three major themes are developed: 1) exploration of the concept of systems thinking; 2) suggestion of how enhanced systems thinking can increase the capability of individuals to more effectively design for system governance; 3) a strategic framework and initial findings for application of an instrument for assessment of the level of systems thinking for an individual. Systems thinking is suggested as a critical capability for individuals who must design, analyse, and transform complex system governance and address its derivative problems. Effectiveness in systems thinking is a critical skill for addressing some of the most vexing problems of the 21st century. This paper summarises the findings of a systems thinking instrument developed to identify the systems skills individuals need to engage complex system governance. The paper concludes with future research and application of the systems thinking instrument to better understand complex system governance.

This paper proposes Systems Thinking as a methodology to better observe, learn, analyse and construct curriculum and pedagogy. Informed by von Bertalanffy’s (1950) principle of Dynamic Equilibrium (Fliessgleichgewich), Systems Thinking presents a means to consider complex systems as continuously breaking down and rebuilding to adapt and maintain function. In addition, I refer to two root metaphors applied by key systems theorists: (i) Descartes world like a machine (reductionism) and (ii) world like an Ecology (holism) and relate these to a Systems Thinking approach to curriculum construction, pedagogy and learning. I also draw upon the Aristotelian dictum: ‘the whole is greater than its parts’ (gestalt) to illustrate how elements of all systems are interconnected and how the application of Systems Thinking can inform new pedagogical approaches and curriculum design. In explaining how a Systems Thinking approach could apply to curriculum development, I draw on two key theorists who draw their perspectives from organismic biology: Ludwig von Bertalanffy and Fritjof Capra, and compare their concepts with theorists who focus on more organisational and applied perspectives, such as Russell Ackoff and Peter Senge. I link this spectrum of Systems Thinking to curriculum development, by first considering its specific relevance to education through its relationship to applied approaches to learning, such as those proposed by Kurt Fischer and Zheng Yan (1998) and Fischer (2019). I then consider the potential for Systems Thinking to act as an analytical tool, which can be applied to global/national educational policy and practice. By looking at critiques of the reductionist Global Education Reform Movement (GERM) as described by Sahlberg (2012), I consider the ways in which taking a Systems Thinking lens can shift the balance in curriculum design more towards Capra’s proposal for a deeper ecology in learning. Finally, I examine the case of the Australian Curriculum and outline how Systems Thinking provides an innovative methodology to support curriculum development of relevance to today’s context. In considering effective historic and emerging initiatives, I propose future approaches where Systems Thinking can be a co-creation tool for learners throughout the education system that is sensitive to student self-efficacy, personalised and independent learning. This is imperative if we are going to prepare students for a future world that cannot be conceived, predicted nor imagined.

Early Greek philosophers doubled as natural scientists; that is a commonplace. It is equally true, though less often remarked, that numerous historical philosophers doubled as cognitive scientists. They constructed models of mental faculties in much the spirit of modern cognitive science, for which they are widely cited as precursors in the cognitive science literature. Today, of course, there is more emphasis on experiment, and greater division of labor. Philosophers focus on theory, foundations, and methodology, while cognitive scientists are absorbed by experimental techniques and findings. Nonetheless, there are sound reasons for massive communication between philosophy and cognitive science, which happily proceeds apace. On this occasion I shall not try to enumerate or delineate these lines of communication in any comprehensive fashion. I just wish to illustrate the benefits to philosophy in two domains: the theory of mind and moral theory. Though this may sound like an ambitious agenda, I shall in fact examine just a single phenomenon: empathy. Using that term first broadly and later narrowly, I shall argue that empathy may be the key to one sector of the philosophy of mind and to several sectors of moral theory. But whether empathy can in fact unlock any doors depends heavily on the outcome of empirical research in cognitive science.

Understanding complex systems is an important goal for science learning, so it requires a deep understanding of complex systems knowledge as a subject matter that should be taught in schools. The analysis was conducted to find the dimensions of complex systems and their relevance to the characteristics of systems thinking in the context of science. The systems thinking framework in science learning materials is built based on the dimensions of complex systems and systems thinking. The results of the conceptualization of systems thinking framework are expected to provide a way to select science learning materials as content knowledge of complex systems and contribute to complex systems learning that facilitates systems thinking.