Beyond the Machine

The topic of electoral volatility was not at the center of academic work in Latin America until Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully’s seminal 1995 work Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (cited in Electoral Volatility as an Expression of Party System Equilibrium). Preceding analyses primarily focused on explaining the breakdown of democratic politics in the region during the 1960s and 1970s. Conventional wisdom that departed from the classic work of Sartori in Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976), maintained that stable party systems are crucial for the durability of democracies, focusing his attention on aspects such as party system polarization and fragmentation. Mainwaring and Scully shift the discussion, arguing that previous literature on the region neglected and inadequately conceptualized an equally important property of party systems: their level of their institutionalization. According to Mainwaring and Scully, party system institutionalization (PSI) is formed by four different dimensions. The first is stability in the patterns of party competition. Thus, institutionalized party systems are those in which actors develop expectations, orientations, and behavior based on the premise that practices and organizations will prevail into the foreseeable future. Mainwaring’s 2018 work, Party Systems in Latin America (cited in Electoral Volatility as an Expression of Party System Equilibrium), argues that this is the only relevant dimension in PSI, while considering that the other three are just underpinnings that facilitate it. So according to this work, an institutionalized party system is the one in which a stable set of parties interacts regularly in stable ways. This stability of interparty competition is traditionally measured with the Pedersen volatility index, a comprehensive measure of the net systematic shift in levels of electoral support for parties across elections. As volatility is negatively correlated with this important dimension of party system institutionalization, conventional wisdom holds that political representation deteriorates when there is persistent high volatility. To this debate, the well-cited 2006 article by Mainwaring and Torcal, “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization” (cited in Electoral Volatility as an Expression of Party System Equilibrium), adds the idea that this lack of stability in the patterns of competition in party systems, measured by electoral volatility, is a typical characteristic of new and developing democracies. According to that study, the most important defining characteristic of party systems in less developed countries is captured by their lack of institutionalization, in other words, the amount of electoral volatility in their party systems. Since the publication of these three contributions, the debate on party system dynamics in the region has focused on cross-national levels of electoral volatility, their relationship with other indicators of party system stability, and their consequences for democratic quality and performance, while also broadening the analysis to Europe.

Political Party and Party System Institutionalisation in Southeast Asia: A Comparison of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand

Introduction The literature on party systems is composed of two related strands. Studies of emerging democracies typically ask whether the party system is institutionalized : are parties the primary legislative and electoral actors, with deep social roots and routinized patterns of interaction? Those of established democracies, on the other hand, are more concerned with whether the party system is in equilibrium : given status quo socioeconomic and political institutions, are the number of parties and ideological cleavages stable? As this volume’s editors propose, these two approaches are based on distinct conceptions about the role of parties in democracy. In a celebrated quote, Schattschneider (1942: 1) writes, “Political parties created modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.” In new democracies, parties are seen as organizations whose existence – before, during, and after democratization – is crucial but fragile. Scholars of established democracies, by contrast, assume that parties are here to stay and focus instead on more granular distinctions in the character of the party system. My goal in this chapter is to integrate these two literatures through the lens of party system institutionalization in Japan. Japan has had the longest history of party politics in Asia, but its functions and salience have varied over time. Parties emerged during the autocratic Meiji period, and they played a valuable role in political liberalization. Despite being derailed by military governments during World War II, parties quickly became a focal point of legislative politics during and after the U.S. occupation. They took on many of the organizational characteristics of their prewar predecessors, and the primary partisan cleavage in Japan, interregional fiscal redistribution, retained its salience throughout. In this sense, the Japanese party system has been institutionalized for a long period of time: legislative politics – both in the autocratic and democratic periods – was the province of political parties that represented urban versus rural socioeconomic divisions in society.

This chapter examines presidents’ appointment strategy in handling the party system surrounding them. The main prediction is that, facing stronger demands from opposition parties in more institutionalized party systems, presidents are more likely to appoint copartisan ministers, in order to enhance intraparty support. However, with greater dominance over less institutionalized party systems, presidents have greater leeway to choose nonpartisan ministers. The results of statistical analysis are overall in line with this prediction. While presidents are more likely to appoint ministers from the ruling party in more institutionalized party systems, they tend to choose nonpartisan ministers in less institutionalized party systems. Furthermore, an additional analysis of presidents’ portfolio allocation patterns shows that presidents are more likely to allocate cabinet posts in key policy areas to copartisans as party systems are more institutionalized.

Today, all of Latin America's presidential republics are at least nominal democracies, with the region's past experience with frequent military coups an increasingly distant memory. As a result, over the past two decades, many scholars concerned with the health of Latin America's presidential democracies have shifted their focus from those factors which contribute to the consolidation or breakdown of presidential democracies to those which influence the manner in which these democracies operate. In particular, scholars have endeavored to better understand the manner in which constitutional and partisan institutions strengthen or weaken the functioning of a country's democratic system. As the linchpin of a democratic system, political parties have a profound impact on the quality of democracy in a nation. This article highlights the case of Guatemala, where a very weakly institutionalized political party system has had a negative impact on the functioning of the country's presidential democracy. After underscoring Guatemala's status as one of Latin America's least institutionalized party systems via a cross-national analysis of the region's presidential democracies, the article analyzes in detail the limited institutionalization of the Guatemalan party system from a variety of vantage points ranging from the level of temporal volatility in voting patterns within the electorate to the amount of party switching among legislators.

This article is an overview of the types and level of institutionalization of party systems in seven young democracies in East and Southeast Asia. By applying Alan Siaroff’s typology of party systems, the analysis demonstrates that the party systems in Asia do not converge on a single format. The party systems under consideration also differ in the level of institutionalization. Party systems in Thailand, the Philippines and especially South Korea are stuck in an inchoate state. Even though there is considerable variation among the cases, the party systems in Indonesia, Mongolia and Taiwan can be considered as well institutionalized relative to the rest of Asia and moderately institutionalized when compared to Latin America. Furthermore, weak institutionalization correlates with volatile structures of party competition and cooperation in Thailand, whereas in South Korea and the Philippines party systems seem to be paradoxically stabilizing in a situation of protracted under-institutionalization, as both cases combine more or less stable party system patterns with weak institutionalization.

This article explains variation in levels of party system institutionalization in Asia by testing available data against several major hypotheses in the literature. The authors make three contributions to the literature on party system institutionalization. First, this study finds that historical legacies are a crucial variable affecting current levels of party system institutionalization. In particular, the immediate postwar period was the crucible from which institutionalized party systems in Asia developed. Second, the authors claim that for a significant number of institutionalized party systems, historical legacies are rooted in some element of authoritarianism, either as former authoritarian parties or as semidemocratic regimes. Third, precisely because authoritarianism has played an important role in the origins of institutionalized party systems, the authors argue that the concept of institutionalization needs to be strictly separated from the concept of democracy.

A new theoretical development for examining the institutionalization of party systems is proposed in this article. We build on electoral coordination theories to disaggregate volatility into the vote transfers that occur between or towards parties that are in equilibrium (which we call endogenous volatility) and those that are not (exogenous volatility). The former captures accountability, and the latter reflects the number of voters who are not acting in accordance with the existing equilibrium in the party system. Exogenous volatility measures the institutionalization of party systems. We also show that endogenous volatility depends on government performance, while exogenous volatility is a function of institutional openness. The empirical evidence comes from an original data set that includes 448 electoral cycles in lower-house elections in 66 countries between 1977 and 2011.

Formulation of the problem. The urgency of a comprehensive study of the institute of political parties is conditioned by several illustrative circumstances. The past election campaign in the Ukrainian parliament in 2019 was marked by the fact that it was held under the old "rules of the game." It is known that the parliamentary election campaigns of 1998, 2002, 2007, 2012 also used a mixed system of elections, in which 50% of parliamentarians were elected in majority constituencies and 50% of people’s deputies were elected on a proportional basis for party lists. According to the current rules of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, candidates for the People’s Deputies will be nominated by a political party, which were registered in accordance with the established procedure no later than one year before the elections. Despite the fact that the institute of self-nomination of candidates for the People’s Deputies remains, political parties have become the main political players, the only active actors in the electoral process of Ukraine and have received a strong impetus for their development. The purpose of this article is to reveal the history of political party formation in order to gain a better understanding of the essential nature of these important political entities and to identify promising moments in the development of parties in Ukraine. Analysis of recent research and publications. In the world and Ukrainian partology, it should be noted that well-known foreign experts J. Sartori, M. Duverge, A. Leiphart, S. Avineri, G. Almond, E. Wind, S. Lipset, S. Rokkan, S. Neumann in characterization the current state and prospects of the development of parties as political institutions indicate a direct connection and mutual influence between the party and electoral systems. Particular attention of domestic partologists M. Primus, N. Goncharuk, A. Pakharev, I. Kresina, O. Erzhov, V. Lytvyn, G. Malkin, Y. Shvedy focuses on the problem of the influence of the electoral process on the formation of the party system in Ukraine. Recently, in connection with the growing role of parties in the political life of our country, studies of new aspects of their activity have appeared: L. Gonyukova considers political parties as an institute of state policy and governance, O. Sakiri concentrates attention on the principles of constructing the image of a political party, O.Nikogosyan considers the peculiarities of the development of political parties and party systems in the post-communist space, A. Tetyanich explores the constitutional and legal principles of state control over the activities of political parties, etc. The article deals with the history of the formation and development of political parties as socio-political institutions, from the time of antiquity to the emergence of mass parties in the second half of the nineteenth century. The latest trends in the evolution of the institution of political parties as subjects of democratic politics in polyarchy systems are analyzed. It is noted that political parties have become the main political players, the only active actors in the electoral process of Ukraine and have received a strong impetus for their development. Modern political parties emerge as institutions of democratic politics, they "grow" from the bottom, are created by politically active citizens for the protection of their own interests, and therefore represent first and foremost an important segment of civil society, which unites it with public authorities. For a long time, the division of the parties into the left was adopted (the Communists, the Social Democrats were referred to here), the centrists (those who tried to defend the interests of the majority), the right (who stood for an elitist understanding of politics). However, as most political parties shifted to the middle class in the 20th century, only two of them became right-wing: center-right and center-left. At the same time, the ranking scale itself remained the same. At the end of the twentieth century. significant changes occurred in the political sphere of society. Political parties began to lose their traditional class character and appeal not so much to certain social strata as to all groups of the population. American political scientist J. Lapalambara called this type of political party a "grab all party" and then a "voter party". This trend is also confirmed in modern Ukraine (Party of Servants). Parties have stopped offering ways to develop society, politicians are only interested in voter votes, not ideological issues. It is concluded that modern Ukrainian parties need to go a long way in their development to meet all the criteria of a democratic political party. Ukrainian parties must undergo a transformation from political additions of oligarchic holdings to truly mass popular structures based on the principle of modernization, and then there will be a significant increase in real support. A promising direction for further research is to consider the organizational foundations of the functioning of political parties in polyarchies and under hybrid political regimes. Remarks are made about the prospects of party building in contemporary Ukraine.

This chapter analyzes a pattern of internal democratization in the selection of candidates in Latin America and compares elites profiles in traditional and new parties. The emergence of new political parties in the region over the last two decades invites reflection on possible differences in candidate selection in terms of political careers, profiles and mechanisms. Despite the difficulty of drawing a broad picture for such a heterogeneous region of the world, in the last decade, Latin America has been tending generally toward more inclusive procedures as a solution to the growing distrust in political parties. Political disaffection and pressures to include the bases in decision-making processes have had a direct impact on intra-party democracy. Anti-establishment discourses, the turn toward the left and the emergence of new leaders have modified Latin America’s party systems as well as its candidate-selection procedures. This work focuses on four paradigmatic cases from Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Costa Rica.

Party politics in India display numerous paradoxical features, which reveal the blending of Western and modern forms of bureaucratic organization and participatory politics with indigenous practices and institutions. India's leading political party, the Indian National Congress, is one of the oldest in the world, yet it has not succeeded in providing the nucleus for an institutionalized party system which can be fitted easily into any one of the conventional categories of party systems known in the West. There has been a strong Marxist and Communist revolutionary tradition in modern Indian political history. However, unlike other such traditions in most parts of Asia, its dominant parties and movements have neither succeeded in threatening the stability of the Indian state nor been threatened with physical extinction as in Indonesia, but have instead been integrated in the form of reformist political parties within routine politics in the country. The diversities and social fragmentation of Indian society have produced a proliferation of regional and other political parties which often give to each state in the Indian Union a unique party system imperfectly integrated into the “national party system.” Some characteristically Indian features pervade virtually all parties in the country — factionalism, dynastic succession to leadership, and the presence of ideological differences among the parties without ideological cleavage in the party system.

This chapter discusses political parties and party systems, which form a crucial aspect of a modern representative democracy. The origins and natures of political parties, including their functions and organizations, are explained. Party systems govern the dynamics between parties and are considered as the mechanism to represent divergent interests in the society. How are social cleavages related to political parties? A measure of party system, the Effective Number of Political Parties, is introduced. Figures for Hong Kong are provided for comparative research. Finally, this chapter ends with an account on the decline on the importance and role of parties in the current era, accompanied by a discussion on this idea’s relevance to Hong Kong.

Previous research claims that there is a significant relationship between party systems and democracy. Although party system institutionalization is seen as a necessity for democratic consolidation, the effects of different party system characteristics on democracy are sharply contested. This study contributes to this debate through a systematic analysis of the relationship between two party system characteristics (party fractionalization and party polarization) and level of democracy. It is found that party polarization is positively related to the level of democracy in a country, i.e. the higher level of party polarization can produce the higher level of democracy. It is found, however, that there is no significant relationship between party fractionalization and level of democracy in a country.

In this article, I explore the nature of party systems that have emerged in Africa in the wake of the adoption of democratic political systems after 1990. Although political parties help shape core democratic processes and institutions, parties and party systems have received relatively scant attention in the scholarly literature on democratization in Africa. I argue that party systems in most African countries are built on quite a different foundation from the one that undergirds both advanced industrial democracies and the theories about party systems generated by their experiences. I assess the strengths and limitations of the comparative literature on party system development in the light of African experiences, and argue for a more critical examination of concepts from that literature that have been widely used to assess the prospects and progress of party system institutionalization, including pluralism, system fragmentation and volatility.

A simple model involving five concepts-social mobilization, party system institutionalization, turmoil, internal war, and elite conflict-is specified and its structural parameters are estimated for 28 black African nations. The model is fully reciprocal, involving each concept as a function of each of the others, and the concepts are measured for two time periods, 1960-1964 and 1965-1969. Two-stage least-squares regression is utilized to generate parameter estimates. The resulting model structure is evaluated according to (1) its correspondence with extant scholarly theorizing, (2) its ability to account for variance in the concepts, (3) the systematic character of the residual, or error, terms, and (4) its predictions for the future. The major conclusions are that: forms of conflict interrelate in complex ways and are not simply different aspects of a single phenomenon; conflict affects the mobilization of society and the development of political institutions; social mobilization has little, if any, effect on conflict; and, the institutionalization of party systems as linkages between publics and governments has a real impact on the mobilization of society and on the level of conflict in society.