Chapter 1 Causal Models: The Representational Infrastructure for Moral Judgment

Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments

Background: Refugees often exhibit reactions to traumatic events that may be conceptualized as moral injury (i.e. the impact of events that violate important moral values). There have been two types of moral injury appraisals found in refugees: transgressions by others and transgressions by oneself. Objective: To examine whether these types of moral injury appraisals co-occur or whether one form is usually predominant. Additionally, to investigate what types of events (trauma, living difficulties) and outcomes (PTSD, depression, anger, suicidality) were associated with each moral injury appraisal profile. Method: Participants included 221 refugees and asylum seekers residing in Australia. Data was collected online, and via pen and paper. A latent profile analysis was used to identify profiles of moral injury appraisals. Results: Results indicated a three-profile solution: Moral Injury-Other (MI-O; 37.8%), Moral Injury Other + Self (MI-OS; 35.2%), and no moral injury (No-MI; 26.9%). MI-O and MI-OS were predicted by both trauma experience and living difficulties. MI-O and MI-OS were also associated with greater psychopathology across all outcome variables compared to No-MI. MI-OS was also associated with greater anger and depression, compared to the MI-O profile. Conclusions: The association between the moral injury appraisal profiles and traumatic events, living difficulties and psychopathology, will have important clinical implications.

One task of moral theory is to specify criteria for the correct application of moral concepts, and thereby to provide bases for sound moral appraisals. As I noted in my introductory remarks, the proper objects of moral appraisal include both acts and persons; and since this book is concerned with the extent to which appraisals of either kind rest on other-interested considerations, something needs to be said about the nature of act--and of person-appraisals--and particularly about certain differences which can be drawn between and within the two categories.

: We describe research fusing heterogeneous information in an effort eventually to detect terrorists, reduce false alarms, and exonerate those falsely identified. The specific research is more humble, using synthetic data and first versions of fusion methods. Both the information and the fusion methods are subject to deep uncertainty. The information may also be fragmentary, indirect, soft, conflicting, and even deceptive. We developed a research prototype of an analyst centric fusion platform. This uses (1) causal computational models rooted in social science to relate observable information about individuals to an estimate of the threat that the individual poses and (2) a battery of different methods to fuse across information reports. We account for uncertainties about the causal model, the information, and the fusion methods. We address structural and parametric uncertainties, including uncertainties about the uncertainties, at different levels of detail. We use a combination of (1) probabilistic and parametric methods, (2)alternative models, and (3) alternative fusion methods that include nonlinear algebraic combination, Bayesian inference, and an entropy-maximizing approach. This paper focuses primarily on dealing with deep uncertainty in multiple dimensions.

Associations among hypothetical, prototypic moral, and conventional judgments; theory of mind (ToM); empathy; and personal distress were examined in 108 socioeconomically diverse preschoolers (Mage =42.94months, SD=1.42). Repeated measures analysis of covariance with empathy, false beliefs, and their interaction as covariates indicated that empathy was significantly associated with judgments of greater moral but not conventional transgression severity, particularly for psychological harm, and with deserved punishment for unfairness. False beliefs were associated with (combined) moral criterion judgments of rule and authority independence and inalterability. Empathy also was positively associated with criterion judgments but only for children low in ToM. Personal distress was unrelated to judgments. Results demonstrate the importance of both affective and cognitive processes in preschoolers' moral judgments.

Mr. Wilson's Heresies The Moral Sense is an intellectually courageous book that will have relatively few friends among anthropologists or moral philosophers. It is an intellectually courageous book because it commits many heresies, in particular these four: (1) The heresy of moral cognitivism, which claims that moral appraisals should be interpreted and evaluated in terms of their degree of accuracy in representing some domain of moral truth. As I understand The Moral Sense it suggests that moral sense is not merely a feeling or a sensation but is a kind of sixth sense, which, like our other senses, is a source of valid knowledge about something (namely, goodness) that is objective, natural, or real. (2) The heresy of intuitionism, which claims that valid or truthful moral appraisals are produced rapidly and unconsciously and that moral men and women know good (and/or are inclined to do good) spontaneously or reflexively, without being motivated by conclusions of deliberative reason. (3) The heresy of romanticism, which claims that the mind is in heart and that moral truths are represented to senses (and motivate action) by means of emotions, via feelings such as repugnance, indignation, or shame. (4) The heresy of pluralism, which claims that ultimate goods of morality are many, not one, and that plurality is a terminal (rather than an intermediary) state. When joined with heresy of cognitivism, heresy of pluralism implies that there are universally valid moral goods (for example, fairness, sympathy, duty and self-control) but these various goods cannot be reduced, aggregated or translated into any single common denominator of moral evaluation, and cannot be rank ordered in terms of their relative efficiency as alternative means to some more ultimate moral end (such as pleasure, happiness, or utility). The heresy of pluralism also implies that those various universally valid and ultimate moral goods cannot be simultaneously maximized, either because they are inherently in conflict with each other (for example, fairness and sympathy drive out duty and self-control) or because they are practically difficult to combine in this or that setting, culture or institutional context. Permit me to confess from outset that I am a fan of all of those heresies, including a fifth heresy, heresy of thinking that it makes sense to commit all four heresies in same book, or with same breath. Shortly before I became aware of publication of The Moral Sense, Jon Haidt and I wrote a review essay predicting and looking forward to development of a cognitive-pluralist-intuitionist theory of moral psychology,(1) whose main tenets are brilliantly set forth in The Moral Sense. I find it exhilarating to discover that our prophecy had come true even before it had been made. I also find Wilson's four-fold classification of virtues extremely insightful, and credible. The broad domains of moral sensibility that he portrays (fairness, sympathy, duty and self-control) are consistent with a tripartite division of moral domain (the Big Three of Morality) that my associates and I have induced from research on moral intuitions and judgments in India and United States, where we distinguish an ethics of autonomy (including fairness and sympathy) from an ethics of community (including duty) from an ethics of divinity (including self-control).(2) Wilson's abstraction nicely captures some of formal characteristics of substantive moral sensibilities and raises possibility that diverse aspects of personal functioning (for example, planning, foresight and dependability) may well be in service of same moral ideal (for example, self-control). Permit me to also acknowledge up front that, based on my reading of The Moral Sense, I fancy that Wilson and I probably differ a bit in personal temperament. …

How (and where) does moral judgment work?

People often make complicated decisions to help or to punish perfect strangers. Harming someone or breaking some moral imperative is usually linked to feeling guilt, and several researches suggested the existence of two different kinds of guilt: altruistic/empathic and deontological. Our study aimed to investigate the decision-making processes in moral and nonmoral judgments and assess how specific situations in which the subject is close to the victim or flanked by an authority can influence his decisions. We used three different moral conditions: Empathic Moral (the decision has made while physically close to the potential victims), Deontological Moral (the decision has made while flanked by an "authority"), and Standard Moral (without any influence); a fourth condition is represented by Nonmoral dilemmas (the subject must make a choice between two different things and this does not cause any harm or victims). Previously, a pilot study was carried out for validating the experimental stories to be used in the main study. We observed a higher number of utilitarian/positive responses when individuals had to respond to Empathic Moral condition, with respect to Deontological Moral and Nonmoral dilemmas. Moreover, looking at the time needed to read the dilemma, under empathic guilt condition, people tended to be slower in reading the dilemmas than in other conditions and this both in case of positive and negative responses. No significant differences in time needed to effectively respond emerged. These findings suggested that be physically close to potential victims or be flanked by an "authority" differentially influence the decision-making processes in moral judgment, inducing slower decisions and more utilitarian answers, particularly in the scenario of physical proximity.

Understanding others’ intentions is crucial for effective social interaction; however, the psychophysiological and neural mechanisms that drive intentionality attribution remain elusive. The Knobe Effect refers to the tendency to attribute more intentionality to actions resulting in negative compared to positive side effects, even if side effects are unintentional in both cases. This bias has been associated with the emotional responses and moral judgments elicited by the negative valence of the side effects, but findings remain contradictory, and few studies have explored their neural bases. This study investigates the causal contribution of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a region subserving emotional processing and moral judgment, in the Knobe Effect. Participants with vmPFC lesions and healthy controls rated the intentionality and valence of scenarios involving negative or positive side effects. Additionally, they rated the morality of the side effects, the subjective emotional response experienced during scenario reading and had their electrodermal activity recorded. Results showed that vmPFC patients, unlike controls, attributed similar levels of intentionality to positive and negative side effects, thus lacking the expected Knobe Effect. This occurred despite preserved recognition of the valence of the side effects but was accompanied by blunted emotional responses to the side effects and altered moral judgments. These findings support the view that emotional responses and moral judgment are fundamental for the Knobe Effect in healthy adults, and highlight the causal role of the vmPFC in driving this ubiquitous human bias.

Cross-sectional associations between voice and psychological factors are known, but changes over time offer opportunities to refine our understanding of their interactions and consider customized treatment options. Study objectives were to measure relationships between voice and psychological factors using ecological momentary assessment and applying (1) group-level time series analysis and (2) group and (3) individual causal modeling to identify key psychological factors relevant for voice outcomes. Adults (N = 32) with primary muscle tension dysphonia completed multiple assessments daily for 10 days. Measures included items from the Voice Handicap Index-10, voice-adapted perceived present control scale, items from NIH PROMIS and the NIH Toolkit to assess distress, and the Positive and Negative Affect Scale. Group-level time series analysis was conducted using dynamic structural equation modeling; causal analysis utilized the Greedy Fast Causal Inference algorithm. In group-level time series analyses, neither perceived control nor distress predicted subsequent timepoint voice handicap scores. In group-level causal modeling, anxiety was causal for voice handicap, but perceived control was not. Individual-level analyses identified various causal factors for voice handicap including perceived control and negative affect, and to a lesser extent, serenity, anxiety, somatic arousal, and stress. Group-level analyses may obscure important heterogeneity that is identifiable using individual-level causal analyses. For example, perceived control was not identified as predictive or causal for voice handicap at the group level; but was a salient causal factor for voice handicap in some individuals. Causal modeling using intensive longitudinal datasets offers a potential avenue for individualized treatment approaches.

Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment

Moral decision-making is a pivotal human process that requires a harmonious balance between emotion, reasoning, and social context. With recent advances in cognitive neuroscience, it has been revealed that moral judgements are driven by multiple brain systems, including the amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Together, these regions interact to evaluate dilemmas individuals may face and guide one’s behavior. This literature review synthesizes findings from functional imaging, lesion, and studies to address an overarching question: Are moral judgements primarily driven by emotion or rational processes? Evidence suggests that emotional responses, supported by the vmPFC and limbic structures, are more associated with rapid, intuitive moral judgements, whereas cognitive mechanisms in the dlPFC are utilized for more deliberate, or high-conflict decisions (Qu et al., 2022). The interplay between these two forces bolsters the dual-process theory of moral cognition, where emotion and rationality coexist rather than be opposing forces. Understanding this interplay provides insight and vital information regarding ethical behaviors, legal responsibilities, and artificial intelligence systems that are devised to mimic human’s moral capacities.

A quasi-experimental pre-test/post-test study was carried out to investigate the effects of the EQUIP programme on moral judgement, social skills, cognitive distortions and social information processing of juvenile delinquents. The programme is designed to equip antisocial youth to think and act responsibly, and is a combination of Positive Peer Culture (PPC) and the teaching of helping skills. Participants were recruited from three comparable high-security correctional facilities for convicted boys between the ages of 12 and 18 years. One of these facilities implemented the EQUIP programme (n=31); the other two facilities provided the control group (n=25). Analysis of covariance on the post-test scores with the pre-test scores as the covariate showed a greater reduction of cognitive distortions in general for the EQUIP group when compared with the control group. No differences were found on moral judgement, social skills and social information processing. However, a few aspects of social information processing showed modest effect sizes in favour of the experimental group. It is concluded that to strengthen the effects of EQUIP a more intensive treatment is recommended. Future research on EQUIP should include more participants and investigate the impact of the programme on different types of antisocial youths.

Across three online studies, we examined the relationship between the Fear of Missing Out (FoMO) and moral cognition and behavior. Study 1 (N = 283) examined whether FoMO influenced moral awareness, judgments, and recalled and predicted behavior of first-person moral violations in either higher or lower social settings. Study 2 (N = 821) examined these relationships in third-person judgments with varying agent identities in relation to the participant (agent = stranger, friend, or someone disliked). Study 3 (N = 604) examined the influence of recalling activities either engaged in or missed out on these relationships. Using the Rubin Causal Model, we created hypothetical randomized experiments from our real-world randomized experimental data with treatment conditions for lower or higher FoMO (median split), matched for relevant covariates, and compared differences in FoMO groups on moral awareness, judgments, and several other behavioral outcomes. Using a randomization-based approach, we examined these relationships with Fisher Tests and computed 95% Fisherian intervals for constant treatment effects consistent with the matched data and the hypothetical FoMO intervention. All three studies provide evidence that FoMO is robustly related to giving less severe judgments of moral violations. Moreover, those with higher FoMO were found to report a greater likelihood of committing moral violations in the past, knowing people who have committed moral violations in the past, being more likely to commit them in the future, and knowing people who are likely to commit moral violations in the future.

In this article I examine the consequences of the dominance of intuitive thinking in moral judging and deciding for the role of moral reasoning in moral education. I argue that evidence for the reliability of moral intuitions is lacking. We cannot determine when we can trust our intuitive moral judgements. Deliberate and critical reasoning is needed, but it cannot replace intuitive thinking. Following Robin Hogarth, I argue that intuitive judgements can be improved. The expertise model for moral development, proposed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, not only teaches us how we acquire intuitive moral judgements, it also shows the interconnectedness of intuitive thinking and deliberate reasoning. Analysing the expertise model in more detail, I show that it cannot do justice to the importance of reasoning skills. Reasoning skills are needed because we expect people to be able to argue for their standpoints. I conclude that moral education should not only aim at improving intuitive moral judgements, but also at acquiring reasoning skills. © 2009 Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain.